Nella presente tesi mi occupo di esporre il pensiero critico di Spinoza nei confronti della teoria del finalismo, che presuppone che il mondo e le cose che vi sono contenute, tendano ad un fine ultimo. Per primo, fornisco un resoconto delle argomentazioni contenute nei due luoghi principali della critica nell'Etica, ovvero l'Appendice alla Prima parte e la Prefazione alla Quarta parte. Successivamente, esamino le occorrenze dell'argomento contro il finalismo in tre opere minori di Spinoza (Principi della filosofia di Cartesio, Breve (...) trattato ed Epistolario), confrontandole con l'Etica. Infine, riassumo e discuto alcune posizioni del recente dibattito sul bersaglio polemico della critica spinoziana. ​ -/- In this dissertation, I present Spinoza's critical analysis of the theory of finalism, which presupposes that the world and the things within it tend toward an ultimate end. I first provide an account of the arguments contained in the two main sections of the critique in the Ethics, namely the Appendix to Part One and the Preface to Part Four. Next, I examine the occurrences of the argument against finalism in three of Spinoza's minor works (Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, Short Treatise and Letters), comparing them with the Ethics. Finally, I summarize and discuss some of the positions in the recent debate on the polemical target of Spinoza's critique. ​. (shrink)

According to the modal account, risk is a function of modal closeness. A puzzling consequence of this account is that all truths are maximally risky. I defend this puzzling claim against several objections found in the literature, by drawing connections between axiom T for safety and risk and between counterfactual reasoning and risk. I conclude by briefly explaining why we find the conclusion puzzling and by advocating for a pluralist notion of risk where modal risk is a legitimate notion alongside (...) the probabilistic one. (shrink)

Obligations can be affected by knowledge. Several approaches exist to formalize knowledge-based obligations, but no formalism has been developed yet to capture the dynamic interaction between knowledge and obligations. We introduce the dynamic extension of an existing logic for knowledge-based obligations here. We motivate the logic by analyzing several scenarios and by showing how it can capture in an original manner several fundamental deontic notions such as absolute, prima facie and all-things-considered obligations. Finally, in the dynamic epistemic logic tradition, we (...) provide reduction axioms for the dynamic operator of the new logic. (shrink)

In the substitutional framework, validity is truth under all substitutions of the nonlogical vocabulary. I develop a theory where □ is interpreted as substitutional validity. I show how to prove soundness and completeness for common modal calculi using this definition.

According to the interpretational theory of logical validity (IR), logical validity is preservation of truth in all interpretations compatible with the intended meaning of logical expressions. IR suffers from a seemingly defeating objection, the so-called cardinality problem: any instance of the statement ‘There are n things’ is true under all interpretations, since it can be written down using only logical expressions that are not to be reinterpreted; yet ‘There are n things’ is not logically true. I argue that the cardinality (...) problem is indeed a serious problem for IR, when understood in terms of ‘asymmetry of information’. I then argue that IR can be rehabilitated by making quantifiers context-sensitive: what we do not reinterpret is the Kaplanian character of a quantifier, rather than its content. ‘There are n things’ is false in a context where fewer than n things are relevant, so it is not logically true in IR. I finally discuss some objections and ramifications of my account: I discuss how to make space for the possibility of an explicitly absolutely general quantifier in my framework, how terms can be logical even though context-sensitive, and how to recapture classical logic within my framework. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to (...) other humans corresponds essentially to the ‘we-mode’ of cognition, the unique power of human minds to be jointly directed at goals, intentions, states of affairs, or values (which, importantly, differs from having a ‘group mind’). Because the capacity for collective intentionality holds evolutionary and developmental primacy over human-epistemic artefacts relations, the extended mind should not be seen as a special phenomenon, but as a central aspect of the human condition. The original extended mind thesis carried important implications for how the cognitive sciences should proceed. In a version of the thesis that accommodates collective intentionality, these implications would go far deeper than originally assumed. (shrink)

I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions (...) satisfactorily. I then introduce my proposal, which holds that we wrong others when we fail to treat their status as moral agents as a source of stringent constraints on our action. I call it the moral neglect account. Once we have identified a common aim of corrective duties (counterbalancing moral neglect), we can fill their content in the various contexts in which wronging has occurred. I conclude by observing that it is not the primary role of corrective justice to assign responsibilities for damage reparations; in fact, requests for compensation make more sense if framed in distributive rather than corrective terms. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the ground (why correct?) and content (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In (...) the final section, I suggest that it is probably better to restrict the label “corrective duties” to duties generated by interpersonal wronging. (shrink)

