Ontology is a burgeoning field, involving researchers from the computer science, philosophy, data and software engineering, logic, linguistics, and terminology domains. Many ontology-related terms with precise meanings in one of these domains have different meanings in others. Our purpose here is to initiate a path towards disambiguation of such terms. We draw primarily on the literature of biomedical informatics, not least because the problems caused by unclear or ambiguous use of terms have been there most thoroughly addressed. We advance a (...) proposal resting on a distinction of three levels too often run together in biomedical ontology research: 1. the level of reality; 2. the level of cognitive representations of this reality; 3. the level of textual and graphical artifacts. We propose a reference terminology for ontology research and development that is designed to serve as common hub into which the several competing disciplinary terminologies can be mapped. We then justify our terminological choices through a critical treatment of the ‘concept orientation’ in biomedical terminology research. (shrink)

The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic expressivity to (...) existing databases, building data entry forms, and enabling interoperability between knowledge resources. OBI covers all phases of the investigation process, such as planning, execution and reporting. It represents information and material entities that participate in these processes, as well as roles and functions. Prior to OBI, it was not possible to use a single internally consistent resource that could be applied to multiple types of experiments for these applications. OBI has made this possible by creating terms for entities involved in biological and medical investigations and by importing parts of other biomedical ontologies such as GO, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest (ChEBI) and Phenotype Attribute and Trait Ontology (PATO) without altering their meaning. OBI is being used in a wide range of projects covering genomics, multi-omics, immunology, and catalogs of services. OBI has also spawned other ontologies (Information Artifact Ontology) and methods for importing parts of ontologies (Minimum information to reference an external ontology term (MIREOT)). The OBI project is an open cross-disciplinary collaborative effort, encompassing multiple research communities from around the globe. To date, OBI has created 2366 classes and 40 relations along with textual and formal definitions. The OBI Consortium maintains a web resource providing details on the people, policies, and issues being addressed in association with OBI. (shrink)

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

A wide variety of ontologies relevant to the biological and medical domains are available through the OBO Foundry portal, and their number is growing rapidly. Integration of these ontologies, while requiring considerable effort, is extremely desirable. However, heterogeneities in format and style pose serious obstacles to such integration. In particular, inconsistencies in naming conventions can impair the readability and navigability of ontology class hierarchies, and hinder their alignment and integration. While other sources of diversity are tremendously complex and challenging, agreeing (...) a set of common naming conventions is an achievable goal, particularly if those conventions are based on lessons drawn from pooled practical experience and surveys of community opinion. We summarize a review of existing naming conventions and highlight certain disadvantages with respect to general applicability in the biological domain. We also present the results of a survey carried out to establish which naming conventions are currently employed by OBO Foundry ontologies and to determine what their special requirements regarding the naming of entities might be. Lastly, we propose an initial set of typographic, syntactic and semantic conventions for labelling classes in OBO Foundry ontologies. Adherence to common naming conventions is more than just a matter of aesthetics. Such conventions provide guidance to ontology creators, help developers avoid flaws and inaccuracies when editing, and especially when interlinking, ontologies. Common naming conventions will also assist consumers of ontologies to more readily understand what meanings were intended by the authors of ontologies used in annotating bodies of data. (shrink)

Despite his opposition to Schopenhauerian pessimism, Nietzsche repeatedly characterises himself as a pessimist of sorts. Here I attempt to take this assertion seriously and offer an interpretation of in what sense Nietzsche can be called a pessimist. I suggest that Nietzsche’s pessimism has to do not with life in general, but with life in its common form: such life is bad because it is characterised by meaningless suffering, and lacks aesthetic value. Against the Christian tradition, Nietzsche denies that there is (...) a value inherent to life itself, and thinks instead, that value must be achieved, but rarely is. This form of pessimism is rooted in Nietzsche’s engagement with the ancient Greeks, and bears important affinities to the thought of Burckhardt on Greek pessimism. (shrink)

In the recent literature on coherence and structural rationality, it is widely assumed that sets of attitudes are coherent just in case they are not incoherent. In particular, the two most popular kinds of views of incoherence—those centered around wide-scope rational requirements and those centered around guaranteed failures of some normatively significant kind—rely on this assumption. This article argues that this assumption should be rejected because it fails to capture the difference between positively coherent attitudes and random unrelated ones. The (...) article also formulates and defends an alternative support-centric view of coherence and incoherence that captures this difference and has several additional advantages. (shrink)

