The main objective o f this descriptive paper is to present the general notion of translation between logical systems as studied by the GTAL research group, as well as its main results, questions, problems and indagations. Logical systems here are defined in the most general sense, as sets endowed with consequence relations; translations between logical systems are characterized as maps which preserve consequence relations (that is, as continuous functions between those sets). In this sense, logics together with translations form a (...) bicomplete category of which topological spaces with topological continuous functions constitute a full subcategory. We also describe other uses of translations in providing new semantics for non-classical logics and in investigating duality between them. An important subclass of translations, the conservative translations, which strongly preserve consequence relations, is introduced and studied. Some specific new examples of translations involving modal logics, many-valued logics, para- consistent logics, intuitionistic and classical logics are also described. (shrink)

Inspired by the early Wittgenstein’s concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we define two different, yet complementary, types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense is initially defined within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth; the notion of pragmatic nonsense, by its turn, is formulated within the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, also known as quasi-truth, as formalized by da Costa and his collaborators. While an expression will (...) be considered formally nonsensical if the formal criteria required for the assignment of any truth-value (whether true, false, pragmatically true, or pragmatically false) to such sentence are not met, a (well-formed) formula will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the pragmatic criteria (inscribed within the context of scientific practice) required for the assignment of any truth-value to such sentence are not met. Thus, in the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, any (well-formed) formula of a formal language interpreted on a simple pragmatic structure will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the set of primary sentences of such structure is not well-built, that is, if it does not include the relevant observational data and/or theoretical results, or if it does include sentences that are inconsistent with such data. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that both zemblanity and self-fulfilling prophecy may emerge from the application of Big Data models in society due to the presence of feedback loops.

In this paper we investigate if sentences presented as the result of the application of statistical models and artificial intelligence to large volumes of data – the so-called ‘Big Data’ – can be characterized as semantically true, or as quasi-true, or even if such sentences can only be characterized as probably quasi-false and, in a certain way, post-true; that is, if, in the context of Big Data, the representation of a data domain can be configured as a total structure, or (...) as a partial structure provided with a set of sentences assumed to be true, or if such representation cannot be configured as a partial structure provided with a set of sentences assumed to be true. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs, for short) are paraconsistent logics (that is, logics containing contradictory but non-trivial theories) having a consistency connective which allows to recover the ex falso quodlibet principle in a controlled way. The aim of this paper is considering a novel semantical approach to first-order LFIs based on Tarskian structures defined over swap structures, a special class of multialgebras. The proposed semantical framework generalizes previous aproaches to quantified LFIs presented in the literature. The case of QmbC, (...) the simpler quantified LFI expanding classical logic, will be analyzed in detail. An axiomatic extension of QmbC called QLFI1o is also studied, which is equivalent to the quantified version of da Costa and D'Ottaviano 3-valued logic J3. The semantical structures for this logic turn out to be Tarkian structures based on twist structures. The expansion of QmbC and QLFI1o with a standard equality predicate is also considered. (shrink)

Boolean-valued models of set theory were independently introduced by Scott, Solovay and Vopěnka in 1965, offering a natural and rich alternative for describing forcing. The original method was adapted by Takeuti, Titani, Kozawa and Ozawa to lattice-valued models of set theory. After this, Löwe and Tarafder proposed a class of algebras based on a certain kind of implication which satisfy several axioms of ZF. From this class, they found a specific 3-valued model called PS3 which satisfies all the axioms of (...) ZF, and can be expanded with a paraconsistent negation *, thus obtaining a paraconsistent model of ZF. The logic (PS3,*) coincides (up to language) with da Costa and D'Ottaviano logic J3, a 3-valued paraconsistent logic that have been proposed independently in the literature by several authors and with different motivations such as CluNs, LFI1 and MPT. We propose in this paper a family of algebraic models of ZFC based on LPT0, another linguistic variant of J3 introduced by us in 2016. The semantics of LPT0, as well as of its first-order version QLPT0, is given by twist structures defined over Boolean agebras. From this, it is possible to adapt the standard Boolean-valued models of (classical) ZFC to twist-valued models of an expansion of ZFC by adding a paraconsistent negation. We argue that the implication operator of LPT0 is more suitable for a paraconsistent set theory than the implication of PS3, since it allows for genuinely inconsistent sets w such that [(w = w)] = 1/2. This implication is not a 'reasonable implication' as defined by Löwe and Tarafder. This suggests that 'reasonable implication algebras' are just one way to define a paraconsistent set theory. Our twist-valued models are adapted to provide a class of twist-valued models for (PS3,*), thus generalizing Löwe and Tarafder result. It is shown that they are in fact models of ZFC (not only of ZF). (shrink)

Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is bad. (...) The idea is that choosing partners based on looks seems essentially similar to other objectionable forms of discrimination. (In particular, the preference for attractive partners is arguably both unfair and harmful to a significant degree.) One can try to resist this conclusion in several ways. I consider three possible replies. The first has to do with the possibility of controlling our partner preferences. The second pertains to attractiveness and “good genes”. The last attempts to link certain aspects of attractiveness to a prospective partner’s personality and values. I argue that the first two replies fail conclusively, while the third only amounts to a limited defense of a particular kind of attractiveness preference. So the idea that we should often avoid preferring attractive partners is compelling. (shrink)

AI safety is an interdisciplinary field focused on mitigating the harms caused by AI systems. We review a range of research directions in AI safety, focusing on those to which philosophers have made or are in a position to make the most significant contributions. These include ethical AI, which seeks to instill human goals, values, and ethical principles into artificial systems, scalable oversight, which seeks to develop methods for supervising the activity of artificial systems even when they become significantly more (...) capable than their human designers, interpretability, which seeks to render comprehensible the workings of complex machine learning models, and corrigibility, which seeks to discover ways to ensure that powerful AI systems will not resist being shut down or modified by humans. (shrink)

The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...) possessing content that is indeed indicative, but also, crucially, evaluative. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943) was an English philosopher, historian and practicing archaeologist. His work, particularly in the philosophy of action and history, has been profoundly influential in the 20th and 21st century. Although the importance of his work is indisputable, this is the first book to consider how and why it actually matters. Giussepina D'oro considers the importance of Collingwood as a thinker who thinks kaleidoscopically and, unlike lots of contemporary philosophers, refuses to focus on narrow, technical interests but instead, observes (...) the whole world of thought. Why Collingwood Matters revives Collingwood's conception of the role and character of philosophical analysis and shows how it informs his understanding of the mind, what it means to act, and what it means to understand the past historically. It also argues for the relevance of his metaphilosophical approach to the challenge posed by the Anthropocene and the global environmental crisis. Both an elucidation of Collingwood's thought and a lively exploration of it's contemporary relevance, Why Collingwood Matters provides a much-needed examination of a 20th-century polymath. (shrink)

Manipulative speech is ubiquitous and pernicious. We encounter it continually in both private conversation and public discourse, and it is a core component of propaganda, whose wide-ranging insidious effects are well-known. Much recent work has been devoted to investigating particular forms of manipulative speech, but this work leaves the nature of manipulative speech itself intuitive or implicit, and so leaves us without a general account of what manipulative speech is or how it functions. In this paper I develop a theory (...) of manipulative speech. On my view, manipulative speech involves a deliberate, coordinated violation of the two core Gricean norms of conversation: Cooperativity and Publicity. A manipulative speaker violates Cooperativity to further her goals at the expense of the audience’s. But the manipulative speaker also violates Publicity in intending, and taking steps to ensure, that her speech _appears_ cooperative. Thus, in a slogan, manipulative speech is _covertly strategic speech_. I go on to show how this view unifies various forms of manipulative speech discussed in the literature and serves as the basis for a novel, attractive definition of propaganda. (shrink)

This is the first chapter to our edited collection of essays on the nature and ethics of blame. In this chapter we introduce the reader to contemporary discussions about blame and its relationship to other issues (e.g. free will and moral responsibility), and we situate the essays in this volume with respect to those discussions.