The notion of ‘concrete universal’ is crucial to both the theoretical and the practical philosophy of British idealism. In this essay, I will deal with the concrete universal in the early British idealists (1865-1883) and in F.H. Bradley's logic and metaphysics (1883-1893), leaving aside the more practical features of this notion, mostly related to Bosanquet’s philosophy. My aim is twofold. First, I intend to show that the concrete universal continues to be prominent in Bradley's thought even after the publication of (...) his only theoretical work which deals with it specifically (The Principles of Logic), that is, also in his major work (Appearance and Reality), despite the virtual absence of explicit occurrences. Second, I intend to show that, in Bradley’s thought, the idealistic and Hegelian philosophical heritage, considered here through the lens of the concrete universal, undergoes a significant shift – from ‘concept’ to ‘experience’ – that would have a notable impact on early twentieth-century philosophy. Investigating Bradley's thought from this perspective, then, allows us to appreciate its richness and complexity from a unique angle, from which we can also better discern the actual philosophical debts that British idealists owed to Hegel. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Bradley’s engagement with Kant’s theoretical philosophy, often mediated by Herbart, Hamilton, and Lotze, led him to reassess his early Hegelianism and to develop a critical metaphysics. Bradley’s philosophy is examined diachronically, from early writings (2) to Appearance and Reality (4) through The Principles of Logic (3). I also provide a preliminary overview of Kant’s reception in Britain (1) to set the historical background for other sections. This essay explores a topic not previously investigated, as (...) other contributions on Bradley and Kant compare them without historical concern. By focusing on Bradley’s sources, we can appreciate the influence of Kantianism through some understudied thinkers. In addition, I adopt a historical-diachronic approach that clarifies the development of Bradley’s philosophy by exploiting documents such as manuscripts and reading notes. In particular, I present the first analysis of a 1877–1878 manuscript – Bradley’s initial formulation of his peculiar metaphysics. (shrink)

Two problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the right-holder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties (...) and that rights aspire to protect interests of the right-holder, we make it hard to explain why rights violations, in general, wrong right-holders. In the final section, I present what I see as a promising solution to the puzzle. I describe a particular social environment (the society of equals) where interacting with others through rights is indeed valuable because respecting rights communicates that one takes seriously others’ equal moral status. In such a society and only in such a society, I conclude, moral agents are required to treat all rights violations as wrongs perpetrated against the right-holder. (shrink)

Lotze’s philosophy has often been associated to the British idealists, although only a few scattered pages have been devoted to its reception among them. Recently, Milkov claimed that the British neo-Hegelian philosophers were rather “neo-Lotzean”; yet countering the mistaken view of British idealism as a neo-Hegelianism with such another one-sided view does not help us to assess the historical truth. Nevertheless, Milkov’s claim can be read as a challenge, and this is how I will address it in this chapter, the (...) aim of which is to assess to what extent Lotze’s philosophy has actually influenced that of two leading British idealists, namely Green and Bradley. Accordingly, Section 3.2 of the chapter shall be devoted to a preliminary survey of Lotze’s presence in British idealism, and Sections 3.3 and 3.4 to his alleged influence on Green and Bradley (as limited to their metaphysics). I will end up showing that the affinity between Lotze and Green results in a strong analogy due to their shared need to “reform” Hegel’s spiritualism in a non-dialectical way, while the affinity between Lotze and Bradley is rather due to a constructive influence by the former on the latter, who can thus rightly be defined as neo-Lotzean. (shrink)

