# Accounting for Imaginary Presence

## Husserl and Sartre on the *Hyle* of Pure Imagination

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**Abstract**: Both Husserl and Sartre speak of *quasi*-presence in their descriptions of the lived experience of imagination, and for both philosophers, accounting for *quasi*-presence means developing an account of the *hyle* proper to imagination. Guided by the perspective of fulfillment, Husserl's theory of imaginary *quasi*-presence goes through three stages. Having experimented first with a depiction-model and then a perception-model, Husserl's mature theory appeals to his innovative conception of inner consciousness. This elegant account nevertheless fails to do justice to the facticity and bodily involvement of our imaginary experience. Sartre's theory of *analogon*, based on his conception of imaginary quasi-presence as 'magical' self-affection, embodies important insights on these issues. Kinesthetic sensations and feelings are the modes in which we make use of own body to possess and be possessed by the imaginary object, thus lending it a semblance of bodily presence.

**Keywords**: *analogon*, embodiment, Husserl, *hyle*, imagination, inner consciousness, *quasi*-presence, Sartre

Both Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre situate their analyses of imagination[1] within a three-fold distinction of objectifying or representational acts which includes, besides imagination, empty intention and perception. In perception, we have the perceptual object in bodily presence. In empty intention, on the other hand, we merely think of an object, without any intuitive fulfillment. Imagination seems closer to perception in this respect, insofar as in imagination we enjoy some kind of intuitive appearance. However, the difference between imag-


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inary presence and perceptual presence is no less remarkable. First of all, imaginary *presence* is penetrated by a profound sense of *absence*; far from being contradictory, the two characteristics actually require each other. Moreover, though we seem able to observe what is imaginarily presented to us, this peculiar observation does not seem to generate any new information about the imaginary object. Finally, we do not experience the resistance and inexhaustibility of reality when faced with the imaginary appearance; instead, this appearance seems to be somehow sustained by our own spontaneity.

Imaginary presence is thus sufficiently similar to perceptual presence to deserve its name, and also sufficiently different from the latter to call for a separate constitutive analysis. Both Husserl and Sartre develop their analyses of imaginary presence in constant comparison with the perceptual case. Husserl appeals to a non-independent moment of consciousness, called *hyle*, to account for the intuitive bodily presence of perception. *Hyle* gives the intentional *morphe* a sense of fullness, presents or portrays the latter in flesh. The *hyle* of normal external perception is sensation, or 'the phenomenological residuum of what … is mediated through the "senses"'.[2] The component of imagining consciousness that plays a similar role is called *phantasma*. Husserl's account of the difference between sensation and *phantasma* undergoes several mutations until he reaches his mature position, which conceives *phantasma* as intentionally modified sensation. Without knowing this mature Husserlian position, Sartre develops an account of the *hyle*—in his own terms the *analogon*—of imagination that supplements the Husserlian account.

It is the purpose of this article to examine these two accounts of imaginary presence—how the two philosophers share the same general framework but are motivated by different philosophical interests, thereby delivering theoretical accounts that focus on different aspects of the phenomenon and supplement (instead of contradicting) each other. For this purpose, I will approach Sartre's early account of imagination from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology instead of Sartre's later ontology in *Being and Nothingness*, without prejudging the relation between the two.[3] Nevertheless, since the well-known criticism (Sartrean or otherwise) of the Husserlian notion of *hyle* may cast doubt on the philosophical interest of this project, I begin with some remarks on some of these well-known objections in the first section. Their purpose is to clear the way for the subsequent comparative investigation, by inviting the reader to rethink whether the case against the *hyle* is as decisive as it is sometimes presumed. The second and fourth sections will then be devoted to Husserl's and Sartre's

accounts of the *hyle* of imagination, respectively, connected by a brief discussion of Sartre's assessment of Husserl in the third section.

## Some Common Objections Against Husserl's Notion of *Hyle*

It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that Husserl's conception of *hyle* has enjoyed no happy fate since the very beginning of its reception. During the classical period of phenomenology, we already witness at least two lines of criticism, which, though always combined, are in principle separable. One of them sees in it the evidence of Husserl's intellectualism, the other accuses Husserl of idealism. The first charge, represented by Aron Gurwitsch, claims that Husserl fails to do justice to the self-organisation of the sense-field.[4] The second charge, represented by the Sartre of *Being and Nothingness*, sees *hyle* as a homeless construct that vainly attempts to mediate between consciousness and the world.[5] An examination of the Gurwitschean objection[6] would lead us too far astray; I will limit myself to a brief response to the Sartrean objection.

The rationale of the Sartrean repulsion for the notion of *hyle* lies in its *immanence* and *non-intentionality*. An immanent component of consciousness that is non-intentional like things—this is an absurd combination for Sartre. However, even if one shares Sartre's aversion for 'idealism', one should keep in mind the *ambiguity* of Husserl's notion of immanence and the *relativity* of both immanence and non-intentionality. As discussed in *Ideas I*, the notion of immanence is ambiguous between the sense of absolute self-givenness and the sense of real containment—an ambiguity Husserl himself recognises as such in the 1907 lectures *Idea of Phenomenology*. It is the first sense—instead of the more problematic second one—that is functional and fruitful for a transcendental phenomenology.[7] Furthermore, when Husserl speaks about the immanence and non-intentionality of *hyle* in *Ideas I*, he is limiting himself to the sphere of constituted time.[8] Both notions are relativised with the discovery of inner time-consciousness: what is immanent and non-intentional on one level of analysis turns out be a constitutive achievement on a deeper level of reflection.[9]

These brief remarks are only meant to suggest that some popular objections against Husserl's notion of *hyle* are not as destructive as they might seem. In any case, we should remember that *hyle* is a functional notion,[10] which is introduced in terms of its role in the process of constitution, and as such there is no obvious reason why it has to

be absolutely formless, immanent, or non-intentional in the way that Sartre finds so problematic. As we will see, it is also in functional terms that Sartre understands the question of *hyle* as a problem left unsolved by Husserl's account of imagination. With these said, I now turn to the examination of Husserl's account.

