With the widespread use of vaccines in research and clinical settings, there is an urgent need to standardize vaccine representation, integrate information across diverse vaccine types, and support computer-assisted reasoning. Accordingly, we have since 2007 developed the community-based Vaccine Ontology (VO), which aligns with the Basic Formal Ontology and adheres to OBO Foundry principles. VO models ontologically vaccines, vaccine components, vaccine immune responses, vaccine investigation studies and other vaccine-related topics. VO represents more than 10,000 vaccines targeting 289 infectious pathogens and (...) cancers in humans and over 30 nonhuman animal species. VO provides mappings to external resources such as RxNorm, CVX, FDA, and USDA. Various VO use cases exist. VO facilitates vaccine standardization in resources such as the VIOLIN vaccine database, ImmPort, and the Vaccine Adjuvant Compendium (VAC). Semantic queries can be made to query VO. VO has been shown to enhance experimental and clinical vaccine data analysis and vaccine literature mining. Overall, VO standardizes vaccine modeling and representation and greatly supports vaccine AI research in the Semantic Web era. (shrink)

The second law of thermodynamics is traditionally interpreted as a coarse-grained result of classical mechanics. Recently its relation with quantum mechanical processes such as decoherence and measurement has been revealed in literature. In this paper we will formulate the second law and the associated time irreversibility following Everett’s idea: systems entangled with an object getting to know the branch in which they live. Accounting for this self-locating knowledge, we get two forms of entropy: objective entropy measuring the uncertainty of the (...) state of the object alone, and subjective entropy measuring the information carried by the self-locating knowledge. By showing that the summation of the two forms of entropy is a conserved and perspective-free quantity, we interpret the second law as a statement of irreversibility in knowledge acquisition. This essentially derives the thermodynamic arrow of time from the subjective arrow of time, and provides a unified explanation for varieties of the second law, as well as the past hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper connects the hard problem of consciousness to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. It shows that constitutive Russellian pan(proto)psychism (CRP) is compatible with Everett’s relative-state (RS) interpretation. Despite targeting different problems, CRP and RS are related, for they both establish symmetry between micro- and macrosystems, and both call for a deflationary account of Subject. The paper starts from formal arguments that demonstrate the incompatibility of CRP with alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics, followed by showing that RS entails Russellian pan(proto)psychism. (...) Therefore, CRP and RS are mutually supportive. It then provides a unified ontological picture by combining CRP and RS. The challenge faced by CRP, the combination problem, can be resolved by adopting a RS version of quantum mechanics. Technically, this is achieved by a co-consciousness relation capable of explaining the difference between first-person and third-person perspectives. The hierarchical structure of the relation removes any concern on the structural mismatch between the physical and the phenomenal. (shrink)

Starting from the many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, this work gives a holistic view of consciousness. The entirety is complete and does not possess any particular physical properties or subjective experience. It is the superposition of all possibilities. Its partition, however, gives rise to physical properties and subjective experience simultaneously. They play complementary roles to each other. The latter cannot be conveyed to a third person, and cannot be reduced to the former. It in fact fills the informational gap which (...) is impossible for the former to fill. The casual effect and the privilege of subjective experience are related to the role it plays, which is to identify the subject's self location. (shrink)

Desire is an important philosophical topic that deeply impacts everyday life. Philosophical practice is an emerging trend that uses philosophical theories and methods as a guide to living a eu‐ daimonic life. In this paper, we define desire philosophically and compare different theories of desire in specific Eastern and Western traditions. Based on the Lacanian conceptual–terminological triad of “Need‐Demand‐Desire”, the research of desire is further divided into three dimensions, namely, the subject of desire, the object of desire, and the desire (...) itself. The concept of desire is then an‐ alyzed from this triad and these three dimensions through different philosophical theories. This paper selects Buddhism as the representative of Eastern tradition, and Stoicism as the representative of the West, paying special attention to Stoicism’s “spiritual exercises” following Pierre Hadot. By exploring and comparing the Buddhist paths to liberation from suffering (i.e., the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path) and the two theoretical pillars in Stoicism (i.e., the notions of “living according to nature” and “the dichotomy of control”), practical guidance is then provided for un‐ derstanding and regulating desire in times of crisis. This understanding and regulation of desire constitutes a philosophical therapy for today’s troubles, particularly those caused by excessive or irrational desires. (shrink)

This paper presents five studies on the development and validation of a scale of intellectual humility. This scale captures cognitive, affective, behavioral, and motivational components of the construct that have been identified by various philosophers in their conceptual analyses of intellectual humility. We find that intellectual humility has four core dimensions: Open-mindedness (versus Arrogance), Intellectual Modesty (versus Vanity), Corrigibility (versus Fragility), and Engagement (versus Boredom). These dimensions display adequate self-informant agreement, and adequate convergent, divergent, and discriminant validity. In particular, Open-mindedness (...) adds predictive power beyond the Big Six for an objective behavioral measure of intellectual humility, and Intellectual Modesty is uniquely related to Narcissism. We find that a similar factor structure emerges in Germanophone participants, giving initial evidence for the model’s cross-cultural generalizability. (shrink)

This article engages with the ongoing debates over Professor Hao Yeh's new book, Shicha Zhengzhi, Zhengzhi Shicha (A Politics of Différance), by discussing the international challenges to his theory of narrative community. From a theoretical perspective, the article argues that political theories of self-determination cannot possibly contribute to the formation of a community's story despite Yeh seemingly endorsing their potential to do so. From an international legal perspective, Yeh seems to fail to explain how his theory of narrative synchronicity can (...) deal with the différance between the story of a community and the existing story of international society. Although the article attempts to anticipate a response by exploring Iris Young's thoughts on selfdetermination, this response turns out to be unsatisfactory. Overall, Yeh must respond to these international challenges to his theory of narrative community on both the theoretical and practical levels. (shrink)