As large language models (LLMs) continue to demonstrate remarkable abilities across various domains, computer scientists are developing methods to understand their cognitive processes, particularly concerning how (and if) LLMs internally represent their beliefs about the world. However, this field currently lacks a unified theoretical foundation to underpin the study of belief in LLMs. This article begins filling this gap by proposing adequacy conditions for a representation in an LLM to count as belief-like. We argue that, while the project of belief (...) measurement in LLMs shares striking features with belief measurement as carried out in decision theory and formal epistemology, it also differs in ways that should change how we measure belief. Thus, drawing from insights in philosophy and contemporary practices of machine learning, we establish four criteria that balance theoretical considerations with practical constraints. Our proposed criteria include accuracy, coherence, uniformity, and use, which together help lay the groundwork for a comprehensive understanding of belief representation in LLMs. We draw on empirical work showing the limitations of using various criteria in isolation to identify belief representations. (shrink)

This paper defends the Intention Account of Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial (...) norms which mandate a rational inquirer's ignorance towards the answer to her question can be reformulated and defended by appeal to rational constraints on intention. Fourth, instrumental pressures inquirers face are the standard pressures of plan-rationality. In defending these theses, I show that the Intention Account provides compelling explanations to standing challenges, in ways competitors cannot. It does so by advancing understanding of how our epistemic and practical agency are intertwined. (shrink)

Recently, there has been an explosion of research in philosophy and psychology about conspiracy theories. This chapter explores what this work can tell us about whether conspiracy theorists genuinely believe the theories they engage with. On one hand, it’s natural to assume that anyone who claims to believe conspiracy theories, and who spends a lot of time engaging with them, must really believe them. On the other hand, given that many conspiracy theories seem quite far-fetched and lacking in good evidence, (...) it’s also natural to wonder whether conspiracy theorists are just playing a big game of pretend or make-believe. Philosophers and psychologists writing about conspiracy theorists often simply assume, without argument, that they really do believe (an assumption this chapter calls the “Belief View”). More recently, however, several philosophers have appealed to empirical evidence to argue that conspiracy theorists take a more imaginative cognitive attitude towards their theories (the “Imaginative View”). It’s difficult to conclusively settle this debate without first settling another, highly controversial debate over how to define the term “conspiracy theory.” However, insights emerging from the disagreement between the Belief View and Imaginative View may be able to help us make some progress on this definitional question. (shrink)

This chapter will amount to a detailed exposition and exploration of one of the most prominent arguments against the existence of an unsurpassable world: the argument from addition. Endorsed by a variety of thinkers such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Alvin Plantinga, and William Rowe, the argument from addition uses the possibility of adding good things to a candidate unsurpassable world to argue that every world is surpassable. While widely endorsed, the argument has come under recent criticism. By carefully working through (...) a targeted version of the argument, I set out to establish the following: (i) that a world can always contain more good things; (ii) that a suitably restricted additive aggregation principle allows us to say that adding more good things in a certain way is an improvement, and (iii) that objections to the argument from widespread value incomparability fail. (shrink)

“I wonder what it is that makes one person push on in the face of difficulty and makes someone else crumble in helplessness.” – Fred Rogers -/- In the movie Rocky IV (1985), heavyweight boxer Rocky Balboa reveals in a heart-to-heart talk with his son that sometimes in the ring he feels like giving up. But, he continues, “going that one more round when you don’t think you can—that’s what makes all the difference in your life.” Perseverance can be a (...) difference-maker, for ill and for good, and when for good, it is widely prized and often the sine qua non of human survival and flourishing. However, understanding when and why perseverance is valuable requires an answer to Mr. Rogers’s question about what it is. In section 1, we briefly answer that question, and we sketch a neo-Aristotelian view of when perseverance is a virtue. In section 2, we exhibit how perseverance shows up in the religious life, in the Hebrew and Christian traditions. In section 3, we show how perseverance infuses faith and faithfulness in both the portrayal of pístis in the Christian New Testament, which was written in Greek, and ʾĕmûnāh in the Hebrew scriptures. We then articulate, in section 4, a theory of faith and faithfulness that accommodates this portrayal, before showing in section 5 how the theory handles other religious data related to the connection between faith and faithfulness, on the one hand, and perseverance, on the other. (shrink)