*Three Stages of Husserl's Account of the Imaginary Presence*

Husserl's investigation of imagination is motivated by epistemological interests, that is, interest in a phenomenological critique of reason. Whereas in *Logical Investigations* he pursues this task via the problem of expression and (predicative) meaning, in the 1904/05 lectures 'Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis', this task is approached through 'a second way from the opposite side, i.e., the side of experience and sensory givenness'.[11] At stake for a phenomenological critique of reason is the descriptive analysis of the various kinds of intentional acts and their objects, especially the different forms of consciousness of evidence, beginning from 'the simple intellectual acts lying at the bottom', as he remarks in his introduction to the 1904/05 lectures.[12] The third part of these lectures deals with imagination. Husserl's account of imagination in these lectures and subsequent research manuscripts is constantly evolving and never reaches a definitive form. Therefore, any attempt to distinguish stages and well-defined positions implies some measure of arbitrariness. The three stages I will sketch below focus on the problem of *hyle* and disregard mutations in other aspects.[13]

In the first account he proposes, phantasy is believed to share a 'community of essence' with image-consciousness, and the character of unreality in both cases is explained by a *conflict* with the real. According to Husserl's analysis, when we look at a (material) picture, our consciousness of what is depicted in the picture (image-subject) is mediated through a fictional yet present appearance (image-object), which is in turn in conflict with our consciousness of the picture as a material object, that is, the picture-thing.[14] In a portrait of Charles VIII—to use Sartre's example—the absent (and deceased) Charles VIII is the image-subject, the appearing human figure with 'those sinuous and sensual lips, that narrow, stubborn forehead'[15] is the image-object, and the oil painting on canvas which I can touch with my hands is the picture-thing. Crucial to this analysis of image-consciousness is the insight that the character of non-reality pertaining to image-object (and, *eo ipso*, image-subject) is explained by its conflict with the apprehension of picture-thing.[16]

According to Husserl's first theory, this same mediated structure is exemplified in pure phantasy as well, with the exception that in phantasy there is nothing corresponding to the picture-thing. In other words, phantasy shares with image-consciousness the structure of double objectivity: the absent imaginary object (the first objectivity, i.e. image-subject) is given through a present but irreal appearance (the second objectivity, i.e. image-object).[17] However, no sooner had Husserl introduced such a theory in the 1904/05 lectures than he 'was seized by serious doubt'.[18] The doubts concern whether phantasy really has the mediated structure (double objectivity) that includes something like an image-object. In the case of image-consciousness, as we have seen, the *non-reality* of the image-object is constituted through its *conflict* with the picture-thing, which is given in straightforward perceptual faith as the real. If, as is obviously the case, there is no tangible picture-thing in pure phantasy, then we need a different account of how the kind of conflict necessary for the constitution of double objectivity could gain purchase. Husserl points here to a *global* conflict between two fields of presence (instead of a *local* one between the image-object and the picture-thing) that is in turn based on a specific difference between sensation and phantasm. Phantasy has its own field, 'one completely separate from the field of perception', and this field comes into conflict with the perceptual field without any 'permeation' with the latter, only *in transition* from the one to the other.[19] This global conflict is rooted in a separation in principle between sensation and *phantasma*: while sensations 'fuse into intuitive apperceptive unities', phantasm never enters into such unity of fusion with sense-fields'.[20]

Now—and here we move to the second stage—if one has to assume a specific difference between sensation and phantasm to account for the possibility of global conflict, the detour through the global conflict to account for the 'nothingness' of phantasy seems unnecessary, for the nothingness of phantasy-appearance is now explanatorily prior to the global conflict. If this is the case, the analogy with image-consciousness breaks down, and there is nothing like image-object in pure phantasy. This is indeed Husserl's view in the latter parts of the 1904/05 lectures. This second theory gives up the idea of mediated structure and double objectivity. There is no mediation (*Vermittlung*) in the structure of pure phantasy; it 'lack[s] an image object' in any sense.[21] Instead, phantasy 'relates to its object just as straightforwardly as perception does'.[22] In this view, sensation 'defends itself, so to speak, against the demand that it be taken as the mere image of something', while the phantasm carries, from the beginning, 'the characteristic of

irreality'; hence 'the establishment of an original phenomenological distinction between sensation and phantasm'.[23]

As with his first theory, Husserl had no sooner elaborated the second theory than he expressed his reservations. These are mainly of a methodological nature. This theory is methodologically precarious, because 'the direct comparison between the two [i.e. sensation and phantasm], although it remains open to us in every moment, is disappointing [*versagt*]', because of the difficulty of 'abstracting from the apperceptions that bestow signification on them'.[24] Given the inherent methodological difficulty of ascertaining the existence of two specifically different kinds of *hyle* (which are supposed to correspond to each other exactly despite their radical difference), Husserl suggests that the difference between perception and phantasy must be located in the different *characterisations of the acts*, that is, as presenting and presentifying (*gegenwärtig* and *vergegenwärtig*).[25]

This suggestion near the end of the 1904/05 lectures is taken up and further developed in Husserl's research manuscripts in the immediately following years. This development hinges upon the discovery of the absolute or inner consciousness. It is this discovery that allows for the treatment of the problem of *hyle* as a problem of intentional constitution. Absolute or inner consciousness is that deepest dimension of consciousness where sensation and phantasm are constituted as (temporal) unities. With this notion, the distinction between sensing (*Empfinden*) and content of sensation (*Empfindungsinhalt*), which is collapsed in the *Logical Investigations*,[26] must be re-introduced.[27] Thus, sensations are no longer thought to be contained immanently in consciousness 'as if in a bag' (*gleichsam ein Sack*).[28] Rather, a minimal sense of transcendence pertains even to sensation (transcendence vis-à-vis the absolute consciousness), insofar as sensing (*Empfinden*) is intentional, in the sense that it is constitutive of contents of sensation through syntheses of coinciding. In other words, sensing is 'nothing but the inner consciousness of contents of sensation', that is, its constitution in inner time-consciousness.[29]

Now, according to Husserl, there are two modes of this absolute or inner consciousness, corresponding to whether it is constitutive of sensations or phantasms.[30] 'The original time-consciousness itself functions like a perceptual consciousness and has its counterpart in a corresponding phantasy-consciousness'.[31] This means that the difference between sensation and phantasm is not a brute fact, but an intentional difference constituted in absolute consciousness. This idea is well expressed by Husserl's oft-cited claim: 'Phantasy is precisely

modification through and through'; 'the sensation as well as the phantasm is already 'consciousness'.[32]