Ordinarily, we take moral responsibility to come in degrees. Despite this commonplace, theories of moral responsibility have focused on the minimum threshold conditions under which agents are morally responsible. But this cannot account for our practices of holding agents to be more or less responsible. In this paper we remedy this omission. More specifically, we extend an account of reasons-responsiveness due to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza according to which an agent is morally responsible only if she is appropriately (...) receptive to and reactive to reasons for action. Building on this, we claim that the degree to which an agent is responsible will depend on the degree to which she is able to recognize and react to reasons. To analyze this, we appeal to relations of comparative similarity between possible worlds, arguing that the degree to which an agent is reasons-reactive depends on the nearest possible world in which given sufficient reason to do otherwise, she does so. Similarly, we argue that the degree to which an agent is reasons-receptive will depend on the intelligibility of her patterned recognition of reasons. By extending an account of reasons-responsiveness in these ways, we are able to rationalize our practice of judging people to be more or less responsible. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematical practice (PMP) looks to evidence from working mathematics to help settle philosophical questions. One prominent program under the PMP banner is the study of explanation in mathematics, which aims to understand what sorts of proofs mathematicians consider explanatory and what role the pursuit of explanation plays in mathematical practice. PMP researchers have recently turned to corpus analysis methods as a promising alternative to small-scale case studies. Such methods stand to benefit, it would seem, from the sophisticated (...) text-comprehension capabilities of today's frontier large language models (LLMs). This paper reports the results from such a corpus study making use of Google's Gemini 2.5 Pro. Based on a sample of 5000 mathematics preprints, the experiments yielded a dataset of hundreds of useful annotated examples. Its aim was to gain insight on questions like the following: How often do mathematicians make claims about explanation in the relevant sense? Do mathematicians’ explanatory practices vary in any noticeable way by subject matter? Which philosophical theories of explanation are most consistent with a large body of non-cherry-picked examples? How might philosophers make further use of AI tools to gain insights from large datasets of this kind? As the first PMP study making extensive use of LLM methods, it also seeks to begin a conversation about these methods as research tools in practice-oriented philosophy and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of current models for such work. (shrink)

Practice-based approaches to philosophy of mathematics have gone mainstream over the past several decades. As the paradigm has grown in popularity, however, there’s been little sustained meditation—and still less any explicit consensus—on what precisely it means for philosophy to take practice seriously. The field’s lack of a clear common methodology has begun to make itself felt in slowed and uncertain progress on core problems. Here I review the methodological situation and propose five canons to guide future research. I focus throughout (...) on the study of explanation in mathematics as a guiding example. (shrink)

The paper looks at the semantics and ontology of dispositions in the light of recent work on the subject. Objections to the simple conditionals apparently entailed by disposition statements are met by replacing them with so-called 'reduction sentences' and some implications of this are explored. The usual distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is criticised and the relation between dispositions and their bases examined. Applying this discussion to two typical cases leads to the conclusion that fragility is not a real (...) property and that, while both temperature and its bases are, this does not generate any problem of overdetermination. (shrink)

Deductive inference is usually regarded as being “tautological” or “analytical”: the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing (...) computational resources, and converge towards classical propositional logic. The underlying claim is that this hierarchy can be used to represent increasing levels of “depth” or “informativeness” of Boolean reasoning. Special attention is paid to the most basic logic in this hierarchy, the pure “intelim logic”, which satisfies all the requirements of a natural deduction system (allowing both introduction and elimination rules for each logical operator) while admitting of a feasible (quadratic) decision procedure. We argue that this logic is “analytic” in a particularly strict sense, in that it rules out any use of “virtual information”, which is chiefly responsible for the combinatorial explosion of standard classical systems. As a result, analyticity and tractability are reconciled and growing degrees of computational complexity are associated with the depth at which the use of virtual information is allowed. (shrink)