Political egalitarians hold that there is a distinct ideal of political equality, which defines and justifies democracy. So what is political equality? The orthodox view says it is equality of opportunity for political influence, not equality of political influence. The first goal of this article is to argue against this view about the nature of political equality. From 1962 to 1983, Australia’s First Nations citizens had the right to vote, but unlike other citizens they did not have the duty to (...) vote. First Nations citizens were made politically unequal without being given any less opportunity for influence; the most plausible explanation for why they were made politically unequal is instead that they were made to exert less influence. The second goal is to use this challenge to illuminate the point of political equality. The orthodox view is typically undergirded by taking political equality to be concerned with some cosmic injustice that inheres in states of affairs, depending on the distribution of power. This is doubly mistaken. The point of political equality is deontic, not telic; and what it prescribes is not distributive, but relational. More specifically, the point of political equality is for the state to treat each citizen as an equal coauthor of the law. The overarching goal is to catalyze a more vigorous debate about political equality, akin to the long-standing debates about other dimensions of equality. (shrink)

We inquire together all the time, yet the norms of such inquiring are poorly understood. Parallels from norms of individual inquiry fall short in accurately characterizing our inquiring together. The need then for an account of inquiring together which provides normative guidance is pressing. This paper unpacks and defends a version of a crucial norm of such inquiry, inspired by Harman (1986), which codifies the kind of evidence necessary for a shared inquirer to permissibly settle her shared question. It is (...) informed by the demands of directed openness between inquirers, characteristic of much shared activity generally, and shared inquiry specifically. In defending this norm, a general account of shared inquiry is developed, one which sheds light on the complex and surprising relationship between human cooperation and epistemic rationality. (shrink)

Malapportionment—electoral districts with divergent ratios of people to representation—was ruled to be unconstitutional in a widely venerated series of cases before the Warren Court. Those cases held that a principle of political equality, ‘one person, one vote’, is required by the Constitution. But what is the content of that principle? Many Justices and commentators declare that it is vague, empty, circular, or meaningless. This creates a murder mystery. Malapportionment was killed; but by what, exactly? This Article seeks an answer by (...) focusing on the Court’s commitments about the scope and strictness of one person, one vote: it is a broad (rather than narrow) principle of rough (rather than exact) equality. As such, one person, one vote requires an equal number of people per district and an equal number of votes per voter; and it requires a roughly equal number of people per district. These commitments are attractive in isolation. But, this Article shows, they are objectionable in conjunction: they entail that one person, one vote is too permissive, as it only requires a roughly equal number of votes per voter. If your vote is roughly equal to mine when your district is fractionally more populous than mine, your vote is also roughly equal to mine when I can cast fractionally more votes than you. -/- Since this problem follows inexorably from the Court’s commitments about the scope and strictness of one person, one vote, there are two possible solutions. First, one person, one vote could be broad a principle of exact equality; administrability may then justify underenforcing the principle in distributing voters to districts, but not in distributing votes to voters. Second, one person, one vote could include a narrow principle requiring rough equality in apportionment, as well as a distinct principle requiring exactly equal votes per voter. These solutions have important constitutional implications—including for resolving the population baseline at issue in malapportionment, which remains uncertain after Evenwel v. Abbott. But neither provides an easy way out. Each makes one person, one vote either too restrictive or too permissive. -/- This puzzle brings to light why the operative principle in a venerated series of cases is deeply unclear and unsettled. But it has a special significance beyond that. One person, one vote lies at the heart of America’s constitutional democracy, which is already under considerable threat. On the one hand, if the content of the principle is too restrictive (or too uncertain), then objections to its constitutionality are considerably strengthened. On the other hand, if it is too permissive, then one person, one vote provides little constraint on Vice-President J.D. Vance’s recent proposal to give extra votes to parents, as well as myriad similar policies and procedures that would erode voters’ equality at the ballot box. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism – the view that moral concern, and consequently moral duties, are not limited by borders – seems to justify colonialism with a ‘civilizing’ mission, because it supports the enforcement of moral norms universally, with no distinctions between territories, and settler colonialism, because it promotes ideas like common ownership of the Earth and open borders. I argue that existing attempts to defend cosmopolitanism from this worry fail, and that instead the cosmopolitan should embrace a cosmopolitan instrumentalist defence. According to cosmopolitan (...) instrumentalism, colonialism is wrong (when it is wrong) for instrumental reasons: it has all sorts of terrible effects. There is nothing per se wrong with colonialism itself, so cosmopolitanism need not worry about licencing it in principle. There is much that is wrong with colonialism in practice, so cosmopolitanism can easily condemn colonialism as egregiously wrong, although it cannot condemn it as per se or necessarily wrong. (shrink)

