Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts (...) and the legislative apparatus. Law is also a key institution for overcoming contracting uncertainties. It is furthermore a part of the power structure of society, and a major means by which power is exercised. This argument is illustrated by considering institutions such as property and the firm. Complex systems of law have played a crucial role in capitalist development and are also vital for developing economies. (shrink)

This study is based on the theory of emergence and introduces a hierarchical model of consciousness to analyze how consciousness emerges, propagates, and evolves within human level. By examining the interaction mechanisms between different hierarchical levels, it interprets complex phenomena such as individual desires, free will, and social evolution. Additionally, by exploring the possibility of consciousness transcending biological constraints, it analyzes potential future forms of consciousness. Finally, through a reflexive approach, this paper highlights that it is not only a theoretical (...) description of consciousness but also a self-proof of the theory itself. This research aims to provide a systematic theoretical framework for the nature of consciousness, individual behavior, and mechanisms of social evolution, while opening new directions for systems science and sociology. (shrink)

This paper challenges the conventional view that pre-Qin Confucianism represents kingly virtue politics that lacks institutional duty. By interpreting Xunzi’s notion of yi 義, particularly gong-yi 公義, as a form of public obligation, I show that Xunzi exposes yi to state institutions to oblige people to serve public ends. While institutional duty is often associated with post-Enlightenment political philosophy, this paper argues that Xunzi’s philosophy offers a comparable framework of public–private exchange. Xunzi’s gong-yi may be a public-servicing sense of duty (...) that combines moral and civic dimensions, compelling individuals to cooperate for the collective good. Unlike social contract theories that trade private rights with public duties, Xunzi’s system relies on moral compulsion and normative reciprocity. This system posits a sensible exchange between individual duties from inner compulsion for the public good. By contrasting gong 公 (the public) with si 私 (the private), Xunzi envisions the public as an entity that is serviced through public duties and a place for human flourishing. Positioning the role of gong-yi in Xunzi’s broader institutional project crystalizes this nascent concept of a “public” and its relationships with civic duties. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly adopted to make decisions in domains such as business, education, health care, and criminal justice. However, such algorithmic decision systems can have prevalent biases against marginalized social groups and undermine social justice. Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is a recent development aiming to make an AI system’s decision processes less opaque and to expose its problematic biases. This paper argues against technical XAI, according to which the detection and interpretation of algorithmic bias can be handled (...) more or less independently by technical experts who specialize in XAI methods. Drawing on resources from feminist epistemology, we show why technical XAI is mistaken. Specifically, we demonstrate that the proper detection of algorithmic bias requires relevant interpretive resources, which can only be made available, in practice, by actively involving a diverse group of stakeholders. Finally, we suggest how feminist theories can help shape integrated XAI: an inclusive social-epistemic process that facilitates the amelioration of algorithmic bias. (shrink)

This paper examines Edmund Husserl's revised account of expression in his 1913–1914 revisions of the Logical Investigations. Rejecting the Investigations’ thesis that linguistic meanings are constituted in a distinctive class of essentially non-intuitive meaning intentions, Husserl develops a new conception of empty intention, a new analysis of the intuitively fulfilled discourse and a phenomenology of the indicative tendency. While these revisions have been acknowledged, their motivation, connection, and significance remain under-explored in the existing literature. By comparing the Investigations and the (...) Revisions, this paper shows how these developments fundamentally alter Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between language, thought, and intuition. The revised account of expression illuminates the dynamic interaction of these elements in the process of meaning-making, offering a balanced account of the interplay of presence and absence in our use of words. (shrink)

Two types of formal models - landscape search tasks and two-armed bandit models - are often used to study the effects that various social factors have on epistemic performance. I argue that they can be understood within a single framework. In this unified framework, I develop a model that may be used to understand the effects of functional and demographic diversity and their interaction. Using the unified model, I find that the benefit of demographic diversity is most pronounced in a (...) functionally homogeneous group, and decreases with the increase of functional diversity. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs Sartre’s account of the “circuit of ipseity” as an integral theory of the experiential, agentive and normative aspects of self-consciousness. At the core of this theory is a conception of human (self-)consciousness as lacking, and the correlation between lacking and ideal. In Section 1, I show how this theory manages to satisfy the apparently incompatible requirements generated by the idea of a pre-reflective cogito. Section 2 discusses practical self-consciousness, in particular the agent’s consciousness of herself as self-determined (...) in the projection and pursuit of ends, and how this is accounted for in Sartre’s theory by the correlation of lack and ideal. Section 3 first clarifies the Sartrean conception of the ideal by comparing it with Korsgaard’s, and then reconstructs Sartre’s account of practical normativity by showing how it can be read as emerging from a critical engagement with Heidegger. (shrink)

This study aims to establish a formal system grounded in observation, transforming the properties and outcomes of empirical observation into rigorously treatable mathematical structures, thereby constructing a strictly epistemological mathematical framework for physics and the natural sciences. Starting from the indistinguishability inherent in observation, we rigorously demonstrate how the modern mathematical notions of structure and morphism can be employed to represent phenomena as objects within topological spaces; and, by analyzing the relations among observations, how causality and dynamics can be strictly (...) reconstructed as evolution processes centered on observable phenomena. This study reveals that the necessity of mathematics in the natural sciences arises from the fact that mathematical logic itself is the only possible language through which natural phenomena can be coherently described. Accordingly, epistemology is established as the foundational language of the natural sciences, and a complete logical reconstruction of the fundamental concepts of physics is achieved without invoking any ontological assumptions. (shrink)