Simple though this claim seems, it is also tricky and even enigmatic. For every presenting (*Gegenwärtigen*) there is a corresponding presentifying (*Vergegenwärtigen*), Husserl claims, down to the level of the absolute consciousness. Now, everything turns on how the 'correspondence' between the two is understood. Its correct understanding hinges upon the avoidance of two pitfalls. On the one hand, despite Husserl's deliberate choice of the term 'reproduction' to denote the presentification of inner consciousness,[33] reproduction/presentification does not mean the mere repetition of an earlier consciousness, 'as if an echo, reflection, afterimage of the earlier internal consciousness, although weak, were coming back'.[34] On the other hand, it is not correct to say, as Husserl does in his second model, that phantasy is, strictly speaking, as straightforward as perception. For phantasy (here understood as reproduction in general) is differentiated from perception precisely through its 'characteristic mediatedness' (*eigentümliche Mittelbarkeit*).[35]

To avoid the second pitfall, Husserl characterises phantasy as an intentional modification. Here, modification is a characterisation of its internal structure (rather than a description based on external comparison, such as is the case when we say that the final draft of a paper includes many modifications to the original version), meaning that it contains as its essential constitution a reference to the unmodified original. 'Reproduction' describes precisely the way in which phantasy refers to its unmodified original as something implicated in its internal structure. Hence, phantasy is necessarily more complicated than perception insofar as it reaches its intentional object through an implicated perception.[36]

To avoid the first pitfall, it is necessary to insist once again on the peculiarity of Husserl's notion of reproduction. Against what the word might suggest, modification 'does not imply that what is said to be modified was already there earlier, only precisely as unmodified'.[37] The difference can be clarified in terms of relations of dependence and independence. Whereas that which 'was already there earlier' is certainly independent of that which comes later and subsequently refers to it, the reproduced original is strictly non-independent of the act of reproduction. The reproduced act is not a real act, and it does not have to have existed at any time. It *is*, only as a *quasi*-act implicated in an act of intentional reproduction, and one cannot have a *quasi*-perception except as intentionally implicated.

A consequence of this novel understanding of reproduction is that neither *phantasma* nor imaginary presence (adumbration) is any longer conceived as an immanent lived experience (*Erlebnis*). For lived experience is 'a datum of internal consciousness, something internally perceived',[38] whereas *phantasma* is precisely not a datum of the original time-consciousness which 'functions like a perceptual consciousness', but a datum of its 'counterpart'.[39] Every lived experience, as that which is constituted by the 'perceptive' inner consciousness, is lived as 'presently being' in a mode of primordial belief.[40] With *phantasma* and imaginary presence, however, this moment of primordial belief is transformed into the character of 'as though it were the case' (*gleichsam*), which is to say that *phantasmata* are not given as presently existing lived experiences.[41]

On this account, imaginary adumbrations are not actually, but *quasi*-lived through. Of course, whatever is given in the imaginary world is given in a certain orientation. However, the oriented aspects are not given to the actual perceiving subject situated here and now in the real world, but to an imaginary subject, my imaginary double in the imaginary world, so to speak. In other words, according to Husserl, phantasy necessarily involves a self-fictionalisation, the establishment of a fictional subject as the performer of the *quasi*-acts and *quasi*-affections.[42] The imaginary presence is presence to my imaginary double, hence not experienced as actually present to me, but only *quasi*-presence.

This theory of phantasy has obvious advantages over its predecessors, and in its basic outlines it remains Husserl's considered position. It has the virtue of doing justice to the peculiar intertwining of presence and absence in our experience of phantasy. On the one hand, the character of phantasy as an intuitive presentation is accounted for, insofar as phantasy is conceived as involving an implicated perception. On the other hand, the characteristic sense of absence (or nothingness, irreality) of phantasy is also given its due, insofar as the implicated perception is a *quasi*-perception of my imaginary double. Despite its elegance, this theory also leaves much to be desired, especially concerning its account of the hyletic dimension of phantasy. This inadequacy is manifest in two closely connected aspects, which are also the sites where Sartre's theory has much to offer.

First, while the idea of two parallel forms of inner consciousness suggests a certain parallelism of sensation and *phantasma*, this parallelism is nevertheless broken on a fundamental point, which leaves the account of *phantasma* incomplete. Sensations are constituted as (temporal) unities in the inner consciousness through syntheses of coinciding that involve primal impressions, retentions, and protentions.

Primal impression (*Urimpression*) enjoys a privileged place insofar as it is the moment of primal creation (*Urzeugung*), or the primal source (*Urquelle*) of the new.[43] It is an indispensable condition of original time-constitution, a condition 'alien to consciousness', meaning that it does not belong to the 'primal spontaneity' of consciousness.[44] Thus, primal impression introduces the element of 'external' check or resistance from 'without' to the process of constitution. In this sense, it can be characterised as a dimension of facticity. Now, what about the inner consciousness of phantasy? Does it have a corresponding dimension of facticity? As far as I know, Husserl nowhere address this problem directly. If anything, his theory seems to suggest a negative answer.[45] While it is true that phantasy is not subjected to the same kind of external check as perception, it seems nonetheless problematic to say that what we imagine in each concrete situation is totally independent of any factual support or constraint. In other words, though phantasy is superlatively spontaneous, spontaneity nevertheless cannot do without facticity.

Second, while Husserl's ingenious conception of imaginary self-doubling neatly accounts for the peculiar combination of presence and absence in our experience of phantasy, the relation between the actual subject and the imaginary subject remains a puzzle, especially concerning their embodiment. As we have seen, Husserl's main argument for the idea of ego-doubling is the fact of the oriented givenness of imaginary objects. Since orientation implies relatedness to a zero-point, and since this zero-point cannot be supplied by my actual body in the real world, it has to be focused on the imaginary body of my imaginary double. Now how does this imaginary body relate to my real body? Does not my real body participate in some manner when I phantasise, for example, by taking on a bodily attitude as if faced with the imaginary object? Does not the affective state of my real body influence my imaginary experience? Thus, when it comes to the body, the insufficiency of merely supposing a splitting between the imaginary subject and the real subject becomes manifest.