Aim To examine the challenges and opportunities presented by generative artificial intelligence in healthcare education and explore how it can be used ethically to enhance rather than compromise future healthcare workforce competence. Background Generative artificial intelligence is fundamentally changing healthcare education, yet many universities and healthcare educators have failed to keep pace with its rapid development. Design A discussion paper. Methods Discussion and analysis of the challenges and opportunities presented by students' increasing use of generative artificial intelligence in healthcare education, (...) with particular focus on assessment approaches, critical thinking development and artificial intelligence literacy. Results Students' widespread use of generative artificial intelligence threatens assessment integrity and may inhibit critical thinking, problem-solving skills and knowledge acquisition. Without adequate artificial intelligence literacy there is a risk of eroding future healthcare workforce competence and compromising patient safety and professional integrity. Conclusion While generative artificial intelligence presents significant challenges to healthcare education, it offers great promise if used carefully with awareness of its limitations. The development of artificial intelligence literacy is crucial for maintaining professional standards and ensuring patient safety and mitigating its potentially negative impact on the formation of critical thinking skills. (shrink)

‘One person, one vote’ (OPOV) is an important slogan in democratic movements, a principle that undergirds a landmark series of cases in US constitutional law, and a widely accepted axiom of democratic theory in philosophy and political science. It is taken to be sacrosanct; some even state that OPOV “is, like the injustice of chattel slavery, a ‘fixed point’” (Kolodny 2023: 291). This is a rare distinction for an ideal. For all the ink spilt on Rawls’ Difference Principle, no one (...) printed it on the pamphlets and placards of trade unionist, decolonial, and anti-Apartheid protests; it never appears in US Supreme Court decisions; and none of its defenders would say that denying it is akin to accepting slavery. But despite this, OPOV has proved remarkably hard to pin down. It is not meant to be a mere slogan. It is meant to explain why practices of plural voting and vote dilution are inegalitarian. But there is no consensus and little debate about what it means. Many leave the principle undefined. Others say OPOV means anonymity, or equal voting weight, or equal representation, or equal voting power. These accounts differ significantly. But little is said about one should be preferred to its rival. -/- My goal is to convince you that the meaning of OPOV poses a deep, urgent problem, for which we have no adequate solution. I will argue that all current accounts of OPOV should be rejected. The key upshot will be that we need, but lack, a good explanation of the datum that practices of plural voting and vote dilution robustly fail a minimal condition for political equality. In closing, I’ll explain why my arguments also push us towards embracing what has often been considered a radical and overly demanding implication: namely, that all district-based systems—including those used in the US House of Representatives, Senate, and Electoral College—violate OPOV. (shrink)

The concept of ‘population thinking’ was introduced by Ernst Mayr in the mid-twentieth century and it has since become one of the most pervasive notions in the philosophy of biology. Despite its influence, however, the term has been widely misunderstood, even by those who have done the most to champion it. Population thinking today is often confused with population-level thinking (i.e., the idea of treating populations as units of analysis), which, ironically, is the opposite of what Mayr intended to convey (...) when he coined the term. For Mayr, population thinking was a way of emphasizing the variation among individuals in a population, as well as the importance of recognizing their differences and uniqueness. In this paper, I recover the original meaning of ‘population thinking’ and elucidate its central role in evolutionary theory. I also demonstrate its surprising relevance to many other areas of contemporary biology. In particular, I show how the recent introduction of novel methodologies in molecular biology has led to a number of unexpected discoveries that are best understood through the lens of population thinking. Finally, I examine the historical origins and philosophical foundations of population thinking, and I show how it lies at the heart of what makes biology different from physics. (shrink)

What do we owe those with whom we inquire? Presumably, quite a bit. Anything beyond what is necessary to secure knowledge? Yes. In this paper, I argue for a class of ‘zetetic rights.’ These are rights distinctive to participants in group inquiry. Zetetic rights help protect important central interests of inquirers. These include a right to aid, a right against interference, and a right to exert influence over the course of inquiry. Building on arguments by Fricker (2015), I defend these (...) rights, and explore cases of their violation: zetetic wrongings. I argue that zetetic wrongings constitute a distinctive, ubiquitous, and significant form of injustice in our epistemic and zetetic lives. To improve our inquiries and avoid epistemic injustice, we need to contend with zetetic wronging. Making this case helps show that a complete picture of epistemic life must account for the deep influence of our cooperative ties to one another. (shrink)

