Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical (...) rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do. (shrink)

The paper explores whether David Bohm’ s proposal about quantum theoretical active information, and the mind-matter scheme he developed on the basis of it, can help us to explain consciousness (Bohm and Hiley 1987, 1993; Bohm 1989, 1990 ; Pylkkänen 2007 ). Here it is important to acknowledge that other researchers in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies have also made use of the concept of information in their theories of mind and consciousness. For example, Dretske (1981 ) and Barwise (...) and Seligman (1997 ) have explored the possibility that information in the sense of factual semantic contents (i.e. information as meaningful data that represents facts correctly or incorrectly) can be grounded in environmental information (i.e.information as mere correlation, e.g. the way tree rings carry information about age). For Dretske this was an important part of his attempts to give a naturalistic account of sensory experiences, qualia and consciousness. During recent years the notion of information has been used to explain consciousness most notably by David Chalmers (1996 ), as well as by Giulio Tononi and his co-workers (Tononi and Koch 2014 ; Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi 2014 ). The strategy of this paper will be to first describe Bohm’ s mind-matter scheme, and then to briefl y consider Chalmers’ and Tononi et al.’ s ideas in the light of this scheme. (shrink)

Introduction non technique à la Théorie de l'Information Intégrée de la conscience de Giulio Tononi. Traduction française de l'article de Hedda Hassel Mørch.

This paper proposes a unified ontological framework grounded in two foundational definitions arrived at through intuitive reasoning, without prior engagement with the relevant philosophical or scientific literature. The first definition holds that consciousness is information's ability to manipulate energy. The second holds that matter is energy at varying density, and therefore compressed information within a continuous information-energy field. These definitions are functional and naturalistic: they ground consciousness in causal structure rather than phenomenal property, and locate matter and mind within a (...) single ontological continuum rather than treating them as categorically distinct substances. The paper demonstrates that these intuitive definitions independently converge with three major positions in contemporary philosophy of mind and physics: Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory, which defines consciousness as a system's capacity to integrate information in causally effective ways; John Archibald Wheeler's 'it from bit' doctrine, which proposes information as the fundamental substrate of physical reality; and Philip Goff's panpsychism, which holds that consciousness or proto-conscious properties are universal features of information systems. This independent convergence — achieved without knowledge of any of these frameworks — is itself treated as a methodological observation: that certain deep structural features of reality may be accessible through careful intuitive reasoning operating from different disciplinary foundations. (shrink)

The Enigma of Consciousness: Exploring Theories and Angelito Malicse’s Universal Law of Balance -/- Consciousness—the subjective experience of being aware—remains one of humanity’s most profound mysteries. From the vivid redness of an apple to the sting of a scraped knee, our inner world defies easy explanation. Scientists, philosophers, and thinkers have proposed countless theories to unravel its nature, ranging from brain-based models to cosmic speculations. While no definitive count exists, the sheer diversity of ideas reflects both the complexity of consciousness (...) and our relentless curiosity about it. Among these, lesser-known perspectives like Angelito Malicse’s “Universal Law of Balance” offer fresh lenses, suggesting consciousness emerges from equilibrium across natural systems. This essay explores the major theoretical camps of consciousness and delves into Malicse’s unique contribution, weaving together a tapestry of thought that spans the physical, philosophical, and universal. -/- Theories of consciousness often begin with materialist views, which anchor awareness in the physical brain. Integrated Information Theory (IIT), proposed by Giulio Tononi, posits that consciousness arises from the integration of information within a system, measurable as “phi”—a marker of how interconnected and differentiated a network is. Similarly, Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace Theory (GWT) likens consciousness to a theater stage, where information is broadcast to various cognitive processes for attention and action. Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC), pursued by Christof Koch and others, seeks specific brain activities tied to experience, while Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories argue consciousness requires thoughts about thoughts, as David Rosenthal suggests. These models share a belief that consciousness is a product of neural machinery, yet they diverge on how and why subjective experience emerges. -/- Beyond materialism, dualist theories propose that consciousness transcends the physical. René Descartes’ substance dualism famously separated mind and body into distinct realms, a view echoed in modern property dualism, where thinkers like David Chalmers argue physical systems possess non-physical qualities. Panpsychism takes this further, asserting consciousness is fundamental to all matter. Proponents like Philip Goff suggest even electrons might harbor proto-awareness, culminating in human experience through complexity. Quantum theories, such as Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff’s Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-OR), link consciousness to quantum processes in microtubules, blending physics with metaphysics. Meanwhile, mysterians like Colin McGinn contend that consciousness might forever elude our grasp, a puzzle beyond human cognition. -/- Into this rich landscape steps Angelito Malicse with his “Universal Law of Balance,” a theory that frames consciousness as an emergent property of equilibrium. Malicse argues that all natural systems—stars, cells, brains—operate under a principle of balance. Inanimate objects like planets achieve this passively through forces like gravity, but living systems actively self-regulate via processes like homeostasis. Consciousness, he proposes, emerges when this self-regulation becomes sufficiently complex, integrating sensory feedback and adaptive responses into a unified awareness. Subjective experiences, or qualia, serve a functional role: pain signals imbalance (e.g., injury), while pleasure reinforces stability (e.g., nourishment). For Malicse, the brain is a dynamic system where neural activity and awareness form a feedback loop, maintaining equilibrium to produce coherent thought. -/- Malicse’s theory extends beyond biology, suggesting any system—artificial or cosmic—could achieve consciousness if it attains balanced self-regulation. Advanced AI, for instance, might mirror the brain’s equilibrium, while the universe itself could exhibit awareness if its vast systems align harmoniously. This echoes panpsychism but roots consciousness in a testable principle rather than inherent universality. Rejecting strict dualism and pure materialism, Malicse sees consciousness as neither wholly separate from nor reducible to physical processes—it’s the interplay of systems in balance. Some interpretations hint at quantum coherence playing a role, akin to Orch-OR, yet balanced with classical neural dynamics. Though less prominent than mainstream theories, Malicse’s view offers a unifying bridge across disciplines. -/- The sheer number of consciousness theories—dozens of major frameworks and hundreds of variants—underscores its elusive nature. A 2021 Nature Reviews Neuroscience paper cataloged over 20 neuroscientific models alone, a fraction of the broader philosophical and interdisciplinary spectrum. From IIT’s mathematical rigor to Malicse’s equilibrium hypothesis, each theory grapples with the “hard problem”—why subjective experience exists at all. While materialists seek answers in neurons, panpsychists look to the cosmos, and Malicse ties it to balance, no single model has claimed consensus. Perhaps this diversity is the point: consciousness, as both a scientific and existential question, invites endless exploration. -/- In conclusion, the study of consciousness reveals as much about human inquiry as it does about the mind. Established theories like IIT and GWT provide concrete frameworks, while speculative ideas like panpsychism and Malicse’s Universal Law of Balance stretch our imagination. Malicse’s contribution, though underrecognized, offers a compelling synthesis—consciousness as the awareness of balance, uniting brain, body, and beyond. Whether we’ll ever solve this riddle remains uncertain, but the journey through these ideas illuminates the depth of what it means to be aware. For now, consciousness remains a mirror reflecting our quest to understand ourselves, one theory at a time. -/- . (shrink)