Philosophical speculation about how psychiatric externalism might function in practice has yet to fully consider the multitude of externalist psychiatric systems that exist beyond the bounds of modern psychiatry. Believing that anthropology can inform philosophical debate on the matter, the paper illustrates one such case. The discussion is based on 19 months of first-hand ethnographic fieldwork among Akha, a group of swidden farmers living in highland Laos and neighboring borderlands. First, the paper describes the Akha set of medicinal, ritual, and (...) shamanic practices, analyzing issues of stigma and medical pluralism within it. Second, it makes the case that the Akha realize a functioning biopsychosocial system which comes with a well-developed set of resources for treating the social dimension of illness. Externalism among the Akha re-frames psychiatric illness as a ‘problem in living,’ which becomes manageable as such. The paper claims that, in so doing, the Akha system succeeds in many of the areas where modern internalist psychiatry falls short, and that it does so because Akha society is structured in such a way so that its practitioners can shift the social environment around the patient. As a takeaway for philosophers, it suggests that the development of an externalist psychiatry must begin from questioning the accepted ontology of the social causes of psychiatric illness. (shrink)

Wrongs, Harms, and Compensation By SlavnyAdamOxford University Press, 2023. 240 pp.

M. Visentin has identified a ‘neo-Parmenidean’ feature in 20th-century Italian philosophy, marked by the rejection of metaphysics as the rational attempt to ground experience. This essay explores a different neo-Eleatic feature in contemporary philosophy, focusing on two seemingly distant figures: F. H. Bradley, an alleged British Hegelian, and Giorgio Colli, an alleged Italian follower of Nietzsche. Through a comparative analysis – both historical and conceptual – of their logic and metaphysics, the Author outlines a ‘Zenonian’ neo-Eleaticism. This form of dialectic, (...) not speculative like Hegel’s but aporetical and sceptical, draws on Plato’s 'Parmenides', Kant, and Herbart to expose the internal contradictions of discursive thought. Yet this dialectic does not lead the two philosophers to scepticism or anti-metaphysics, but rather to a ‘radical experientialism’ grounded in a paradoxical rationalist critique of rationalist metaphysics. (shrink)

Il problema centrale sul quale il pensiero di Giorgio Colli s’interroga è il «problema della ragione», cioè della genesi storico-strutturale e della validità epistemica della ragione umana. La filosofia di Colli si configura perciò come una “critica della ragione”, nella doppia valenza del genitivo: una critica, cioè, condotta dalla ragione e che ha per oggetto la ragione stessa. Lo scopo del presente saggio è quello di determinare il significato filosofico e la struttura argomentativa di tale critica. Procederemo quindi nel seguente (...) ordine. Innanzitutto, dovremo stabilire che cosa Colli intenda per “ragione” e in che senso la sua filosofia possa essere intesa come una “critica” della ragione (§ 1). In seguito, presenteremo una ricostruzione della struttura generale di questa critica, o meglio delle diverse forme della critica (§ 2), soffermandoci poi sulle principali obiezioni di Colli al metodo genealogico di Nietzsche (§ 3). L’esame di tali obiezioni servirà a comprendere l’esigenza di una critica interna – “logica” – della ragione, la cui struttura verrà contestualizzata nella logica colliana (§ 4), analizzata (§ 5) e infine interpretata (§ 6). (shrink)

This essay explores the origins of twentieth-century epistemological and metaphysical relativism in Victorian Britain, a cultural milieu where the relativistic sensibility – typically associated with Nietzsche and postmodernism – first took root. While contemporary discussions on relativism tend to foreground postmodern thinkers, the foundational role played by Victorian philosophers such as Hamilton, Spencer, and, crucially, Bradley is often overlooked. Although relativism traces back to Protagoras’s homo mensura, the Victorians were the first modern thinkers to elevate relativity to a guiding principle (...) of both knowledge and life. Among them, Bradley stands out for the historical and theoretical significance of his work. A contemporary of Nietzsche, Bradley developed an original synthesis of Hegelian, Kantian, empiricist, pragmatist, and neo-realist ideas. Unlike many British idealists, he did not rely on Hegelian “absolute knowledge” to overcome relativity but attempted to reconcile Enlightenment philosophy of finitude and relativity with Romantic philosophy of the infinite and the absolute. Bradley’s theory of truth integrates both the inescapable limitations of human knowledge and the enduring metaphysical demand for totality. The essay proceeds in three parts: (I) an overview of the Victorian context as a backdrop for Bradley’s idealist reaction to relativity; (II) an analysis of Bradley’s logic, shaped by Lotze’s epistemology; and (III) a reading of his metaphysics as a reconciliation of logical skepticism and metaphysical absolutism. In conclusion, Bradley is presented as a valuable interlocutor for Nietzsche and his intellectual legacy. (shrink)