According to a common argument in defense of border control, legitimate states have a right to exclude on grounds of collective self-determination. I argue that the value of self-determination can also serve as a basis for criticizing states’ immigration policies. Specifically, I contend that the externalization policies of states in the Global North often undermine the self-determination of peoples in the Global South. I identify five pathways by which externalization policies undermine self-determination. I conclude by tentatively suggesting some potential implications (...) of this argument for broader debates about the governance of migration. (shrink)

The cognitive sciences are facing questions of how to select from competing theories or develop those that suit their current needs. However, traditional accounts of theoretical virtues have not yet proven informative to theory development in these fields. We advance a pragmatic account by which theoretical virtues are heuristics we use to estimate a theory’s contribution to a field’s body of knowledge and the degree to which it increases that knowledge’s ability to solve problems in the field’s domain or problem (...) space. From this perspective, properties that are traditionally considered epistemic virtues, such as a theory’s fit to data or internal coherence, can be couched in terms of problem space coverage, and additional virtues come to light that reflect a theory’s alignment with problem-having agents and the context in a societally embedded scientific system. This approach helps us understand why the needs of different fields result in different kinds of theories and allows us to formulate the challenges facing cognitive science in terms that we hope will facilitate their resolution through further theoretical development. (shrink)

Internet trolling involves making assertions with the aim of provoking emotionally heated responses, all while pretending to be a sincere interlocutor. In this paper, I give an account of some of the epistemic and psychological dimensions of trolling, with the goal of developing a better understanding of why certain kinds of trolling can be dangerous. I first analyze how trolls eschew the epistemic norms of assertion, thus covertly violating their conversation partners’ normative expectations. Then, drawing on literature on the “explore/exploit (...) trade-off,” I argue that trolling is a kind of exploratory behaviour. Specifically, it involves exploring the consequences of violating an interlocutor’s expectation that one will follow the epistemic norms of assertion. To defend this account, I argue that it explains various facts about trolls and the kind of pleasure they get from their activities. My account provides a deeper understanding of why trolling can be dangerous: namely, it explains why certain trolling behaviours contribute to radicalizing people into extremist or hateful ideologies, as well as why online platforms where trolls run amok gradually become polluted with extreme, hateful speech. (shrink)

According to anti-haecceitism, facts about particular things are modally fixed by qualitative matters. According to qualitativism, such facts are metaphysically second-rate, perhaps because grounded in qualitative matters. Qualitativism seems to imply anti-haecceitism, so objections to the latter threaten the former. The most powerful sort of apparent counterexample to anti-haecceitism, I think, consists in a pair of situations that seem the same, and qualitatively symmetric, for a stretch of time, but that differ in how that symmetry breaks. I examine this sort (...) of candidate counterexample in depth, and argue that the prospects for resisting it are heavily sensitive to broader metaphysical considerations, specifically ones about ontology, time, and causation. So, anti-haecceitism’s and qualitativism’s prospects are heavily sensitive to such considerations. (shrink)

According to qualitativism, thisness is not a fundamental feature of reality; facts about particular things are metaphysically second-rate. In this paper, I advance an argument for qualitativism from ideological parsimony. Supposing that reality fundamentally contains an array of propertied things, non-qualitativists employ a distinct name (or constant) for each fundamental thing. I argue that these names encode a type of worldly structure (thisness structure) that offends against parsimony and that qualitativists can eliminate without incurring a comparable parsimony-offense.

There are two leading theories about the ontology of dreams. One holds that dreams involve hallucinations and beliefs. The other holds that dreaming involves sensory and propositional imagining. I highlight two features of dreams which are more easily explained by the imagination theory. One is that certain things seem to be true in our dreams, even though they are not represented sensorily; this is easily explained if dreams involve propositional imagining. The other is that dream narratives can be temporally segmented, (...) involving events which take place across long spans of time; this makes sense if dreams involve sensory imagining, for we often sensorily imagine narratives during wakefulness in the same way. The two considerations are unified by the fact that both highlight forms of content determination characteristic of imagining. (shrink)