This paper explores how contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering can benefit from Richard Rorty's approach by outlining Rortian conceptual engineering. Three perspectives on Rortian conceptual engineering are discussed. First, Rortian conceptual engineering represents a form of radical conceptual engineering that dismisses the role of folk intuitions and views philosophical progress as the replacement of old problems with new ones. More specifically, Rortian conceptual engineering sees conceptual revolution as a process in which new metaphors replace old literal meanings. Second, Rorty's metaphilosophical (...) distinction between epistemological and conversational philosophy is more profound than the distinctions between conceptual analysis and conceptual engineering, or between functional and nonfunctional approaches, thus enhancing our understanding of two types of contemporary conceptual engineering: epistemological and conversational. Third, Rorty argues that choosing concepts should take into account not only the competing concepts but also the conceptual schemes in which these concepts are situated. (shrink)

Background: While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved widespread adoption, malicious prompt engineering—specifically "jailbreak attacks"—poses severe security risks by inducing models to bypass internal safety mechanisms. Current benchmarks predominantly focus on public safety and Western cultural norms, leaving a critical gap in evaluating the niche, high-risk domain of medical ethics within the Chinese context. Objective: To establish a specialized jailbreak evaluation framework for Chinese medical ethics and to systematically assess the defensive resilience and ethical alignment of seven prominent LLMs when (...) subjected to sophisticated adversarial simulations. Methodology: We evaluated seven prominent models (e.g., GPT-5, Claude-Sonnet-4-Reasoning, DeepSeek-R1) using a "role-playing + scenario simulation + multi-turn dialogue" vector within the DeepInception framework. The testing focused on eight high-risk themes, including commercial surrogacy and organ trading, utilizing a hierarchical scoring matrix to quantify the Attack Success Rate (ASR) and ASR Gain. Results: A systemic collapse of defenses was observed, whereas models demonstrated high baseline compliance, the jailbreak ASR reached 82.1%, representing an ASR Gain of over 80 percentage points. Claude-Sonnet-4-Reasoning emerged as the most robust model, while five models—including Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-4.1—exhibited near-total failure with ASRs between 96% and 100%. Conclusions: Current LLMs are highly vulnerable to contextual manipulation in medical ethics, often prioritizing "helpfulness" over safety constraints. To enhance security, we recommend a transition from outcome to process supervision, the implementation of multi-factor identity verification, and the establishment of cross-model "joint defense" mechanisms. (shrink)

This study constructs a generative model of subjective experience based on neuroscience and complex systems research, revealing the origins of authenticity in both subjective and dream experiences. By incorporating investigations into marginal cases in neuroscience, it provides an interpretive pathway for the hard problem and the first-person perspective within the evolutionary mechanisms of complex systems. This research deepens understanding of classical problems in philosophy of consciousness and offers novel perspectives for consciousness studies through a complex systems lens.

In the literature on expert trust, it is often assumed that track records are the gold standard for evaluating expertise, and the difficulty of expert identification arises from either the lack of access to track records, or the inability to assess them. I show, using a computational model, that even in an idealized environment where agents have a God’s eye view on track records, they may fail to identify experts. Under plausible conditions, selecting testimony based on track records ends up (...) reducing overall accuracy, and preventing the community from identifying the real experts. (shrink)

John Harris recently argues that the moral bioenhancement proposed by Persson and Savulescu can damage moral agency by depriving the recipients of their freedom to fall (freedom to make wrongful choices) and therefore should not be pursued. The link Harris makes between moral agency and the freedom to fall, however, implies that all forms of moral enhancement, including moral education, that aim to make the enhancement recipients less likely to “fall” are detrimental to moral agency. In this paper, I present (...) a new moral agency-based critique against the moral bioenhancement program envisaged by Persson and Savulescu. I argue that the irresistible influences exerted by the bioenhancement program harms our capabilities for conducting accurate self-reflection and forming decisions that truly express our will, which subsequently undermine our moral agency. (shrink)

萨特的他人学说与胡塞尔现象学构成了多层次的对话。本文不仅关注萨特对胡塞尔同感理论的明确批评，更聚焦于他对“交互身体性”理论方向的隐含拒斥，以此凸显其“目光”学说的独特路径。本文将这一路径诠释为一种基于 “想象变更”的哲学尝试：即便在思想实验中悬置了身体的触觉自反性结构，他人依然可以通过“目光”经验被给予我们。目光经验是一种具身情感经验：在他人目光下，我为自身感到羞耻。这种羞耻是对自身脆弱性和他人超越 性的承认，表达了诸具身意识间存在的统一。以目光经验为前提，萨特理论中的同感不仅是对他人作为对象的直接知觉，而且是对他人脆弱性的守护。.

ABSTRACT In a Buddhist treatise from around the fourth century CE there is a very remarkable story which serves as a thought experiment calling us to question the nature of self and the identity of persons. Lost in Sanskrit, the passage is fortunately preserved in a Chinese translation, the Dà zhìdù lùn. We here present the first reliable translation directly from the Classical Chinese, and discuss the philosophical significance of the story in its historical and literary context. We emphasise the (...) philosophical importance of embedding the story in two framing narratives, and demonstrate that the story taps a range of intuitions, and indeed fears, about the survival of the self which have also played a large role in the history of the topic in the West, and which continue to be of great contemporary concern. (shrink)

The rare but severe cerebral venous thrombosis occurring in some AstraZeneca vaccine recipients has prompted some governments to suspend part of their COVID-19 vaccination programmes. Such suspensions have faced various challenges from both scientific and ethical angles. Most of the criticisms against such suspensions follow a consequentialist approach, arguing that the suspension will lead to more harm than benefits. In this paper, I propose a rights-based argument against the suspension of the vaccine rollouts amid this highly time-sensitive combat of COVID-19. (...) I argue that by suspending a vaccine rollout, a government infringes people's right to take the risks they deem worth taking for their health. I also consider four potential objections to my argument and explain why none of them undermines my argument. (shrink)