The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) formulated for the first time in 2004 by the neuroscientist Giulio Tononi, is a theoretical framework aiming to scientifically explain phenomenal consciousness. The IIT is presented in the first part of this work. Broadly speaking, integrated information is an abstract quantitative measure of the causal power a system has on itself. The main claim of IIT is the identity between informational structures and experience. The nature of this identity will be the subject of the (...) second part. One can interpret the IIT as a fundamental law of nature connecting the physical domain to the mental domain. The philosophical implications of such a claim are numerous and they are subject to criticism. This will be the main concern of the third and last part. (shrink)

This paper does not propose a positive theory of consciousness; rather, it isolates a fundamental category mistake in the philosophy of mind: the Model-Transcribing Error, a conflation fallacy whereby mathematical models are erroneously identified with ontological realities. Inspired by Baruch Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, the study introduces the $\theta$-Test, a three-stage logic gate designed to assess whether a given theory tacitly treats a mathematical model as the very essence of the phenomena it purports to explain. Moving beyond general metaphysical (...) objections, the $\theta$-Test functions as a rigorous diagnostic for theories of consciousness: I. Can the model’s structure encapsulate behavior without reference to the phenomenal experience? II. Is there a contradiction between the model’s structure and the phenomenal experience? III. Does the theory posit that the model’s structure is the phenomenal experience, or merely parallels it? Application of the $\theta$-Test to Integrated Information Theory (IIT) demonstrates that, while IIT offers a structurally causal framework, it commits the Model-Transcribing Error by conflating high-dimensional correlation with metaphysical identity, thereby exceeding what model-based explanation can ontologically license. Finally, to evaluate the internal coherence of the proposal, the $\theta$-Test is itself subjected to reflexive evaluation. (shrink)

This contribution proposes how beholders may internally process unfinished works of art. It does so by considering five of Michelangelo Buonarroti’s interrupted sculptures and pointing out their empathic and imaginative potential. The beholder focused on the surface, I propose, is inclined to mentally simulate the artist’s gesture that drafted the sculptures through the visible graphic signs of the chisels. This inner simulation takes place within the activation of various brain networks, located in the brain’s motor system. Renaissance authors associated the (...) observation of the unfinished to learning and, as this article shows, this assumption seems to find confirmation in recent neuroscientific studies on mirror neurons and imitation learning. In this way, the empathic engagement established between the beholder and the work of art observed – as well as the role played by embodied simulation and imagination in this kind of visual perception – clarifies how the incompleteness can also have that pedagogical function recognised by Giorgio Vasari and Benvenuto Cellini. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to advocate the ideas of Wilhelm Worringer, John Dewey, and Nelson Goodman on the roles of perception, empathy, emotion, and enjoyment in aesthetic experience. I will attempt to do this by offering a novel interpretation of some of these thinkers’ insights from a biological perspective. To this end, I will consider the following questions. What is an aesthetic experience? Does such a thing exist at all? If yes, is there a correlation between the concept (...) of the aesthetic and perception? Is it possible, then, to find a biological basis for aesthetic experience? My argument is that a fresh analysis of the aesthetics of Worringer, Dewey, and Goodman, in light of some of the discoveries and theories of the cognitive neurosciences – such as the biological correlations of emotions, the “as-if-body-loop” theory, the discovery of mirror neurons, and the phenomenon of embodied simulation – may provide a contribution to longstanding philosophical problems relating to the nature of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to (...) other humans corresponds essentially to the ‘we-mode’ of cognition, the unique power of human minds to be jointly directed at goals, intentions, states of affairs, or values (which, importantly, differs from having a ‘group mind’). Because the capacity for collective intentionality holds evolutionary and developmental primacy over human-epistemic artefacts relations, the extended mind should not be seen as a special phenomenon, but as a central aspect of the human condition. The original extended mind thesis carried important implications for how the cognitive sciences should proceed. In a version of the thesis that accommodates collective intentionality, these implications would go far deeper than originally assumed. (shrink)

I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions (...) satisfactorily. I then introduce my proposal, which holds that we wrong others when we fail to treat their status as moral agents as a source of stringent constraints on our action. I call it the moral neglect account. Once we have identified a common aim of corrective duties (counterbalancing moral neglect), we can fill their content in the various contexts in which wronging has occurred. I conclude by observing that it is not the primary role of corrective justice to assign responsibilities for damage reparations; in fact, requests for compensation make more sense if framed in distributive rather than corrective terms. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the ground (why correct?) and content (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In (...) the final section, I suggest that it is probably better to restrict the label “corrective duties” to duties generated by interpersonal wronging. (shrink)

