Philosophy of Perception, General

This paper deals with Peirce’s understanding of perceptual judgment, relating it to the conditions for the use of language defined by Michael Dummett. Namely, drawing on Dummett’s requirement for harmony between descriptive and evaluative aspects of our linguistic practice, we will try to give an interpretation of Peirce’s view of perception that implies rejecting the idea that the formation of a perceptual judgment has an inferential structure. On the other hand, since it is, in Peirce’s opinion, the structure of abductive (...) inference, this approach should enable us to draw some conclusions related to abduction in general. (shrink)

This paper explores the limitations of physicalist explanations of consciousness through a thought experiment involving a blind individual who perceives objects through touch. By examining the hypothetical case of Daniel, who can identify cars using his sense of touch, the paper raises important questions about the nature of perception and conscious experience. The main argument centers on whether physical properties, such as color, can be perceived through touch if our sensory capabilities were enhanced to a molecular level.1 The conclusion argues (...) that physicalist approaches fall short in explaining the subjective experiences (qualia) that arise from sensory perception. This argument is reinforced through a comparison with Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room thought experiment and John Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment, showing that even conscious states obtained through different sensory organs cannot substitute for each other, nor can they grant access to each other. Although dualism is a prominent alternative to physicalism, this paper does not address its validity, focusing instead on highlighting the shortcomings of physicalism alone. (shrink)

Research on music semantics has demonstrated the existence of a cognitive capacity to represent virtual sources of sounds, distinct from the capacity to represent sounds and sources of sounds. Our research explores a parallel phenomenon in the olfactory domain. The first contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a smell can inform us about an entity — referred to as its virtual source — that is not causally tied to the characteristics of the smell. We exemplify two types of (...) virtual sources of smells: some deriving from representations of smellscapes, some from representations of odor sources. The second contribution is an explanation of some practices of perfumery that intend to shape mental representations elicited by perfume smells, through their temporal structures and their constituent notes. The third contribution is a comparison between key features of the capacities to represent virtual sources of music and of smells. Three of those features are shared by both capacities: (1) only some of the properties of the stimulus are interpreted; (2) musical pieces and smells have an extremely underspecified semantics; (3) inferences may be about objects that are not able to produce the stimulus. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy took a wrong turn when it rehabilitated direct realism. From the perspective of cognitive science, it seems that we can have the directness-claim or the realism-claim but not both together. Up until the mid-1900s the vast majority of philosophers dismissed direct realism as hopelessly naïve, but by the close of the century it had become the orthodoxy within analytic philosophy. In contrast, mainstream cognitive science has remained constant in its opposition to the directness-claim, and when the directness-claim is (...) maintained, by an avowedly-radical minority, it is at the expense of the realism-claim. (shrink)

Representationalism (aka intentionalism) has been the most significant weapon in the late twentieth century defence of direct realism. However, although the representationalist objection to the Phenomenal Principle might provide an effective response to the arguments from illusion and hallucination, plausible representationalist theories of perception are, when fleshed-out, incompatible with metaphysical direct realism’s directness-claim. Indeed within cognitive science, direct perception is the avowedly-radical anti-representationalist heterodoxy. Drawing on both the philosophy and cognitive science, we develop a robust argument against representationalist direct realism (...) which does not rest on illusory cases or the notion of an object of immediate awareness. None of the representations so far posited, or in prospect, can supply the content required of a representation in a direct realist theory of veridical perception. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that interest in light was, and is, an ongoing area of interest in the philosophy of visual perception. I then argue that 'light' is not a real entity, and that light rays are opaque. It should follow that the philosophy of direct perception of real objects is not sound.

In this paper I will argue that what is perceived as the Representation is not formed out of sensory-data1 directly. Instead, I will argue that a more fundamental structure, that I have named the pre-Representation, precedes the Representation and it is formed out of sensory-data.

In this paper, I assess John McDowell's paper "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" (2009) (AMG) and its theory of epistemological openness to the world. I trace its motivations back to Kantian, Sellarsian and Aristotelean roots. I argue that McDowell subscribes to a kind of Holistic Theory of Rationality (HTR). To explain the HTR, I will analyze the Sellarsian notions of the "Manifest Image," the "Myth of the Given" and the "logical space of reasons." I argue that the holistic nature (...) of McDowell's theory gives it particular properties that put it in need of conservatism, because all the elements of the theory "hang together" - i.e. cohere - in a dangerous fashion. I argue that McDowell cannot afford big changes without upsetting the apple-cart. With this in mind, I shall assess the merits and demerits of AMG, and its modified theory of perceptual content, as an attempted conservative reform of HTR. I want to argue that, taken independently, AMG is a good and important change, but taken holistically it is non-conservative, and disruptive, of the McDowellian picture. Thus, if we wish to proceed with the McDowellian path, we are led to a choice between rejecting the local reform (and retreating back to an earlier version) or demanding further explanations of its global implications. (shrink)