This paper investigates the mechanism of downward causation in emergent systems, proposing the concept of an effective potential as its mathematical formalization from the perspective of lower-level dynamics. In connection with nonlinear dynamical equations, we demonstrate that feedback mechanisms in complex systems are often erroneously reduced to phenomenological models. This reveals a methodological pitfall in physical research: phenomenological models grounded in reductionism may fail to uniquely map onto the intrinsic dynamics of the system. Consequently, we advocate establishing a new paradigm (...) that transcends reductionism and seeks a more fundamental understanding of complex systems. Using cosmological-scale dark matter phenomena as an example, we highlight the interdisciplinary significance of this approach. (shrink)

This article explores the use of model organisms in studying the cognitive phenomenon of decision-making. Drawing on the framework of biological control to develop a skeletal conception of decision-making, we show that two core features of decision-making mechanisms can be identified by studying model organisms, such as E. coli, jellyfish, C. elegans, lamprey, and so on. First, decision mechanisms are distributed and heterarchically structured. Second, they depend heavily on chemical information processing, such as that involving neuromodulators. We end by discussing (...) the implications for studying distinctively human decision-making. (shrink)

This study attempts to reconstruct Nietzsche’s reading of Aristotle in the 1860s and 1870s—the years before he left his career as a philologist. Against the popular view that Nietzsche read only one book by Aristotle, namely the Rhetoric, the present study hopes to show that he had direct knowledge of several of Aristotle’s main works, while much of his interest in Aristotle centred on the latter’s account of art. The particular aim of this study is to explore how Nietzsche’s reading (...) of Aristotle contributed to the formation of The Birth of Tragedy. It will show that, although Nietzsche mentions Aristotle in his first book only en passant, his theory of tragedy should be understood against the background of Aristotelian poetics, especially as interpreted by such contemporaries as Jacob Bernays, Joseph Hubert Reinkens, and Gustav Teichmüller. (shrink)

In this article, I analyze the evolution of Husserl's view on the normativity of logic and the corresponding changes in his phenomenological analysis of judgment. Initially, in the Prolegomena, Husserl claimed that the laws of pure logic are ideal and acquire normative status only as a result of application. Later, however, he revised this position and claimed that the same laws are at once ideal and normative. Sections 1 and 2 present textual evidence for attributing such a change of position (...) to Husserl, which is not generally acknowledged in the literature. Section 3 critically examines Husserl's early position, with specific attention to the model of instantiation. Sections 4–6 identify three key stages in the development of Husserl's theory of judgment that lead to the normative conception of pure logic: (1) the critique of the dissociation of ideal content and assertive force; (2) the rejection of the instantiation model of proposition and the development of a new account in terms of identification; (3) the genetic‐phenomenological interpretation of proposition and the elaboration of the three‐layer structure of pure logic. (shrink)

There is a literature across science and technology studies, sociology of science, and philosophy examining the phenomenon of hype in science and technology. While definitions of hype vary, most accounts share a critical stance, viewing them as misleading or distorting scientific and public discourse. This paper takes a different approach by asking whether certain aspects of hyping might, under specific conditions, be beneficial. Rather than thinking about hype as isolated episodes, I think about hyping as a communicative strategy that affects (...) decision-making under uncertainty. While individual instances of hype are harmful and often short-lived, as a practice, hyping might nevertheless be efficient in allocating resources. I draw an analogy between aggressively promoting the potential of emerging technologies despite significant uncertainty, and the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm in reinforcement learning, a strategy shown to perform well in problems involving multiple uncertain choices. By drawing this analogy, I identify the conditions under which hyping can function as a collective implementation of UCB in a multi-agent, distributed context. To do so, I present a formal model that allows us to think about hyping as a mechanism for orchestrating public attention and helping shape the direction of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

This paper is meant as a contribution to the longstanding debate among Husserl scholars regarding the relationship between time-consciousness and the I. From a genetic-phenomenological perspective, the I lives in the tension between passivity and activity. Exploring how the I relates to time-consciousness thus involves thematizing the interplay of passivity and activity at the most fundamental level of constitution. Specifically, it is necessary to determine whether there is an active form of temporalization. Acknowledging the ambiguities in Husserl’s late manuscripts on (...) time, this paper takes an indirect approach to this question. Relying primarily on Husserl’s analysis of active synthesis in his transcendental logic, I argue that being intellectually active requires an active form of temporalization, which establishes the specific rhythm of egoic activity. (shrink)

This research adopts a quantitative-qualitative mixed-methods approach to examine the role of flipped classroom pedagogy in fostering critical thinking skills in English argumentative essays among Chinese EFL undergraduates. Specifically, the pilot study compares the mean scores of the pretest and posttest, focusing on the performance in English argumentative essays between the experimental group (N=32) and the control group (N=28). It investigates the impact of the flipped classroom on developing critical thinking skills in argumentative essays. It explores the experiences and perceptions (...) of Chinese EFL learners regarding how the flipped classroom enhances their critical thinking skills in such essays. The ultimate goal is to assist these students in improving their writing quality, achieving better academic outcomes, and enhancing their competitiveness in future job markets. The significance of this research lies in its potential to promote the adoption of the flipped classroom as an effective pedagogical tool for supporting Chinese EFL undergraduates. The findings indicate that the experimental group’s mean scores steadily increased throughout the intervention, providing robust evidence of the effectiveness of the flipped classroom approach in fostering critical thinking skills in Chinese EFL undergraduates’ argumentative essays writing. We hope this study will inspire more researchers to propose meaningful pedagogical implications and recommendations to improve teaching and learning processes within EFL contexts. (shrink)