The notion of ‘concrete universal’ is crucial to both the theoretical and the practical philosophy of British idealism. In this essay, I will deal with the concrete universal in the early British idealists (1865-1883) and in F.H. Bradley's logic and metaphysics (1883-1893), leaving aside the more practical features of this notion, mostly related to Bosanquet’s philosophy. My aim is twofold. First, I intend to show that the concrete universal continues to be prominent in Bradley's thought even after the publication of (...) his only theoretical work which deals with it specifically (The Principles of Logic), that is, also in his major work (Appearance and Reality), despite the virtual absence of explicit occurrences. Second, I intend to show that, in Bradley’s thought, the idealistic and Hegelian philosophical heritage, considered here through the lens of the concrete universal, undergoes a significant shift – from ‘concept’ to ‘experience’ – that would have a notable impact on early twentieth-century philosophy. Investigating Bradley's thought from this perspective, then, allows us to appreciate its richness and complexity from a unique angle, from which we can also better discern the actual philosophical debts that British idealists owed to Hegel. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Bradley’s engagement with Kant’s theoretical philosophy, often mediated by Herbart, Hamilton, and Lotze, led him to reassess his early Hegelianism and to develop a critical metaphysics. Bradley’s philosophy is examined diachronically, from early writings (2) to Appearance and Reality (4) through The Principles of Logic (3). I also provide a preliminary overview of Kant’s reception in Britain (1) to set the historical background for other sections. This essay explores a topic not previously investigated, as (...) other contributions on Bradley and Kant compare them without historical concern. By focusing on Bradley’s sources, we can appreciate the influence of Kantianism through some understudied thinkers. In addition, I adopt a historical-diachronic approach that clarifies the development of Bradley’s philosophy by exploiting documents such as manuscripts and reading notes. In particular, I present the first analysis of a 1877–1878 manuscript – Bradley’s initial formulation of his peculiar metaphysics. (shrink)

Two problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the right-holder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties (...) and that rights aspire to protect interests of the right-holder, we make it hard to explain why rights violations, in general, wrong right-holders. In the final section, I present what I see as a promising solution to the puzzle. I describe a particular social environment (the society of equals) where interacting with others through rights is indeed valuable because respecting rights communicates that one takes seriously others’ equal moral status. In such a society and only in such a society, I conclude, moral agents are required to treat all rights violations as wrongs perpetrated against the right-holder. (shrink)

Lotze’s philosophy has often been associated to the British idealists, although only a few scattered pages have been devoted to its reception among them. Recently, Milkov claimed that the British neo-Hegelian philosophers were rather “neo-Lotzean”; yet countering the mistaken view of British idealism as a neo-Hegelianism with such another one-sided view does not help us to assess the historical truth. Nevertheless, Milkov’s claim can be read as a challenge, and this is how I will address it in this chapter, the (...) aim of which is to assess to what extent Lotze’s philosophy has actually influenced that of two leading British idealists, namely Green and Bradley. Accordingly, Section 3.2 of the chapter shall be devoted to a preliminary survey of Lotze’s presence in British idealism, and Sections 3.3 and 3.4 to his alleged influence on Green and Bradley (as limited to their metaphysics). I will end up showing that the affinity between Lotze and Green results in a strong analogy due to their shared need to “reform” Hegel’s spiritualism in a non-dialectical way, while the affinity between Lotze and Bradley is rather due to a constructive influence by the former on the latter, who can thus rightly be defined as neo-Lotzean. (shrink)

Philosophical speculation about how psychiatric externalism might function in practice has yet to fully consider the multitude of externalist psychiatric systems that exist beyond the bounds of modern psychiatry. Believing that anthropology can inform philosophical debate on the matter, the paper illustrates one such case. The discussion is based on 19 months of first-hand ethnographic fieldwork among Akha, a group of swidden farmers living in highland Laos and neighboring borderlands. First, the paper describes the Akha set of medicinal, ritual, and (...) shamanic practices, analyzing issues of stigma and medical pluralism within it. Second, it makes the case that the Akha realize a functioning biopsychosocial system which comes with a well-developed set of resources for treating the social dimension of illness. Externalism among the Akha re-frames psychiatric illness as a ‘problem in living,’ which becomes manageable as such. The paper claims that, in so doing, the Akha system succeeds in many of the areas where modern internalist psychiatry falls short, and that it does so because Akha society is structured in such a way so that its practitioners can shift the social environment around the patient. As a takeaway for philosophers, it suggests that the development of an externalist psychiatry must begin from questioning the accepted ontology of the social causes of psychiatric illness. (shrink)

M. Visentin has identified a ‘neo-Parmenidean’ feature in 20th-century Italian philosophy, marked by the rejection of metaphysics as the rational attempt to ground experience. This essay explores a different neo-Eleatic feature in contemporary philosophy, focusing on two seemingly distant figures: F. H. Bradley, an alleged British Hegelian, and Giorgio Colli, an alleged Italian follower of Nietzsche. Through a comparative analysis – both historical and conceptual – of their logic and metaphysics, the Author outlines a ‘Zenonian’ neo-Eleaticism. This form of dialectic, (...) not speculative like Hegel’s but aporetical and sceptical, draws on Plato’s 'Parmenides', Kant, and Herbart to expose the internal contradictions of discursive thought. Yet this dialectic does not lead the two philosophers to scepticism or anti-metaphysics, but rather to a ‘radical experientialism’ grounded in a paradoxical rationalist critique of rationalist metaphysics. (shrink)

Wrongs, Harms, and Compensation By SlavnyAdamOxford University Press, 2023. 240 pp.

