For over a decade now, a community of researchers has contributed to the development of the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) - aimed at providing foundations for all major conceptual modeling constructs. This ontology has led to the development of an Ontology-Driven Conceptual Modeling language dubbed OntoUML, reflecting the ontological micro-theories comprising UFO. Over the years, UFO and OntoUML have been successfully employed in a number of academic, industrial and governmental settings to create conceptual models in a variety of different domains. (...) These experiences have pointed out to opportunities of improvement not only to the language itself but also to its underlying theory. In this paper, we take the first step in that direction by revising the theory of types in UFO in response to empirical evidence. The new version of this theory shows that many of the meta-types present in OntoUML (differentiating Kinds, Roles, Phases, Mixins, etc.) should be considered not as restricted to Substantial types but instead should be applied to model Endurant Types in general, including Relator types, Quality types and Mode types. We also contribute a formal characterization of this fragment of the theory, which is then used to advance a metamodel for OntoUML 2.0. Finally, we propose a computational support tool implementing this updated metamodel. (shrink)

In this paper, we intend to discuss if and in what sense semiosis (meaning process, cf. C. S. Peirce) can be regarded as an "emergent" process in semiotic systems. It is not our problem here to answer when or how semiosis emerged in nature. As a prerequisite for the very formulation of these problems, we are rather interested in discussing the conditions which should be fulfilled for semiosis to be characterized as an emergent process. The first step in this work (...) is to summarize a systematic analysis of the variety of emergence theories and concepts, elaborated by Achim Stephan. Along the summary of this analysis, we pose fundamental questions that have to be answered in order to ascribe a precise meaning to the term "emergence" in the context of an understanding of semiosis. After discussing a model for explaining emergence based on Salthe's hierarchical structuralism, which considers three levels at a time in a semiotic system, we present some tentative answers to those questions. (shrink)

Joao Kogler Jr. & Paulo Santos discuss, in chapter eleven, the geometrical and logical aspects of a cognitive agent, which distinguishes it from merely reactive and perceptive agents. What singles out the cognitive agent is the use of context- invariant information that breeds knowledge. In their approach, the perceptual system is formed by a chain of processes dealing with contextual information, beginning at the sensorial system and ending at the motor system. The perceptual chain is constrained not only at both (...) extremities, but its transformations are geometrically connected with “holonomic” constraint propagation. On the other hand, the cognitive system comprises self-constrained processes that operate with learned transformations, so that the geometry of cognition is “non- holonomic”. Shifting to the logical approach to the problem, “qualitative spatial reasoning” is unveiled in terms of “regional connection calculus”, which describes how spatial regions are connected. The approach, as pointed by the authors, has not fared well with experimental data from cognitive psychology, which is expected since the formal approach is an abstraction from perception. Building on suggestions from advantaged properties of representations, a formalism is proposed which represents qualitative location by partitioning the visual scene around an agent into sectors, and providing relations among them, so that they form a language capable of expressing the spatial organization of the scene. (shrink)

A hipótese de que uma colônia de formigas pode manifestar algum nível de consciência fenomênica abrange quatro respostas distintas, de acordo com o modo de interação das partes na constituição do superorganismo (Fonseca, 2023). No entanto, para que a resposta seja satisfatória ao problema da combinação as informações químicas transmitidas pelas formigas teriam que estar estruturadas de modo a comunicar estados intencionais, e, consequentemente, após a exposição aos estímulos sensoriais externos ou ao contato por antenas (troca semioquímica) poderia ocorrer a (...) sincronização neuro-interindividual (dos cérebros) embasando, deste modo, o comportamento coletivamente coordenado. Por conseguinte, defendo a ideia de que os sinais químicos dispersados pelas formigas têm conteúdo mental e que a troca semioquímica produz sincronização interencefálica, constituindo assim, uma consciência coletiva. Concluo que, se há sincronização suficientemente ‘forte’ entre os cérebros, após a partilha dos estados intencionais, a colônia de formigas pode ter uma mente unificada com um corpo espacialmente distribuído. (shrink)

Biosemiotics is a growing fi eld that investigates semiotic processes in the living realm in an attempt to combine the fi ndings of the biological sciences and semiotics. Semiotic processes are more or less what biologists have typically referred to as “ signals, ” “ codes, ”and “ information processing ”in biosystems, but these processes are here understood under the more general notion of semiosis, that is, the production, action, and interpretation of signs. Thus, biosemiotics can be seen as biology (...) interpreted as a study of living sign systems — which also means that semiosis or sign process can be seen as the very nature of life itself. In other words, biosemiotics is a field of research investigating semiotic processes (meaning, signification, communication, and habit formation in living systems) and the physicochemical preconditions for sign action and interpretation. -/- (...). (shrink)

Peirce's pragmatic notion of semiosis can be described in terms of a multi-level system of constraints involving chance, efficient, formal and final causation. According to the model proposed here, law-like regularities, which work as boundary conditions or organizational principles, have a downward effect on the spatiotemporal distribution of lower-level semiotic items. We treat this downward determinative influence as a propensity relation: if some lower-level entities a,b,c,-n are under the influence of a general organizational principle, W, they will show a tendency (...) to behave in certain specific ways, and, thus, to instantiate a set of specific processes. Our goal in this paper is to examine the role of downward determination in semiotic systems, conceived as multi-level hierarchical systems. (shrink)