Lexical utilities have emerged as a promising way to model the precautionary principle in recent years. But some object that the lexical precautionary principle is hypersensitive because slight increases in risk of catastrophe can prompt it to recommend precautions regardless of cost. This article defends the lexical precautionary principle from the hypersensitivity objection by explaining why costs matter for what it recommends. In addition, we show how minimizing the probability of catastrophe tends to make the lexical precautionary principle insensitive to (...) the precise dividing line between catastrophe and non-catastrophe. Finally, our discussion leads to a novel interpretation and justification of a de minimis condition for invoking the precautionary principle. (shrink)

The study of teleology is challenging in many ways, but there is a particular challenge that makes matters worse, distorting the conceptual space that has set the terms of debate. And that is the tendency to think about teleology in terms of certain long-established dichotomies. In this paper, we examine four such dichotomies prevalent in the literature on teleology, the notions that: 1) Teleological explanations are opposed to mechanistic explanations; 2) teleology must arise from processes operating either internal to an (...) organism or external to it; 3) systems are either alive and teleological, or nonliving and not teleological; 4) humans are teleological, on account of our ability to intend, seek, prefer, etc., while other systems without these capacities are not. Here, we use our own view of goal directedness, field theory, to show for each dichotomy that there is an alternative, a view of teleology that either violates these dichotomies or demands revision of them. What this reveals is not only the dangers of dichotomous thinking, but a widespread lack of clarity about what teleology is. (shrink)

This is the text of a keynote lecture that was given on 8 April 2006 at the 11th annual graduate student conference of the Department of Philosophy at Villanova University. The conference was titled "Materialism: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives" and was organized by Liz Irvine and Andy Davis.

Some philosophers argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. They typically have in mind “norms” that specify what one ought to do as a matter of normative fact, in a way that’s independent of whether anyone actually conforms to these norms or expects others to do so. This paper explores a different sense in which knowledge could be a norm for belief. Under this sociological, descriptive sense, “norms” constitutively depend on what we in fact expect of each other, and (...) the standards by which we evaluate and criticize each other’s activities. Since which social norms we enforce is to some degree a contingent, voluntary matter, it makes sense to ask whether there’s practical utility in adopting knowledge as a social norm for belief. We argue that enforcing such knowledge norms for belief would be more practically useful than two of the main alternative social norms we could enforce instead. (shrink)

The Stoics developed a fascinating and interlocking set of doctrines about time, and those doctrines stood in stark contrast to the theory developed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics. Some controversies about Stoic views of time centre on how to unpack their idea that time and the processes of the universe are cyclical. Other controversies concern their views of the nature of time, and its relationship to bodies: how are times divided, is there a present time, and are there any bodies (...) that are found only in the past or only in the future, or are there only present bodies? This chapter will also suggest that some Stoics thought that some bodies are divided into temporal parts. (shrink)

I argue that death can be (and sometimes is) bad for cattle because it destroys relationships that are valuable for cattle for their own sake. The argument relies on an analogy between valuable human relationships and relationships cattle form with conspecifics. I suggest that the reasons we have for thinking that certain rich and meaningful human relationships are valuable for their own sake should also lead us to think that certain cattle relationships are valuable for their own sake. And just (...) as death is bad for us when it destroys our valuable relationships, so death is bad for cattle when it destroys their valuable relationships. This argument is important because it pinpoints something that is bad about death for cattle that is overlooked by popular accounts of the badness of death for non-human animals that focus exclusively on the impact of death on lifetime well-being levels. Thus, the argument reveals an overlooked moral cost of some of our farming practices. (shrink)

Philosophers are routinely embarrassed by philosophy, or at least write as if they are. But what should we make of the connection between philosophy and embarrassment? Taking a cue from sociologist Erving Goffman, in this paper I treat embarrassment in general as revealing of social phenomena and then consider the case of philosophical embarrassment from that point of view. As we will see, the project allows us to formulate and explore several hypotheses about the discipline of philosophy, why it might (...) be rational to be embarrassed by it, and how this embarrassment might be managed or overcome. (shrink)

Critiques the higher-order hyperintensional theory developed by Cian Dorr in "To be F as to be G" as an exercise in overfitting.