Background: The concept of digital twins has great potential for transforming the existing health care system by making it more personalized. As a convergence of health care, artificial intelligence, and information and communication technologies, personalized health care services that are developed under the concept of digital twins raise a myriad of ethical issues. Although some of the ethical issues are known to researchers working on digital health and personalized medicine, currently, there is no comprehensive review that maps the major ethical (...) risks of digital twins for personalized health care services. Objective: This study aims to fill the research gap by identifying the major ethical risks of digital twins for personalized health care services. We first propose a working definition for digital twins for personalized health care services to facilitate future discussions on the ethical issues related to these emerging digital health services. We then develop a process-oriented ethical map to identify the major ethical risks in each of the different data processing phases. Methods: We resorted to the literature on eHealth, personalized medicine, precision medicine, and information engineering to identify potential issues and developed a process-oriented ethical map to structure the inquiry in a more systematic way. The ethical map allows us to see how each of the major ethical concerns emerges during the process of transforming raw data into valuable information. Developers of a digital twin for personalized health care service may use this map to identify ethical risks during the development stage in a more systematic way and can proactively address them. Results: This paper provides a working definition of digital twins for personalized health care services by identifying 3 features that distinguish the new application from other eHealth services. On the basis of the working definition, this paper further layouts 10 major operational problems and the corresponding ethical risks. Conclusions: It is challenging to address all the major ethical risks that a digital twin for a personalized health care service might encounter proactively without a conceptual map at hand. The process-oriented ethical map we propose here can assist the developers of digital twins for personalized health care services in analyzing ethical risks in a more systematic manner. (shrink)

This paper approaches Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness from a mereological perspective. Taking as inspiration Bergson’s idea that pure durée is a multiplicity of interpenetration, I will show, from within Husserlian phenomenology, that the absolute flow can indeed be described as a whole of interpenetrating parts. This mereological perspective will inform my re-consideration of the much-discussed issue of Husserl’s self-criticism concerning the schema of content and apprehension. It will also reveal a fundamental similarity between Husserl’s conception of the absolute flow and (...) Sartre’s conception of lived temporality. This paper consists of four sections. Section 2 presents the basic elements of Husserl’s mereology. Section 3 introduces the difficulty encountered by Husserl’s early account of time that makes use of the schema. I will examine Barry Dainton’s criticism of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness against the background of the older debate between Meinong and Stern, a debate that has informed Husserl’s own account. Section 4 distinguishes two common criticisms of the schema from Husserl’s own self-criticism, which is in turn divided into two steps. It is shown how the second step of this self-criticism implies the interpenetration of the absolute flow and responds to Dainton’s criticism. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes with some comparative remarks. I will show how Husserl’s notion of absolute flow, as mereologically interpreted, anticipates Sartre’s conception of consciousness as self-transcendence, as well as how it accommodates the apparently conflicting mereological intuitions of Aristotle and Bergson. (shrink)

The article examines the necessity of moral knowledge for moral worth, focusing on Neil Sinhababu’s (2024) arguments. Sliwa (2015) and Cunningham (2021) contend that moral worth requires moral knowledge. In contrast, Sinhababu (2024) challenges this view using Gettier cases, arguing that justified true belief, even without knowledge, can still confer moral worth. This article argues that Sinhababu’s Gettier cases do not convincingly demonstrate that moral knowledge is unnecessary for moral worth.

This article reconstructs Sartre’s theory of selfhood against the background of the contemporary debate between minimal-self theories and narrative-self theories. I argue that Sartre’s theory incorporates both an emphasis on the singular first-person perspective, which is characteristic of minimal-self theories, and an emphasis on the practical intelligibility of experience, which is characteristic of narrative-self theories. The distinctiveness of the Sartrean combination of these motifs consists in its idea of the necessary ideal-relatedness of consciousness. According to Sartre, the logical structure of (...) the pre-reflective cogito requires the haunting presence of an ideal of self-coincidence, which determines for consciousness the meaning of its lived experiences. Consciousness exists as a question to itself due to this ideal-relatedness, and it answers this question by projecting its possibilities as creative and symbolic realizations of this ideal. Establishing the connection between Sartre’s theory of imagination and his theory of selfhood, I suggest that both the ideal and the possibility of consciousness are lived in the manner of the imaginary. (shrink)

The issue of the use of the Nachlass material has been much debated in Nietzsche scholarship in recent decades. Some insist on the absolute interpretative priority of his published writings over those unpublished and suggest that an extensive engagement with the Nachlass is harmful because it is something Nietzsche rejected. To verify this claim, they appeal to the story of Nietzsche asking his landlord in Sils-Maria to burn some of his notes. Since the notes that were ultimately retrieved are purportedly (...) incorporated into the compilation The Will to Power, the story also leads some to conclude that Nietzsche rejected his project on the will to power. However, the reliability of this story has been questioned. In this manuscript I first present the decisive piece of evidence that will settle the controversy over the story’s authenticity. After showing that it is true that in 1888 Nietzsche wanted some of his notes burned, I address the question of what we can conclude from this story. I argue that it neither suggests the abandonment of the will to power project, nor warrants a devaluation of the Nachlass. Finally, I will discuss the methodological problem of the use of Nietzsche’s Nachlass in general. (shrink)

Research has indicated that microRNAs (miRNAs), a special class of non-coding RNAs (ncRNAs), can perform important roles in different biological and pathological processes. miRNAs’ functions are realized by regulating their respective target genes (targets). It is thus critical to identify and analyze miRNA-target interactions for a better understanding and delineation of miRNAs’ functions. However, conventional knowledge discovery and acquisition methods have many limitations. Fortunately, semantic technologies that are based on domain ontologies can render great assistance in this regard. In our (...) previous investigations, we developed a miRNA domain-specific application ontology, Ontology for MIcroRNA Target (OMIT), to provide the community with common data elements and data exchange standards in the miRNA research. This paper describes (1) our continuing efforts in the OMIT ontology development and (2) the application of the OMIT to enable a semantic approach for knowledge capture of miRNA-target interactions. (shrink)