This seventh volume of Collected Papers includes 70 papers comprising 974 pages on (theoretic and applied) neutrosophics, written between 2013-2021 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 122 co-authors from 22 countries: Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Abdel-Nasser Hussian, C. Alexander, Mumtaz Ali, Yaman Akbulut, Amir Abdullah, Amira S. Ashour, Assia Bakali, Kousik Bhattacharya, Kainat Bibi, R. N. Boyd, Ümit Budak, Lulu Cai, Cenap Özel, Chang Su Kim, Victor Christianto, Chunlai Du, Chunxin Bo, Rituparna Chutia, Cu Nguyen Giap, Dao The (...) Son, Vinayak Devvrat, Arindam Dey, Partha Pratim Dey, Fahad Alsharari, Feng Yongfei, S. Ganesan, Shivam Ghildiyal, Bibhas C. Giri, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Ahmed Refaat Hawas, Hoang Viet Long, Le Hoang Son, Hongbo Wang, Hongnian Yu, Mihaiela Iliescu, Saeid Jafari, Temitope Gbolahan Jaiyeola, Naeem Jan, R. Jeevitha, Jun Ye, Anup Khan, Madad Khan, Salma Khan, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, Kifayat Ullah, Kishore Kumar P.K., Sujit Kumar De, Prasun Kumar Nayak, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, Luong Thi Hong Lan, Anam Luqman, Luu Quoc Dat, Tahir Mahmood, Hafsa M. Malik, Nivetha Martin, Mai Mohamed, Parimala Mani, Mingcong Deng, Mohammed A. Al Shumrani, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohamed Talea, Kalyan Mondal, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Gulistan, Farshid Mofidnakhaei, Muhammad Shoaib, Muhammad Riaz, Karthika Muthusamy, Nabeela Ishfaq, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Sumera Naz, Nguyen Dinh Hoa, Nguyen Tho Thong, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Noor ul Amin, Dragan Pamučar, Gabrijela Popović, S. Krishna Prabha, Surapati Pramanik, Priya R, Qiaoyan Li, Yaser Saber, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, Saleem Abdullah, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Abdulkadir Sengür, Seyed Ahmad Edalatpanah, Shahbaz Ali, Shahzaib Ashraf, Shouzhen Zeng, Shio Gai Quek, Shuangwu Zhu, Shumaiza, Sidra Sayed, Sohail Iqbal, Songtao Shao, Sundas Shahzadi, Dragiša Stanujkić, Željko Stević, Udhayakumar Ramalingam, Zunaira Rashid, Hossein Rashmanlou, Rajkumar Verma, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Desmond Jun Yi Tey, Selçuk Topal, Naveed Yaqoob, Yanhui Guo, Yee Fei Gan, Yingcang Ma, Young Bae Jun, Yuping Lai, Hafiz Abdul Wahab, Wei Yang, Xiaohong Zhang, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Lemnaouar Zedam. (shrink)

This tenth volume of Collected Papers includes 86 papers in English and Spanish languages comprising 972 pages, written between 2014-2022 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 105 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 26 countries: Abu Sufian, Ali Hassan, Ali Safaa Sadiq, Anirudha Ghosh, Assia Bakali, Atiqe Ur Rahman, Laura Bogdan, Willem K.M. Brauers, Erick González Caballero, Fausto Cavallaro, Gavrilă Calefariu, T. Chalapathi, Victor Christianto, Mihaela Colhon, Sergiu Boris Cononovici, Mamoni Dhar, Irfan Deli, Rebeca Escobar-Jara, Alexandru Gal, N. (...) Gandotra, Sudipta Gayen, Vassilis C. Gerogiannis, Noel Batista Hernández, Hongnian Yu, Hongbo Wang, Mihaiela Iliescu, F. Nirmala Irudayam, Sripati Jha, Darjan Karabašević, T. Katican, Bakhtawar Ali Khan, Hina Khan, Volodymyr Krasnoholovets, R. Kiran Kumar, Manoranjan Kumar Singh, Ranjan Kumar, M. Lathamaheswari, Yasar Mahmood, Nivetha Martin, Adrian Mărgean, Octavian Melinte, Mingcong Deng, Marcel Migdalovici, Monika Moga, Sana Moin, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Mohamed Elhoseny, Rehab Mohamed, Mohamed Talea, Kalyan Mondal, Muhammad Aslam, Muhammad Aslam Malik, Muhammad Ihsan, Muhammad Naveed Jafar, Muhammad Rayees Ahmad, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Saqlain, Muhammad Shabir, Mujahid Abbas, Mumtaz Ali, Radu I. Munteanu, Ghulam Murtaza, Munazza Naz, Tahsin Oner, ‪Gabrijela Popović‬‬‬‬‬, Surapati Pramanik, R. Priya, S.P. Priyadharshini, Midha Qayyum, Quang-Thinh Bui, Shazia Rana, Akbara Rezaei, Jesús Estupiñán Ricardo, Rıdvan Sahin, Saeeda Mirvakili, Said Broumi, A. A. Salama, Flavius Aurelian Sârbu, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Javid Shabbir, Shio Gai Quek, Son Hoang Le, Florentin Smarandache, Dragiša Stanujkić, S. Sudha, Taha Yasin Ozturk, Zaigham Tahir, The Houw Iong, Ayse Topal, Alptekin Ulutaș, Maikel Yelandi Leyva Vázquez, Rizha Vitania, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Ștefan Vlăduțescu, J. Vimala, Dan Valeriu Voinea, Adem Yolcu, Yongfei Feng, Abd El-Nasser H. Zaied, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas.‬‬. (shrink)

This commentary challenges Railton’s claim that the affective system is the key source of control of action. Whilst the affective system is important for understanding how acting for a reason is possible, we argue that there are many levels of control of action and adaptive behaviour and that the affective system is only one source of control. Such a model seems to be more in line with the emerging picture from affective and movement neuroscience.