Certain problems with standard two-dimensional semantics are addressed and cases in which these problems arise explored. In such cases the primary intension cannot be univocally mapped in one and only one indexical world, thus standard two-dimensional semantics cannot efficiently address the problems presented. Subsequently, a modified model is presented which leads these problems to be averted in the replicated cases. This modified model admits primary intensions that are not univocally mapped. The conclusion discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the modified (...) model and analyzes its possible consequences for the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

The hypothesis that an ant colony may exhibit some level of phenomenal consciousness encompasses four distinct answers, depending on how the parts interact in the constitution of the superorganism (Fonseca, 2023). However, for a given answer to be satisfactory to the Combination Problem, the chemical information transmitted by ants would have to be structured in such a way as to communicate intentional states, and, consequently, following exposure to external sensory stimuli or contact via antennae (semiochemical exchange), interindividual neural synchronization (among (...) brains) could occur, thereby grounding collectively coordinated behavior. Accordingly, I defend the view that the chemical signals dispersed by ants carry mental content, and that semiochemical exchange produces interbrain synchronization, thus constituting a collective consciousness. I conclude that, if there is sufficiently strong synchronization among brains, following the sharing of intentional states, an ant colony may possess a unified mind with a spatially distributed body. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the Problem of Evil becomes more difficult if it is plausible that certain invertebrate animals suffer, as this would increase the amount of evil in the world and its proportion relative to good. My thinking is based on the argument of Dustin Crummett (2017), who supports this point of view. First, I will examine the ideas of Trent Dougherty (2014) and Richard Swinburne (2004), whose theodicies do not take into account the plausibility of invertebrate (...) suffering. Next, I will address Crummett's thesis, for whom the suffering of creatures such as insects makes the problem of evil much worse. After that, I present the Gradualist Argument from Consciousness as a response to Swinburne and Crummett's thinking. I conclude that the inclusion of invertebrates in the Problem of Evil strengthens the naturalist argument against theism and, therefore, deserves to be taken seriously. (shrink)

Neste artigo, originalmente escrito em 2019, abordamos o conceito de identidade pessoal, de Derek Parfit, por meio do experimento mental do teletransporte aplicado à edição genética de embriões com síndrome de Down. Parfit propõe que o teletransporte, no momento em que destrói o original e produz uma duplicata, não preserva a identidade numérica. Similarmente, sugerimos que a terapia gênica através da edição genética ao substituir o material deficiente de um embrião, geraria um novo indivíduo. Desse modo, elaboramos uma situação hipotética (...) para sustentar que essa intervenção romperia com a continuidade física e psicológica do indivíduo original, i.e., haveria duas pessoas, uma antes e outra após a “morte” da primeira. Em contrapartida, analisamos a ideia de que a edição genética não causaria danos ao indivíduo, pois os zigotos não possuem identidade numérica no início. A partir disso, discutimos as implicações éticas e morais. Concluímos favoravelmente à hipótese de descontinuidade pessoal em contextos análogos ao da terapia gênica em embriões com trissomia 21. (shrink)

The similarity between the interaction pattern of neurons in the human brain and the ant colony makes the latter an object of the hypothesis of being a structure capable of having a consciousness. In this article, Thomas Nagel's definition of consciousness as something that is to be for an organism becomes fundamental for the examination of it as a possible experiential subject. The ant colony, if considered an organism, could be a subject capable of having internal experiences. Therefore, in this (...) article, I developed based on Panpsychism, criteria for colony analysis, presenting which characteristics it must meet in order to be qualified as conscious. I do not argue that the ant colony is a genuine organism, but that, if it is, it will have some kind of conscious experience. In dealing with this question, I examine whether the colony is a biological individual, and then, whether it is possible for the ants' minds to underlie the colony's mind. I conclude that, based on how the parts interact with the whole, there may be more than one resolution to the problem, that is, the colony's consciousness depends on the way how its components are physically and phenomenally integrated. (shrink)

A semelhança entre o padrão de interação dos neurônios do cérebro humano e a colônia de formigas torna esta última objeto da hipótese de ser uma estrutura apta a ter uma consciência. Assim, neste artigo, a definição de Thomas Nagel da consciência como algo que é ser para um organismo se torna basilar para o exame dela como um possível sujeito experiencial. A colônia de formigas, se considerada um organismo, poderia ser um sujeito apto a ter experiências internas. Por isso, (...) neste artigo, eu desenvolvo com base no Pampsiquismo, critérios de análise da colônia, apresentando quais características ela deve atender para ser qualificada como consciente. Dessa maneira, ela se torna um modelo apropriado para o exame da relação corpo-mente. Não defendo que a colônia de formigas é um organismo genuíno, mas que, caso seja, terá algum tipo de experiência consciente. No tratamento dessa questão, eu examino se a colônia é um indivíduo biológico, e, em seguida, se é possível que as mentes das formigas embasem a mente da colônia. Concluo que, a partir do modo de interação das partes com o todo, pode haver mais de uma resolução para o problema, i.e., a consciência da colônia depende do modo como seus componentes estão física e fenomenalmente integrados. (shrink)