Il problema centrale sul quale il pensiero di Giorgio Colli s’interroga è il «problema della ragione», cioè della genesi storico-strutturale e della validità epistemica della ragione umana. La filosofia di Colli si configura perciò come una “critica della ragione”, nella doppia valenza del genitivo: una critica, cioè, condotta dalla ragione e che ha per oggetto la ragione stessa. Lo scopo del presente saggio è quello di determinare il significato filosofico e la struttura argomentativa di tale critica. Procederemo quindi nel seguente (...) ordine. Innanzitutto, dovremo stabilire che cosa Colli intenda per “ragione” e in che senso la sua filosofia possa essere intesa come una “critica” della ragione (§ 1). In seguito, presenteremo una ricostruzione della struttura generale di questa critica, o meglio delle diverse forme della critica (§ 2), soffermandoci poi sulle principali obiezioni di Colli al metodo genealogico di Nietzsche (§ 3). L’esame di tali obiezioni servirà a comprendere l’esigenza di una critica interna – “logica” – della ragione, la cui struttura verrà contestualizzata nella logica colliana (§ 4), analizzata (§ 5) e infine interpretata (§ 6). (shrink)

This essay explores the origins of twentieth-century epistemological and metaphysical relativism in Victorian Britain, a cultural milieu where the relativistic sensibility – typically associated with Nietzsche and postmodernism – first took root. While contemporary discussions on relativism tend to foreground postmodern thinkers, the foundational role played by Victorian philosophers such as Hamilton, Spencer, and, crucially, Bradley is often overlooked. Although relativism traces back to Protagoras’s homo mensura, the Victorians were the first modern thinkers to elevate relativity to a guiding principle (...) of both knowledge and life. Among them, Bradley stands out for the historical and theoretical significance of his work. A contemporary of Nietzsche, Bradley developed an original synthesis of Hegelian, Kantian, empiricist, pragmatist, and neo-realist ideas. Unlike many British idealists, he did not rely on Hegelian “absolute knowledge” to overcome relativity but attempted to reconcile Enlightenment philosophy of finitude and relativity with Romantic philosophy of the infinite and the absolute. Bradley’s theory of truth integrates both the inescapable limitations of human knowledge and the enduring metaphysical demand for totality. The essay proceeds in three parts: (I) an overview of the Victorian context as a backdrop for Bradley’s idealist reaction to relativity; (II) an analysis of Bradley’s logic, shaped by Lotze’s epistemology; and (III) a reading of his metaphysics as a reconciliation of logical skepticism and metaphysical absolutism. In conclusion, Bradley is presented as a valuable interlocutor for Nietzsche and his intellectual legacy. (shrink)

«Le origini della filosofia greca, e quindi dell’intero pensiero occidentale, sono misteriose». Così si apre l’importante libro di Giorgio Colli (Adelphi, Milano 1975), al cui studio integrale il gruppo di ricerca Simposio ha dedicato un seminario all’Università di Torino (23-25 ottobre 2017), nell’ambito delle attività del Centro Studi Giorgio Colli. I nove capitoli del breve ma denso testo colliano forniscono un’interpretazione non convenzionale e stimolante della genesi e della genealogia di quella pratica che, almeno a partire da Platone, porta il (...) nome di “filosofia”. Questo primo volume dei Quaderni Colliani, attraverso un’analisi critica che si estende anche alle altre opere del filosofo torinese, si propone d’indagare le origini del logos occidentale che, come insegna Colli, si perdono nei labirinti del mito, albergano nelle parole dell’oracolo e si annidano tra le reti dialettiche della retorica. I contributi qui presentati, seguendo lo sviluppo argomentativo e tematico de La nascita della filosofia, spaziano dagli albori della civiltà greca (Apollo e Dioniso, il mito cretese, la divinazione), al pensiero più maturo dei cosiddetti sapienti e dei sofisti, per giungere infine a Platone, l’inventore della “letteratura” filosofica. (shrink)

Cova et al. (2019) have tested people's beliefs on aesthetic disagreements using experimental studies based on questionnaires. Since the vast majority of participants chose answers that are incompatible with intersubjectivism, they conclude that the traditional approach in aesthetics is ”fundamentally misguided”. Contesi et al. (2024) claim that Cova et al. entirely misunderstand the relevance of their experimental findings to the aesthetics literature: those results actually ”confirm what aestheticians predicted all along”. According to Contesi et al., while aestheticians generally assume “that (...) people explicitly endorse the claim of subjectivism”, folk intersubjectivism ”is mainly seen as remaining implicit in patterns of behaviour”; its presence, therefore, cannot be inferred from people's ”explicit avowals”. Contesi et al. support their understanding of the literature by citing passages from contemporary philosophers. I argue that these passages fail to demonstrate that folk aesthetic intersubjectivism is regarded as implicit. (shrink)

In Ph. I 2.185b19–25, Aristotle puzzlingly challenges essence monism, arguing that, if all things have the same definition and essence, they are nothing at all. In his recent book on Aristotle and the Eleatics, Tim Clarke proposes a traditional reading: if essence monism were true, all opposite predicates would belong to all subjects at the same time, thus making all things self-contradictory and hence annihilating them. In this paper I contend that this standard reading, dating back to Cherniss and Ross, (...) is mistaken. After a preliminary contextualisation of the passage at issue, I present Clarke’s reading and initially strengthen it by referring to a seemingly parallel passage from Metaph. I then discuss the difficulties surrounding the standard reading of these two texts, showing that both need to be interpreted differently. Building on this criticism, I finally set out the requirements that an alternative reading should meet, outlining some of its main features as well. (shrink)

The biopsychosocial (BPS) model in psychiatry has come under fire for being too vague to be of any practical use in the clinic. For many, its central flaw consists in lack of scientific validity and philosophical coherence: the model never specified how biological, psychological and social factors causally integrate with one another. Recently, advances in the cognitive sciences have made great strides towards meeting this very ‘integration challenge.’ The paper begins by illustrating how enactivist and predictive processing frameworks propose converging (...) accounts of biopsychosocial integration that are far superior to those of previous theories. It argues, however, that the main problem of implementing the BPS model has less to do with integration than with the lack of a social etiology. Psychiatric practice leans heavily towards ‘bio’ and ‘psycho’ approaches, without an equally developed set of explanatory and therapeutic resources for dealing with the ‘social’ dimension of illness. This leaves psychiatry essentially internalist in orientation. As illustrated most poignantly by conditions such as functional neurological disorders, internalism comes with the risks of stigma and the curtailment of therapeutic possibilities. The paper argues that the answer to the failings of the BPS model lies in combining the integration challenge with the development of an ‘externalist psychiatry,’ which casts both causes and treatment of psychiatric illness onto the social environment. The following two papers explore the conditions that might make this idea a reality. (shrink)