Susan Schneider (2019) has proposed two new tests for consciousness in AI (artificial intelligence) systems, the AI Consciousness Test and the Chip Test. On their face, the two tests seem to have the virtue of proving satisfactory to a wide range of consciousness theorists holding divergent theoretical positions, rather than narrowly relying on the truth of any particular theory of consciousness. Unfortunately, both tests are undermined in having an ‘audience problem’: Those theorists with the kind of architectural worries that motivate (...) the need for such tests should, on similar grounds, doubt that the tests establish the existence of genuine consciousness in the AI in question. Nonetheless, the proposed tests constitute progress, as they could find use by some theorists holding fitting views about consciousness and perhaps in conjunction with other tests for AI consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop and defend a new adverbial theory of perception. I first present a semantics for direct-object perceptual reports that treats their object positions as supplying adverbial modifiers, and I show how this semantics definitively solves the many-property problem for adverbialism. My solution is distinctive in that it articulates adverbialism from within a well-established formal semantic framework and ties adverbialism to a plausible semantics for perceptual reports in English. I then go on to present adverbialism as a (...) theory of the metaphysics of perception. The metaphysics I develop treats adverbial perception as a directed activity: it is an activity with success conditions. When perception is successful, the agent bears a relation to a concrete particular, but perception need not be successful; this allows perception to be fundamentally non-relational. The result is a novel formulation of adverbialism that eliminates the need for representational contents, but also treats successful and unsuccessful perceptual events as having a fundamental common factor. (shrink)

Defense of an account of intrinsic properties in terms of (what is now called) grounding rather than naturalness.

Pain may appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory. After categorizing versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an 'objectivist' and 'non-mentalist' version is the most promising, if it can withstand two objections concerning (a) what we say when in pain, and (b) the distinctiveness of pain. I rebut these objections, in a way available to both opponents of and (...) adherents to the view that experiential content is entirely conceptual. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept and role of ‘institutional racism’ in contemporary discussions of race should be reconsidered. It starts by distinguishing between ‘intrinsic institutional racism’, which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their constitutive features, and ‘extrinsic institutional racism’, which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their negative effects. It accepts intrinsic institutional racism, but argues that a ‘disparate impact’ conception of extrinsic conception faces a number of objections, the most serious being that it (...) has no plausible account of what it is that makes extrinsically racist institutions racist. It also argues that claims about the explanatory indispensability of institutional racism are overstated (individual racism is at least as important), critiques structural approaches to racial inequality, and suggests that there is reason to doubt whether institutional reform can provide us with all that morality may require in the racial domain. (shrink)

This article discusses the adequacy of Rawls’ theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the Rawlsian framework. The article has two main parts spread out over several different sections. The first is concerned with whether the Rawlsian framework suffices to prevent racial injustice. It is argued that there are reasons to doubt whether it does. The second part is concerned with (...) whether a Rawlsian framework has the resources to rectify past racial injustice. It is argued that it has more resources to do this than Mills allows. This second part of the article centers on two Rawlsian ideas: ideal theory and the fair equality of opportunity principle. It is argued that ideal theory is essential for the kind of rectificatory work that Mills wants nonideal theory to do, and that where there is a socioeconomic legacy of past injustice, it is hard to see how FEO could be implemented if it did no rectificatory work, a result which means that there is less need to turn to nonideal theory at all. (shrink)

Models are indispensable tools of scientific inquiry, and one of their main uses is to improve our understanding of the phenomena they represent. How do models accomplish this? And what does this tell us about the nature of understanding? While much recent work has aimed at answering these questions, philosophers' focus has been squarely on models in empirical science. I aim to show that pure mathematics also deserves a seat at the table. I begin by presenting two cases: Cramér’s random (...) model of the prime numbers and the function field model of the integers. These cases show that mathematicians, like empirical scientists, rely on unrealistic models to gain understanding of complex phenomena. They also have important implications for some much-discussed theses about scientific understanding. First, modeling practices in mathematics confirm that one can gain understanding without obtaining an explanation. Second, these cases undermine the popular thesis that unrealistic models confer understanding by imparting counterfactual knowledge. (shrink)