«Le origini della filosofia greca, e quindi dell’intero pensiero occidentale, sono misteriose». Così si apre l’importante libro di Giorgio Colli (Adelphi, Milano 1975), al cui studio integrale il gruppo di ricerca Simposio ha dedicato un seminario all’Università di Torino (23-25 ottobre 2017), nell’ambito delle attività del Centro Studi Giorgio Colli. I nove capitoli del breve ma denso testo colliano forniscono un’interpretazione non convenzionale e stimolante della genesi e della genealogia di quella pratica che, almeno a partire da Platone, porta il (...) nome di “filosofia”. Questo primo volume dei Quaderni Colliani, attraverso un’analisi critica che si estende anche alle altre opere del filosofo torinese, si propone d’indagare le origini del logos occidentale che, come insegna Colli, si perdono nei labirinti del mito, albergano nelle parole dell’oracolo e si annidano tra le reti dialettiche della retorica. I contributi qui presentati, seguendo lo sviluppo argomentativo e tematico de La nascita della filosofia, spaziano dagli albori della civiltà greca (Apollo e Dioniso, il mito cretese, la divinazione), al pensiero più maturo dei cosiddetti sapienti e dei sofisti, per giungere infine a Platone, l’inventore della “letteratura” filosofica. (shrink)

In Ph. I 2.185b19–25, Aristotle puzzlingly challenges essence monism, arguing that, if all things have the same definition and essence, they are nothing at all. In his recent book on Aristotle and the Eleatics, Tim Clarke proposes a traditional reading: if essence monism were true, all opposite predicates would belong to all subjects at the same time, thus making all things self-contradictory and hence annihilating them. In this paper I contend that this standard reading, dating back to Cherniss and Ross, (...) is mistaken. After a preliminary contextualisation of the passage at issue, I present Clarke’s reading and initially strengthen it by referring to a seemingly parallel passage from Metaph. I then discuss the difficulties surrounding the standard reading of these two texts, showing that both need to be interpreted differently. Building on this criticism, I finally set out the requirements that an alternative reading should meet, outlining some of its main features as well. (shrink)

Cova et al. (2019) have tested people's beliefs on aesthetic disagreements using experimental studies based on questionnaires. Since the vast majority of participants chose answers that are incompatible with intersubjectivism, they conclude that the traditional approach in aesthetics is ”fundamentally misguided”. Contesi et al. (2024) claim that Cova et al. entirely misunderstand the relevance of their experimental findings to the aesthetics literature: those results actually ”confirm what aestheticians predicted all along”. According to Contesi et al., while aestheticians generally assume “that (...) people explicitly endorse the claim of subjectivism”, folk intersubjectivism ”is mainly seen as remaining implicit in patterns of behaviour”; its presence, therefore, cannot be inferred from people's ”explicit avowals”. Contesi et al. support their understanding of the literature by citing passages from contemporary philosophers. I argue that these passages fail to demonstrate that folk aesthetic intersubjectivism is regarded as implicit. (shrink)

The biopsychosocial (BPS) model in psychiatry has come under fire for being too vague to be of any practical use in the clinic. For many, its central flaw consists in lack of scientific validity and philosophical coherence: the model never specified how biological, psychological and social factors causally integrate with one another. Recently, advances in the cognitive sciences have made great strides towards meeting this very ‘integration challenge.’ The paper begins by illustrating how enactivist and predictive processing frameworks propose converging (...) accounts of biopsychosocial integration that are far superior to those of previous theories. It argues, however, that the main problem of implementing the BPS model has less to do with integration than with the lack of a social etiology. Psychiatric practice leans heavily towards ‘bio’ and ‘psycho’ approaches, without an equally developed set of explanatory and therapeutic resources for dealing with the ‘social’ dimension of illness. This leaves psychiatry essentially internalist in orientation. As illustrated most poignantly by conditions such as functional neurological disorders, internalism comes with the risks of stigma and the curtailment of therapeutic possibilities. The paper argues that the answer to the failings of the BPS model lies in combining the integration challenge with the development of an ‘externalist psychiatry,’ which casts both causes and treatment of psychiatric illness onto the social environment. The following two papers explore the conditions that might make this idea a reality. (shrink)