Nel presente saggio mi propongo di esaminare alcune delle nozioni fondamentali della logica colliana, commentando le definizioni di “qualità”, “giudizio”, “essere”, “non-essere”, “vero” e “falso”, esposte alle pp. 65-78 dell’opera del 1969. Tali nozioni, considerate sotto un profilo sistematico, costituiscono di fatto la struttura sintattica e semantica del logos, cioè la base elementare – insieme con la teoria della modalità – su cui vengono edificate le teorie colliane riguardanti l’inferenza deduttiva e la dimostrazione, intese appunto come massima espressione della ragione (...) costruttiva e scientifica. Il fine primario del presente saggio è perciò quello di comprendere la lettera del testo di Colli, di per sé piuttosto arduo; ad ogni modo, non mancherò di rilevare – sia pure di passaggio, talvolta solo in nota – alcune difficoltà teoriche dell’impianto colliano, che verranno dettagliatamente esaminate in altra sede. Il saggio si concluderà con un’appendice nella quale la logica colliana verrà contestualizzata rispetto alla logica aristotelica e alla logica di Frege e Russell, ricostruendo da un lato il debito di Colli verso Aristotele, dall’altro la sua polemica contro la moderna logica simbolico-matematica. (shrink)

Response to commentaries on the three-paper set 'Outline for an externalist psychiatry'.

Nel presente saggio intendo ricostruire la concezione colliana della filosofia, contestualizzandola, sotto il profilo concettuale, all’interno della “crisi della ragione” degli ultimi centocinquant’anni (da Nietzsche in avanti), nel corso dei quali si è parlato a più riprese di «fine» o «morte» della filosofia. La mia argomentazione si articolerà in tre punti. In primo luogo, proporrò una ricostruzione schematica della crisi della ragione filosofica contemporanea, finalizzata a comprendere la posizione di Colli rispetto a colui che di tale crisi è stato il (...) massimo portavoce, cioè Nietzsche (§ 1). In secondo luogo, a partire da una presentazione elementare della logica di Colli, fornirò un’interpretazione della critica colliana della “ragione costruttiva”, che trova nella “legge generale della deduzione” la sua espressione eminente (§ 2). In terzo e ultimo luogo, rifletterò su quale concezione della filosofia emerga – e si salvi – dalla critica colliana della ragione costruttiva, al di là delle dichiarazioni esplicite da parte di Colli, spesso volutamente ambigue (§§ 3-4). (shrink)

Any progress in shaping up an externalist psychiatry, so previous discussion suggested, must begin from questions about the ontology of social causation. So far, research and theory have adhered to a naturalistic approach to the social causes of illness, concentrating mostly on the ‘social determinants of mental health’ (inequality, discrimination, housing insecurity, etc.). The paper starts with an assessment of ‘social determinants’ through the lens of epidemiology and critical psychiatry. It illustrates existing practical and political approaches that fight these constraints (...) and it highlights their therapeutic value. It argues, though, that a focus on social determinants is not sufficient for fully realizing externalism because a great portion of sociogenic illness remains causally indeterminate. Alongside political action, externalism requires a social etiology that is established by virtue of the meaning that it holds for patients, rather than by virtue of its capacity to identify objective social causes of illness. This entails abandoning naturalism about social causation and embracing constructivism. The paper shows that this methodological shift is less contradictory and more effective than it is commonly imagined. Drawing from further anthropological evidence, it concludes that only by lending support to projects that balance a focus on constraints with social construction will psychiatry be truly externalist. At stake is a prospect of effective treatment for sociogenic illness for the countless in struggle. (shrink)

In this paper, I contrast two approaches to political legitimacy, both influenced by Rawls. One is the classic political liberal picture, according to which a state is legitimate if its “constitutional essentials” could be endorsed by reasonable citizens. The alternative is the idea that what makes a state legitimate is primarily its success at organizing the basic structure in a way that is demonstrably favorable to the governed. Specifically, I suggest that a state is legitimate insofar as it organizes the (...) basic structure in a manner that makes it easier for citizens to behave justly towards one another and adopt autonomous choices. I then move to demonstrate the superiority of this normative impact solution to the problem of legitimacy vis-à-vis political liberalism, even when reasonable disagreement about justice is factored in. (shrink)

It is common to distinguish between disagreement in the state sense (being in disagreement) and disagreement in the activity sense (having a disagreement). This paper deals with the question of what it is for two people to have a disagreement. First, I present and reject the thesis according to which having a disagreement is a matter of expressing conflicting attitudes. I argue that this is not sufficient for having a disagreement: two people can express conflicting attitudes without having a disagreement. (...) Second, I present and reject the thesis according to which having a disagreement involves not only the expression of conflicting attitudes, but also the persuasive attempt to bring the other around to one’s view. I argue that this is not necessary for having a disagreement: two people can have a disagreement without trying to change each other’s minds. Finally, I put forward an alternative account that goes beyond the mere expression of conflicting attitudes, but that does not go as far as to posit the attempt to change someone’s mind. Having a disagreement, I submit, is a matter of expressing conflicting attitudes and demanding agreement, that is, advancing the normative claim that the other should share one’s attitude. (shrink)

In Appearance and Reality (1893), F. H. Bradley held that reality is both immanent to thought (as a known object) and transcendent to it (as non-relational in structure). This cohabitation of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in his metaphysics was relevantly attacked by J. Dewey (1907) as being self-contradictory. The goal of my essay is to defend Bradley against this charge by elucidating the structure of the thought-reality relationship and the proper status of contradiction.