Structural Omission is a framework for realist painting developed for the post-certainty era of generative AI, when images can be produced at scale with a surface of total certainty. This essay argues that realism remains viable only by abandoning completion as its premise. Traditional realism, even at its best, carried an old promise: that completion was available in principle, and that the artist could deliver wholeness if they chose. Generative AI systems now manufacture that kind of closure faster, cheaper, and (...) more convincingly than any human hand. Structural Omission rebuilds realism on a different ground rooted in perception itself: perceptual limits are not an error in representation. They are the condition of representation. The framework formalizes planned, load-bearing incompleteness through three criteria—Ground (perceptual limits), Structure (structural incompleteness), and Consequence (narrative without resolution). Completion-biased image systems can imitate the look of omissions, but they usually treat gaps as a visual effect rather than structural absence. Rather than competing with algorithmic finish, Structural Omission treats partial visibility as the architecture holding the painting together. The result is realism that is accountable to human perception. (shrink)

This short essay introduces a simple yet profound analogy to capture the paradoxical nature of consciousness: We objectively live on a planet hurtling through space, spinning around its axis, orbiting the Sun, and traversing the space at unimaginable speeds. Yet subjectively, we perceive ourselves as perfectly still and stable. Drawing on this analogy, I argue that consciousness functions precisely as the inner stabilization of an objectively dynamic and continuously changing reality. Consciousness does not directly alter external reality, but modulates the (...) subjective frame through which reality is perceived. (shrink)

Color is often treated as a qualitative deliverance of perception: one first sees red, blue, green, or gray, and only afterwards asks how such qualities are represented, caused, or experienced. This paper argues that such accounts begin too late. Before any determinate hue can be stably read as the color of something, chromatic appearance must become legible within a bounded structure of differentiation. The claim is deliberately limited. I do not offer a general ontology of color, nor do I argue (...) that perceivers first explicitly detect edges and only then see color. The thesis is structural rather than temporal: stable chromatic appearance requires that differentiation be organized in a way that allows a region to be recovered as a locus of color. Two limit cases help fix this lower-bound condition. In the Ganzfeld, homogeneous stimulation undermines stable chromatic assignment; in neon color spreading, boundary organization can generate assignable chromatic regions that outrun local chromatic input. Taken together, these cases suggest that chromatic legibility depends not on stimulus taken in isolation, but on recoverable field organization. On that basis, I propose an analytical vocabulary of white, black, hue, rainbow, and transparency as limit, stabilized, and non-closed modes of chromatic legibility. The contribution is modest but consequential: a phenomenological account of the minimal structural condition under which color can appear as assignable at all. The claim is structural and diagnostic rather than empirically exhaustive. (shrink)

Contemporary accounts of mystical “non-dual” or minimal-dual consciousness often describe a state beyond the ordinary subject–object framework. In this paper we propose a novel parametric introspection framework, according to which such a breakthrough is not achieved by doctrinal affirmation or mere insight into metaphysics, but by driving specific introspective parameters to critical values. We identify three core variables – Intensity of attentional engagement, Cycle Frequency of introspective process, and total Duration of practice – and propose a simple model (I × (...) F × D ≥ T) for when a stable reduction of the subject–object structure (“groundless” awareness) becomes likely. We situate this theory at the confluence of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, contemplative science, and cognitive neuroscience. We draw on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on intentionality and embodiment, James and Zen analyses of “pure experience,” and analytic critiques of introspection (Dennett, Metzinger) to clarify the status of the proposed framework. We also review empirical meditation research (default-mode network suppression, EEG complexity, neurophenomenology) that maps onto these parameters. We contrast our process-based, functional approach to traditional mystical metaphysics. The formal I × F × D ≥ T model is examined for its conceptual utility and limitations, and its relation to dynamical systems (attractor landscapes, complexity theory) is explored. Finally, we discuss implications for theories of selfhood, the practice of contemplation (e.g. meditation pedagogy), and the role of introspection in philosophy. In sum, we advocate a scientifically disciplined model of practical minimal-dual insight as a self-organizing cognitive event, rather than an ontological revelation. (shrink)