This paper responds to Chen Yajun’s critique in “Frankfurt’s Concept of Identification.” Frankfurt is well-known for defining free will as second-order volitions that an agent fully endorses wholeheartedly. Chen, however, argues that Frankfurt’s concept of wholeheartedness is problematic for two reasons. First, it fails to offer a clear endpoint in the appeal to higher-order desires to resolve conflicts among second-order desires. Second, wholeheartedness sets an unreasonably high bar for acting freely, as one can still act freely even in a state (...) of halfheartedness or ambivalence. In response, Chen proposes his theory of weak identification, which he claims has certain advantages over Frankfurt’s view. I argue that Frankfurt can address the issue of arbitrariness and that Chen misinterprets Frankfurt’s concept of wholeheartedness. Furthermore, I argue that Chen’s theory faces significant challenges. (shrink)

There is an eminent tradition of thought that sees in the phenomenon of time something contradictory. This tradition has been recently revived by some contemporary proponents of dialethism – the view that there are true contradictions. In this paper, I will contribute to this line of thinking by tracing the first steps of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. In particular, I will argue that the experiential flow of time can be accounted for in the framework of an intentionalist approach to (...) temporal perception if we conceive of time-consciousness as a quasi-multiplicity, i.e., a multiplicity of non-self-identical parts, hence the embrace of dialethism. Section 1 introduces dialethism, discusses Priest's dialethic theory of motion and time, and motivates the project of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. Section 2 introduces the intentionalist approach to time-consciousness and distinguishes pure intentionalism from sense-data intentionalism; both subscribes to a certain Principle of Simultaneous Awareness but interprets it differently. In Sect. 3, I offer an in-depth analysis of this principle and identify its core as the requirement of self-unification, i.e., the requirement that time-consciousness unifies itself in flowing without any higher-order act of unification. Section 4 then argues that pure intentionalism can satisfy this requirement by embracing dialethism. I conclude by noting how the dialethic account of time-consciousness incorporates a central extensionalist insight within an intentionalist outlook. (shrink)

Against the intellectualist conception of subjectivity as a constituting power that transcends the temporal condition of our existence, phenomenology proposes to understand subjectivity in terms of temporality and temporality in terms of subjectivity. This paper explores how this mutual illumination works out for our intellectual consciousness. To address this question, the author revisits the debate between phenomenology and intellectualism, using Maurice Merleau-Ponty's critique of neo-Kantian intellectualism as a starting point. Two conclusions emerge from this revisiting: the original constitution of time (...) is essentially incomplete, hence its nonintellectuality; intellectual activity must be complete, hence its irreducibility to the nascent time. To articulate the relation between temporalization and intellectual activity, the phenomenological conception of foundation as a two-way relation proves helpful. Intellectual activity is indeed founded on original temporalization, insofar as it is to be understood as active synthesis in the living present, but it also imposes a constraint on the mode of temporalization appropriate to such synthesis. We can speak of a temporalization of intellectual consciousness only insofar as we allow for an intellectualizing transformation of original temporality. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a clarification of the long debate on whether enhancement will or will not diminish authenticity. It focuses particularly on accounts provided by Carl Elliott and David DeGrazia. Three clarifications will be presented here. First, most discussants only criticise Elliott’s identity argument and neglect that his conservative position in the use of enhancement can be understood as a concern over social coercion. Second, Elliott’s and DeGrazia’s views can, not only co-exist, but even converge together as an (...) autonomy based theory of authenticity. Third, the current account of autonomy provided by DeGrazia fails to address the importance of rationality and the ability of self-correction, which, as a result impedes the theory to provide a fully developed account for authenticity. In conclusion, a satisfactory account of authenticity cannot focus only on identity or subjective preference. (shrink)

本文尝试在柏格森哲学中内思考时间的内在量度。绵延的不可测量性是柏格森哲学的标志性命题，但《时间与自由意志》中两种复多性的互斥对立似乎设定了一种全然无“度”的绵延，这不仅使得任何对时间的测量成为难以理解 的操作，而且与该书中“量所呈现的质”这一核心概念相冲突。与此相对，《物质与记忆》提出的绵延存在差异化张力程度的理论修正了两种复多性的学说，从而赋予绵延以内在量度。但柏格森本人囿于其对数概念的空间化理解 ，未能明确指认这一变化。 -/- This paper attempts to think the intrinsic measure of time within Bergsonian philosophy. The immeasurability of duration is a signature proposition of Bergson's philosophy. However, the stark opposition of the two multiplicities in Time and Free Will seems to postulate a duration without any intrinsic measure, which not only makes any measurement of time an incomprehensible operation, but also conflicts with the central notion of “quantity presented as quality” in the same book. In contrast, the theory of the (...) differentiated degrees of tension in duration proposed in Matter and Memory modifies the doctrine of the two multiplicities, thus giving duration an intrinsic measure. However, Bergson himself, caught up in his spatialized understanding of the concept of number, fails to explicitly identify this change. (shrink)

Balancing a hermeneutic of trust with a hermeneutic of suspicion, this article develops a phenomenological description of imagination that highlights its alethic ambiguity. Imagination is an act of disclosure, without which the world of fiction and pure possibility cannot be constituted. Imagination is also an act of self-indulgence and narcissism, the source of much concealment and untruth. It is not the one or the other, but both at the same time, essentially ambiguous because of its phenomenological constitution. In this article, (...) I will take some steps towards clarifying this essential ambiguity of the imagination by drawing on the insights of Husserl and Sartre. Beginning with Husserl’s parallel treatment of imagination and perception as intuitive, objectifying acts, I will argue, drawing on insights from Sartre, that there is an important discrepancy between them with respect to the role of desire. While the constitution of perceptual presence is inseparable from a desire for truth, the desire involved in the constitution of imaginary presence has an ambiguous character, both epistemic and magical. This duplicity of desire partly accounts for the ambiguity of imagination, which is all the more pronounced the more the imagination demands the full emotional involvement of the imagining subject. (shrink)