Il presente contributo vuole essere una sorta di commento ai primi due capitoli (“La rappresentazione” e “L’espressione”) della prima parte (“L’apparenza”) di Filosofia dell’espressione, in cui Colli introduce e discute i presupposti teorici della sua opera: (1) la critica alla moderna teoria rappresentazionalistica della conoscenza, al soggettivismo e al solipsismo; (2) l’interpretazione della rappresentazione come espressione rievocativa, elaborata per superare i problemi di (1); (3) la giustificazione di (2) mediante il meccanismo della memoria. I primi tre paragrafi della nostra trattazione (...) seguiranno esattamente quest’ordine e presenteranno una ricostruzione degli argomenti di Colli; nel quarto e ultimo paragrafo rifletteremo invece sulla problematicità dei presupposti della filosofia dell’espressione, proponendone un’interpretazione “debole” capace di difenderla da alcune obiezioni e di preservarne l’impianto teoretico generale. (shrink)

A partire dal 1938, il giovane Giorgio Colli progetta a più riprese la stesura di un libro di carattere teoretico e speculativo, provvisoriamente intitolato Ellenismo e oltre, che secondo un piano di lavoro datato 1940 avrebbe dovuto articolarsi in quattro parti. Di questo progetto, che per vari motivi non è stato portato a compimento, rimangono la stesura definitiva della prima parte e alcuni abbozzi, più o meno organici, delle altre tre. La seconda parte, intitolata “Tentativi sistematici”, avrebbe dovuto suddividersi in (...) tre capitoli: gnoseologia, metafisica ed estetica. Nel presente contributo mi propongo di studiare ciò che rimane dei primi due capitoli su gnoseologia e metafisica: innanzitutto ricostruirò il contesto storico-teoretico da cui prende avvio la riflessione filosofica del giovane Colli; successivamente esaminerò i principali nodi speculativi dei suoi tentativi sistematici, seguendo il percorso che dalle problematiche gnoseologiche conduce al cuore della metafisica; infine prospetterò brevemente un confronto fra la metafisica giovanile di Colli e la sua filosofia dell’espressione matura. L’ipotesi interpretativa che sorregge il mio contributo è che Colli, partito da posizioni esplicitamente schopenhaueriane, nella propria maturità filosofica sia pervenuto a posizioni più vicine a Kant che non a Schopenhauer. Questa tesi mi sembra interessante per almeno due motivi: in primo luogo, perché gli interpreti di Colli insistono solitamente sul suo forte legame con Schopenhauer e Nietzsche, sottovalutando quello – altrettanto forte e teoreticamente più rilevante – con Aristotele e, appunto, con Kant; in secondo luogo, perché, se è vero che Colli supera Schopenhauer con Kant, assistiamo qui a una significativa inversione del corso storico-teoretico della filosofia moderna, che dal criticismo kantiano è nuovamente sfociata nella metafisica con Schelling, Hegel e appunto Schopenhauer. La peculiarità della filosofia dell’espressione di Colli consisterebbe allora in una sintesi tanto eclettica e originale, quanto apparentemente contraddittoria, tra l’impostazione gnoseologico-trascendentale di Kant e quella metafisico-genetica di Schopenhauer, mediata dalla logica di Aristotele. (shrink)

El artículo examina un episodio curioso, ocurrido en las relaciones de Galileo Galilei y de su amigo Giovanfrancesco Sagredo -el destacado personaje del Diálogo sobre los dos máximos sistemas del mundo- con el filósofo aristotélico Cesare Cremonini. Estando todavía de profesor en Padua, Galilei entrega al colega y amigo Cremonini, en forma de préstamo, la cuantiosa suma de cuatrocientos ducados. Al trasladarse de Padua a Florencia, el científico confía a Sagredo la tarea de recuperar el dinero prestado. Las cartas numerosas (...) que Sagredo dirigiera a Galilei a tal propósito, nos informan que la cancelación total del préstamo tardó nueve años (1619), gracias a las reiteradas intromisiones del patricio veneciano. Es opinión común de los historiadores, que la tardanza fue causada simplemente por la morosidad y la mala conducta seguida por Cremonini. El autor, en cambio, sugiere una interpretación diferente de los hechos; al tomar en cuenta, de un lado, la presencia de factores financieros que hicieron subir el costo de la deuda; del otro, la forma agresiva con que Sagredo llevó adelante el cuidado de los intereses de Galilei, hasta el extremo de levantar en Cremonini la sospecha de ser objeto de maniobras usureras. (shrink)

Se examina la defensa que de la filosofía en cuanto episteme, elaboró el aristotélico renacentista Cesare Cremonini (1550-1 631), al introducir el curso de lecciones sobre la Física de Aristóteles, según la redacci6n todavía inédita del Ms.200-2 de la Biblioteca Universitaria de Padua. Mediante un topos ya clásico, y actual, los temas en discusión son además de la falta de certitudo y la inconsistencia veritativa que afectan las conclusiones de la filosofía de la naturaleza, la inutilidad e incluso la peligrosidad (...) que, desde el punto de vista ético- político, parecen descalificar la labor del filósofo ociosamente levantar sospechas y alarma. La interpretación de la réplica cremoniniana intenta establecer conexiones entre el perfil conceptual de los argumentos esgrimidos, y algunos episodios de la biografía intelectual y académica de Crernonini sin dejar de tomar en cuenca las implicaciones políticas que pueden derivarse, en perspectiva histórica, del amplio debate que caracterizó la vida académica y cultural del estudio de Padua y de la república veneciana, durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVI.The defence of philosophy as episteme is examined, as elaborated by Renaissance Aristotelian philosopher Cesare Cremonini (1550 - 1 631) in his as yet unpublished manuscript numbered 200-2 by t he University of Padua. Which purported to be an introduction for a course on Aristotle's Physics. Following a topos both classic and contemporary, the issues arc, in addition to the lack of certitudet and the inconsistency of truth concerning the philosophy of nature. The uselessness and even the ethical-political danger arising from the work of the idle philosopher devoted to the contemplation of truth, whose presence in society may stir suspicion and unrest. The analysis of Cremonini’s arguments intends to establish the connections between the philosopher's views and his own academic and intellectual circumstances. Also the political implications are taken into account that resulted from the wide-range debate typical of academic and cultural life in the Studio of Padua and the Republic of Venice during the second half of the 16th Century. (shrink)