Nel presente saggio mi propongo di esaminare alcune delle nozioni fondamentali della logica colliana, commentando le definizioni di “qualità”, “giudizio”, “essere”, “non-essere”, “vero” e “falso”, esposte alle pp. 65-78 dell’opera del 1969. Tali nozioni, considerate sotto un profilo sistematico, costituiscono di fatto la struttura sintattica e semantica del logos, cioè la base elementare – insieme con la teoria della modalità – su cui vengono edificate le teorie colliane riguardanti l’inferenza deduttiva e la dimostrazione, intese appunto come massima espressione della ragione (...) costruttiva e scientifica. Il fine primario del presente saggio è perciò quello di comprendere la lettera del testo di Colli, di per sé piuttosto arduo; ad ogni modo, non mancherò di rilevare – sia pure di passaggio, talvolta solo in nota – alcune difficoltà teoriche dell’impianto colliano, che verranno dettagliatamente esaminate in altra sede. Il saggio si concluderà con un’appendice nella quale la logica colliana verrà contestualizzata rispetto alla logica aristotelica e alla logica di Frege e Russell, ricostruendo da un lato il debito di Colli verso Aristotele, dall’altro la sua polemica contro la moderna logica simbolico-matematica. (shrink)

Response to commentaries on the three-paper set 'Outline for an externalist psychiatry'.

Nel presente saggio intendo ricostruire la concezione colliana della filosofia, contestualizzandola, sotto il profilo concettuale, all’interno della “crisi della ragione” degli ultimi centocinquant’anni (da Nietzsche in avanti), nel corso dei quali si è parlato a più riprese di «fine» o «morte» della filosofia. La mia argomentazione si articolerà in tre punti. In primo luogo, proporrò una ricostruzione schematica della crisi della ragione filosofica contemporanea, finalizzata a comprendere la posizione di Colli rispetto a colui che di tale crisi è stato il (...) massimo portavoce, cioè Nietzsche (§ 1). In secondo luogo, a partire da una presentazione elementare della logica di Colli, fornirò un’interpretazione della critica colliana della “ragione costruttiva”, che trova nella “legge generale della deduzione” la sua espressione eminente (§ 2). In terzo e ultimo luogo, rifletterò su quale concezione della filosofia emerga – e si salvi – dalla critica colliana della ragione costruttiva, al di là delle dichiarazioni esplicite da parte di Colli, spesso volutamente ambigue (§§ 3-4). (shrink)

Any progress in shaping up an externalist psychiatry, so previous discussion suggested, must begin from questions about the ontology of social causation. So far, research and theory have adhered to a naturalistic approach to the social causes of illness, concentrating mostly on the ‘social determinants of mental health’ (inequality, discrimination, housing insecurity, etc.). The paper starts with an assessment of ‘social determinants’ through the lens of epidemiology and critical psychiatry. It illustrates existing practical and political approaches that fight these constraints (...) and it highlights their therapeutic value. It argues, though, that a focus on social determinants is not sufficient for fully realizing externalism because a great portion of sociogenic illness remains causally indeterminate. Alongside political action, externalism requires a social etiology that is established by virtue of the meaning that it holds for patients, rather than by virtue of its capacity to identify objective social causes of illness. This entails abandoning naturalism about social causation and embracing constructivism. The paper shows that this methodological shift is less contradictory and more effective than it is commonly imagined. Drawing from further anthropological evidence, it concludes that only by lending support to projects that balance a focus on constraints with social construction will psychiatry be truly externalist. At stake is a prospect of effective treatment for sociogenic illness for the countless in struggle. (shrink)

In this paper, I contrast two approaches to political legitimacy, both influenced by Rawls. One is the classic political liberal picture, according to which a state is legitimate if its “constitutional essentials” could be endorsed by reasonable citizens. The alternative is the idea that what makes a state legitimate is primarily its success at organizing the basic structure in a way that is demonstrably favorable to the governed. Specifically, I suggest that a state is legitimate insofar as it organizes the (...) basic structure in a manner that makes it easier for citizens to behave justly towards one another and adopt autonomous choices. I then move to demonstrate the superiority of this normative impact solution to the problem of legitimacy vis-à-vis political liberalism, even when reasonable disagreement about justice is factored in. (shrink)