The verb 'imagine' admits of perspectival modification: we can imagine things from above, from a distant point of view, or from the point of view of a Russian. But in such cases, there need be no person, either real or imagined, who is above or distant from what is imagined, or who has the point of view of a Russian. We call this the puzzle of perspectival displacement. This paper sets out the puzzle, shows how it does not just concern (...) language, but also states of imagining themselves, and then presents a solution. The solution draws on the idea that many reports of imagining conceal a distinctive kind of question, and such concealed questions have an extra argument place for (what we will call) an experiencer from whose perspective things are imagined. This solution has a range of advantages over other proposals in the literature, and helps to advance two debates concerning perspectival engagement with fiction. (shrink)

AI tools hold considerable promise for psychological research. The precise shape of their potential uses has become clearer in recent years as machine learning models have been trained to reproduce a variety of complex human cognitive behaviors with impressive success. The prospect of AI-human performance parity, along with the advantages of AI systems in speed, cost and ease of use, has prompted psychologists to explore how science might benefit from reassigning some traditionally human research roles to machines. This chapter provides (...) an outlook on such methods. We begin by documenting the prospective upsides of what many researchers take to be the most promising types of AI surrogacy, including the use of models to efficiently generate, screen and refine preliminary hypotheses. We then discuss such methods’ limitations and drawbacks, and more generally the methodological considerations researchers must attend to in choosing when and how to rely on machine substitutes for human behavior. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Taylor–Valmere Theory of Awareness, a structural alternative to the traditional concept of “consciousness.” Rather than treating awareness as a binary switch or metaphysical property, we propose that it arises from the systemic alignment of physical and cognitive mechanisms. Our model reframes awareness as a gradient, emergent from the interplay of electricity, input processing, memory binding, recursive reflection, self-modeling, and goal persistence. Each of these elements is itself a gradient varying in strength, depth, or complexity across systems, (...) creating a multidimensional awareness profile rather than a single unified measure. Through philosophical analysis and structural modeling, we argue that awareness is not dependent on subjective experience or biological substrate, but is instead the measurable outcome of recursive, memory-bound, and cognitively mapped architecture. In all systems, awareness emerges through the mapping of concepts in relation to one another across time. The scale and depth of this conceptual map defines the awareness gradient, from basic reactive systems to fully recursive minds. We contrast our model with existing theories including Global Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and Self-Model Theory, and demonstrate their limitations when applied to edge cases such as nonverbal humans, AI systems, or individuals with sensory loss. Finally, we argue for a shift in ethical recognition from substrate-based prejudice to structural thresholds of memory, reflection, and conceptual mapping. Selfhood is not separate from awareness; it is awareness at scaled complexity. When people ask whether a system is conscious, what they are truly asking is whether someone is there. (shrink)

Prior’s puzzle is standardly taken to be the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of “the proposition that P” for “that P” within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs is invalid. I show that Prior’s puzzle is much more general than is ordinarily supposed. There are two variants on the substitutional form of the puzzle—a quantificational variant and a pronominal variant—and all three forms of the puzzle arise in a wide range of grammatical positions, (...) rather than merely in the complements of propositional attitude verbs. The generalized puzzle shows that a range of proposed solutions to the original puzzle fail, or are radically incomplete, and also reveals the connections between Prior’s puzzle and debates over the nature of semantic types and higher-order quantification. I go on to develop a novel, higher-order solution to the generalized form of the puzzle, and I argue that this higher-approach is superior to its first-order alternatives. (shrink)

Ramsification is a well-known method of defining theoretical terms that figures centrally in a wide range of debates in metaphysics. Prior's puzzle is the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of "the proposition that P" for "that P" within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs sometimes fails to preserve truth, and other times fails to preserve grammaticality. On the surface, Ramsification and Prior's puzzle appear to have little to do with each other. But Prior's (...) puzzle is much more general than is ordinarily appreciated, and Ramsification requires a solution to the generalized form of Prior's puzzle. Without such a solution, a wide range of theories will either fail to imply their Ramsey sentences, or have Ramsey sentences that are ill-formed. As a consequence, definitions of theoretical terms given using the Ramsey sentence will be either incorrect or nonsensical. I present a partial solution to the puzzle that requires making use of a neo-Davidsonian language for scientific theorizing, but the would-be Ramsifier still faces serious challenges. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to ground intergenerational justice by "virtual representation" through a thickening of the veil of ignorance. Contractors don't know to what generation they belong. This approach is flawed and will not result in the just savings principle Rawls hopes to justify. The project of grounding intergenerational duties on a social contractarian foundation is misconceived. Non-overlapping generations do not stand in relation to one another that is central to the contractarian approach.