I contributi del sesto volume dei Quaderni colliani sono frutto di un seminario tenutosi presso l’Università degli Studi di Torino il 24 e 25 novembre 2022, nel quale, a partire dal Dopo Nietzsche di Giorgio Colli (Adelphi, 1974), si è indagato da prospettive differenti e interdisciplinari lo statuto della ragione filosofica dopo la crisi dei “sistemi” moderni, della quale Nietzsche ha rappresentato il punto apicale. I nove saggi inclusi nel volume, arricchiti dall’introduzione di Valerio Meattini, esplorano quindi lo scenario poliedrico (...) della ricezione delle problematiche nietzschiane fra Otto e Novecento, toccando autori come Freud, Simmel, Rensi, Benn, Weischedel e Severino, le cui posizioni vengono fatte opportunamente dialogare con quelle colliane, nonché temi quali la “morte” della filosofia fra scetticismo e relativismo, il recupero positivo del pensiero greco arcaico, il ruolo dell’arte e della psicanalisi nel contesto della crisi della soggettività. Da ciascun contributo emerge così una diversa concezione della ragione filosofica, in grado di problematizzare aspetti specifici e complementari a partire da un confronto con vari classici del pensiero post-nietzschiano, alcuni dei quali oggi poco frequentati a dispetto della loro ricchezza e attualità. (shrink)

Il “problema Nietzsche” – formula che designa l’impatto dirompente del pensiero nietzschiano sulla filosofia del Novecento – costituisce il filo conduttore di questa indagine collettiva, dedicata alla sua ricezione in Italia. Il volume, nato da tre giornate di studio ospitate dall’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici (5-7 dicembre 2022), ricostruisce le modalità con cui alcuni dei maggiori filosofi e germanisti italiani contemporanei – da Paci a Colli e Montinari, da Antimo Negri a Ferruccio Masini, da Severino e Sini (qui presente (...) con un suo contributo) a Vattimo e Cacciari, fino ad Agamben ed Esposito – hanno criticamente rielaborato l’eredità nietzschiana, trasformandola in un laboratorio concettuale fertile e plurale. Dai saggi qui raccolti emerge infatti una trama speculativa ricca e stratificata, capace di sfidare le coordinate della contemporaneità filosofica e culturale. Lungi dal proporre una sintesi univoca, il volume offre una cartografia di approcci divergenti ma dialoganti, nei quali Nietzsche funge ancora da dispositivo generativo per nuove forme della razionalità e dell’agire. (shrink)

I contributi del secondo numero dei Quaderni Colliani cercano di restituire la ricchezza e la varietà degli scritti postumi raccolti in Apollineo e dionisiaco. Frutto di un seminario tenutosi all’Università di Torino nel 2018 (30-31 ottobre), il presente volume enuclea le considerazioni di Colli sulla filologia, l’arte, la politica, la storia e sulle origini della filosofia, così come l’influenza delle sue letture di Kant, Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Cardine del libro è l’estensione del campo d’azione della filologia alla vita nella sua (...) interezza. Il logos di cui è questione, infatti, non è solo la parola scritta, ma il “discorso” della vita, l’espressione di altre interiorità che vengono conosciute nella loro intima e nascosta natura. In questo senso, la filologia della vita che Colli qui propone è un metodo di indagine che prima ancora dell’analisi testuale esplora l’affinità che lega il lettore e l’autore e, in ultima istanza, i membri di una stessa comunità. (shrink)

Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd–3rd century CE), a key figure in Hellenic philosophy, influenced Arabic-speaking thinkers through two distinct interpretations: a Neoplatonized Aristotelianism and a faithful Peripatetic approach. In the treatise entitled Fī l-tadbīrāt al-falakiyya (On the Governments of the Celestial Spheres), he explores themes like good arrangement (al-sharḥ wa-l-niẓām), reason (naṭīq), and the rational soul (al-nafs al-nāṭiqa). These concepts frame the emanative process where the First Cause creates and governs the cosmos. Nature, embodying divine power, compensates for human imperfections with (...) the rational soul while maintaining cosmic harmony. This study highlights key passages, illustrating Alexander Arabus’ contribution to Arabic Aristotelianism. (shrink)

We review a recent approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics inspired by quantum information theory. The approach is based on a general framework, which allows one to address a large class of physical theories which share basic information-theoretic features. We first illustrate two very primitive features, expressed by the axioms of causality and purity-preservation, which are satisfied by both classical and quantum theory. We then discuss the axiom of purification, which expresses a strong version of the Conservation of Information (...) and captures the core of a vast number of protocols in quantum information. Purification is a highly non-classical feature and leads directly to the emergence of entanglement at the purely conceptual level, without any reference to the superposition principle. Supplemented by a few additional requirements, satisfied by classical and quantum theory, it provides a complete axiomatic characterization of quantum theory for finite dimensional systems. (shrink)