Constructivist approaches have become influential across philosophy, cognitive science, and social theory, yet they are often applied in a fragmented and domain-specific way. Knowledge may be described as constructed while nature is treated as given; social reality as constructed while perception or physical reality remains exempt. This paper argues that such local constructivisms are conceptually unstable. If cognition is genuinely constructive, then construction cannot be confined to isolated domains without reintroducing hidden dualisms. Building on insights from epistemic, radical, social, and (...) enactive constructivism, the paper defends cognitive constructivism as a general ontology of world-availability. On this view, any world accessible to a cognitive system is available only through constructive processes shaped by constraints. Reality is not denied, but reconceived as what emerges through stable, constrained constructions rather than as a pre-given foundation. The paper explores the implications of this position for objectivity, realism, intersubjectivity, and cognitive failure, and argues that cognitive constructivism, taken seriously, must be global rather than local in scope. (shrink)

We reject eliminativism about core cognition while moving beyond the view that perception represents many of the same contents as core cognition. Focusing on the approximate number system and core physics, we recommend foundationalism about core cognition. Core cognition is a sui generis cognitive faculty that takes up contents and principles from perception and extends them to non-perceptual tasks.

It is a familiar story that, where Kant humbly draws a line beyond which cognition can’t reach, Husserl presses forward to show how we can cognize beyond that limit. Kant supposes that cognition is bound to sensibility and that what we experience in sensibility is mere appearance that does not inform us about the intrinsic nature of things in themselves. By contrast, for Husserl, it makes no sense to say we experience anything other than things in themselves when we enjoy (...) sensory perception. Kant’s conception, then, by doing just that, is nonsensical. I argue that Husserl’s account does not deliver on its promise. Things as they are in themselves are just as cognitively out of reach on Husserl’s understanding of them as they are on Kant’s. Further, the charge of nonsense Husserl raises against Kant’s conception of things in themselves applies—indeed, with greater force—to his own. (shrink)

Property realism is the view that there are mind-independent universals. In this paper, I present a distinctive argument for property realism, partly inspired by Edmund Husserl, which has not appeared in the contemporary literature and has only a spare few precedents in the history of philosophy. The argument is distinguished by being phenomenological, that is, based in reflective analysis of experiential content. It shows that universals must exist because we can have veridical experiences as of universals whose contents cannot be (...) reduced to representations of particulars. (shrink)

(Commentary on target article "Core Perception: Re-imagining Precocious Reasoning as Sophisticated Perceiving" by Bai, Hafri, Izard, Firestone, & Strickland.) Bai et al. claim that perceptual and core-cognitive object tracking operate according to common principles, including cohesion and spatiotemporal continuity. This claim is false: perceptual object continuity is not strictly governed by cohesion or spatiotemporal continuity. We must therefore either reject Bai et al.’s relocation of core-cognitive processes within perception or adopt more radically revisionary attitudes toward core cognition.

Mental capacities for perceiving, remembering, thinking, and planning involve the processing of structured mental representations. A compositional semantics of such representations would explain how the content of any given representation is determined by the contents of its constituents and their mode of combination. While many have argued that semantic theories of mental representations would have broad value for understanding the mind, there have been few attempts to develop such theories in a systematic and empirically constrained way. This paper contributes to (...) that end by developing a semantics for a ‘fragment’ of our mental representational system: the visual system’s representations of the bounding contours of objects. At least three distinct kinds of composition are involved in such representations: ‘concatenation’, ‘feature composition’, and ‘contour composition’. I sketch the constraints on and semantics of each of these. This account has three principal payoffs. First, it models a working framework for compositionally ascribing structure and content to perceptual representations, while highlighting core kinds of evidence that bear on such ascriptions. Second, it shows how a compositional semantics of perception can be compatible with holistic, or Gestalt, phenomena, which are often taken to show that the whole percept is ‘other than the sum of its parts’. Finally, the account illuminates the format of a key type of perceptual representation, bringing out the ways in which contour representations exhibit domain-specific form of the sort that is typical of structured icons such as diagrams and maps, in contrast to typical discursive representations of logic and language. (shrink)

I argue that something analogous to the myth of the given threatens conceptualism and show that conceptualists could solve the problem by adopting a predictivist approach to perception. Conceptualists thus have a strong reason to be predictivists.