## Sartre's Assessment of Husserl's Account

Even a superficial look at Sartre's *The Imagination* should be enough to evince the significance that Husserl's theory of phantasy holds for Sartre. According to Sartre, Husserl makes a major breakthrough with his understanding of imagination as an intentional act, which frees us from what Sartre calls 'the illusion of immanence'. Husserl's account

of the phenomenon of imaginary presence, however, does not satisfy Sartre. Instead of giving a compressive review of Sartre's assessment of Husserl here,[46] I will limit myself to presenting Sartre's assessment on two points related to the problem of *hyle*. In both cases, Sartre's attitude is nuanced, at the same time praising Husserl's achievement and indicating its shortcoming.

The first point concerns Husserl's conception of fulfillment. We have seen how the perspective of fulfillment dominates Husserl's discussion of imagination in the *Logical Investigations*. Husserl's approach constitutes for Sartre an advance over the classical theories, insofar as it draws a clear distinction between signitive consciousness and imagination.[47] However, by claiming that phantasy fulfills an empty intention in the same way a perception does (only to a lesser degree), Husserl's conception of the distinctiveness of phantasy falls short on both sides—vis-à-vis both empty intention and perception.

In relation to perception, Husserl's theory presupposes, according to Sartre, the presence, in an act of phantasy, of 'a concrete impressional matter' that is of the same kind as the *hyle* of perception.[48] Though this criticism may not be unfair to Husserl's position in the *Logical Investigations*, it does not apply to Husserl's mature notion of *phantasma* as 'reproduced' sensation. Indeed, Sartre seems to have missed the point of Husserl's innovative conception of reproduction, precisely in the manner of the first pitfall discussed above.[49] In relation to empty intention, Sartre thinks that Husserl underestimates the transformation undergone by an empty intention upon entering into an imagining consciousness. As we will show later, what happens here is, according to Sartre, not so much fulfillment as degradation.

The second point concerns the relation between image-consciousness and phantasy. Again, Sartre's assessment is two-sided. On the one hand, he praises Husserl for having seen the commonality of image-consciousness and pure phantasy.[50] On the other hand, he criticised Husserl for not being sensitive enough to a fundamental difference between the two with respect to *hyle*. In the case of image-consciousness, the same *hyle* underlies both the apprehension of the picture-thing and the apprehension of the image-object, the difference being purely one of intentional character. We have seen that for Husserl these two apprehensions stand in a relation of conflict, and it is precisely this conflict that characterises the image-object as irreal (and it is worth repeating that this conflict is a constitutive structure internal to image-consciousness). Now, in the case of pure phantasy, which does not have the same internally mediated structure (i.e. no conflict between picture-thing and image-object), the conflict, if there is one, could

only be extrinsic, for example, conflict between an episode of phantasy and the immediately preceding or succeeding episodes of perception. This is, as we know, what Husserl calls *conflict manifested in transition* in his first theory. However, and this is Sartre's criticism, if one claims that the peculiarity of phantasy consists in such extrinsic conflict, then the differentiation of phantasy from perception becomes a matter of inductive judgment,[51] the problematic consequences of which he has demonstrated in his examination of Albert Spaier's theory of image.[52] Thus, Sartre concludes that the theory based on extrinsic conflict does not work and that the *hyle* of pure phantasy must be qualitatively different from the *hyle* of perception.

Recalling our account of the three stages of Husserl's account of phantasy, it becomes clear that Husserl makes a similar claim in his second theory. But we have also seen that Husserl quickly becomes dissatisfied with this view on methodological grounds, which then leads him to the mature theory centred on the notion of inner consciousness. Now, is Sartre merely repeating Husserl's second model? Will his theory be subjected to the same methodological objection? We must answer in the negative, because Sartre is quite aware of the methodological difficulty concerning the introspective unavailability of *hyle*.[53] But his response to this unavailability is different from Husserl's. Instead of pushing forward to a conception of the absolute consciousness, Sartre acknowledges the limit of reflective phenomenology and turns to experimental psychology. He is content with saying that his theory of *analogon*, which depends on third-person empirical data, is merely *probable*. Thus, Husserl's mature theory and Sartre's theory of *analogon* represents two different—and hopefully complementary—ways to investigate the *hyle* proper to our experience of mental imagination.

## Sartre's Account of Imaginary Presence

When *The Imagination* and *The Imaginary* are read together, it seems obvious that the question of the *hyle* of (mental) imagination, which is left hanging in the air at the end of the earlier book, finds its answer in the theory of *analogon* as elaborated in the later book. However, there are some curious facts that might cast doubt on such a reading. The word '*analogon*' is not used at all in *The Imagination*, whereas the word '*hyle*' is mentioned only once—in a footnote—in *The Imaginary*.[54] Thus, despite the obvious continuity, both systematically and historically, of the two works, one might wonder whether Sartre is

signaling his distance from the Husserlian notion of *hyle* by this silent shift of terminology.[55] Indeed, this view seems supported by Sartre's insistence that the *analogon*— of mental as of physical image—is transcendent,[56] which seems to contradict directly Husserl's conception of the immanence of *hyle*. However, given the noted relativity of immanence and transcendence, we should not reach a verdict on the strength of this single statement. In fact, Sartre's conception of the status of the *analogon* includes the following elements:

(1) It is transcendent, in the sense that it is 'already constituted as an object for consciousness';

(2) It is not external, in the sense that it is not of the order of things in the world;

(3) It is not that which is aimed at by the imaginary intention, but that through which such aiming takes place.[57]

Given these characterisations, I submit that the Sartrean notion of *analogon* corresponds to Husserl's notion of *hyle*, as the notion is reconceived after the introduction of the idea of the inner consciousness. To say that the *analogon* is transcendent is just to affirm its intentionality. Husserl says the same about *hyle*, after his discovery of the inner consciousness.[58] Sartre lists three kinds of *analogon*: knowledge, movement, affectivity.[59]