Entanglement is one of the most striking features of quantum mechanics, and yet it is not specifically quantum. More specific to quantum mechanics is the connection between entanglement and thermodynamics, which leads to an identification between entropies and measures of pure state entanglement. Here we search for the roots of this connection, investigating the relation between entanglement and thermodynamics in the framework of general probabilistic theories. We first address the question whether an entangled state can be transformed into another by (...) means of local operations and classical communication. Under two operational requirements, we prove a general version of the Lo-Popescu theorem, which lies at the foundations of the theory of pure-state entanglement. We then consider a resource theory of purity where free operations are random reversible transformations, modelling the scenario where an agent has limited control over the dynamics of a closed system. Our key result is a duality between the resource theory of entanglement and the resource theory of purity, valid for every physical theory where all processes arise from pure states and reversible interactions at the fundamental level. As an application of the main result, we establish a one-to-one correspondence between entropies and measures of pure bipartite entanglement and exploit it to define entanglement measures in the general probabilistic framework. In addition, we show a duality between the task of information erasure and the task of entanglement generation, whereby the existence of entropy sinks (systems that can absorb arbitrary amounts of information) becomes equivalent to the existence of entanglement sources (correlated systems from which arbitrary amounts of entanglement can be extracted). (shrink)

In quantum theory every state can be diagonalized, i.e. decomposed as a convex combination of perfectly distinguishable pure states. This elementary structure plays an ubiquitous role in quantum mechanics, quantum information theory, and quantum statistical mechanics, where it provides the foundation for the notions of majorization and entropy. A natural question then arises: can we reconstruct these notions from purely operational axioms? We address this question in the framework of general probabilistic theories, presenting a set of axioms that guarantee that (...) every state can be diagonalized. The first axiom is Causality, which ensures that the marginal of a bipartite state is well defined. Then, Purity Preservation states that the set of pure transformations is closed under composition. The third axiom is Purification, which allows to assign a pure state to the composition of a system with its environment. Finally, we introduce the axiom of Pure Sharpness, stating that for every system there exists at least one pure effect occurring with unit probability on some state. For theories satisfying our four axioms, we show a constructive algorithm for diagonalizing every given state. The diagonalization result allows us to formulate a majorization criterion that captures the convertibility of states in the operational resource theory of purity, where random reversible transformations are regarded as free operations. (shrink)

Nella presente tesi mi occupo di esporre il pensiero critico di Spinoza nei confronti della teoria del finalismo, che presuppone che il mondo e le cose che vi sono contenute, tendano ad un fine ultimo. Per primo, fornisco un resoconto delle argomentazioni contenute nei due luoghi principali della critica nell'Etica, ovvero l'Appendice alla Prima parte e la Prefazione alla Quarta parte. Successivamente, esamino le occorrenze dell'argomento contro il finalismo in tre opere minori di Spinoza (Principi della filosofia di Cartesio, Breve (...) trattato ed Epistolario), confrontandole con l'Etica. Infine, riassumo e discuto alcune posizioni del recente dibattito sul bersaglio polemico della critica spinoziana. ​ -/- In this dissertation, I present Spinoza's critical analysis of the theory of finalism, which presupposes that the world and the things within it tend toward an ultimate end. I first provide an account of the arguments contained in the two main sections of the critique in the Ethics, namely the Appendix to Part One and the Preface to Part Four. Next, I examine the occurrences of the argument against finalism in three of Spinoza's minor works (Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, Short Treatise and Letters), comparing them with the Ethics. Finally, I summarize and discuss some of the positions in the recent debate on the polemical target of Spinoza's critique. ​. (shrink)

Il pensiero umanistico è stato influenzato nel profondo dal dibattito sull’Antropocene, nato all’interno del campo disciplinare della geologia nel tentativo di individuare un’epoca che faccia seguito all’Olocene, caratterizzata dalle tracce dell’attività umana sul pianeta. Dalla sua diffusione con Paul Crutzen e Eugene F. Stoermer, la questione dell’Antropocene ha valicato ampiamente i confini della geologia, riversandosi in altre discipline – dagli studi culturali alla filosofia – così come nei dibattiti pubblici e nell’attivismo ambientale. In questo volume il concetto di Antropocene viene (...) esaminato criticamente nelle sue principali implicazioni, affrontando temi quali il rapporto con la crisi ecologica, il femminismo, la tecnologia, i rifiuti, la democrazia, la relazione tra umano e non-umano, la sua periodizzazione, l’ecomodernismo, e altri ancora. (shrink)

Giorgio Colli (1917-1979) è stato uno dei maggiori intellettuali italiani del secolo scorso. Storico della filosofia, filologo ed editore, Colli ha ideato e curato, con Mazzino Montinari, la prima edizione critica mondiale delle opere di Friedrich Nietzsche; ha intrapreso un’innovativa edizione dei frammenti e delle testimonianze relativi a La sapienza greca (3 voll., 1977-1980); ha tradotto alcuni dei maggiori classici della filosofia, come l’Organon aristotelico e la Critica della ragion pura di Kant. Ma Colli è stato soprattutto un filosofo in (...) prima persona, che ha sviluppato un’originale e complessa riflessione storico-teoretica sulla natura della ragione e sul suo rapporto con la vita. Tale riflessione, che ha sempre orientato le altre attività, più note, di Colli, è culminata in uno dei testi più densi e impegnativi del Novecento, oggetto di una rinnovata attenzione negli ultimi anni: Filosofia dell’espressione (1969), a cui vanno affiancati i quaderni postumi de La ragione errabonda (1982). Il presente volume, composto di dieci saggi, ha origine da tre giornate di studio svoltesi all’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici (4-6 ottobre 2021), e interroga il pensiero di Colli nelle sue varie declinazioni: dall’interpretazione del pensiero antico al confronto con Nietzsche, dall’estetica alla metafisica e alla logica, dall’influenza del misticismo al rapporto con la filosofia italiana del Novecento. Ad emergere è il profilo di un pensatore che ha praticato e difeso una forma di filosofia come espressione della potenza ambigua, insieme costruttiva e distruttiva, della ragione umana – una filosofia che, mediante un’analisi vertiginosa della “distruttività” connaturata al logos, individua una ragione sana, purificata dagli eccessi “costruttivi” e riannodata alla vita quale techne del giusto bios. (shrink)