A cidade nas práticas artísticas [The city in artistic practices] is the result of the work developed, of the presentations and the debates held within the cycle of seminars “The experience of the city between art and philosophy”, held between 3 March 2020 and 16 June 2021 (calendar dramatically compromised by the challenges of the COVID 19 pandemic), one of the main activities of the OBRA project — Fragmentation and Reconfiguration: experiencing the city between art and philosophy, based at IFILNOVA (...) — Philosophy Institute of NOVA, in Lisbon. The book is divided into five parts, relating to each of the artistic disciplines to which the seminars were dedicated – cinema, photography, sound arts, literature and architecture —, which are edited by the organizers responsible for each of them — respectively, Susana Viegas, Humberto Brito, Nuno Fonseca João Oliveira Duarte and Susana Ventura — and composed of the respective narrated accounts of each seminar and of short essays, some merely textual, others graphical or even photographic, which are either in-depth versions of the reflections and positions that were presented and debated by the participants and guests, or works that motivated and inspired the work of the seminars. The seminar cycle and the book now presented here intend to reflect on the role of artistic practices in the representation and reconfiguration of urban experience, trying to understand their different attempts to apprehend and express the fragmentation of aesthetic experience in modern and contemporary cities, as well as to evaluate their contribution to an eventual symbolic and imaginative reconfiguration of that experience. Each section tries, in its own way, to answer questions such as: How do these arts think and reinvent the city? What do they make us feel? And what is their social and political role? For reasons that are easy to understand, Lisbon was the starting point, but other cities were also part of the journey. (shrink)

A semelhança entre o padrão de interação dos neurônios do cérebro humano e a colônia de formigas torna esta última objeto da hipótese de ser uma estrutura apta a ter uma consciência. Assim, a definição de Thomas Nagel da consciência como algo que é ser para um organismo se torna basilar para o exame dela como um possível sujeito experiencial. A colônia de formigas, se considerada um organismo, poderia ser um sujeito apto a ter experiências internas. No entanto, a falta (...) de um princípio geral de organização psicofísica afeta a ideia de mente na teoria de Nagel. Por isso, desenvolvemos com base no Pampsiquismo, critérios de análise da colônia, apresentando quais características ela deve atender para ser qualificada como consciente. Dessa maneira, ela se torna um modelo apropriado para o exame do argumento de Nagel. Não defendemos que a colônia de formigas é um organismo genuíno, mas que, caso seja, terá algum tipo de experiência consciente. No tratamento dessa questão, examinamos a abordagem enativa para o sistema vivo, a fim de verificar se a colônia é um indivíduo biológico, e, em seguida, à luz do combinacionismo, se é possível que as mentes das formigas embasem a mente da colônia. Concluímos que, a partir do modo de interação das partes com o todo, pode haver mais de uma resolução para o problema, i.e., a consciência da colônia depende do modo como seus componentes estão física e fenomenalmente integrados. (shrink)

Terms loaded with informational connotations are often employed to refer to genes and their dynamics. Indeed, genes are usually perceived by biologists as basically ‘the carriers of hereditary information.’ Nevertheless, a number of researchers consider such talk as inadequate and ‘just metaphorical,’ thus expressing a skepticism about the use of the term ‘information’ and its derivatives in biology as a natural science. First, because the meaning of that term in biology is not as precise as it is, for instance, in (...) the mathematical theory of communication. Second, because it seems to refer to a purported semantic property of genes without theoretically clarifying if any genuinely intrinsic semantics is involved. Biosemiotics, a field that attempts to analyze biological systems as semiotic systems, makes it possible to advance in the understanding of the concept of information in biology. From the perspective of Peircean biosemiotics, we develop here an account of genes as signs, including a detailed analysis of two fundamental processes in the genetic information system (transcription and protein synthesis) that have not been made so far in this field of research. Furthermore, we propose here an account of information based on Peircean semiotics and apply it to our analysis of transcription and protein synthesis. (shrink)

We will make a new approach for an effect known as “Dark Energy” by an effect on gravitational field. In an accelerated rocket, the dimensions of space towards movement due to ‘Lorentz Contraction’ are on continuous reduction. Using the equivalence principle, we presume that in the gravitational field, the same thing would happen. In this implicates in ‘dark energy effect’. The calculi show that in a 7%-contraction for each billion years would explain our observation of galaxies in accelerated separation.