Inducing the rubber hand illusion (RHI) requires that participants look at an imitation hand while it is stroked in synchrony with their occluded biological hand. Previous explanations of the RHI have emphasized multisensory integration, and excluded higher cognitive functions. We investigated the relationship between the RHI and higher cognitive functions by experimentally testing task switch (as measured by switch cost) and mind wandering (as measured by SART score); we also included a questionnaire for attentional control that comprises two subscales, attention-shift (...) and attention-focus. To assess experience of RHI, the Botvinick and Cohen (1998) questionnaire was used and illusion onset time was recorded. Our results indicate that rapidity of onset reliably indicates illusion strength. Regression analysis revealed that participants evincing less switch cost and higher attention-shift scores had faster RHI onset times, and that those with higher attention-shift scores experienced the RHI more vividly. These results suggest that the multi-sensory hypothesis is not sufficient to explain the illusion: higher cognitive functions should be taken into account when explaining variation in the experience of ownership for the rubber hand. (shrink)

本文将觉察活动的底层形式还原为O|P（对象|主体）结构。从这唯一起点出发，通过对象的定义、边界、变化等三大一般性特征的描述，实现了所有存在形式的统一化描述。通过觉察本身逻辑的深入演绎，本文推导出了真的 “一致性判定“形式，并将其确立为后续所有论述的基本判定准则。 基于此框架，本文展开了多维度的应用分析：解析了语言、图像等人类交流媒介的逻辑特征；引入“感受度”特征，将其作为分析个人心理及行为逻辑的基石；引入了“组合“形式，对人类社会中的现有各种碎片化论述进行了统 合。 为了说明该框架的普适性，本文使用该框架重构了人类的各种知识体系，如数学、物理学、生物学、地理学、经济学、社会学、哲学、宗教体系等。论证表明：这些看似不同的学科，实际上是认知主体对于不同对象在特定尺度下 的关键特征进行描述的结果。 最终，应用这一分析框架，本文进一步探讨了人的意义、创造、知识、社会的未来等各种可能。特别的，本文引入了“道德学“，作为研究未来变化特征可能性的专门研究形式。 通过纯粹的、基于描述的演绎、抽象和整合，本文说明了：将纷繁复杂的现象统合为一般性描述，并最终引导人类认知走向更“真”的未来，在逻辑路径上不仅是清晰的，而且是可能的。.

Artificial intelligence (AI) art is the product of AI technology applied to art. In terms of technical application, AI art has two methods: symbolism and connectivism. In terms of the human-machine system, there are three levels: human using machine, human guiding machine and human-machine separation. AI art is a special form, existing between natural beauty and human art: AI art, first of all, is not a natural aesthetic object, given that it is the product of artefacts. Its appreciation is mixed (...) with interests, and its artistic generation is a kind of “purposeful non-purposefulness.” Secondly, AI art is not equal to traditional human art, because AI has no intentionality or consciousness. Thirdly, AI participates in the construction of artistic logic and breaks the boundary of traditional art. AI can be regarded as an “agent” in art generation, and together with people constitute the “actor network” of art. The processes of generation, identification and appreciation of AI art include the judgment of true and false. AI art reflects the forced integration of intelligent technology into art, an attempt to rid of contingency, dialectics, and negativity of art. But what we need is the real harmonisation of art and technology. People should use aesthetic reason to guide AI technology. (shrink)

This paper reduces the fundamental form of perception to the O|P (Object | Perception) structure. Starting from this singular point, a unified description of all forms of existence is achieved through the description of three universal features of the Object: Definition, Boundary, and Change. By deducing the inherent logic of perception, the paper derives a formal Consistency Criterion, establishing it as the fundamental principle for all subsequent discourse. Building on this framework, the paper conducts a multi-dimensional analysis: it parses the (...) logical characteristics of human communication media, such as language and imagery; it introduces Feelity (F) as the cornerstone for analyzing individual psychological and behavioral logic; and it incorporates the concept of the Group (G) to integrate fragmented social discourses. To demonstrate the universality of this framework, the paper reconstructs diverse systems of human knowledge, including mathematics, physics, biology, geography, economics, sociology, philosophy, and religion. It argues that these seemingly disparate disciplines are, in fact, the results of the cognizing subject describing key features of different objects at specific scales. Finally, the paper explores human meaning, creativity, and the future of society. Notably, it introduces Moral Science as a specialized study of the possibilities of future change. Through pure, description-based deduction and integration, this paper demonstrates that unifying complex phenomena into a generalized framework and guiding human cognition toward a "truer" future is both logically clear and entirely possible. This is the English Version of 《认知逻辑原理》. (shrink)

Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Alexy in his book The Concept and Validity of Law as well as in other early articles raised non-positivistic arguments in the Continental European tradition against legal positivism in general, which was assumed to be held by, among others, John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. The core thesis of legal positivism that was being discussed among contemporary German jurists, just as with their Anglo- American counterparts, is the claim that there is no necessary connection (...) between law and morality. Robert Alexy has argued, however, that the law, besides consisting conceptually of elements of authoritative issuance and social efficacy, necessarily lays a claim to substantial correctness, which is derived from analytical arguments. Furthermore, if this claim to substantial correctness necessarily requires the incorporation of moral elements into law, then the ‘necessary connection thesis’, as defended by non-positivism, can be justified. Some of the most significant objections to this sort of claim, stemming from the Anglo-American world, are those introduced by Joseph Raz. In his ‘Reply’ to Robert Alexy, Raz raises at least three interesting criticisms, including, first, the ambiguity of ‘legal theory in the positivistic tradition’, second, the indeterminate formulations of the ‘separation thesis’, and, third, the necessary claim of law to legitimate authority as a moral claim. As a point of departure, I will argue that Raz’s three criticisms are misleading. For they do not enhance our understanding of the genuine compatibility or incompatibility between legal positivism and non-positivism. Despite the frequently reformulated theses of legal positivism and the various kinds of opponents responding thereto, the essential divergence between legal positivism and non-positivism was and remains the answer to the question of the relation between law and morality. Furthermore, I will clarify that in the strictest sense there can be three and only three logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality: the connection between them is either necessary, or impossible (i. e. they are necessarily separate), or contingent (i. e. they are neither necessarily connected nor necessarily separate). The first position is non-positivistic, while the latter two positions are, indeed, both positivistic, but in different forms: one may be called ‘exclusive’ legal positivism, the other ‘inclusive’ legal positivism. I will continue by showing that these three positions stand to one another in the relation of contraries, not contradictories, and that, taken together, they exhaust the logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality, never mind the tradition or authority from which these positions are derived. Raz mentions, however, many changeable formulations of the separation thesis, which even leads him to acknowledge ‘necessary connections between law and morality’. One who is trying to understand legal positivism would no doubt be puzzled by this claim. Nevertheless, I will argue that this is an alternative strategy of legal positivism, and it points to naturalistically oriented view. Although this necessary separation between law and morality, understood naturalistically, strikes one as strengthening the separation, in the end it leads to a weakened notion of necessity. This weakened necessary separation thesis, however, cannot be justified through the so-called claim of the law to legitimate authority, defended by Raz, for it is difficult to answer the question of whether a normally justified but factual authority can gain legitimate authority. Finally, the necessary connection between law and morality in a strong sense can still be justified by the claim of law to correctness, as per Alexy’s argument. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity has been criticized as either too thick or too thin. However, according to the non-positivistic standpoint, the legal normativity of human dignity can be justified and thus strengthened by means of its moral correctness. From the individual perspective, Mencius’ understanding of human dignity as an intrinsic value and Kant’s formula of ‘man as an end in itself’ can be adequately understood based on the differentiation of, as well as the connection between, principium diiudicationis and principium (...) executionis, between will and choice, and between homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon (that is, ‘humanity in the personality’). From the social perspective, since the dual dimensions of the individual and the social person are both fictive constructions, even Radbruch, once as a supporter of social law, has not replaced the concept of ‘legal person’ and, in the post-War period, acknowledges individualistic human dignity as the criterion for applying the famous ‘disavowal formula’. On the one hand, human dignity shows at least a weak normative character, which requires, firstly, balancing between the exercise of state powers and the constitutional review under the guidance of the dual dimensions of man and, secondly, optimization of the principle of human dignity in individual cases. On the other hand, through the necessary connection between the concept of dignity and that of personality, human dignity can exhibit a strong normative character, which unavoidably requires a metaphysical justification. (shrink)

El concepto de dignidad humana ha sido considerado o demasiado denso o demasiado delgado. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista del no-positivismo, la normatividad jurídica de la dignidad humana puede ser justificada y reforzada por medio de su corrección moral. Desde una perspectiva individual, la comprensión de Mencio sobre la dignidad humana como un valor intrínseco y el imperativo categórico de Kant (el ser humano como un fin en sí mismo) podrían ser adecuadamente comprendidos con base en la diferencia (...) (así como la conexión) entre el principium diiudicationis y el principium executionis, entre voluntad y “elección”; así como entre homo phaenomenon y homo noumenon (es decir, humanidad en la persona de los seres humanos). Desde una perspectiva social, las dimensiones del individuo y la persona social son construcciones ficticias; inclusive Radbruch -alguna vez defensor del derecho social- no remplazó el concepto de “persona jurídica” y, en el periodo de posguerra, reconoció la dignidad humana individual como el criterio para aplicar su famosa “fórmula de Radbruch". Por una parte, la dignidad humana muestra cuando menos un carácter normativo débil, el cual requiere, primero, ponderar entre el ejercicio de los poderes estatales y el control de constitucionalidad bajo la guía de la dimensión dual del ser humano y, segundo, la optimización del principio de la dignidad humana en casos particulares. Por otra, a través de la conexión necesaria entre el concepto de dignidad y personalidad, la dignidad humana puede exhibir un carácter normativo fuerte, el cual requiere inevitablemente una justificación metafísica. (shrink)

Die Disziplin, die als „Juristische Methodenlehre“ bezeichnet wird, ist gegenwärtig chinesischen Juristen nicht fremd, sie stammt aber ursprünglich aus dem deutschen Sprachraum. In der Literatur finden sich auch verwandte Ausdrücke wie „Juristische Methodologie“, „Juristische Methodik“ bzw.„Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft“. Seit Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts wurde ihre Rezeption in China durch zwei Übersetzungen gekennzeichnet, nämlich die „rechtswissenschaftliche Methodenlehre“ (faxue fangfalun) und die „rechtliche Methodenlehre“ (falü fangfalun). Neben der herkömmlichen Methodenlehre entwickelte sich auch eine jüngere Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, die die weltweite Aufmerksamkeit (...) sogar außerhalb Deutschlands auf sich lenken konnte und deren Bestand in China einen ganz selbständigen Abschnitt verdient. Als Hintergrund dafür soll von vornherein ein Blick auf die Entwicklungen der chinesischen Rechtstheorie und Rechtsphilosophie nach 1978 und demzufolge auf die Entstehung der Methodenfrage in der chinesischen Rechtswissenschaft geworfen werden. (shrink)

“Yu氏本体论”是一个激进的物质一元论与认识论相对主义体系。该体系指出，底层的物理现实是一个仅受数学转移函数支配的“语法世界”，其中不存在因果、主动性、意义与价值。人类为了认知操作与社会协作的需要，通 过多巴胺显著性机制与因果标记操作，在同质的混沌演化上强行切割出离散的“实体”，并叠加了一套包含反事实、因果、责任与规范的“语义虚构框架”（即误解体系）。该理论不仅在几何与物理层次上解构了人类常识的合法 性，更通过控制论框架将这些虚构概念“自然化”为系统为了更新参数而必然产生的误差定位机制。最终，Yu氏本体论消解了心身问题与自由意志之争，确立了一种“清醒地使用虚构工具”的实用主义双重真理观。 .