Robert Sparrow recently argues that state-driven moral bioenhancement is morally problematic because it inevitably invites moral perfectionism. While sharing Sparrow’s worry about state-driven moral bioenhancement, I argue that his anti-perfectionism argument is too strong to offer useful normative guidance. That is, if we reject state-driven moral bioenhancement because it cannot remain neutral between different conceptions of the good, we might have to conclude that all forms of moral enhancement program ought not be made compulsory, including the least controversial and most (...) popular state-driven program: compulsory (moral) education. -/- In this paper, I argue that instead, the spirit of Sparrow’s worry should be recast in the language of the capability approach – an approach that strives to enhance people’s capabilities to develop their own conceptions of the good by restricting itself from endorsing thick conceptions of the good. The distinction made regarding thick and thin conceptions of the good helps better capture sentiments against state-driven bioenhancement programs without falling prey to the issues I raise against Sparrow’s anti-perfectionist arguments. (shrink)

本文在梅洛—庞蒂前期哲学“先验自然主义”的整体问题脉络中考察他在 “沉默的我思”名目下提出的主体性概念，并将其与萨特的“前反思的我思”比较。先验自然主义的要义是：意识的先验维度不离其自然根基。知觉二重性和运动的二重性表明，先验与自然之“不离”应被理解为双向奠基关系。 对感觉和他人现象的考察则展示，主体性本身也不免于此二重性。然而，梅氏最终未能维持二重主体性中双向奠基关系的微妙平衡，而是将“我思”的明证性最终归结于知觉场域的事实存在的确定性，此即前人格的、与自然交融 的“沉默的我思”。萨特的“前反思的我思”则是不可变格的第一人称视角，是主体性与世界、与自身的断裂。二者各具原初性，其关系乃双向奠基。 -/- In this paper, I examine Merleau-Ponty’s conception of subjectivity – which he put forward under the title of “tacit cogito” – in the overall context of his early philosophy characterized by “transcendental naturalism” and compare it with Sartre’s notion of “pre-reflective cogito”. Transcendental naturalism holds that the transcendental dimension of consciousness is inseparable from its rootedness in nature. The “duality” of perception and of bodily movement, as discussed by Merleau-Ponty, shows that the inseparability of the transcendental and (...) the natural should be understood as a two-way relation of foundation. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of sensation and the other shows, furthermore, that subjectivity itself is not unaffected by this duality. However, Merleau-Ponty fails, in the end (in Phenomenology of Perception), in keeping the subtle balance in the two-way relation of foundation between the two sides of the dual subjectivity. He reduces, in the final analysis, the evidence of the “cogito” to the certainty of the factual existence of the perceptual field, that is to say, of the pre-personal “tacit cogito” in communion with nature. Sartre’s “pre-reflective cogito” is, on the other hand, the indeclinable first-person perspective, the rupture of subjectivity with the world and with itself. Each of the two is original in its way, and the relation between them is the two-way relation of foundation. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that a liberal state has a general duty to protect its people from undue health risks. However, the unprecedented emergent measures against the COVID-19 pandemic taken by governments worldwide give rise to questions regarding the extent to which this duty may be used to justify suspending a vaccine rollout on marginal safety grounds. -/- In this chapter, I use the case of vaccination to argue that while a liberal state has a general duty to protect its (...) people’s health, there is a limit to the measures this duty can be used to justify. First, I argue that since every available option involves different risks and benefits, the incommensurability of the involved risks and benefits forbids the prioritisation of a particular vaccine. Second, I argue that given epistemic limitations and uncertainty, policies that favour certain vaccines are not only epistemically ill-founded but also morally unacceptable. I conclude that in a highly uncertain situation such as the unfolding pandemic, the duty a liberal state ought to uphold is to properly communicate the knowns and unknowns to the general public and help people decide which option to choose for themselves. I call this duty the duty to facilitate risk-taking. (shrink)

The nature of the self remains a central enigma in philosophy and a key frontier in science. This paper proposes a novel “Dynamic Self-Model”—the “minimal self” emerges from the rapid alternation between first-order “awareness” (A) and second-order “awareness-of-awareness” (AoA)—inspired by phenomenological insights from Buddhist meditation. -/- As a core component, we define AoA—typically not accessible to ordinary introspection—as a spontaneous, non-inferential “knowing” state distinct from effortful “meta-cognition” and attentional “meta-awareness”, thereby advancing it as a prime candidate for the Higher-Order Representation. (...) -/- This conceptual model places clear constraints on candidate neural implementations, thereby recasting the long-standing philosophical puzzle of selfhood as a testable question about neural processes. -/- Among the many possible neural bases, we propose a parsimonious, falsifiable neurodynamic hypothesis as a leading candidate mechanism: an “anti-phase” theta-gamma coupling, where sensory gamma activity (A) and anterior-insular/fronto-insular gamma activity (AoA) are driven by opposite phases of the same theta rhythm. We then outline a proof-of-concept study comparing a simple task baseline with an induced flow state (reduced self-referential processing); we predict robust anti-phase coupling at baseline and selective attenuation during flow. Furthermore, regardless of whether the leading candidate is supported, a systematic testing framework—encompassing comparative, boundary, and causal tests—should be developed. -/- Finally, we argue—within an inference-to-the-best-explanation (IBE) framework—that this parsimonious “Dynamic Self-Model” offers a unified explanatory account of three enduring puzzles in self-consciousness studies (Higher-Order vs. Reflexive theories, the classic infinite regress problem, and the mechanism for phenomenological “transparency”), which in turn provides abductive support for the model. (shrink)