Standard accounts of object perception force us to choose between the unity of objects and the particularity of objects. The unity of objects is explained in terms of general, repeatable representations and a mental act of predication that binds those representations. The particularity of objects is explained in terms of particular, unrepeatable representations and a pre-predicational mode of perceptual consciousness. Generalists argue that particularists cannot explain the structure of perception while particularists argue that generalism makes perception indifferent to the objects (...) themselves. Here, I show how Susanna Schellenberg’s capacitism can capture the motivations for both views. According to capacitism, perception is the result of exercises of perceptual capacities to discriminate concrete perceptual particulars. The trouble is that Schellenberg’s capacitism struggles to explain the structure of object perception without resorting to a further contribution from non-perceptual capacities. I propose that these problems can be avoided by positing a capacity to discriminate unity. Successful exercises of this capacity result in a representation of an object bound with its properties and make us directly aware of an object’s unity. (shrink)

Consider two experiences, one a veridical perceptual experience of a black cube in front of one, and a matching hallucinatory experience. From the perspective of the subject undergoing these experiences they at least can be phenomenologically indistinguishable. Call this the phenomenological indistinguishability claim (PI for short). My aim in this paper is to argue for a distinctive view which I call phenomenological disjunctivism, drawing on the works of classical phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. Phenomenological disjunctivism significantly qualifies the PI claim, and in (...) doing so is able to establish, through phenomenological analysis of the relevant experiences, an intrinsic difference in kind between veridical perception and (matching) hallucination, that is a difference in ‘essence’ purely on phenomenological grounds. Phenomenological disjunctivism accepts that veridical perception and hallucination either are or at least can be phenomenologically indistinguishable at a time but argues that due to a key difference in the possibilities of fulfilment of their ‘horizon structure’ are nonetheless phenomenologically distinguishable as fundamentally different types of experience over time (i.e., diachronically). This is the key Husserlian insight I will be reconstructing and attempting to make sense of in an articulation of phenomenological disjunctivism. (shrink)

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the role that 'intentional horizons' play in our visual experiences of complete three-dimensional objects. In doing so it critically evaluates a range of proposals concerning how best to theorize the respect in which our visual experiences include some form of awareress of the occluded or otherwise hidden parts of their objects. It proposes a novel Modal-Ability view, which emerges as the most plausible account of this 'possibilistic' compontent of spatial perception.

Core object representations are neither exclusively cognitive nor perceptual but subserve the hybrid capacity for perceptual demonstrative thinking. Developing the hypothesis that cognition and perception share a format, we propose that core object representations are indexical “mental files” at the perception/cognition interface.

Casey O’Callaghan has argued that rather than hearing meanings, we hear phonemes. In this note I argue that valuable though they are in an account of speech perception – depending on how we define ‘hearing’ – phonemes either don’t explain enough or they go too far. So, they are not the right tool for his criticism of the semantic perceptual account (SPA).

The sense of agency is the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions. In this paper, I provide a novel account of the sense of agency that appears in perceptual consciousness. I follow theorists such as Bayne and Prinz in suggesting that the perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes. The self-monitoring mechanism compares sensory predictions, made on the basis of motor commands, with sensory feedback. This comparison process distinguishes self-caused from other-caused perceptual changes. I argue for (...) a view where the PSoA is not explained by certain contents represented in perceptual experience. Rather, my account models the PSoA as a type of intentional mode that perceivers bear to contents. After defending this view, I respond to objections and contrast my account with others in the literature. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that language understanding has a distinctive phenomenology, as illustrated by phenomenal contrast cases. Yet it remains unclear how to account for the perceptual phenomenology of language experience. I advance a rhythmic account, which explains this phenomenology in terms of changes in rhythm of sensory capacities in both reading and speech perception. After presenting conceptual and empirical foundations for the account, I argue that it should be abductively preferred over competing views, especially the semantic perceptual view, which (...) holds that we literally perceive linguistic meaning. (shrink)

This paper examines a pre-linguistic state of experience as a legitimate phenomenological condition, focusing on the stillness and density that precede conscious formation. The visual image discussed in the paper functions as a phenomenological field of encounter and is currently exhibited at the Saatchi Art Gallery.