I present a new attitude puzzle involving disjunction. Specifically, though it can sound strange to ascribe the belief that or when and are about very different subject‐matters, we can assure ourselves that the strangeness is merely pragmatic because of the alethic properties of disjunction. But frustration‐ and other non‐doxastic attitude‐ascriptions also sound very strange. Are the corresponding frustratingness, etc. properties of disjunction the same as with truth? I will argue that they are not: frustratingness and desirability, and likely the other (...) non‐doxastic analogues (e.g., for sadness, fear, regret, etc.) do not work at all like truth does for belief. That means there is no obvious route to make sense of the strangeness of the relevant frustration‐ and desire‐ascriptions with disjunctive contents with very unrelated disjuncts. I argue that frustratingness's and desirability's behavior in this respect, while not to my knowledge noticed before, seems to arise from natural and general structural features of that kind of property: roughly, frustratingness requires that each property essential to the given state of affairs said to be frustrating contribute to the frustratingness of the state of affairs. This suggests that we just do not have these attitudes, not just that the ascriptions sound strange. (shrink)

This article aims to challenge the common view that virtually all early eastern thought on the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin favours what has come to be called Ancestral Sin, or the ‘eastern view’. To begin, Ancestral Sin is broadly outlined in conversation with several recent writers; it is noted in particular the ways in which this tradition has often been defined in opposition to quintessentially ‘western’ emphases vis-à-vis the origin of sin. This serves as a foundation for (...) the remainder of the article, where the hamartiological thought of Tatian, Melito, Theophilus, and Irenaeus is considered against the backdrop of Ancestral Sin as previously demarcated. It is concluded that though each thinker no doubt shares important affinities with Ancestral Sin, the discordances evidenced are both too plentiful and too substantial to overlook, so much so as to cause appreciable hesitancy about a straightforward ‘eastern’ ascription. A fundamental east/west divide on original sin is, in the earliest years at least, not so certain as is sometimes assumed. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion of gratitude tends to emphasize the way in which the emotion is responsive to manifestations of benevolence (or good will). In some cases, however, gratitude ‘grows’—or increases in strength— across time, in ways that are intuitively fitting but unaccounted for by gratitude’s sensitivity to benevolence. To make sense of this kind of gratitude-growth, I argue that there are conditions in which manifestations of benevolence— particularly, benevolent hopes—can rationally accommodate the unforeseen and unintended outcomes to which they give rise, (...) rendering fitting a greater degree of gratitude than was fitting in response to the original manifestation of benevolence. (shrink)

In this paper, I present three claims belonging to Cavendish's theory of the passions. First, positive and negative passions are species of love and hate. Second, love and hate involve pleasure and pain. Third, pleasure and pain are regular and irregular, where these notions are to be understood in teleological terms. From these commitments, it follows that hate is irregular. I argue that this consequence is a problematic one for Cavendish. After defending my reading through a consideration of Cavendish's reflections (...) on mental health and disorder, I explore ways in which she might revise her commitments to avoid the problem. Throughout the paper, I demonstrate the extent to which Cavendish's theory of the passions draws on Aristotelian and Augustinian ideas that loomed large in late sixteenth‐ and early seventeenth‐century writings on the topic. (shrink)

A number of universities have implemented policies to increase the proportion of plant-based items offered by their food services as part of efforts to promote environmental sustainability and health. This article explores student freedom as an ethical issue in this context. Our central claim is that, while freedom is indeed an important ethical concern for university plant-based food initiatives, these efforts can avoid unjustifiably interfering with freedom if certain conditions are met. We suggest four criteria: (1) public messaging surrounding dietary (...) choices should avoid stigmatizing meat-eating, (2) menus should retain some animal-source foods and ensure that plant-based substitutes included nutritionally fortified and whole food options, (3) the aggressiveness of the transition should be calibrated to student support, and (4) plant-based menu items should be appealing on their own terms. [Open access]. (shrink)

It is commonplace to observe that members of the same family resemble each other in various ways. So perhaps it surprising to learn that some philosophers see family resemblances as deeply intertwined with myths. But how could this be? Aren’t the resemblances out there, waiting to be noticed quite apart from any family mythology? This paper argues that family resemblances can be thought of as myth-involving through one of three myths: 1. The myth of ubiquity, 2. The myth of natural (...) salience and 3. The myth of significance. Beyond explaining the myths, I explain their ethical and political ramifications. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is now widely accessible and already being used by healthcare researchers throughout various stages in the research process, such as assisting with systematic reviews, supporting data collection, facilitating data analysis and drafting manuscripts for publication. The most common AI tools used are forms of generative AI such as ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini. Generative AI is a type of AI that can generate human-like text, audio, videos, code and images based on text-based prompts inputted by a human user. Generative (...) AI is trained on large amounts of data, and the outputs are sophisticated and can be indistinguishable from a response from a skilled human. In this article, we outline several AI applications that can be used in healthcare research, examining their benefits, limitations and outline best practices for maintaining research integrity and ethical standards. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the Contingent Spotlight Theory, a theory of modality analogous to the Moving Spotlight Theory in the philosophy of time. My defence of the theory consists in developing responses to three objections that have been raised against it, two of which are due to Lewis (1986). I also argue that the version of the contingent spotlight theory I develop in response to these objections has some advantages over its closest rival, Philip Bricker's (2006, 2008) ‘Leibnizian Realism’.