In sensorimotor integration, representation involves an anticipatory model of the action to be performed. This model integrates efferent signals (motor commands), its reafferent consequences (sensory consequences of an organism’s own motor action), and other afferences (sensory signals) originated by stimuli independent of the action performed. Representation, a form of internal modeling, is invoked to explain the fact that behavior oriented to the achievement of future goals is relatively independent from the immediate environment. Internal modeling explains how a cognitive system achieves (...) its goals despite variations in the environment with insufficient and noisy sensory–perceptual data. In a self that acts intentionally on the environment, knowledge is dependent upon the necessity to guide actions directed toward an aim. The self-inner model, a representation of internal and external environments (including reafferent and afferent messages) and also of the behavior plans and desirable future states (aims) and efferent intentions (motor planning and motor command messages), is intrinsically linked to a thinking capacity, which is supposed to emerge from the binding of multiple influences. Thinking emerges when higher behavior strategies are considered possible and capable of leading to aims or the fulfillment of intentions. In this model, symbolization processes are projective and anticipatory and, in this way, beyond present referents. Symbolization occurs linked to action planning, command, and regulation in mental simulation. Meaning is related to an inner sense of a self that acts over the environment. (shrink)

No presente artigo argumentamos que os fatos morais dependem da realidade da consciência. Por esse viés, abordamos, então, que apenas seres sencientes dotados de razão estão aptos a conhecer os valores objetivamente. Considerando a teoria do Pampsiquismo, que afirma ser a consciência uma propriedade essencial da matéria, analisamos a possibilidade de que se organismos subjetivos evoluírem em outros sistemas solares alcançando a racionalidade, poderiam ter a mesma percepção das leis naturais que o homem tem. Nesse contexto, a existência de um (...) direito natural cosmológico é viável. Analisamos, portanto, o realismo moral sob a ótica do Pampsiquismo, segundo Thomas Nagel. Em contraste, examinamos também o Biopsiquismo. Concluímos que o conhecimento do valor terá interpretações distintas para cada uma das teorias da mente. (shrink)

The notion of aesthetic experience attempts to account for an important part of human experience and, although it embraces an immense and multifaceted variety, the complexity and vagueness of which have been an authentic challenge to its definition (to the point that some suggest its conceptual uselessness), it is still crucial and decisive for an entire philosophical discipline: aesthetics-which is not to be confused with the philosophy of art, although it often intersects with it. This chapter considers the case of (...) the city-which is not so much an object as a multifaceted and fragmented environment where aesthetic experiences can occur-in order to attempt to elucidate (or at least to make a contribution to the elucidation of) the meaning and scope of this philosophical topic. (shrink)

La Logique ou L'Art de Penser (LAP), also known as the Port-Royal Logic, is generally presented as a "logic of ideas" in which the idea, the central epistemological entity, is the starting point of this logic based on Cartesian ontology. Structured around the four main operations of the mind - conceiving, judging, reasoning and ordering - the first part of the LAP contains "reflections on ideas". The idea, "the form by which we represent things [objects]", thus takes the place of (...) the concept in Aristotelian-inspired logic. Some of the chapters in this first part deal with the problems raised in scholasticism by the theory of _proprietates terminorum_, which means that it is also a semantics of terms. The word 'term' itself must be understood in its logical and grammatical dimensions. The analyses of the 'Messieurs' of Port-Royal often have a logico-grammatical character, because, according to the anthropology of the authors, men need to make their thoughts heard by one another through language (institutional signs) and, therefore, "it is necessary in logic to consider ideas joined to words, and words joined to ideas". In this text, we shall endeavour to show the importance and innovative character of the semantics of terms in this logic of ideas which makes LAP a pivotal moment in the evolution of the language sciences, reviving the tradition and allowing dialogue with future developments (extension vs. comprehension, explanation, determination of terms, etc.). We will pay particular attention to the chapters on definition, "a remedy for the confusion that arises in our thoughts and speech from the confusion of words". (shrink)

No capítulo 1 da dissertação “A Colônia de Formigas está Consciente?”, intitulado “O Monismo Nageliano e a Composição Material” examinamos a premissa da Composição Material, a qual estabelece que a consciência depende do modo de disposição material das entidades físicas básicas (átomos, elétrons, etc.), na composição do organismo. Ou seja, a experiência consciente de um sistema vivo se encontra estreitamente conectada com a forma em que seus componentes físicos estão relacionados. Isso significa que cada organismo terá um processo diferente de (...) interação desses componentes formando, então, uma mente subjetiva. As diferenças entre um e outro são em grau. Assim, é possível que haja estruturas com níveis alto, baixo, ausente, e até mesmo intermediários de consciência. E cada nível, por sua vez, corresponde a uma relação específica entre parte e todo, se é um sistema orgânico, ou se está entre o orgânico e o não orgânico. Durante o desenvolvimento embrionário, por exemplo, pode existir um momento fronteiriço entre a individualidade e a não-individualidade (ou ser um agregado celular), um momento em que somos incapazes de determinar quando há um organismo. Nesta linha, a consciência também seria indeterminada. Como desconhecemos a relação exata dos componentes físicos para constituir o todo, temos que considerar a consciência como uma propriedade imprecisa do sistema biológico. O Problema da Composição envolve, portanto, a inconsistência do conceito de organismo. Em linhas gerais, se a noção de indivíduo é vaga, por sua vez, a de consciência também será. Por conseguinte, a correlação entre consciência fenomenológica e organização material torna o próprio conceito de mente em uma propriedade imprecisa da composição. Assim, no presente capítulo, esmiuçamos cada uma das quatro premissas que fundamentam o Pampsiquismo: composição material, antirreducionismo, antiemergentismo e realismo. E, em seguida analisamos cada uma dessa premissas como parâmetros para verificar se uma colônia de formigas pode ser um sujeito experiencial. Supomos que, se a colônia estiver estruturada como um indivíduo genuíno, ela terá alguma fenomenalidade. No entanto, não sabemos de que tipo. Por fim, elucidamos como o chamado Problema da Combinação se aplica à colônia de insetos sociais e quais implicações disso. (shrink)