A topic of interest in the philosophy of perception concerns similarities and differences between the senses. One way of approaching this issue is to focus on structural differences. An interesting question in this respect concerns whether, and in what respect, perceptual modalities other than vision might possess a spatial field which is in some respects similar to the visual field. This paper argues that haptic touch is structured by an external spatial field, namely peripersonal space. I first provide a clarification (...) of the general characteristics of an external spatial field. The paper then outlines the notion of peripersonal space. Finally, I argue that peripersonal space functions as the external spatial field of haptic touch insofar as it meets the necessary conditions for a spatial field. (shrink)

In this essay, painter Deborah Scott examines how generative AI is changing representational painting in a screen-first visual culture. She argues that photography challenged painting at the level of recording, while AI challenges painting at the level of authorship, meaning, and provenance. As digital reproduction becomes the primary way viewers encounter art, traditional signals of human origin and image authenticity are weakened. Scott presents Structural Omission as a framework in contemporary painting built around perceptual limits, where partial seeing is treated (...) as load-bearing architecture rather than stylistic effect. She further argues that artist writing now functions as part of artistic practice: not secondary commentary, but evidence of human inquiry embedded in the work. The essay positions painting and writing together as a response to post-certainty conditions in contemporary visual culture. -/- . (shrink)

A good theory of perception should be able to account for the epistemology as well as the phenomenology of perception. My paper has two main goals: a) to offer such theory by proposing an argument in favor of a modified version of Reid`s direct realism and b) to argue that there are no illusions and we should drop the distinction between seemings and seeings. The novelty of my approach is that, unlike existing arguments against illusions, I am going to treat (...) illusions as a single category and will not adopt any form of anti-realism or phenomenalism. Instead, I am going to target the distinction between an object looking in a certain way and an object seeming to a perceiver to be such and such and show that it is unjustified to suppose that there are objective perceptual or looking properties of objects or phenomenal properties of experience. Perception is a relation and most of the properties that we are aware of while perceiving are relational properties. (shrink)

The purpose of my paper is to address the notion of experience, that is, the domain of discourse on the relationship of minds to the world. The mainstream vocabulary developed to handle such a relationship relies on representations. I will defend an empiricist standpoint by raising doubts on the heuristic value of this widely shared assumption. In a basic sense, metaphysics is involvement in nonexperiential entity stipulation. My key claim is that representationalism is a typical metaphysical doctrine because posits nonexperiential (...) entities. My starting point is the very succinct argument by Zeno which is reported by Plato at the beginning of Parmenides. I will reconstruct it as a challenge to any kind of pluralist ontology. In the second section, I will give a cursory account of examples of representationalist doctrines. I will argue that representationalism originates from the need of answering Zeno’s challenge. In the third section, I will provide a structured overview of Berkeley’s immaterialism. His doctrine is a package of three logically independent blocks: i. a refusal of representationalism; ii. an ontology of mental states; iii. a nominalist account of universals. As such it addresses traditional issues about minds and the world that involve belief justification, semantic concerns about the content of mental states, and the nature of objects. In the fourth section, I will address Berkeley’s conceivability argument against representations. I will show how it engages with open issues in contemporary debates. In the fifth section, I will supplement Berkeley’s criticism of representations with his views on contents. In the final section, I will summarize why empiricism constitutes an alternative to metaphysics. (shrink)

Leddington (2016. “The Experience of Magic.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74: 253–64) remains the leading philosophical account of magic, one that has gone relatively unchallenged. In this discussion piece, I have three aims. Namely, to (i) criticize Leddington’s attempt to explain the experience of magic in terms of belief-discordant alief; (ii) explore the possibility that much, if not all, of the experience of magic can be explained by mundane belief-discordant perception; and (iii) argue that make-believe is crucial (...) to successful performances of magic in ways Leddington at best overlooks and at worst denies. (shrink)

This paper presents a comprehensive scientific–philosophical framework for understanding consciousness through the Consciousness Frequency Model and the concept of the Cosmic Consciousness Field. Building on interdisciplinary evidence from neuroscience, physics, and philosophy of mind, it proposes that consciousness operates as a frequency-based phenomenon capable of both individual and collective scaling. -/- The framework explains how varying levels of consciousness frequency influence perception, decision-making, creativity, and social interaction. It further explores the interaction between the individual consciousness field and a proposed universal (...) field, offering a unified perspective that bridges subjective experience and objective reality. -/- By redefining consciousness in measurable, frequency-based terms, this work opens pathways for new research directions in cognitive science, quantum theory, and global ethics. Potential applications range from enhancing mental well-being and collective intelligence to developing technologies that align with higher states of human awareness. -/- . (shrink)

The philosophical riddle ‘If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?’ dramatises a conflict that is not merely metaphysical but epistemic and political. This essay reframes the question through Epistemic Clientelism Theory, showing how assent to either physics or phenomenology constitutes a clientelist exchange with epistemic authority. Drawing on Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, alongside phenomenology, cognitive science, and political psychology, I argue that the puzzle exposes our dependence on (...) authority structures. Silence is shown not as absence but as epistemic subjugation, resonant with Spivak’s notion of epistemic violence. Engaging Ivana Marková’s theory of epistemic trust and my own works on epistemocracy, free-range knowledge, and fiduciary openness, I propose that dependence need not degrade into clientelism. Fiduciary authority offers a way forward, binding epistemic power to duties of care, loyalty, and openness. The falling tree thus becomes a parable for our epistemic condition: vibrations exist, perception matters, but what counts as ‘sound’ depends on how authority is structured and how silence is dignified. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31320.56321. (shrink)