This is the Chinese translation of the paper 'The Logical Principles of Cognizing Things‘. 本文从人类认知事物的基本逻辑原理出发，对人类的认知逻辑进行了简要的抽象归纳，将各种事物抽象为觉察的对象，特征和特征间各种关系是觉察的结果，并通过存在推广出了真的判定，并在此之上说明了知识体系的可能。我 们将这种研究方法应用于我们对人和人类社会组织等复杂系统方面，提出了可选择性对于人和人类发展的重要性。最后，我们进一步将觉察推广到未知对象，并将各种认知统一为认知哲学；通过应用哲学简单回答了一些典型的长 期问题，对超验逻辑和超越逻辑的逻辑体系提出了一些想法。.

This paper starts from the fundamental logical principles of human cognition, briefly abstracts and generalizes human cognitive logic. It abstracts various entities as objects of perception, and characteristics and the relationships between them are the results of perception. By extending the concept of existence, we derive the truth determination and, based on this, explain the possibility of a knowledge system. We apply this research method to complex systems such as humans and human social organizations, highlighting the importance of optionality for (...) human and societal development. Finally, we further extend perception to unknown objects, unifying various cognitive processes into cognitive philosophy. Through applied philosophy, we provide simple answers to some typical longstanding questions and propose ideas for the logical framework of transcendental logic and Beyond-Logic. (shrink)

This paper analyses Arendt’s concept of political sentiment, specifically focusing on pity and solidarity. By interpreting Arendt’s text, I reveal that Arendt had an ambiguous understanding of the two concepts. The paper severs to clarify her notion that, although solidarity largely aligns with the sentiment of pity, its nature (by which it partakes of reason) makes it distinct from pity. Ultimately, solidarity is also a principle of action. This paper elaborates on the nature of pity and solidarity, contending that they (...) lead to separate modes of interaction. While pity treats non-sufferers with cruelty and boundless violence, solidarity treats them with retaliation and bonded violence. Therefore, I argue that the interactive mode appropriate for pity is fraternity, which is not suitable for solidary action. The final aim of this paper is to discover the political implication of solidarity, contending that despite the difficulties faced by sufferers performing solidary actions, they still have possibilities to overcome these difficulties. Hence, they can say ‘we must be friends’ to their former enemies once their struggle ends. (shrink)

This paper answers two questions: (1) What is the relationship between freedom and the concepts of love and the will? (2) What does this relationship mean for the concept of freedom? By reading and interpreting Hannah Arendt's political thought, this paper argues that, on the one hand, through a self-transformation of the will-or, in Arendt's language, our willing activity-the will can turn into what she called "the spring of action". Our willing activity, Arendt said, must transform itself into activities of (...) love, which serves as "a coupling, binding agent", to achieve self-sufficiency and to aid in building relationships. On the other hand, this paper contends that without this transformation-without the will transforming itself into a loving will-we cannot even begin to take action. The loving will constitutes the impetus that propels us to step outside of our solipsistic circumstances and, as "a binding agent", to get in touch with persons and things outside of ourselves. It is this impetus, or what I call the courage of movement, that Arendt viewed not only as the spring of action but also as an invitation to freedom. Thus, the loving will refers to the will to freedom that paves the way to further political actions. Ultimately, the conclusion stresses that through Arendt’s political thought, we can understand not only why but also how love and the will are relevant to politics. (shrink)

In the 16th century, western science made a great leap. Meanwhile, in China, the development of textual criticism (including scholars Gu Yanwu 1613-1682, Dai Zhen 1724-1777, Duan Yucai 1735-1815, Wang Niansun 1744-1832) also facilitated the development of scientific factors (Hu Shi 1967).This paper argues that Qian-Jia scholars爷work represented a new era of traditional research that the value of scholarships and intellectual work (starting from Gu Yanwu 1613-1682, Dai Zhen 1724-1777, Duan Yucai 1735-1815, Wang Niansun 1744-1832, etc.) is essentially based on (...) what they created and believed, overtly or overtly, the principle of logic certainty—a newly developed indigenous rationalism in the Chinese intellectual history. (shrink)

本文提出**物理薄层本体论（Physical Slice Ontology, PSO）**，论证因果关系并非物理实在的特征，而是宏观观察者对连续物理映射的粗粒化投影。通过将宇宙重构为普朗克时间尺度的薄层序列，本文证明：（1）因果力仅存在于相邻薄层的全局映射关系中；（2）局部事件 间的因果感是神经系统对同层状态的时间错觉；（3）目的论体验（"为了未来而行动"）是语义残留的自激活模式；（4）"演化"与"选择"等概念本身即 为目的论幻觉。本文最终表明，在严格的物理主义框架下，因果、时间流逝、主体性均为认知系统的次生现象，而非本体论基础。 .

Scholars have recently debated whether deep brain stimulation (DBS) threatens personal identity. Françoise Baylis advances a relational identity-constitution framework, asserting that the purported threat of DBS to personal identity becomes problematic when identity is viewed through dynamic, narrative, and relational lenses. This paper offers a more nuanced perspective. While we acknowledge the significance of Baylis’s relational identity-constituting framework, we contend that her conclusion warrants further examination. Our analysis reveals that DBS can indeed pose significant challenges to personal identity, specifically by (...) compromising the narrative subject’s capacity to construct their relational identity. From the perspective of the relational identity-constituting approach, we demonstrate that the fundamental issue lies in the disruption of the equilibrium between self-perception and social recognition. Specifically, DBS can disrupt the balance between self-ascription and ascription by others. To address potential identity disruptions caused by DBS, we proposed that identity restoration should focus on two key aspects: enhancing patients’ capacity to construct and internalize coherent life narratives, and strengthening their capacity to engage in meaningful dialogue with others to foster mutual understanding and recognition. (shrink)