This paper explores Victoria Welby's fundamental assumption of meaning process (“semiosis” sensu Peirce) as translation, and some implications for the development of a general model of intersemiotic translation.

We will use the “Decreasing Universe” (D.U.) theory to estimate the age of the Universe based on the average wavelength of the Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB) radiation.

The suggestion of something akin to a ‘relativist solution to the Mind-Body problem’ has recently been held by some scientists and philosophers; either explicitly (Galadí, 2023; Lahav & Neemeh, 2022; Ludwig, 2015) or in more implicit terms (Solms, 2018; Velmans, 2002, 2008). In this paper I provide an argument in favor of a relativist approach to the Mind-Body problem, more specifically, an argument for ‘1st/3rd person relativism’, the claim that ‘The truth value of some sentences or propositions is relative to (...) 1st and 3rd person perspectives’. The argument for 1st/3rd person relativism is close to a forma proof. It is shown that, just by assuming the 1st/3rd person distinction itself and using first order logic and set theory, ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ follows as a theorem. Some consequences of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ to the Mind-Body Problem are evaluated. It is shown that ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ predicts the existence of an (apparent) Explanatory Gap; explains why the Explanatory Gap is just apparent (and the origins of such illusion); dissolves the Hard-Problem; provides a possible solution the problem of Mental Causation; explains why Mental Causation looks like a problem in the first place and accurately predicts the actual empirically found correlation and covariation between conscious experiences and brain states. This explanatory power of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ is particularly impressive since it was not designed as a possible solution to the Mind-Body problem in the first place. (shrink)

This book consists of an edited collection of original essays of the highest academic quality by seasoned experts in their fields of cognitive science. The essays are interdisciplinary, drawing from many of the fields known collectively as “the cognitive sciences.” Topics discussed represent a significant cross-section of the most current and interesting issues in cognitive science. Specific topics include matters regarding machine learning and cognitive architecture, the nature of cognitive content, the relationship of information to cognition, the role of language (...) and communication in cognition, the nature of embodied cognition, selective topics in visual cognition, brain connectivity, computation and simulation, social and technological issues within the cognitive sciences, and significant issues in the history of neuroscience. This book will be of interest to both professional researchers and newer students and graduate students in the fields of cognitive science—including computer science, linguistics, philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. The essays are in English and are designed to be as free as possible of technical jargon and therefore accessible to young scholars and to scholars who are new to the cognitive neurosciences. In addition to several entries by single authors, the book contains several interesting roundtables where researchers contribute answers to a central question presented to those in the focus group on one of the core areas listed above. This exciting approach provides a variety of perspectives from across disciplines on topics of current concern in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Os signos e as classes dos signos estão entre os tópicos mais importantes do sistema filosófico de Charles S. Peirce. As 10, 28, e 66 classes de signos são classificações desenvolvidas especialmente a partir de 1903 e representam um grande refinamento da divisão fundamental de signos – ícone, índice, símbolo. Nossa abordagem aqui define uma estratégia de visualização das classificações dos signos, com especial atenção para as 10 e 66 classes de signos. O livro está dividido em duas partes: (i) (...) bases teóricas, (ii) diagramas para as classes de signos. Na Parte I (bases teóricas), são apresentadas introdutoriamente as noções fundamentais das categorias fenomenológicas, classes de signos, as tricotomias e diagramas, assim como implicações gerais de nossa abordagem, metodologia e aplicações. Na Parte II (diagramas para as classes de signos), são apresentados e discutidos os modelos das classes, propostos por Peirce e seus comentadores, incluindo uma introdução detalhadamente documental de nossos modelos, 10cubes e 3N3, diagramas dinâmicos para as classes de signos. (shrink)

Psychiatrists such as Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg, and Yoshiki Ishisaka have presented the posthumous diagnosis that philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein had Asperger’s Syndrome. In this essay, I question this diagnosis by presenting evidence that Wittgenstein’s autism condition was significantly more severe than that. Taking into account this prospect, as well as the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria, I raise the possibility to be discussed by experts in Autism Spectrum Disorder that Wittgenstein had below-average intelligence or even intellectual disability, which is a common co-occurring (...) condition associated with moderate to severe autism. Among other cognitive and behavioral characteristics that corroborate this hypothesis, I consider the fact that Wittgenstein only began to speak at the age of four, he had poor school performance, he was frequently aggressive, and he presented lifelong reading and writing difficulties. (shrink)