It is common to distinguish between disagreement in the state sense (being in disagreement) and disagreement in the activity sense (having a disagreement). This paper deals with the question of what it is for two people to have a disagreement. First, I present and reject the thesis according to which having a disagreement is a matter of expressing conflicting attitudes. I argue that this is not sufficient for having a disagreement: two people can express conflicting attitudes without having a disagreement. (...) Second, I present and reject the thesis according to which having a disagreement involves not only the expression of conflicting attitudes, but also the persuasive attempt to bring the other around to one’s view. I argue that this is not necessary for having a disagreement: two people can have a disagreement without trying to change each other’s minds. Finally, I put forward an alternative account that goes beyond the mere expression of conflicting attitudes, but that does not go as far as to posit the attempt to change someone’s mind. Having a disagreement, I submit, is a matter of expressing conflicting attitudes and demanding agreement, that is, advancing the normative claim that the other should share one’s attitude. (shrink)

In Appearance and Reality (1893), F. H. Bradley held that reality is both immanent to thought (as a known object) and transcendent to it (as non-relational in structure). This cohabitation of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in his metaphysics was relevantly attacked by J. Dewey (1907) as being self-contradictory. The goal of my essay is to defend Bradley against this charge by elucidating the structure of the thought-reality relationship and the proper status of contradiction.

Il presente contributo vuole essere una sorta di commento ai primi due capitoli (“La rappresentazione” e “L’espressione”) della prima parte (“L’apparenza”) di Filosofia dell’espressione, in cui Colli introduce e discute i presupposti teorici della sua opera: (1) la critica alla moderna teoria rappresentazionalistica della conoscenza, al soggettivismo e al solipsismo; (2) l’interpretazione della rappresentazione come espressione rievocativa, elaborata per superare i problemi di (1); (3) la giustificazione di (2) mediante il meccanismo della memoria. I primi tre paragrafi della nostra trattazione (...) seguiranno esattamente quest’ordine e presenteranno una ricostruzione degli argomenti di Colli; nel quarto e ultimo paragrafo rifletteremo invece sulla problematicità dei presupposti della filosofia dell’espressione, proponendone un’interpretazione “debole” capace di difenderla da alcune obiezioni e di preservarne l’impianto teoretico generale. (shrink)

A partire dal 1938, il giovane Giorgio Colli progetta a più riprese la stesura di un libro di carattere teoretico e speculativo, provvisoriamente intitolato Ellenismo e oltre, che secondo un piano di lavoro datato 1940 avrebbe dovuto articolarsi in quattro parti. Di questo progetto, che per vari motivi non è stato portato a compimento, rimangono la stesura definitiva della prima parte e alcuni abbozzi, più o meno organici, delle altre tre. La seconda parte, intitolata “Tentativi sistematici”, avrebbe dovuto suddividersi in (...) tre capitoli: gnoseologia, metafisica ed estetica. Nel presente contributo mi propongo di studiare ciò che rimane dei primi due capitoli su gnoseologia e metafisica: innanzitutto ricostruirò il contesto storico-teoretico da cui prende avvio la riflessione filosofica del giovane Colli; successivamente esaminerò i principali nodi speculativi dei suoi tentativi sistematici, seguendo il percorso che dalle problematiche gnoseologiche conduce al cuore della metafisica; infine prospetterò brevemente un confronto fra la metafisica giovanile di Colli e la sua filosofia dell’espressione matura. L’ipotesi interpretativa che sorregge il mio contributo è che Colli, partito da posizioni esplicitamente schopenhaueriane, nella propria maturità filosofica sia pervenuto a posizioni più vicine a Kant che non a Schopenhauer. Questa tesi mi sembra interessante per almeno due motivi: in primo luogo, perché gli interpreti di Colli insistono solitamente sul suo forte legame con Schopenhauer e Nietzsche, sottovalutando quello – altrettanto forte e teoreticamente più rilevante – con Aristotele e, appunto, con Kant; in secondo luogo, perché, se è vero che Colli supera Schopenhauer con Kant, assistiamo qui a una significativa inversione del corso storico-teoretico della filosofia moderna, che dal criticismo kantiano è nuovamente sfociata nella metafisica con Schelling, Hegel e appunto Schopenhauer. La peculiarità della filosofia dell’espressione di Colli consisterebbe allora in una sintesi tanto eclettica e originale, quanto apparentemente contraddittoria, tra l’impostazione gnoseologico-trascendentale di Kant e quella metafisico-genetica di Schopenhauer, mediata dalla logica di Aristotele. (shrink)