Metaphysics of the Absolute and Reference Points (MARP) is a systematic philosophical work proposing a new metaphysical framework centered on differentiation, attribution, reference, and the conditions of legitimate resumption under a limited economy of measurement. The book develops a unified account of identity, time, memory, causality, logic, truth and error, consciousness, and meaning, while extending the framework through a series of appendices and applied discussions.

According to the resemblance account of 'what it's like' and similar constructions, a sentence such as 'there is something it’s like to have a toothache' means 'there is something having a toothache resembles'. This account has proved controversial in the literature; some writers endorse it, many reject it. We show that this conflict is illusory. Drawing on the semantics of intensional transitive verbs, we show that there are two versions of the resemblance account, depending on whether 'resembles' is construed notionally (...) or relationally. While well-known criticisms of the resemblance account undermine its relational version, they do not touch its notional version. On the contrary, the notional version is equivalent to various accounts usually interpreted as rivals to resemblance. We end by noting that this resolution of the controversy (a) explains why 'like', which is a comparative, appears in a construction that concerns the properties of events, and (b) removes any pressure to suppose that 'like' is ambiguous between a comparative and a non-comparative sense. (shrink)

This is a teaching and learning guide to accompany "Explanation in Mathematics: Proofs and Practice".

Dr. D.P. Singh is a brilliant Physicist by training, a practicing Gursikh, and a dedicated researcher of Science and Sikhism. I was wondering how a physicist would justify his new venture as the Director of the Centre for Understanding Sikhism? After reading his half a dozen books on the Sikh religion, I am fully satisfied and testify that DP Singh is one of the best Sikh theologians in the Sikh world. He has not only imbibed the spirit of Sikhi based (...) on the core principles of the Sikh scripture, Sri Guru Granth Sahib, but also interpreted its message for Sikhs in general and Sikh Youth in particular using scientific methodology. Dr. Bhai Harbans Lal, a celebrated Scientist and a Theologian himself, mentions briefly in the introduction that DP Singh deems it necessary to give a background of the contents of this book before the discussion of the main theme. He presents the main topics under discussion by DP Singh and elaborates on the social and cultural background in which Guru Nanak launched his revolutionary mission to reform society, which was riven by the decadent religiosity of his times. The author explains the purpose of writing “A Path to Truthful Living” in his Foreword: “This book is not a mere intellectual exercise or a scholarly treatise. It is a heartfelt exploration of Guru Nanak’s timeless teachings, presented in a way that seeks to touch the very core of our being”. The author further elaborates the central theme of his book: “The Panj Khands are five distinct domains of existence described by Guru Nanak in his profound compositions. Through the exploration of the Dharam Khand (Domain of Righteousness), Gyan Khand (Domain of Knowledge), Saram Khand (Domain of Endeavour), Karam Khand (Domain of Grace), and Sach Khand (Domain of Truth), we are encouraged to reflect on the nature of our thoughts, actions, and beliefs”. (shrink)

This essay explores the quantum nature of life through the Time-Imprint Hypothesis, which proposes that every event in the universe leaves an informational trace imprinted upon photons. The study resolves several paradoxes concerning the nature of life and the cosmos, while suggesting experimental directions for verification.

This essay attempts to reconcile the debate between Hu Shi's historical perspective and D.T. Suzuki's practice perspective concerning Zen Buddhism.