Psychiatrists such as Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg, and Yoshiki Ishisaka diagnosed Ludwig Wittgenstein posthumously with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Taking into account this diagnosis, as well as the fact that people with ASD tend to have fixed, concrete, literal ways of talking and thinking, I analyze in this paper how Wittgenstein’s pictorial thinking is reflected in his texts, including the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – the book that represents Wittgenstein’s first philosophy, which is based on a picture theory of language – and (...) the Philosophical Investigations – the book that synthesizes Wittgenstein’s second philosophy, in which he presents a critical review of the Tractarian conception of language. (shrink)

In several places, John Bickle claims that current neuroscientific practice provides actual cellular/molecular reductions of certain mental states. He gives the case study of ‘memory consolidation switch’ as an example where recent findings suggest that this mental state/process can be reduced to the molecular ‘cAMP, PKA, CREB Pathway’. Taking this example, Bickle ‘waves the eleminativist flag’ by claiming that psychological explanations loose their pertinence (or, as he says, ‘became otiose’) once a cellular/molecular explanation replaces them. On this paper I’ll try (...) to show that, even if a reductive explanation of ‘memory consolidation switch’ is disposable, we cannot eschew reductively its causal/functional integrity, i.e.: the explanatory/causal context that defines the mental concept/process ‘memory consolidation switch’ in the first place. (shrink)

Since the mid-20th century, the so-called analytic philosophy has been considered the dominant philosophical tradition in English-speaking countries, especially England and the United States. Despite this, there is still no clarity or the slightest consensus on what analytic philosophy means. Given this scenario, I argue in this paper that analytic philosophy has never really constituted itself as a philosophical school. My objective is to show how the criticisms that have been made of philosophy in recent centuries – including the obscurantism (...) of philosophical texts, the lack of methodological rigor of philosophical investigations, and the lack of attention of philosophers to scientific advances – have not really been eliminated by analytical philosophers but only “pushed” by them to what they began to call, a few decades ago, in a vague way, continental philosophy. (shrink)

In his preface to the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein sets forth the book as a work with the intent to draw a limit to the expression of thoughts. He further argues that such a limit could only be drawn in language and, therefore, only nonsense would lie on the other side of it. However, as Wittgenstein himself accepts in his work, the very Tractatus, and the entire philosophy alike, are beyond the limit drawn for the expression of thoughts. Given such (...) a paradox, contemporary readers carry on the debate concerning what Wittgenstein understood as the limits of language. In this paper, I state that regardless of how the limits to expression are understood, Wittgenstein has never respected them before or after writing the Tractatus. Besides, against the common opinion concerning the existence of genuine philosophical progress between Wittgenstein’s first and second philosophies, I highlight how the main issue in Wittgenstein’s first philosophy is also the main issue in his second philosophy: the fact that Wittgenstein has never followed his own methods. (shrink)

In the essay “Cognitive Linguistics and Autonomous Linguistics,” published in 2007 in the Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, John R. Taylor suggests the dialogue and even the integration of cognitive linguistics with other strands of language studies. Following this line of argument, I reanalyze George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors in this paper. I aim to make explicit the empirical and rhetorical excesses of these authors since the publication of the book Metaphors We Live By, 45 years (...) ago, as a consequence to a large extent of their attack on Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar. With this, I hope to facilitate the approximation between generativism and cognitivism in biolinguistics. (shrink)

Falsas definições, má exemplificação e diversidade de conceituação e multiplicidade de análise. Em 1983, no livro Da necessidade de uma gramática-padrão da língua portuguesa, Amini Boainain Hauy aponta esses três problemas-chave das gramáticas tradicionais de língua portuguesa, argumentando ser necessário produzir uma gramática “objetiva, coerente e uniforme” a fim de que o ensino gramatical nas escolas de nível fundamental e médio deixe de ser “deficiente e improdutivo”. Seria isso possível? Nesta obra, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva evidencia que, quase 40 anos (...) depois de esse alerta ter sido feito, ainda não se elaborou no Brasil uma gramática aos moldes daquela idealizada por Hauy. Para isso, analisou gramáticas lançadas nas últimas décadas no país por autores como a própria Hauy, Maria Helena de Moura Neves, José Carlos de Azeredo, Ataliba Teixeira de Castilho, Marcos Bagno, Mário Alberto Perini e Lorenzo Vitral, apontando que as mesmas falhas e divergências teóricas das gramáticas tradicionais são encontradas nessas publicações. Para compreender por que os conceitos gramaticais, de modo geral, não têm limites rígidos nem podem ser coerentemente definidos, ele se baseia nos textos do filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein sobre “semelhanças de família” e nos trabalhos clássicos da psicóloga Eleanor Rosch sobre categorização. Por conseguinte, à luz da pedagogia humanizante, libertadora e problematizadora de Paulo Freire, o autor propõe uma metodologia de ensino dos conceitos gramaticais que, em vez de apresentar respostas prontas – e muitas vezes insatisfatórias –, visa estimular os alunos a produzir suas próprias classificações e definições gramaticais, em diálogo com os gramáticos e linguistas. Com isso, busca auxiliar os professores de língua portuguesa a levar os alunos a reinventar a gramática em sala de aula – especialmente no ensino médio. -/- . (shrink)