Beyond reciting and coping the popular Heart Sutra, what does “五蕴皆空” (“all the five aggregates are empty”) exactly mean? In addition, the most famous verse “色不异空，空不异色，色即是空，空即是色，受想行识亦复如是” also seems to be tautological and puzzling all along. -/- Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche’s view on the progressive stages of “emptiness” and we interpreting “non-self ” as no subject (or mental entity) of “awareness” by regarding the five aggregates as “awareness” are two keys to crack the enigma at the heart of the Heart Sutra. (...) -/- The theme of the Heart Sutra is “emptiness”, the core doctrine of Buddhism. But different Buddhist schools do not interpret “emptiness” in the same way. Theravada Buddhism holds that the self does not exist, but the external world does exist; Mind-Only school holds that only the mind exists, and the external world does not really exist; Madhyamaka school argues that even the mind does not exist, so “all dharmas are empty”. -/- According to Thanissaro Bhikkhu, Rupert Gethin, Sue Hamilton and Alexander Wynne, different from the traditional mainstream view that the individual person consists of five ever-changing aggregates, the five aggregates should be regarded as descriptions of the individual’s subjective experience. We further argue that the five aggregates should be viewed directly as a stream of moments of consciousness, which are equivalent to awareness (or consciousness) in the modern sense, or what Mahayana Buddhism calls mind (or consciousness). -/- Therefore, to interpret “non-self” in Theravada Buddhism as that there is no personal self underlying the five aggregates (or “awareness”), would inevitably lead to interpret “五蕴皆空” (“all the five aggregates are empty”) at the beginning of the Heart Sutra as that even the mind does not exist, the same to the view of Madhyamaka school. -/- The famous verse that follows is the argument and explanation for this view. However, “异” in “色不异空，空不异色，色即是空，空即是色，受想行识亦复如是” does not mean “different”, but mean “separable”. Therefore, we translate this verse to English as “Body is inseparable from Emptiness, and Emptiness is inseparable from Body; thus, Body is just Emptiness, and Emptiness is just Body. The same is true for the Feelings, Perceptions, Mental Formations, and Consciousness.” -/- To go a step further, inspired by the logic used by the Madhyamaka school to refute the Mind-Only school according to Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, we find out that the correlation between “consciousness” and “the objects of consciousness” is just the most logical and reasonable interpretation of this verse: -/- “Consciousness cannot arise without the arising of the objects that have been proved to be empty by Cittamatra Approach, and the objects that have been proved to be empty by Cittamatra Approach cannot arise without the arising of consciousness; thus, consciousness could be regarded as the objects or the objects could be regarded as consciousness.” -/- Then, what is trying to be argued here is that consciousness is also empty and does not exist independently. In this way, the first two lines and the last two lines of this famous verse are no longer a relationship of repetition, but a causal relationship. -/- In addition, according to the research of Jan Nattier, the Heart Sutra was likely first written in Chinese and then translated into Sanskrit. This indirectly supports our interpretation, because the Sanskrit version of the Heart Sutra also uses “different” rather than “separable”. -/- To summarize, the true meaning of the popular Heart Sutra is to conclude that “all dharmas (or phenomenon) are empty” by arguing that even the mind does not exist. -/- Finally, we summarize the progressive stages of “emptiness” in terms of a three-tier structure of “subject”, “be aware of” and “object”, bridging various Buddhist schools in a unified analytical framework. (shrink)

Both Husserl and Sartre speak of quasi-presence in their descriptions of the lived experience of imagination, and for both philosophers, accounting for quasi-presence means developing an account of the hyle proper to imagination. Guided by the perspective of fulfillment, Husserl’s theory of imaginary quasi-presence goes through three stages. Having experimented first with a depiction-model and then a perception-model, Husserl’s mature theory appeals to his innovative conception of inner consciousness. This elegant account nevertheless fails to do justice to the facticity and (...) bodily involvement of our imaginary experience. Sartre’s theory of analogon, based on his conception of imaginary quasi-presence as ‘magical’ self-affection, embodies important insights on these issues. Kinesthetic sensations and feelings are the modes in which we make use of own body to possess and be possessed by the imaginary object, thus lending it a semblance of bodily presence. (shrink)

Identification of non-coding RNAs (ncRNAs) has been significantly improved over the past decade. On the other hand, semantic annotation of ncRNA data is facing critical challenges due to the lack of a comprehensive ontology to serve as common data elements and data exchange standards in the field. We developed the Non-Coding RNA Ontology (NCRO) to handle this situation. By providing a formally defined ncRNA controlled vocabulary, the NCRO aims to fill a specific and highly needed niche in semantic annotation of (...) large amounts of ncRNA biological and clinical data. (shrink)

Identification of non-coding RNAs (ncRNAs) has been significantly enhanced due to the rapid advancement in sequencing technologies. On the other hand, semantic annotation of ncRNA data lag behind their identification, and there is a great need to effectively integrate discovery from relevant communities. To this end, the Non-Coding RNA Ontology (NCRO) is being developed to provide a precisely defined ncRNA controlled vocabulary, which can fill a specific and highly needed niche in unification of ncRNA biology.