In this chapter we will explore new avenues for developing and defending Naïve Realism (also known as Relationalism), understood as a thesis about the phenomenal character of experience. The core claim of Naive Realism is that ‘what it’s like’ for a subject who enjoys a normal, successful perceptual experience of her surroundings consists in her being directly consciously aware of mind-independent entities in her external environment. It is widely agreed that the strongest challenge to Naïve Realism comes from the alleged (...) possibility of total hallucinations, and the orthodox line of response has been to adopt Disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this chapter, we will instead focus on an emerging alternative family of responses, which we’ll call ‘New Wave Relationalism’ (NWR). The core commitment of NWR is to reject the initial assumption that there can be total hallucinations that are both non-relational and subjectively indistinguishable from genuine perceptions. The primary aim for this chapter will be to explore and defend this broad NWR strategy for responding to the threat posed by hallucinations to Naïve Realism. We will argue that which specific version or species of NWR a Naïve Realist should adopt will depend on their background methodological and metaphysical commitments. (shrink)

Este trabajo explora, en primer lugar, la recepción heideggeriana de la filosofía de Kant, con especial atención a su concepción de la subjetividad y la función trascendental del tiempo, para posteriormente cuestionar la legitimidad de sus críticas mediante una interpretación alternativa de los textos que son el foco de su diatriba. Al reconstruir esta recepción, ponemos de relieve una ambigüedad: Kant es valorado como precursor del proyecto heideggeriano, pero se le reprocha una falta de radicalismo relativo a la cuestión del (...) tiempo que resulta, en última instancia, en una insuficiente superación del planteamiento ontológico cartesiano. A partir de lecturas recientes que sostienen que la subjetividad kantiana guarda un papel trascendental implícito para la espacialidad del sujeto, proponemos una reinterpretación unitaria de la paradoja de las contrapartes incongruentes, la “Refutación del idealismo” y la “Deducción trascendental de las categorías” de la edición B. Acudiremos, asimismo, a varias Reflexionen, entre las cuales destacaremos la llamada “Reflexión de Leningrado” descubierta en 1986. Sostenemos, contra Heidegger, que la redacción de la KrV de 1787 no pretende suprimir la primacía trascendental del tiempo frente al espacio, sino presentar una concepción de la relación entre ambos en la que el espacio desempeña una función constitutiva en la apertura a la experiencia. Por último, defenderemos que en el curso de Heidegger de 1935-1936 sobre la KrV se produce un giro respecto a la lectura de la década anterior compatible con la interpretación aquí propuesta. (shrink)

My interest lies in offering a phenomenological perspective on how noise is experienced, with particular attention to what may be common to different sorts of noise phenomena. As a counterpoint to the notion that noise is an empty or constructed notion, I argue for two desiderata of a phenomenological account of noise; accommodating a plurality of noise experiences, on the one hand, and clarifying their specific phenomenal character, on the other. I then pursue these desiderata by turning to an examination (...) of some contemporary views of perception that have implications for how the phenomenal character of perceptual noise in particular is to be understood; an epistemic misfire view and a sensory misfire view. After clarifying each and its appeal, I convey concerns about the one and the other. I propose a third alternative for further exploration - a perceptual disjoint view - and point to how it ought to explored. On the premise that there is something like a unity of consciousness or experience, I lay out the idea that there may then be many forms of 'disunities' of experience. From an analysis of the latter, I suggest, one may account for many different types of experiences of noise, though with a common ‘phenomenal’ thread running through them. (shrink)

Austere relationalism combines two claims. First, the phenomenal character of perception is at least partially constituted by the perceived items. Second, perception doesn’t consist in representing the perceived items as being a certain way. Recently, Daniel Kalpokas, Avner Baz, and Søren Overgaard have cast doubt on the ability of austere relationalism to account for the peculiar phenomenology of aspect-seeing. I show that this explanatory challenge can be met. Some of the claims made by the critics can be resisted, whereas other (...) can be accommodated into austere relationalism. Most notably, I argue that austere relationalists should acknowledge that aspect-seeing is enabled by unconscious perceptual judgment. This not only allows them to meet the challenge, but also provides the means to reconcile the apparently belief-independent phenomenology of aspect-seeing with the arguably indispensable role that concepts and recognition play in it. (shrink)