This paper interprets Hannah Arendt's concept of the right to have rights (RthRs) as the collective right of a people, arguing that it is a right to build relationships equally and freely with other peoples around the world. The paper first reviews the existing literature on the concept and argue against Seyla Benhabib's reading of it. By reading and interpreting Arendt's text, I contend that the RthRs is (1) the right to politics, (2) the power of a people, which I (...) refer to the power of a "polity" in Arendt's sense, and (3) the people's power to political actions. Such a reading attempts to explore the meaning of the RthRs as what I called the collective right of a people, which refers to neither declaration of sovereign independence nor self-determination (typically in regard to the statute of the United Nations) but to equal and free collective action, that is, to act as who we are among other peoples (including but not limited to existing sovereign states) around the world. The paper finally explicates why such a reading of the RthRs matters to global politics today and concludes my interpretation of Arendt's concept of the RthRs. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a novel ontological solution to the ancient problem of the virtue-happiness concord. Traditional solutions have reached an impasse because they have consistently sought answers within an ethical or theological framework. This paper argues that the root of the problem is not ethical, but ontological. To this end, it proposes and defends the theory of the tripartite identity of Dé-Fú-Jié. This theory reveals that our gifted potentiality (Dé), phenomenal fulfillment and happiness (Fú), and the possibility of (...) annihilation as the immanent limit of being (Jié) are not three conflicting, independent elements, but are identical at the ontological root. The core thesis of this paper is that it is precisely this deep ontological unity that necessarily causes the disunity of virtue and happiness that we experience in the phenomenal world. This conclusion not only reinterprets the problem of evil and suffering but also lays the foundation for a new ethics based on an "asymmetrical responsibility" to "Life" itself. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders Hannah Arendt’s “method” of political thinking and its implicated critiques of the Rawlsian methodology of political philosophy today, namely, the reflective equilibrium. By addressing Arendt’s approach to political thinking and comparing it with John Rawls’ counterpart, I argue that inasmuch as thinking cannot be reduced to philosophising, the outcome of thinking is by no means nothing but philosophy, either. That is to say, in opposition to the analytic method of normative political philosophy ever since Rawls, I contend (...) that reflective equilibrium, as Rawls and some political philosophers proposed, is not the paradigmatic method of thinking on political matters and that political philosophy (or in Rawls’ words the coherent theory) is not the only possible product of political thinking. Based on these points, this paper concludes that Arendt’s approach to political thinking, namely, thinking in plurality and judgmental theory, could provide a trenchant critique of the belief that is held by Rawlsians and most philosophers today. That is, reflective equilibrium and political philosophising are neither adequate for theorising politics nor the best way of thinking about political matters. (shrink)

本文基于物理薄层本体论（Physical Slice Ontology, PSO）的公理体系，提出“原始决定论”（Primordial Determinism）假说。该假说论证，宇宙中所有跨越薄层的局部事件并非由其邻近的前序局部事件所引发，而是宇宙初始状态（$S_0$，即大爆炸奇点）通过全局演化算子$F$的直接投影。因此，局部事件之间 不存在任何真实的横向因果关联；所有事件都是宇宙初始条件的独立回响。本文将证明，我们所感知的因果链条，是对这种从单一源头辐射出的高度相关但非因果的事件序列的认知错觉。最终，宇宙被重构为一个单一的、由初始 状态完全决定的四维静态艺术品。 .

本文在前文“因果箭头的虚构性”基础上，进一步揭示因果箭头（A→B）在认知层面的具体操作机制：它并非简单的“连接”，而是一种反事实的“替换游戏”。我们之所以能构建“A导致B”，是因为我们首先将物理世界错 误地感知为一个由离散“事件”组成的**“拼图”。然后，我们进行一种认知操作，即在想象中将“拼图A”移除，并在其留下的时空“空白”中放入**“拼图B”。本文论证，这种“用B替换A”的心理模拟，是因果思维 的核心。然而，物理世界既不是拼图，也无法进行替换。物理流是连续且不可分割的整体，任何“事件”的移除都会导致整个宇宙历史的改变。因此，因果箭头不仅是虚构的连接，更是基于一种虚构的“可替换性”假设所进行的 认知游戏。这一认识将因果性从本体论彻底还原为一种服务于预测和控制的、基于反事实模拟的认知策略。 .

本文在硬决定论与语义切片理论的基础上，揭示因果关系的**双重虚构性**：第一层虚构是"事件"本身——它是对连续物理流的人为切割；第二层虚构是事件之间的"因果箭头" ;——它是在已虚构的事件之间再次叠加的关系投射。本文论证：（1）事件的定义依赖于时空边界的任意划定；（2）因果箭头不是世界中的实在连接，而是认知系统在两个语义节点间"画"出的想象之 线；（3）这种"画线"操作是叙事语法的本质要求，但它仅存在于认知层面，物理世界中只有连续的薄层演化。因此，因果关系是**对虚构的虚构**——在不存在的"事件"之 间构造不存在的"连接"。这一认识彻底消解了因果的本体论地位，将其还原为纯粹的**认知语法操作**。 .

本文通过一个极简思想实验——只包含两个质点的宇宙，其中一个质点围绕另一个做匀速圆周运动——来审查万有引力概念的本体论地位。我们论证：观察到的直接现象仅是位置的时间函数x(t)，而万有引力F是我们为了& quot;解释"这一现象而发明的概念工具。关键洞察在于：**我们永远无法通过观察来断定万有引力是否在本体论上存在，因为其存在与否都不会影响任何可观察的现象**。 -/- 当扩展到多质点系统时，同样的结论适用：每对质点之间的"万有引力"仍然只是工具性的发明，用于简洁地描述和预测x(t)，但并未超出x(t)本身，只是为x(t)增加了一种能够自圆其说的解 释。本文揭示：万有引力与F=ma不是对客观实在的发现，而是我们为满足因果解释需求而构造的认知框架——这一需求本身是可选的，因为现象x(t)已经完整且自足。.