It is surprising, and indeed, confusing, that Sartre should discuss knowledge (*savoir*) in the chapter on *analogon*. For the *analogon* is that moment of consciousness which is responsible for the sensory fulness of imaginary experience, whereas knowledge as such is 'a simple empty expectation, a direction', or what Husserl calls empty intention.[60] For Husserl as for Sartre, empty intention is not *hyle* but that which can be fulfilled by an intuitive act, that is, an act with the right kind of *hyle*. Now, the reason why Sartre discusses knowledge in the chapter on the *analogon* is presumably the same that stands behind one of his objections to Husserl's doctrine of fulfillment. As we have seen, Sartre believes that empty intention is *degraded* instead of fulfilled when it is absorbed into an imaginary attitude. Sartre's basic idea can be illustrated by comparing our experience of reading a novel with that of reading a phrase isolated from its context, such as 'the syndicate of property owners in Paris'.[61] In the second case, we normally just produce an empty intention, while in the first case, we use the letters on the page like a drawing, 'the physiognomy of the word becom[ing] representative of that of the object'.[62] According to Sartre, this kind of behaviour is made possible by a desire implicit in the imaginary attitude to feel itself in the presence of an imaginary world. That this is

supposed to imply a degradation of knowledge has to do with Sartre's conception of what pure knowledge is like. Following Karl Bühler and the Würzburg psychologists, Sartre characterises knowledge in its pure state as a pre-objective consciousness directed primarily at relations.[63] Mere relations without determinate relata cannot constitute an imaginary world. The imaginary consciousness, eager to feel itself in the presence of such a world, treats pure significations 'in the manner of things', hence reification and degradation. Whatever the merits of this Sartrean idea of degradation,[64] it is not an answer to the question of *hyle*. Pure knowledge is degraded by the adoption of the imaginary attitude. It remains to be asked what provides the specific *hyle* that enables this degradation.

The contrast between Husserl's conception of fulfillment and Sartre's conception of degradation has an important implication for their different accounts of the *hyle* of imagination. Despite the shared goal of accounting for the phenomenon of imaginary presence, they nevertheless interpret this phenomenon differently. In other words, their conception of what is to be accounted for is not exactly the same. Whereas Husserl takes a trusting attitude toward the intuitiveness of imagination, Sartre casts a more suspicious gaze. For Husserl, the *quasi*-perception of imagination is isomorphous with perception; and so is their respective *hyle*. Though Sartre speaks similarly of *quasi*-observation, he understands something very different by '*quasi*-'. The appearance of intuitive presence is for him an appearance not only in the sense of that which gives itself, but also in the sense of that which gives itself differently from what it is. There is something deceptive about the intuitiveness of imagination. Of course, this deceptiveness is not on the order of a metaphysical possibility, like Descartes' malicious demon. In accordance with the transparency of consciousness, this deceptiveness is itself part of the phenomenon. It leaves its trace, for example, in the uninformativeness of imagination (one "cannot count in image the columns of the Panthéon")[65], or in the supposed fact that the imagined object does not obey the principle of individuation and the principle of identity.[66] Moreover, this deceptiveness is a kind of self-deception, because the imaginary attitude is spontaneously sustained by consciousness itself. As he says about the apparent richness of hypnagogic images: 'one only supposes that the image is so rich; which obviously means that one does not see all these details … which appear with so much force'.[67] However, in the imaginary attitude, supposing is not just supposing. In the imaginary attitude, supposing that the image is so rich makes the image look rich, and it is precisely this peculiarity of imagination that calls for an account.

Thus, the phenomenon of imaginary presence is a phenomenon of self-affection, and Sartre's theory of *analogon* is an analysis of the mechanism of this self-affection.

Now we come to the second item on Sartre's list of the varieties of the *analogon*. By movement Sartre understands not bodily movement as objective events, but movements as experienced, that is, kinesthetic sensations.[68] Sartre's idea that bodily movement functions as *analogon* in imagination resembles to a certain extent contemporary enactive approaches to imagination.[69] On the enactive model, imaginary presence is explained by the *availability* of environmental features as revealed by embodied anticipation. Similarly, for Sartre, imaginary presence is explained by past and future phases of movement being retained and anticipated 'under the aspect that they would have had if I had perceived them by the organs of sight'.[70] Despite this similarity, Sartre is puzzled by a question that does not seem to trouble the enactive theorists: if the kinesthetic sensations or bodily skills are by nature different from visual impressions, how is it possible that the one can stand in for the other?[71] The apparent incomprehensibility of this substitution may well be the reason why Husserl never considers such a possibility. As we know, Husserl distinguishes between presentational (*darstellende*) sensations and kinesthetic sensations in the noetic structure of perceptual consciousness. It is the former series of sensations that undergoes apprehension as adumbrations for features of the perceived thing, whereas the second series stands to the first in the motivational relation of 'if-then'.[72] According to Husserl, both terms of the motivational relation are indispensable for the constitution of perceptual presence. Now, it is obviously *not* the case that the simple absence of the first series would transform a perception into a phantasy; instead, there would result only a disappointed perception. Hence, there arises for Sartre the task of a phenomenological description of how, in the case of phantasy, kinesthetic sensations can function in place of presentational sensations.

We must first be clear about what such a phenomenological description can be expected to achieve. Kinesthetic sensations can only function as *hyle within the imaginary attitude*, and the imaginary attitude is characterised, as we have seen, by a desire to feel oneself in the (bodily) presence of an irreal object in an irreal world.[73] Thus, what is required of the *hyle* of imagination is to give some foothold to this desire to be thrust into the irreal. This stands in stark contrast with the case of perception, where the presentational *hyle* compels our acknowledgement of its reality. Thus, the task is to understand how kinesthetic sensations can function as such a foothold.

To prepare for this account, it is helpful to be reminded of the intermediate stages between typical image-consciousness and pure phantasy, that is, consciousness of schematic drawing, of faces in the fire, etc. Here, the visual form provided by presentational sensations is so poor in content and so dissimilar to the represented object that Sartre claims that 'the representative elements in the consciousness of a schematic drawing are not the lines properly so-called, but the movements projected onto these lines'.[74] Different figures and shapes are 'seen' in the arabesques on the wall tapestry because of the different paths my eyes trace on it. My ocular movement is projected onto the wall and a temporary synthesis is carried out there. Thus, movements take on the function of the *analogon* already in this form of externally supported phantasy.