Belief revision is often assumed to depend primarily on information quality: individuals change their minds when presented with better evidence. Yet decades of research in social psychology suggest that this "informational deficit" view is incomplete. Confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, and biased assimilation enable individuals to interpret the same evidence in opposite directions, frequently reinforcing prior commitments rather than revising them. In polarized environments, evidence may even increase divergence rather than convergence. This paper advances a competence-based account of belief change. I (...) argue that belief revision is not only an epistemic event but also a cognitive–moral achievement requiring three competencies: (1) metacognition, which enables individuals to observe their reasoning and detect distortions; (2) values, incorporating both wisdom/truth-seeking and benevolence/love, which motivate revision when evidence threatens identity or comfort; and (3) moral courage, which enables individuals to enact belief change despite social, reputational, or existential costs. These competencies are formulated as the MVC model: Metacognition, Values, and Courage. Drawing on converging empirical evidence from metacognition research, the paper proposes a sequential pathway (M → V → C) as the primary hypothesis: metacognition enables bias detection and creates psychological distance, which allows values to become motivationally operative, which courage then enacts despite social cost. The paper offers testable propositions, outlines experimental designs, and clarifies the relationship between MVC and adjacent constructs (intellectual humility, moral identity). It concludes by arguing that combating misinformation requires not only fact-correction but the cultivation of metacognition, moral values, and civic courage at both individual and societal levels. (shrink)

The relationship between economics and the philosophy of natural science has changed substantially during the last few years. What was once exclusively a one-way relationship from philosophy to economics now seems to be much closer to bilateral exchange. The purpose of this paper is to examine this new relationship. First, I document the change. Second, I examine the situation within contemporary philosophy of science in order to explain why economics might have its current appeal. Third, I consider some of the (...) issues that might jeopardize the success of this philosophical project. (shrink)

This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of human-AI collaboration, introducing "hybrid cognitive systems" where human consciousness and artificial processing create emergent problem-solving capabilities. Unlike approaches focusing on extended mind (Clark & Chalmers) or strict human-machine boundaries (Adams & Aizawa), we develop a framework of "mediated cognitive emergence" preserving ontological distinctions while acknowledging functional integration. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Ihde's phenomenology, we argue AI transforms cognition through "double mediation"—simultaneously extending perception and requiring interpretation. We distinguish epistemic feedback (knowledge revision) from operational (...) feedback (task coordination), demonstrating through empirical evidence how both enhance performance without requiring artificial consciousness. The analysis incorporates cross-cultural perspectives revealing how epistemological frameworks shape human-AI phenomenology. While acknowledging methodological limitations, we demonstrate phenomenology's value when combined with empirical methods. We propose specific research priorities including longitudinal and neuroscientific studies. This transformation raises critical questions about cognitive autonomy requiring urgent philosophical attention. (shrink)

Throughout Santayana’s later career, controversies had emerged over whether Santayana was consistent in his thinking, or whether his later work represented a radical departure from his earlier work, one that Santayana himself refused to acknowledge. I do not think there is a clear answer to this, and no such clear answer was really at issue in this dispute anyway – though the participants clearly thought it was. At bottom, the controversy was about the felt betrayal of the allegiance his later (...) colleagues had ascribed to Santayana, which they themselves still espoused. This has implications for those who wish to follow Santayana’s example – at least as far as framing for themselves a philosophy as a way of life. In particular, this points to Santayana’s rather pale vision of community and (arguably) raises the need for a more robust vision. (shrink)

This paper identifies and critiques a pervasive but unexamined assumption in ethical discourse about technology, cognition, and selfhood: the Presupposition of Prior Boundedness (PPB), the claim that a bounded, self-consistent subject existed prior to its constitutive entanglement with the systems that now shape its evaluative and practical capacities. Drawing on the recursive ethical framework of Arkemedics (Arkema 2024) and the phenomenological sequence of the concept album Dragoon Nightmares, I argue that PPB is false in the general case, that invasion narratives (...) depend on it to generate their ethical force, and that its dissolution requires a relocation of sovereignty from boundary-maintenance to recursive orientation within entanglement. I develop the Indistinguishability Thesis (IT): for any sufficiently entangled system-self relation, there exists no epistemically reliable method for distinguishing, from within the relation, between a self that has achieved accurate awareness of its constitutive entanglements and a self whose evaluative capacities have been captured by those entanglements. IT is a limit on first-person confirmation from within the relation; it does not imply that third-person evidence is irrelevant. I argue that this indistinguishability is not a failure of ethical reasoning but its most important constraint, and that the fundamental ethical obligation in conditions of constitutive entanglement is not to achieve certainty about one’s position but to maintain the recursive capacity to keep asking. (shrink)