Poems are treated by translators as hierarchical multilevel systems. Here we propose the notion of “multilevel poetry translation” to characterize such cases of poetry translation in terms of selection and rebuilding of a multilevel system of constraints across languages. Different levels of a poem correspond to different sets of components that asymmetrically constrain each other (e. g., grammar, lexicon, syntactic construction, prosody, rhythm, typography, etc.). This perspective allows a poem to be approached as a thinking-tool: an “experimental lab” which submits (...) language to unusual conditions and provides a scenario to observe the emergence of new patterns of semiotic behaviour as a result. We describe this operation as a problem-solving task, and exemplify with Augusto de Campos’ Portuguese translation of John Donne’s poem “The Expiration.”. (shrink)

In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein reveals that he owed “the most fruitful ideas” of the work to the “stimulus” of the economist Piero Sraffa. Curiously, however, according to Amartya Sen (2003), Sraffa considered his point of view – which emphasizes the relationship between language and the sociocultural environment in which it is used – “rather obvious,” found it tedious to talk to Wittgenstein, and was never excited about having decisively influenced his later philosophy. To justify Sraffa’s (...) behavior, Sen (2003) argues that his former professor considered his social approach to language trivial – which contrasts with the logical approach of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – basically due to his Marxist background. In contrast to this explanation by Sen (2003), I argue in this article that Sraffa’s point of view is indeed “rather obvious,” having a long list of precursors that goes back to Ancient Greece. To prove this statement, I revisit here both the works of philosophers with whom Wittgenstein engages in his texts, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Saint Augustine, as well as esteemed authors he apparently did not know, among them the linguists William D. Whitney, Hermann Paul, and Ferdinand de Saussure. (shrink)

No ensaio “Wittgenstein on mathematics”, publicado no Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Michael Potter procura não apenas analisar por que a filosofia da matemática de Wittgenstein é tão controvertida entre filósofos e matemáticos como justificar essa situação. Com esse intuito, Potter enfatiza o caráter inacabado das reflexões de Wittgenstein sobre a matemática. Neste artigo, tem-se por objetivo explicitar algumas inconsistências e contradições no pensamento matemático de Wittgenstein que ratificam as críticas que esse autor vem recebendo há décadas, mas que não tiveram (...) a mesma atenção dos especialistas que os comentários de Wittgenstein sobre os teoremas da incompletude de Kurt Gödel e suas discussões com Alan Turing sobre os fundamentos da matemática. (shrink)

Em 27 de janeiro de 1937, o filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) anotou em seu diário, enquanto viajava para Skjolden, um vilarejo norueguês à beira do fiorde Sogne, onde havia construído em 1913 uma cabana para viver isolado: “Certamente sou singular em muitas coisas & por isso, muitas pessoas se comportam de maneira comum quando comparadas comigo; mas em que consiste minha singularidade?” De acordo com psiquiatras contemporâneos como Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg e Yoshiki Ishisaka, a singularidade de Wittgenstein decorria de (...) ele ter autismo. Considerando-se o diagnóstico póstumo feito por esses especialistas em transtorno do espectro autista, este livro tem dois objetivos básicos: (1) detalhar como se refletem na obra de Wittgenstein tanto as suas particularidades comportamentais quanto as suas dificuldades cognitivas, inclusive aquelas relacionadas à linguagem, e (2) mostrar que Wittgenstein “dissolveu” em sua segunda filosofia, especialmente nas Investigações filosóficas, problemas que não são problemas para ninguém valendo-se de conhecimentos linguísticos e filosóficos básicos acumulados no Ocidente desde a Grécia Antiga que ele havia ignorado no Tractatus logico-philosophicus, livro de sua primeira filosofia. (shrink)

In the last decades, psychologist Michael Tomasello became a leading critic of Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar. Within the framework of his cognitive-functional linguistics, which is associated with emergentism and cognitive linguistics, Tomasello challenges the central pillars of generativism, including the innateness thesis, autonomy of syntax hypothesis, and language module alike. Considering the influence of Tomasello’s ideas, this paper rediscusses the theoretical foundations of his work. The objective in doing so is to reaffirm the validity of generativism’s theoretical assumptions. Notwithstanding this, (...) it is argued that it seems possible, and even necessary, to integrate many aspects of emergentists’ discussions regarding language acquisition and Tomasello’s cognitive-functional linguistics into a research program grounded in a modular conception of language. (shrink)

In the essay ‘Wittgenstein on mathematics’, Michael Potter offers not only an analysis of why Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is so controversial among philosophers and mathematicians but also justifies such controversy. For that purpose, Potter emphasizes that Wittgenstein’s discussions on math are unfinished. In contrast to this position, this paper sheds light on some inconsistencies and contradictions in Wittgenstein’s mathematic thoughts that, although reinforcing the decade-long criticism of the author, did not interest scholars as much as Wittgenstein’s comments on Kurt (...) Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. (shrink)