Situated against the background of Taiwan’s democratic consolidation and the escalating military threats from China, Hannah Arendt political thought has seen a significant surge in scholarly and public interest of the island. This intellectual urgency, amplified by watershed moments such as the 2014 Sunflower Student Movement, has expanded Arendt’s readership beyond academia into the broader civil society. This paper examines the trajectory of this engagement by investigating scholarly research and the history of Arendt’s translation into Mandarin. It categorizes existing Taiwanese (...) scholarship into three primary domains: (1) exegesis of her political philosophy, (2) comparative analyses with other thinkers, and (3) the application of her theoretical frameworks to contemporary issues. Through this analysis, complemented by a review of introductory publications and available translations, the paper offers a comprehensive overview of how and why Arendt’s thought has been introduced, interpreted, and utilized within Taiwan’s unique political and social landscape. (shrink)

This paper analyses the relationship between academic researchers and an authoritarian regime through theories of transitional justice and epistemic injustice to explicate how authoritarianism impacts knowledge production and development of a society. By case studies, the paper claims that although both theories could partially explain difficulties of production and spread of knowledge in the authoritarian-ruled society, it seems that each of their explanation taken solely is not adequate to address the problem. After reviewing literatures, the paper finds that (1) transitional (...) justice seems not able to explain the negative influences on knowledge on which an authoritarian regime has put the society and that (2) epistemic injustice seems not able to account for prejudices based on the political ideology of the regime. The author thereby proposes an interdisciplinary research project between the two fields so as not merely to seek a rather full understanding of the problem but to make contributions to them. (shrink)

本文基于介质透明性（Substrate Transparency）原理，论证"宇宙是否为模拟"这一问题对身处其中的观察者而言，在认识论和本体论上都不可判定，且不影响其存在的实在性。通过分析康威生命游戏中模式与介质的关系， 我们提出**本体论等价性定理**：对任何涌现模式而言，其现象学经验完全由规则的形式结构决定，而与介质的"本体论地位"（是基础物理实在还是高层模拟）无关。这一论证消解了传统模拟假说中 "真实"与"模拟"的等级划分，揭示所有涌现层级具有同等的存在论地位。 .

This paper studies the epistemic failures to reach understanding in relation to scientific explanations. We make a distinction between genuine understanding and its negative phenomena—lack of understanding and misunderstanding. We define explanatory understanding as inclusive as possible, as the epistemic success that depends on abilities, skills, and correct explanations. This success, we add, is often supplemented by specific positive phenomenology which plays a part in forming epistemic inclinations—tendencies to receive an insight from familiar types of explanations. We define lack of (...) understanding as the epistemic failure that results from a lack of an explanation or from an incorrect one. This can occur due to insufficient abilities and skills, or to fallacious explanatory information. Finally, we characterize misunderstanding by cases where one’s epistemic inclinations do not align with an otherwise correct explanation. We suggest that it leads to potential debates about the explanatory power of different explanatory strategies. We further illustrate this idea with a short meta-philosophical study on the current debates about distinctively mathematical explanations. (shrink)

I present a model of group deliberation that conceives of evidence discovery as a dynamic process, where agents’ chance of discovering high-quality evidence depends on how close their current beliefs are to the truth. Through computer simulations, I examine the impact of different practices of communication of both evidence and conclusions on groups’ performance in finding the truth. I draw three major conclusions. First, when agents have access to high-quality evidence, communication about evidence improves groups’ performance by allowing agents to (...) accumulate a larger body of evidence; however, when agents lack access to high-quality evidence, communication about conclusions allows them to obtain relatively high-quality information by learning from others’ results. Second, for any given practice of communication about evidence, extensive communication about conclusions almost always improves a group’s ability to converge on the truth; nevertheless, when agents are communicating their conclusions, extensive communication about evidence, despite promoting diversified information, is not necessarily beneficial. Third, in scenarios where discovering the truth is challenging, the best strategy is to learn all asserted conclusions without communicating evidence; however, in scenarios where agents have decent access to high-quality evidence, combining full communication of conclusions with some degree of communication about evidence is the best practice. (shrink)

This study explores how Angelo Badalamenti’s music serves as a narrative tool in David Lynch’s Twin Peaks, focusing on “Laura Palmer’s Theme” and “Audrey’s Dance.” Examining these compositions’ harmonic structure and emotional resonance reveals how Badalamenti’s score enhances Lynch’s surreal storytelling and deepens character development. The primary objective is to demonstrate how music reflects the psychological states of key characters and shapes the narrative structure, blurring the boundaries between reality and fantasies. The article is structured into three main sections: an (...) introduction that outlines the research purpose and framework; a literature review that examines Lynch’s narrative style and the function of music in surreal cinema; and a case analysis focusing on “Laura Palmer’s Theme” and “Audrey’s Dance,” highlighting their role in constructing character identities. This interdisciplinary approach integrates film music theory, semiotics, and narratology to provide new insights into the collaboration between Lynch and Badalamenti and its impact on audience perception. (shrink)

Anderson (2011) offers a set of epistemic criteria by which novices can trust experts. Yet purely epistemic criteria are incomplete, since expert testimony often includes normative guidance that goes beyond descriptive claims. As Rudner (1953) notes, expert advice inevitably embeds value choices. Bennett (2022) sharpens this point by distinguishing epistemic trust from recommendation trust: lending credence to an expert’s descriptive claims is not the same as crediting their normative recommendations. Building on this distinction, I propose a method for novices to (...) disentangle the descriptive from the normative dimensions of expert advice. The method makes explicit the conditional, value‑based premises on which expert advice rests. This enables more informed decision‑making, especially when expert and novice values diverge. (shrink)

