Abstract

In this article, I argue that the Problem of Evil becomes more difficult if it is plausible that certain invertebrate animals suffer, as this would increase the amount of evil in the world and its proportion relative to good. My thinking is based on the argument of Dustin Crummett (2017), who supports this point of view. First, I will examine the ideas of Trent Dougherty (2014) and Richard Swinburne (2004), whose theodicies do not take into account the plausibility of invertebrate suffering. Next, I will address Crummett's thesis, for whom the suffering of creatures such as insects makes the problem of evil much worse. After that, I present the Gradualist Argument from Consciousness as a response to Swinburne and Crummett's thinking. I conclude that the inclusion of invertebrates in the Problem of Evil strengthens the naturalist argument against theism and, therefore, deserves to be taken seriously.