摘要：本文旨在系统探讨《黄帝内经》中提出的七情（喜、怒、忧、思、悲、恐、 惊）学说，并基于阴阳五行理论，构建一个阐释情志活动影响人体健康的结构化 模型。论文首次明确提出七情内在的阴阳属性划分（如怒为阳、郁为阴）及其与 五脏（肝、心、脾、肺、肾）五行配属的对应关系，揭示了情志致病的动态病理 学路径。通过跨学科的文献分析与理论思辨，本研究将《黄帝内经》“恬淡虚无， 真气从之”的核心养生理念，与现代神经科学、内分泌学的“稳态平衡”概念进 行深度对话与互释。研究提出：“恬淡虚无”可理解为一种理想的中枢情绪稳态， 而“真气从之”则是以此为基础的自主神经平衡与内分泌功能的最佳运行状态。 本文论证了负面情志通过“扰动气机”这一中介环节，破坏阴阳平衡与五行生克， 进而引发特定脏腑的神经功能紊乱与激素分泌失调，最终导致疾病的现代科学内 涵。本研究不仅为传统中医情志理论提供了清晰的现代化阐释框架，也为现代心 身医学、心理生理学及压力管理等领域提供了源自东方智慧的独特理论贡献与实 践启示。.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Rob Withagen has rendered the distinction between affordances and invitations more radical in two aspects: (i) affordances do not explain behavior anymore, invitations do; (ii) invitations do not boil down to affectively charged affordances, they also encompass affectively charged misperceptions. I argue that Withagen went too far. If we understand affordances as a relation between the abilities of an individual organism and its environment, then we already have sufficient resources to incorporate affectivity in the ecological approach. Affective states constitute perceptual (...) abilities and modulate their exercise, in that every perception of affordance is affectively charged. Affective states are crucial for guiding our attention to the possibilities of action relevant to the activities in which we are engaged and for providing a sense of the quality of our relationship with the environment. (shrink)

O debate acerca de qual é a natureza do conteúdo da experiência perceptiva ganhou novos contornos nas últimas décadas ao se introduzir a questão de se este conteúdo é conceitual ou não conceitual. Essa questão metafísica acerca da natureza da percepção é geralmente pressionada por uma outra de índole epistêmica: como a experiência perceptiva pode justificar crenças acerca do nosso entorno? John McDowell sustenta que, se a experiência já não tem um conteúdo conceitual de modo a apresentar o mundo como (...) sendo de uma determinada maneira, acarretando assim um elo comum entre percepção e pensamento, então é difícil ver como a experiência poderia justificar uma crença, especialmente se entendemos a justificação em termos internalistas, como faz McDowell. Contrapondo-se a essa posição, Athanassios Raftopoulos alega que se a experiência perceptiva envolve conceitos intrinsecamente e, portanto, é penetrada cognitivamente, então a experiência não é independente das nossas crenças de fundo e, desse modo, não pode funcionar como um tribunal neutro de justificação, pois o apoio evidencial fornecido pela experiência é circular e epistemologicamente viciado. Neste texto, eu defendo uma explicação de como a experiência perceptiva mantém uma relação racional com o pensamento empírico. Na primeira parte, vou elaborar duas teses que são centrais para explicar o papel de justificação da experiência perceptiva segundo uma perspectiva minimamente internalista, a saber, a tese do conteúdo comum entre a percepção e a crença e a tese da independência da percepção em relação à crença. Indicarei as dificuldades que estão envolvidas na tentativa de conciliar essas teses. A primeira parece requerer o conceitualismo de conteúdo, enquanto a segunda parece implicar sua rejeição. Apesar de declarações em contrário, eu argumento que McDowell falha em fazer justiça à segunda tese em Mind and World. Na segunda parte, apoiado na teoria enativa da percepção, de Alva Noë, defendo uma leitura menos intelectualista da primeira tese, descomprometida com o conceitualismo de conteúdo, e mostro como ela pode ser conciliada com a segunda. Finalmente, explico como atos perceptivos que nos dão acesso direto a objetos podem coagir racionalmente o pensamento empírico acerca do mundo circundante. Essa explicação pretende fazer justiça a um internalismo que qualifico como mínimo. (shrink)