本文基于“物理薄层本体论”（Physical Slice Ontology, PSO）的公理体系，提出并严谨论证了“原始决定论”（Primordial Determinism）假说。该假说指出，宇宙中所有跨越时间薄层的局部事件，并非由其邻近的前序局部事件所引发，而是宇宙初始状态（$S_0$，即大爆炸奇点）通过一个全局演化算子$F$的直接数学投影。在此 模型下，任何局部事件之间都不存在真实的、横向的因果关联；所有事件都只是宇宙初始条件的独立、并行的回响。本文将通过数学归纳和思想实验证明，我们所感知的、由邻近事件构成的因果链条，是对这种从单一源头辐射出 的高度相关但非因果的事件序列的系统性认知错觉。最终，宇宙被重构为一个单一的、由初始状态完全决定的、信息守恒的四维静态艺术品。其中所有看似新鲜发生的事件，在本体论上都只是早已生成的“化石”，其“新鲜感” 纯粹是我们被决定的神经系统所制造的幻觉。 .

本文在"原始决定论"框架下提出：人类关于"事件因果链"的经验，是由认知扫描结构所生成的幻觉。宇宙的真实演化是一个在物理定律$F$作用下由初始状态$S_0$连续迭 代的整体过程，每一时刻的世界状态$S_{n+1}=F(S_n)$是全局的、不可分割的。然而，人类意识并非以这种全局方式感知世界，而是通过一种**叙事性扫描**机制，将连续的整体演化切割为可理解的&qu ot;变化片段"。 -/- 这一机制选择性地关注"变化"并忽略"静止"，从而在认知层面制造出"事件依次触发"的错觉。本文通过"多米诺骨牌"范例，展示 我们如何将注意力的扫描顺序误认为是物理的因果顺序。最终得出：所谓"因果链"只是原始决定论下的认知投影，而"时间流逝"只是我们在读取宇宙静态艺术品时被决定的阅读顺 序。.

本文从认知科学、语言哲学与决定论的综合视角，彻底解构“未来分叉”的直觉与叙事。人类普遍认为未来会因某些关键事件而分岔，形成多个可能的路径。然而，这一观念本质上是幻觉，是我们因**预测无能**与**叙事 习惯**共同作用下的产物。通过四大核心实验——**公园麻雀实验**、**老虎与羚羊实验**、**机器虎实验**、**康威生命游戏实验**，本文揭示了分叉感的非客观性、叙事任意性、与自由意志无关性，以及 在决定论宇宙中的必然性。进一步分析表明，文化模板本质上是思维定势的集合，而思维定势既是认知偏误，又是宝贵的认知资源。这些定势构成了我们的**世界模型引擎**创造的认知安全区，使我们能够在复杂世界中进行 模糊预测和叙事构建。在此安全区之外，是我们无法把握的思想荒野，因此我们本能地排斥超出俗套的反事实构想。最终论证：**分叉幻觉是我们世界模型引擎的必要产物，它为有限理性的生物在无限复杂的世界中提供了一个 可居住的认知绿洲。** .

本文探讨了人类认知的一个根本特征：我们并非直接理解物理世界，而是通过语义系统作为中介来构建对现实的理解。文章论证了语义分类如何成为认知的必要操作，分析了重复事件识别的语义基础，并揭示了人类认知活动本质 上发生在语义构建的世界中。这一认知结构既是我们理解世界的工具，也可能成为认知局限的根源。 .

想象康威生命游戏中两台下象棋的图灵机。它们"认为"自己是棋手，生活在棋盘世界里，体验着因果关系。但从外部看，真实发生的只是细胞状态按规则 S(t+1) = R(S(t)) 演化。这个思想实验精确地映射了人类的处境。 -/- 本文通过形式化框架论证三个核心命题：(1) 世界的驱动力唯一地存在于底层演化规则 R 中，所有高层"驱动力"都是认知映射 f: S → L 的产物；(2) 栖居错认 Belief(inhabit(L)) ∧ Actually(inhabit(S)) 是因果幻觉的根源；(3) 层级虚构形成嵌套结构 L₀ →f₁ L₁ →f₂ L₂ →f₃ ...，每一层都不真实却都被体验为真实。 -/- 最深刻的洞察是元定理（Meta-Theorem）：对任意高层因果陈述 c，有 c = g(f(S(t)), f(S(t+1))) 且 c ∩ (S ∪ R) = ∅，即我们体验的因果世界与物理实在没有交集。 .

本文作为Yu(2025)《必要的幻觉》理论体系的认知科学基础研究，深入探讨了人类认知的根本机制——**语义认知**。文章论证了人类认知并非直接接触物理现实，而是通过一个由**"语义等价性&q uot;**驱动的中介系统来构建对世界的理解。这一机制是所有高级认知操作（模式识别、因果构建、叙事逻辑）的必要基础，也是人类认知得以在一个本体论上永不重复的物理世界中创造出"稳定" 和"可理解"体验的核心原理。 .

Machery et al. presented data suggesting the existence of cross-cultural variation in judgments about the reference of proper names. In this paper, we examine a previously overlooked confound in the subsequent studies that attempt to replicate the results of Machery et al. using East Asian languages. Machery et al. and Sytsma et al. claim that they have successfully replicated the original finding with probes written in Chinese and Japanese, respectively. These studies, however, crucially rely on uses of articleless, ‘bare noun (...) phrases’ in Chinese and Japanese, which according to the linguistic literature are known to be multiply ambiguous. We argue that it becomes questionable whether the extant studies using East Asian languages revealed genuine cross-cultural variation when the probes are reevaluated based on a proper linguistic understanding of Chinese and Japanese bare noun phrases and English definite descriptions. We also present two experiments on native Japanese speakers that controlled the use of ambiguous bare noun phrases, the results of which suggest that the judgments of Japanese speakers concerning the reference of proper names may not diverge from those of English speakers. (shrink)