In The Principles of Mechanics, Heinrich Hertz argues that, instead of trying to answer the question “what is force?,” as physicists and philosophers had unsuccessfully been doing, Newtonian physics should be reformulated without using “force” as a basic concept. Decades after the publication of Hertz’s book, Ludwig Wittgenstein would consider this proposal a perfect model for how to solve philosophical problems, to the point of adopting it as the basis for his way of doing philosophy. Considering this scenario, this article (...) discusses not only Wittgenstein’s method of doing philosophy but also why he failed in his attempt to solve philosophical problems – just as Hertz had failed in his project to reformulate Newtonian physics without using the concept of “force.” To illustrate Wittgenstein’s failure, his disputes with mathematicians Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing over the foundations of mathematics are examined. (shrink)

Initially, in this article, we present the foundation on which current science stands. Next, we explain the main stream of modern science, the “Popperian Falsificationism”, and show why the current criticism to the system is flawed. Later, we will prove that the “falsificationism” is logically inconsistent and we will propose a new concept of science, unifying it with philosophy.

In his philosophy of mind, Ludwig Wittgenstein repeatedly states we do not think with our heads or in our heads. However, he does not offer clear arguments to sustain such an opinion. Furthermore, his readers do not focus appropriately on this aspect of his philosophy. Therefore, this paper questions why Wittgenstein insisted on the idea that we do not think with our heads or in our heads. The proposed explanation is that through this statement Wittgenstein was trying to justify his (...) conceptual method, to the detriment of scientific methods used in psychology. In addition, this work analyzes some implications of Wittgenstein’s statement in his critique of G. E. Moore’s refutation of philosophical skepticism and his attacks on psychology and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

This article investigates the uses that Ferdinand de Saussure made of metaphors, analogies, and comparisons both in the manuscripts collected in the Writings in General Linguistics and in the Course in General Linguistics. The aim is to show that, more than the erasures and gaps in the manuscripts, it is the images and figures that Saussure employs in his texts that reveal his doubts and hesitations in the pursuit of a theory of general linguistics. With this reanalysis of the analogies, (...) metaphors, and comparisons made by Saussure, the intention is to cast a new light not only on his legacy but also on the fact that he did not publish the results of his reflections on language. (shrink)

Ray Jackendoff understands that Noam Chomsky’s linguistic models distort the nature of language due to its ‘syntactocentrism.’ Coined by Jackendoff, this term means Chomsky’s assumption that the syntactic component of language is central while the phonological and semantic components are merely interpretive. Jackendoff also states that since the 1970s many researchers have made a mistake opposite to Chomsky’s, by denying that syntax has a relevant role in grammar. Considering such a scenario, this paper analyzes Ronald Langacker’s cognitive grammar, in which (...) syntax is replaced by semantics as the central linguistic component. The goal is to show how Langacker misrepresented language structure by doing so. -/- . (shrink)

The metaphysical assumption that nature is perfect has been one of the foundations of modern physics since the 17th century. Because of the success of this discipline, researchers in other fields of knowledge have followed its principles, including the idea that nature is perfect. A fascinating case of this epistemological transposition occurred in the 20th century with Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar, especially in his Minimalist Program. In it, Chomsky takes to its ultimate consequences what he called ‘the Galilean intuition that (...) “nature is perfect,”’ proposing that language is also perfect. Since it is also assumed in generativism that language is a biological system, the conjecture that it is perfect results in the highly improbable wager that it is unique from a biological point of view. This is because, being the result of evolutionary accidents, biological systems are characteristically imperfect. Given this almost paradoxical situation reached in Chomsky’s minimalism, I argue in this paper that it makes no sense to adopt the metaphysical assumption that language is perfect. I also suggest that a parallel architecture model of language such as Ray Jackendoff’s seems to have a good chance of becoming the main research program of biolinguistics because it is more consistent with the typical features of a mental system such as language than Chomsky’s minimalism. (shrink)

No artigo “Wittgenstein: universalismo, lógica, gramática y lenguaje”, Alejandro Tomasini Bassols afirma que o problema com que Wittgenstein se depara ao fim do Tractatus ”“ as proposições do livro serem elucidações e contrassensos ”“ teve origem em seu erro de considerar a lógica, e não a linguagem, como o mais universal. Bassols afirma ainda que o assim chamado “paradoxo do Tractatus” não foi uma ameaça à segunda filosofia wittgensteiniana porque nela Wittgenstein não cometeu o mesmo erro. Neste artigo argumenta-se que (...) as proposições do Tractatus são contrassensos como consequência direta da teoria pictórica do significado, independentemente da ontologia tractatiana. Além disso, divergindo da opinião de Bassols de ter havido “genuíno progresso filosófico” entre a primeira e a segunda filosofia de Wittgenstein, ressalta-se como o mais sério problema que marca a primeira filosofia wittgensteiniana também marca a segunda: o contrassenso de que Wittgenstein nunca seguiu os próprios métodos filosóficos. (shrink)