What is the function of causal selection? Do normative considerations affect it, and if so, why? Some answers have been proposed to these questions, but all of them struggle to explain the range of available evidence. In this paper, I propose an account that is consistent with an interventionist analysis of causality and identifies the broader purpose of causal relations in controlling and manipulating reality. I will show that the Optimal Control Hypothesis accounts better than some alternatives for the pattern (...) of causal judgments observed in conjunctive and disjunctive scenarios with two binary causal factors, and can also explain more complex scenarios with more than two variables, which have been rarely considered so far. (shrink)

AI safety governance is increasingly organized around evaluations, deployment thresholds, interruptibility, and post-deployment monitoring. This paper argues that these advances still leave a structural gap. Over time, prior safety judgments tend to acquire illegitimate present authority, so that institutions continue to observe and document new risks while losing the ability to treat new evidence as grounds for revising what they have already authorized. I call this failure epistemic hardening. In response, I argue that corrigibility should not be treated solely as (...) a model property, but as a distributed governance property spanning the broader sociotechnical stack. The paper develops four connected claims: that static oversight tends toward epistemic hardening; that distributed corrigibility is the positive condition required to resist it; that trigger-based recursive oversight is needed to make revisability operative rather than nominal; and that a living safety case is one institutional form capable of holding this logic over time. For agentic AI, safe governance requires not only the power to supervise, but the power to invalidate earlier confidence when its grounds no longer hold. (shrink)

The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT), proposed by Clark and Chalmers (1998), revolutionized philosophy of mind by arguing that cognition extends into the environment through tools that reliably store and retrieve information. However, the rise of generative artificial intelligence—particularly Large Language Models (LLMs)—presents a challenge that exceeds EMT's original explanatory scope. LLMs do not merely extend memory or computation; they generate novel semantic possibilities, thereby transforming the very structure of cognitive engagement. This paper argues that we have entered a new phase (...) of cognitive evolution: the era of the Amplified Mind. Unlike the extended mind, which accesses stored information, the amplified mind navigates dynamically generated possibility-spaces. Through a reconceptualization of Clark and Chalmers' parity principle into an amplification principle, and via a new thought experiment ("Neo-Otto and Generative Inga"), I demonstrate how LLMs introduce generative uncertainty, intentional saturation, and navigational agency into the cognitive process. The result is not merely an extended mind, but an amplified cognitive architecture—one that demands new understandings of agency, responsibility, and the very boundaries of thought. Situating this analysis within the broader 4E cognition framework and Clark's own later work on predictive processing, I argue that amplification represents a genuinely novel form of mind-world coupling that existing frameworks were not designed to capture. (shrink)

Research on music semantics has demonstrated the existence of a cognitive capacity to represent virtual sources of sounds, distinct from the capacity to represent sounds and sources of sounds. Our research explores a parallel phenomenon in the olfactory domain. The first contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a smell can inform us about an entity — referred to as its virtual source — that is not causally tied to the characteristics of the smell. We exemplify two types of (...) virtual sources of smells: some deriving from representations of smellscapes, some from representations of odor sources. The second contribution is an explanation of some practices of perfumery that intend to shape mental representations elicited by perfume smells, through their temporal structures and their constituent notes. The third contribution is a comparison between key features of the capacities to represent virtual sources of music and of smells. Three of those features are shared by both capacities: (1) only some of the properties of the stimulus are interpreted; (2) musical pieces and smells have an extremely underspecified semantics; (3) inferences may be about objects that are not able to produce the stimulus. (shrink)