Paul Ricœur describes two ‘ruinous alternatives’ often reached interpreting translation philosophically: either translation is taken as a mechanical process, and there is a theoretical search for a logically universal language in which all words can be at home, or the diversity of languages and natural limits of translation motivate scepticism regarding the possibility of translation. This paper shows how these alternatives, as represented by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Quine’s ‘radical translation’, tend to collapse into and “translate each other” (Derrida 57) due (...) to a shared intellectual standpoint which theorises our human limits (the finitude of translation) as limitations (fatal or sceptical flaws). -/- I demonstrate how Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and its vision of language respond to these philosophical theorisations of translation by accepting the human limits to translation and reclaiming and returning us to our ordinary practice of translation. (shrink)

This paper examines recent empirical research on the psychedelic experience and makes sense of the current literature in terms of ontic structural realism, a position in the metaphysics of science which holds that relations are fundamental. This interpretation is maintained by first providing a philosophical framework for the varieties of self-transcendent experiences by implementing a notion of self-disidentification, drawing from western and eastern sources. Then, to account for the importance of the transformative mystical experience that can occur during a trip, (...) this paper implements Buddhist relationist ontology by showing how the psychedelic experience facilitates the rebuilding of one’s identity into an identity that can be understood by relationships to others and the natural world. The aim of this paper is to implement these diverse strains of thought to make sense of the psychedelic experience in a way that is consistent with metaphysical naturalism by way of structural realism while adequately accounting for the spiritual components of transformative mystical experiences to aid in metaphysical integration of experiences in psychedelic-assisted therapeutic contexts. (shrink)

Despite his opposition to Schopenhauerian pessimism, Nietzsche repeatedly characterizes himself as a pessimist of sorts. Here I attempt to take this assertion seriously and offer an interpretation of in what sense Nietzsche can be called a pessimist. I suggest that Nietzsche’s pessimism has to do not with life in general, but with life in its common form: such life is bad because it is characterized by meaningless suffering, and lacks aesthetic value. Against the Christian tradition, Nietzsche denies that there is (...) a value inherent to life itself, and thinks instead, that value must be achieved, but rarely is. This form of pessimism is rooted in Nietzsche’s engagement with the ancient Greeks, and bears important affinities to the thought of Burckhardt on Greek pessimism. (shrink)

While non-moral varieties of goodness (e.g., aesthetic, epistemic, prudential) are readily recognized by philosophers and non-philosophers alike, the philosophical literature generally suggests that benevolence is a uniquely moral phenomenon. I argue, however, that our interpersonal practices display a range of instances of aesthetic benevolence, and that this observation stands to enrich our understanding of the relation between moral psychology, aesthetic experience, and aesthetic community. I illustrate this point via discussion of the evaluative attitude that is the fitting response to being (...) the target of another’s manifestation of aesthetic benevolence, namely aesthetic gratitude. (shrink)

One important challenge in the ontology of institutions is re-identifying types of institutions across times and cultures. An exclusive focus on the most controversial cases can obscure some general issues about commonalities of institutions across cultures. To exhibit some of these general questions and to make some progress on them, this paper will focus on what will hopefully be a less hot-button institutional question: what is it for an organization to be a navy? While the variety of naval phenomena makes (...) characterising navies a harder task than it might first appear, a functional account of navies with some additional conditions drawn from other approaches appears to provide the most fruitful line of investigation. (shrink)

Scientific fields frequently need to exchange data to advance their own inquiries. Data unification is the process of stabilizing these forms of interfield data exchange. I present an account of the epistemic structure of data unification, drawing on case studies from model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN). MBCN is distinctive because it shows that modeling practices play an essential role in mediating these data exchanges. Models often serve as interfield evidential integrators, and models built for this purpose have their own representational and (...) inferential functions. This form of data unification should be seen as autonomous from other forms, particularly explanatory unification. (shrink)