In the case of pure phantasy, my movements are no longer revealed to me *on* the lines of drawing (or the arabesques of the wall tapestry) and through the mediation of visual impressions. It is pure self-affection through kinesthesia. Making use of Husserl's description of time-consciousness, Sartre claims that in pure phantasy the primal impression is provided by the kinesthetic sensation. For Husserl as for Sartre, primal impression is that non-independent moment of time-consciousness which is a 'support' for the intentional fabric of retentions and protentions. It is the primal impression that gives the feel of presence, while retention and protention, as functions of depresentification (*Entgegenwärtigung*) attached to this core of presence, create the meaningful temporal horizon. Thus, on the one hand, kinesthetic primal impressions confer on the imaginary form 'its character of presence'.[75] On the other hand, they derive their sense from being 'expected and received as a visual impression'.[76] The difference from perception consists, of course, in the lack of fulfillment. In perceptual consciousness, primal impression is the site of constant fulfillment or disappointment, based on agreement or conflict between a new primal impression and the retained protention of the previous moment. In pure phantasy, according to Sartre, the impulse towards fulfillment is inhibited, which explains the essential poverty of the imaginary object.[77] Instead, consciousness in the imaginary attitude strives to give to its knowledge (empty intention) a (bodily) presence, and thus to feel itself in the (bodily) presence of the irreal. It does this by using its own body as the *analogon*. Thus, we may distinguish two functions of primal impression: presencing and fulfillment. In the case of pure phantasy, the latter is inhibited by the imaginary attitude, which makes it possible for kinesthetic sensations to take up the former role.

There are limits to the scope of imaginary attributes for which kinesthetic sensations can play the role of *analogon*. According to Sartre, this is limited to relational and spatial determinations, such as spatial form, shapes, directions, etc.[78] The intrinsic, qualitative, and 'expressive nature' of the imaginary object is represented by a different kind of *analogon*, that is, feelings.

That feelings could function as *hyle* for the constitution of the imaginary object as such is again something Husserl would have difficulty accepting. For Husserl, phantasy belongs to the class of objectifying or doxic acts, while feelings are acts of the sphere of emotion (*Gemütssphäre*) which are always founded on objectifying acts. This is not to deny that feelings are themselves intentional, but to say that they owe their intentional directedness to the underlying objectifying acts.[79] Thus, it seems incomprehensible how the founded act can play a role in the constitution of its foundation. Sartre, however, warns against 'exaggerate[ing] the primacy of the representative'.[80] Though he does not argue for this point in any detail, he certainly believes that feelings are *not* essentially dependent upon objectifying acts for their very intentionality. Thus, the door is at least open for him to consider the possibility of granting feelings a constitutive role in the formation of phantasy as such.

Sartre conducts his analysis with the example of how the feeling of the beautiful white hands of a woman can function, in the absence of this person, as the affective *analogon* for imagining that very person with those very hands. At first, we only have a vague feeling 'of something fine, graceful, pure, with a strictly individual nuance of finesse and purity'.[81] The feeling is already intentional, with its distinctly affective way of aiming at its object, but it does not know its object by representation. Though it is not impossible to stop at this stage, such indeterminate feeling has an inner tendency to determine itself by representing its object. Sartre calls this tendency, this 'blind effort to possess on the representative plane what is already given to me on the affective plane', a desire.[82] Of course, this is no full-fledged desire that presupposes a represented object. Rather, it is a natural extension of the vague feeling, an inchoate desire in search of an unknown object. But here we are not talking about an actual seeking that translates into actions; instead, it is an almost infantile attempt to conjure up a virtual object that answers to my indeterminate longing. In short, I am indulging in phantasy. Thus, as long as an indeterminate feeling allows its implicit desire to unfold, we glide easily into an imaginary attitude. And it is this very feeling that lends itself to the absent object as its virtual body, thus giving it a character of (bodily) presence.

Sartre makes use of a very interesting concept in this connection: possession. Sartre chooses this term deliberately due to its magical connotation: he characterises a mimic on the stage as being *possessed* by the person she imitates, just as primitive peoples in the ritual dances are *possessed* by spirits, or gods.[83] Just as magicians in the ritual dances prepare themselves to be possessed by spirits or gods through their bodily movements and collective sentiments,[84] so the person in an imaginary attitude uses his kinesthetic and affective *analogon* to incarnate and to possess the irreal. Here we note the ambiguity of the notion of possession between passivity and activity. To seek to take possession of the absent object is, for Sartre, to seek to be possessed by the imaginary, that is, to lend it one's own kinesthetic sensations and feelings for its incarnation in a virtual presence. Sartre highlights the centrality of the notion of possession by saying that 'the act of imagination … is a magical act'.[85]

Feelings have a particularly important role to play in imagination as they contribute significantly to the determination of the situation of the subject. Oftentimes feelings reveal to us the real world as *lacking* in a certain respect, which then motivates imagination.[86] In Sartre's example of the imagination of the beautiful white hands, for example, it is the vague feeling of a mass of qualities that motivates the glide into the imaginary attitude. What motivates my apprehension of my environment as a place where my friend is absent and what motivates my imagination of her is above all my affective apprehension of this real environment as emptied of charm. In this way, Sartre's doctrine of *hyle* illuminates the facticity of our imaginary experience, which we find missing in Husserl's account.[87]

## Conclusion

Both Husserl and Sartre understand the phenomenon of imaginary presence as *quasi*-presence. However, guided by different philosophical interests, their understanding of the '*quasi*-ness' of the imaginary presence is rather different, which then leads to their different accounts of the hyletic aspect of imagination. In general terms, we can say that Husserl is more interested in what imagination accomplishes in the constitution of objectivity, whereas Sartre focuses more on the role of imagination in the life of consciousness. Focusing on the relations of fulfillment imagination can enter into, Husserl understands the *quasi*-presence of imagination in terms of intentionally 'reproduced' perception. *Quasi*-presence is presence to an imaginary double of my real

self, and *phantasma* as 'reproduced' sensation is *quasi*-sensation given to this imaginary double. This rather formal account of the sense of '*quasi*-ness' leaves something to be desired. Phantasy is, after all, a real intentional act performed by a real subject. Husserl does not say much about how the real situation of the subject of imagination contributes to her imaginary experience. It is in this aspect that Sartre's account has much to teach us. Interested as he is in the distinctiveness of our imaginary life, Sartre sees, over and above the formal semblance of imaginary and perceptual presence, a 'degraded', 'magical' character in the *quasi*-presence of imagination. Imagination is about incantation and possession. If the question of *hyle* is about how we manage to give a semblance of bodily presence to the imaginary object in the absence of any presentational sensation, Sartre's answer is that we lend parts of our own corporality (kinesthetic sensations and feelings) to the irreal for their incarnation.