El artículo examina un episodio curioso, ocurrido en las relaciones de Galileo Galilei y de su amigo Giovanfrancesco Sagredo -el destacado personaje del Diálogo sobre los dos máximos sistemas del mundo- con el filósofo aristotélico Cesare Cremonini. Estando todavía de profesor en Padua, Galilei entrega al colega y amigo Cremonini, en forma de préstamo, la cuantiosa suma de cuatrocientos ducados. Al trasladarse de Padua a Florencia, el científico confía a Sagredo la tarea de recuperar el dinero prestado. Las cartas numerosas (...) que Sagredo dirigiera a Galilei a tal propósito, nos informan que la cancelación total del préstamo tardó nueve años (1619), gracias a las reiteradas intromisiones del patricio veneciano. Es opinión común de los historiadores, que la tardanza fue causada simplemente por la morosidad y la mala conducta seguida por Cremonini. El autor, en cambio, sugiere una interpretación diferente de los hechos; al tomar en cuenta, de un lado, la presencia de factores financieros que hicieron subir el costo de la deuda; del otro, la forma agresiva con que Sagredo llevó adelante el cuidado de los intereses de Galilei, hasta el extremo de levantar en Cremonini la sospecha de ser objeto de maniobras usureras. (shrink)

Se examina la defensa que de la filosofía en cuanto episteme, elaboró el aristotélico renacentista Cesare Cremonini (1550-1 631), al introducir el curso de lecciones sobre la Física de Aristóteles, según la redacci6n todavía inédita del Ms.200-2 de la Biblioteca Universitaria de Padua. Mediante un topos ya clásico, y actual, los temas en discusión son además de la falta de certitudo y la inconsistencia veritativa que afectan las conclusiones de la filosofía de la naturaleza, la inutilidad e incluso la peligrosidad (...) que, desde el punto de vista ético- político, parecen descalificar la labor del filósofo ociosamente levantar sospechas y alarma. La interpretación de la réplica cremoniniana intenta establecer conexiones entre el perfil conceptual de los argumentos esgrimidos, y algunos episodios de la biografía intelectual y académica de Crernonini sin dejar de tomar en cuenca las implicaciones políticas que pueden derivarse, en perspectiva histórica, del amplio debate que caracterizó la vida académica y cultural del estudio de Padua y de la república veneciana, durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVI.The defence of philosophy as episteme is examined, as elaborated by Renaissance Aristotelian philosopher Cesare Cremonini (1550 - 1 631) in his as yet unpublished manuscript numbered 200-2 by t he University of Padua. Which purported to be an introduction for a course on Aristotle's Physics. Following a topos both classic and contemporary, the issues arc, in addition to the lack of certitudet and the inconsistency of truth concerning the philosophy of nature. The uselessness and even the ethical-political danger arising from the work of the idle philosopher devoted to the contemplation of truth, whose presence in society may stir suspicion and unrest. The analysis of Cremonini’s arguments intends to establish the connections between the philosopher's views and his own academic and intellectual circumstances. Also the political implications are taken into account that resulted from the wide-range debate typical of academic and cultural life in the Studio of Padua and the Republic of Venice during the second half of the 16th Century. (shrink)

I contributi del sesto volume dei Quaderni colliani sono frutto di un seminario tenutosi presso l’Università degli Studi di Torino il 24 e 25 novembre 2022, nel quale, a partire dal Dopo Nietzsche di Giorgio Colli (Adelphi, 1974), si è indagato da prospettive differenti e interdisciplinari lo statuto della ragione filosofica dopo la crisi dei “sistemi” moderni, della quale Nietzsche ha rappresentato il punto apicale. I nove saggi inclusi nel volume, arricchiti dall’introduzione di Valerio Meattini, esplorano quindi lo scenario poliedrico (...) della ricezione delle problematiche nietzschiane fra Otto e Novecento, toccando autori come Freud, Simmel, Rensi, Benn, Weischedel e Severino, le cui posizioni vengono fatte opportunamente dialogare con quelle colliane, nonché temi quali la “morte” della filosofia fra scetticismo e relativismo, il recupero positivo del pensiero greco arcaico, il ruolo dell’arte e della psicanalisi nel contesto della crisi della soggettività. Da ciascun contributo emerge così una diversa concezione della ragione filosofica, in grado di problematizzare aspetti specifici e complementari a partire da un confronto con vari classici del pensiero post-nietzschiano, alcuni dei quali oggi poco frequentati a dispetto della loro ricchezza e attualità. (shrink)