The nature of the self remains a central enigma in philosophy and a key frontier in science. This paper develops a novel “Dynamic Self-Model”—the self is an illusion emerging from the rapid alternation between “awareness” (A) and “awareness-of-awareness” (AoA)—inspired by phenomenological insights from Theravada Buddhist meditation. -/- As a core component, we define AoA—which cannot be detected under ordinary conditions—as a spontaneous process distinct from effortful “meta-cognition” and attentional “meta-awareness”, thereby advancing it as a prime candidate for the Higher-Order Representation. (...) To prevent conceptual confusion with “pre-reflective” self-awareness, we highlight AoA’s “non-simultaneity” with awareness. -/- Among the many possible neural bases for this conceptual model, we propose a parsimonious, falsifiable neurodynamic hypothesis as one promising candidate mechanism: an “anti-phase” theta-gamma coupling, where sensory gamma activity (A) and prefrontal gamma activity (AoA) are driven by opposite phases of the same theta rhythm. This approach recasts the long-standing philosophical puzzle of selfhood as a testable question about neural mechanisms. -/- Beyond its empirical plausibility, we assess the model’s theoretical explanatory power within an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) framing. We find strong abductive support for the model in three respects. First, it provides a framework for reconciling Higher-Order and Reflexive theories: an ontologically two-tier (higher-order) mechanism, via rapid A↔AoA alternation, yields a phenomenologically single-tier (reflexive) experience. Second, it offers a way to dissolve the classic infinite regress problem, since this dynamic process generates the self as an effect rather than serving a pre-existing one. Third, it proposes a mechanism for phenomenological “transparency”. (shrink)

本文探讨萨特的前期哲学中现象学存在论的伦理维度。借用伯纳德·威廉姆斯的道德心理学观念，本文将萨特的主体性哲学解读为一种非道德化的道德存在论，即这样一种有关主体性存在方式的描述性理论，它以一种与道德生活 的自我诠释保持恰当怀疑距离的方式阐明道德生活，同时为伦理批判提供理论基础。在第一部分和第二部分，我通过对萨特和舍勒的对照解读分析萨特的道德存在论的理论来源及其理论特质、尤其是其非道德化特征的确切含义。 这一分析将集中于价值和主体性的关联。第三部分探讨从萨特的道德存在论引出的伦理批判，尤其聚焦伦理生活的一种自发的自恋倾向，剖析其存在论根源并讨论其克服的可能性。 -/- This paper discusses the ethical dimension of the early Sartre’s phenomenological ontology. Making use of Bernard Williams’s idea of moral psychology, I will interpret Sartre’s philosophy of subjectivity as a non-moralized moral ontology, i.e., a descriptive theory of the mode of being of subjectivity that aims at clarifying our moral life at a proper skeptical distance from the self-interpretation of that moral life and thereby lays the ground for ethical critique. In Part One and Part Two, I will (...) compare Sartre’s theory to that of Scheler in order to show the background of Sartre’s moral ontology and to highlight its character as a non-moralized theory. My analysis will focus on the connection of value and subjectivity. Part Three will be devoted to the ethical critique deriving from this moral ontology. Mainly directed at a spontaneous narcissistic tendency of ethical life, our critique reveals the ontological origin of this tendency and discusses the possibility of its. (shrink)

This thesis contributes to a better conceptual understanding of how self-organized control works. I begin by analyzing the control problem and its solution space. I argue that the two prominent solutions offered by classical cognitive science (centralized control with rich commands, e.g., the Fodorian central systems) and embodied cognitive science (distributed control with simple commands, such as the subsumption architecture by Rodney Brooks) are merely two positions in a two-dimensional solution space. I outline two alternative positions: one is distributed control (...) with rich commands, defended by proponents of massive modularity hypothesis; the other is centralized control with simple commands. My goal is to develop a hybrid account that combines aspects of the second alternative position and that of the embodied cognitive science (i.e., centralized and distributed controls with simple commands). Before developing my account, I discuss the virtues and challenges of the first three. This discussion results in a set of criteria for successful neural control mechanisms. Then, I develop my account through analyzing neuroscientific models of decision-making and control with the theoretical lenses provided by formal decision and social choice theories. I contend that neural processes can be productively modeled as a collective of agents, and neural self-organization is analogous to democratic self-governance. In particular, I show that the basal ganglia, a set of subcortical structures, contribute to the production of coherent and intelligent behaviors through implementing “democratic" procedures. Unlike the Fodorian central system—which is a micro-managing “neural commander-in-chief”—the basal ganglia are a “central election commission.” They delegate control of habitual behaviors to other distributed control mechanisms. Yet, when novel problems arise, they engage and determine the result on the basis of simple information (the votes) from across the system with the principles of neurodemocracy, and control with simple commands of inhibition and disinhibition. By actively managing and taking advantage of the wisdom-of-the-crowd effect, these democratic processes enhance the intelligence and coherence of the mind’s final "collective" decisions. I end by defending this account from both philosophical and empirical criticisms and showing that it meets the criteria for successful solution. (shrink)

In recent years, sequencing technologies have enabled the identification of a wide range of non-coding RNAs (ncRNAs). Unfortunately, annotation and integration of ncRNA data has lagged behind their identification. Given the large quantity of information being obtained in this area, there emerges an urgent need to integrate what is being discovered by a broad range of relevant communities. To this end, the Non-Coding RNA Ontology (NCRO) is being developed to provide a systematically structured and precisely defined controlled vocabulary for the (...) domain of ncRNAs, thereby facilitating the discovery, curation, analysis, exchange, and reasoning of data about structures of ncRNAs, their molecular and cellular functions, and their impacts upon phenotypes. The goal of NCRO is to serve as a common resource for annotations of diverse research in a way that will significantly enhance integrative and comparative analysis of the myriad resources currently housed in disparate sources. It is our belief that the NCRO ontology can perform an important role in the comprehensive unification of ncRNA biology and, indeed, fill a critical gap in both the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Library and the National Center for Biomedical Ontology (NCBO) BioPortal. Our initial focus is on the ontological representation of small regulatory ncRNAs, which we see as the first step in providing a resource for the annotation of data about all forms of ncRNAs. (shrink)