Husserl's and Sartre's different interpretations of the phenomenon of *quasi*-bodily presence is more complementary than contradictory. Both agree that *quasi*-bodily presence refers to the body of the subject. For Husserl, this is the intentionally implicated body of my imaginary double. For Sartre, this is my real kinesthetic and affective body. Of course, this article merely points the way for a possible integration of Husserl's fulfillment-oriented and Sartre's possession-oriented theories of imagination, by showing how the latter answers to a theoretical task raised but left unfulfilled by the former. Much needs to be done for the actual carrying out of such an integration.

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## Notes

1. In this article, when I speak of imagination without qualification, I mean pure imagination performed without the aid of a physical image. This corresponds to what Husserl calls '*das reine Phantasie*' and what Sartre calls '*l'image mentale*'. When discussing Husserl, I use 'phantasy' interchangeably with (pure) imagination. For the kind of imagination performed with the intuitive support of a physical image, I use the term 'image-consciousness'.

2. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch,* ed. Karl Schuhmann (Leiden: Martinus Nijhof, 1976), 193. English translation: *Ideas I*, trans. Daniel Dahlstrom (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2014).
3. This approach accords well with Sartre's own view of his work on imagination: 'I wrote a whole book (apart from the final chapters) under his [i.e., Husserl's] inspiration: *L'Imaginaire.* Against him, granted—but just insofar as a disciple can write against his master' (Jean-Paul Sartre, *War Diaries*, trans. Quintin Hoare (London: Verso, 1984), 184). Sartre is saying clearly that the main part of the book is written in a Husserlian spirit (while the conclusion is composed under different, i.e., Heidegger's, guidance). For a different approach, see Vincent de Coorebyter's analysis of Sartre's early account of *hyle* in light of its later rejection in his *Sartre face à la phénoménologie* (Brussels: Éditions OUSIA, 2000), 57–70 and Cam Clayton's interpretation of Sartre's early theory of *analogon* in terms of his later ontology in 'The Psychical Analogon in Sartre's Theory of the Imagination', *Sartre Studies International* 17: 2 (2011): 16–27, https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2011.170202.
4. Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin* [vol. iii of *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973)*], ed. Richard Zaner (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 85–90, 257–271.
5. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Sarah Richmond (London: Routledge, 2018), 19-21.
6. Cf. Walter Hopp, 'Husserl on sensation, perception, and interpretation', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 38, no.2 (2008): 219–245, here 237–239, https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0013; Kenneth Williford, 'Husserl's Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness', *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 12, no. 3 (2013): 501–519, here 507–508, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9297-z.
7. Rudolf Boehm, *Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie.* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 146–163; John Brough, 'Consciousness is not a bag: Immanence, transcendence, and constitution in the idea of phenomenology', *Husserl Studies* 24, no. 3 (2008): 177–191.
8. Husserl, *Ideen,* 191–192.
9. John Brough, 'The emergence of an absolute consciousness in Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness', *Man and World* 5, no. 3 (1972), 298–326, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01248638; Julia Jansen, 'Phantasy's Systematic Place in Husserl's Work', in *Edmund Husserl: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, iii: *The Nexus of Phenomena: Intentionality, Perception and Temporality,* ed. Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton, and Gina Zavota (London: Routledge, 2005), 221–243. This point will be elaborated below.
10. Husserl, *Ideen,* 193.
11. Edmund Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung*, ed. Eduard Marbach (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), XXXV. My Translation.
12. Edmund Husserl, *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit*, ed. Thomas Vongehr and Regula Giuliani (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 3.
13. For two different accounts, see Julia Jansen, 'Phantasy's Systematic Place', and Paolo Volonté, *Husserls Phänomenologie der Imagination* (Freiburg: Alber, 1997).
14. Husserl, *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory,* trans. John Brough (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 19. I will cite the page number of the Husserliana edition, which appears as margin number in the English translation.
15. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Imaginary*, trans. Jonathan Webber (London: Routledge, 2004), 23.

16. Husserl, *Phantasy*, 47.
17. Note that the talk of double objectivity here as in image-consciousness does not imply the phenomenologically false claim that our experience has simultaneously two foci. Only the image-subject is in focus. 'We are not turned toward the image-object, though it does appear' (ibid., 472).
18. Ibid., 55.
19. Ibid., 66–67.
20. Ibid., 74–75.
21. Ibid., 80, 83
22. Ibid., 85.
23. Ibid., 80–81.
24. Ibid., 93
25. Ibid., 100.
26. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil,* ed. Ursula Panzer (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 408n, 774n.
27. Husserl, *Phantasy*, 267.
28. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*, ed. Rudolf Boehm (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 279.
29. Husserl, *Phantasy*, 309.
30. Rudolf Bernet, 'Wirkliche Zeit und Phantasiezeit. Zu Husserls Begriff der zeitlichen Individuation', *Phänomenologische Forschungen* (2004): 37–56, https://doi.org/10.28937/1000107894.
31. Husserl, *Ideen,* 255; Cf. Husserl, *Phantasy*, 259, 308; Husserl, *Zeitbewusstsein*: 51, 127–128.
32. Husserl, *Phantasy*: 267, 265.
33. Ibid., 310.
34. Ibid., 310. As we will see, this is precisely how Sartre (mis)understands Husserl's theory of phantasy. To fend off such misunderstanding, one does well to emphasise the productivity of reproductive phantasy with Bernet ('Reine Phantasie als freie Selbstentzweiung bei Husserl', in *Metaphysik als Wissenschaft: Festschrift für Klaus Düsing zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Dirk Fonfara, (Alber, 2006), 408–426) and Jansen ('Phantasy's Systematic Place').
35. Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*, ed. Rudolf Boehm (Leidne: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 116.
36. Of course, the reproduced experience does not have to be a perception. Phantasy is a universal intentional modification, so that any intentional experience can be the implicated original, including another phantasy; hence its iterability (Husserl, *Ideen*, 250–253).
37. Husserl, *Phantasy*, 208.
38. Ibid., 310.
39. Husserl, *Ideen*, 255.
40. Husserl, *Ideen*, 251; Cf. Husserl, *Phantasy*, 308. This is of course not to deny that that lived experiences can also be given as just past or about to come. However, as constituted by 'perceptive' inner consciousness, every lived experience *can* be given as present and is *oriented toward* its original givenness in the present.
41. Husserl, *Phantasy*, 338.
42. This is the phenomenon of ego-splitting. Cf. Bernet, 'Reine Phantasie'.
43. Husserl, Husserl, *Zeitbewusstsein*, 100.
44. Ibid.