THE GENETIC UNIVERSE brings to light a host of enlightening arguments giving the concept of intelligent design a new level of unprecedented respectability in surpassing of previous promotion efforts that usually end up defeated with ease by the influential global reach of the biological evolution lobby. Rather than defending intelligent design as “scientific” or making references to design with no proper explanation of consequences, the work goes on to elaborate on the “indirect creation basis” of human origins and what the (...) future holds. The universe is invisible and silent and there is no independent existence without express intervention of the supernaturally created structure of mind which acts by means of programmed genetic instructions. Therefore “existence” is up for an update that impacts intentionality directly and personal demeanor indirectly. The facts of the matter as argued in The Genetic Universe warn about the imposing nature of intelligent design suggesting both the possible gains of prudent compliance and the unavoidable pitfalls of a shortsighted attitude towards what “is” by virtue of design, agency, and plain—deliberate intent. (shrink)

Tracking theories of mental representation posit a privileged relation between color representations and the color properties of objects. Tracking theories of mental representation have been used to motivate color realism as they posit that the function of color vision is to represent the colors of objects. It has been argued that tracking theories have a major flaw, namely they cannot account for reliable misrepresentation. It has further been suggested that reliable color misrepresentation is a live possibility. In this chapter, I (...) argue that the current evidence indicates that our color representations reliably misrepresent. This conclusion undermines tracking theories and the color realist theories they purport to motivate. (shrink)

Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience is a must‐read for philosophers of mind and cognitive science. Here I consider Hill's representationalist account of spatial perception. I distinguish two theses defended in the book. The first is that perceptual experience does not represent the enduring, intrinsic properties of objects, such as intrinsic shape or size. The second is that perceptual experience does represent certain viewpoint‐dependent properties of objects—namely, Thouless properties. I argue that Hill's arguments do not establish the first thesis, and then I (...) raise questions about the Thouless‐property view and its role in Hill's defense of representationalism. (shrink)

Perception can provide us with a privileged source of evidence about the external world – evidence that makes it rational to believe things about the world. In Reasons First, Mark Schroeder offers a new view on how perception does so. The central motivation behind Schroeder's account is to offer an answer to what evidence perception equips us with according to which it is what he calls world-implicating but non-factive, and thereby to glean some of the key advantages of both externalism (...) and internalism, respectively. He answers this motivation by developing a more specific view that he calls the Apparent Factive Attitude view, which pairs an answer to what evidence is provided by a perceptual experience with an answer to why having that perceptual experience provides you with that evidence. In this paper, we advance two interconnected problems for Schroeder's Apparent Factive Attitude view. A traditional intuitive judgment that often motivates internalists is the idea that internal duplicates must necessarily be equally rational in whatever beliefs they have. Schroeder's arguments rely on a weaker claim – that people who are both internal and historical external duplicates but differ only in the veridicality of a single perceptual experience must be equally rational in whatever beliefs they have. In this way he preserves what he argues to be a more compelling internalist intuition. But our arguments will show that Schroeder's view is committed to denying an even more compelling internalist intuition yet – that internal duplicates must have the same phenomenology. (shrink)

An interview with Dr. Alaa Algargoosh, a research fellow at MIT Media Lab.

This thesis is about perceptual experience, its subjective character, and how it is essentially structured. It focuses specifically on how the nature of perception is shaped not only by our acquaintance with the world but also by the very structure of experience itself. My central claim is that perceptual consciousness incorporates different aspects, some of which constitute the very way in which experiences are organized, sustained, and structured. Over the course of this thesis, I develop and defend an original account (...) of the nature of perceptual experience by integrating naïve realism, a prominent contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, with insights and ideas from the Phenomenological tradition. In particular, I argue that there are fruitful grounds for combining naïve realism and a phenomenologically grounded account of the essential structural features of experience (‘minimal self’, ‘temporality’, ‘anticipation’). Naïve realism holds that perception is fundamentally a matter of being in direct contact with some mind-independent entities. Proponents of naïve realism often emphasize the ‘object-dependent’ nature of perception. The appeal to the structural features of experience offers us a promising way to delineate the oft-overlooked ‘subject-dependent’ nature of perception and capture the phenomenological richness of our conscious experiential life. This thesis offers a rich, phenomenologically informed account of the nature of perception which in turn places us in a better position to understand the nature of hallucination. The integration of naïve realism and the structural approach to consciousness I develop in this thesis yields a novel solution to the problem of hallucination: structural disjunctivism. According to this view, the ‘partially overlapping’ psychological nature of perception and hallucination is accounted for in terms of their structural similarities and differences. I seek to show how detailed analyses and reflections on the structures of perceptual experience pave the way to reconceive the phenomenological basis of naïve realism. (shrink)