45. Husserl comes close to saying this in the context of discussing the imaginary object's lack of individuation, for primal impression is thought to be responsible for the establishment of individual time-points (Husserl, *Phantasy*, 552).
46. Alain Flajoliet provides an informed and detailed analysis of Sartre's reception and criticism of Husserl's theory of imagination in 'Deux descriptions phénoménologiques de l'imagination', *Alter* 10 (2002): 119–156.
47. The relation between (mental) imagination and signitive consciousness is a guiding thread of Sartre's review of the classical theories and their psychological descendants in *The Imagination*.
48. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Imagination*, trans. Kenneth. Williford and David Rudrauf (London: Routledge, 2012), 136; Cf. Flajoliet, 'Deux descriptions', 146–147, 153–155.
49. For Sartre, Husserl's 'hyle of the image' is 'the re-emerging sensible impression' (*The Imagination*, 136).
50. Sartre, *The Imagination*, 133.
51. Ibid., 139–140.
52. Ibid., 92–101.
53. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 53.
54. Ibid., 202 n10.
55 de Coorebyter, *Sartre,* 57–70.
56. Sartre, *The Imaginary,* 52–3.
57. Ibid.
58. Husserl, *Zeitbewusstsein*, 279. This clarification allows us to respond to the criticsm that Sartre's theory of *analogon* falls victim to the illusion of immanence (Edward Casey forwarded such a criticism in his 'Sartre on Imagination', in *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp (Open Court: La Salle, 1981), 139–166, here 148–150). This line of criticism presupposes that Sartre conceives mental imagination as having the structure of seeing-in in common with physical image, where *analogon* would function as image-object (See Robert Hopkins, *Picture, Image and Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 165–168). But one must insist on the difference between pure imagination and physical image, for which our knowledge of Husserl's development primes us. The *analogon* in the case of mental imagination is not an image-object *in* which we see an imaginary object. It is the *hyle* that is transcended in the constitution of an imaginary object. As opposed to the consciousness of image-object, the thematic consciousness of the *analogon* never enters into the pre-reflective structure of lived pure imagination. It is only in reflection that *analogon* is grasped as a thematic object (Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 85–87). Thus, Sartre's theory of *analogon* (as *hyle*) has nothing to do with the illusion of immanence. A similar claim is made in Clayton, *Psychical Analogon*.
59. Sartre makes no claim to exhaustiveness.
60. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 57.
61. Ibid., 65.
62. Ibid., 67.
63. Ibid., 58, 66.
64. Sartre's conception of pure knowledge seems not entirely consistent. He seems to waver between the Husserlian conception of empty intention as the modification of a corresponding perception (hence consciousness of an individual) and the more traditional Kantian conception of pure thought as a consciousness of general rules. Overall, the Kantian conception seems dominant (Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 57, 65).

Cf. Casey's criticism of Sartre's conception of degradation in *Sartre on Imagination*, 158–160.

65. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 128. This need not imply that we can learn absolutely nothing from imagination (either about the world or about ourselves), which is certainly false. According Hopkins's convincing interpretation, Sartre's thesis on the uninformativeness of imagination only claims that 'imagining leaves no rooms for learning what we have imagined'. See his 'Imagination and Affective Response', in *Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism*, ed. Jonathan Webber (London: Routledge, 2011), 100–117, here 101.
66. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 90–91.
67. Ibid., 38.
68. Ibid., 73.
69. See Helena de Preester, 'The sensory component of imagination: The motor theory of imagination as a present-day solution to Sartre's critique', *Philosophical Psychology*, 25:4 (2012), 503–520, https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.622362.
70. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 77.
71. Ibid., 74, 76.
72. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch.* Marly Biemel (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 55–58.
73. Sartre's notion of the imaginary attitude is complicated. If one takes one's clue from the Conclusion of *The Imaginary*, the imaginary attitude would be understood as totalisation-cum-negation: by taking this attitude, I constitute the real as a totality from a certain perspective and by the same token distance myself from the totality thus constituted. However, in earlier parts of the book, the imaginary attitude is characterised more along the line of a desire of presence. The two characterisations are contradictory; they supplement each other. (I will leave this claim here without further argument, since a thematic discussion of the imaginary attitude would exceed the scope of this article.) My focus here is on the second sense of the imaginary attitude.
74. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 34.
75. Ibid., 77.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 133–134.
78. Ibid., 78, 81.
79. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 404.
80. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 70.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., 71.
83. Ibid., 29, 197n22. Compare Marcel Mauss's remarks: 'possession plays the fundamental role in all magical activities', in *A General Theory of Magic*, trans. Robert Brain (London: Routledge, 2001), 48. For the centrality of the idea of magic in Sartre's philosophy, see Sarah Richmond's 'Magic in Sartre's early philosophy', in *Reading Sartre*, 145–160, as well as Daniel O'Shiel's *Sartre and Magic* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).
84. Mauss, *General Theory*, 149, 159.
85. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, 125
86. Ibid., 184–185.
87. It also anticipates Sartre's own later theory of facticity in *Being and Nothingness*,