Il “problema Nietzsche” – formula che designa l’impatto dirompente del pensiero nietzschiano sulla filosofia del Novecento – costituisce il filo conduttore di questa indagine collettiva, dedicata alla sua ricezione in Italia. Il volume, nato da tre giornate di studio ospitate dall’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici (5-7 dicembre 2022), ricostruisce le modalità con cui alcuni dei maggiori filosofi e germanisti italiani contemporanei – da Paci a Colli e Montinari, da Antimo Negri a Ferruccio Masini, da Severino e Sini (qui presente (...) con un suo contributo) a Vattimo e Cacciari, fino ad Agamben ed Esposito – hanno criticamente rielaborato l’eredità nietzschiana, trasformandola in un laboratorio concettuale fertile e plurale. Dai saggi qui raccolti emerge infatti una trama speculativa ricca e stratificata, capace di sfidare le coordinate della contemporaneità filosofica e culturale. Lungi dal proporre una sintesi univoca, il volume offre una cartografia di approcci divergenti ma dialoganti, nei quali Nietzsche funge ancora da dispositivo generativo per nuove forme della razionalità e dell’agire. (shrink)

I contributi del secondo numero dei Quaderni Colliani cercano di restituire la ricchezza e la varietà degli scritti postumi raccolti in Apollineo e dionisiaco. Frutto di un seminario tenutosi all’Università di Torino nel 2018 (30-31 ottobre), il presente volume enuclea le considerazioni di Colli sulla filologia, l’arte, la politica, la storia e sulle origini della filosofia, così come l’influenza delle sue letture di Kant, Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Cardine del libro è l’estensione del campo d’azione della filologia alla vita nella sua (...) interezza. Il logos di cui è questione, infatti, non è solo la parola scritta, ma il “discorso” della vita, l’espressione di altre interiorità che vengono conosciute nella loro intima e nascosta natura. In questo senso, la filologia della vita che Colli qui propone è un metodo di indagine che prima ancora dell’analisi testuale esplora l’affinità che lega il lettore e l’autore e, in ultima istanza, i membri di una stessa comunità. (shrink)

Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd–3rd century CE), a key figure in Hellenic philosophy, influenced Arabic-speaking thinkers through two distinct interpretations: a Neoplatonized Aristotelianism and a faithful Peripatetic approach. In the treatise entitled Fī l-tadbīrāt al-falakiyya (On the Governments of the Celestial Spheres), he explores themes like good arrangement (al-sharḥ wa-l-niẓām), reason (naṭīq), and the rational soul (al-nafs al-nāṭiqa). These concepts frame the emanative process where the First Cause creates and governs the cosmos. Nature, embodying divine power, compensates for human imperfections with (...) the rational soul while maintaining cosmic harmony. This study highlights key passages, illustrating Alexander Arabus’ contribution to Arabic Aristotelianism. (shrink)

We review a recent approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics inspired by quantum information theory. The approach is based on a general framework, which allows one to address a large class of physical theories which share basic information-theoretic features. We first illustrate two very primitive features, expressed by the axioms of causality and purity-preservation, which are satisfied by both classical and quantum theory. We then discuss the axiom of purification, which expresses a strong version of the Conservation of Information (...) and captures the core of a vast number of protocols in quantum information. Purification is a highly non-classical feature and leads directly to the emergence of entanglement at the purely conceptual level, without any reference to the superposition principle. Supplemented by a few additional requirements, satisfied by classical and quantum theory, it provides a complete axiomatic characterization of quantum theory for finite dimensional systems. (shrink)

Entanglement is one of the most striking features of quantum mechanics, and yet it is not specifically quantum. More specific to quantum mechanics is the connection between entanglement and thermodynamics, which leads to an identification between entropies and measures of pure state entanglement. Here we search for the roots of this connection, investigating the relation between entanglement and thermodynamics in the framework of general probabilistic theories. We first address the question whether an entangled state can be transformed into another by (...) means of local operations and classical communication. Under two operational requirements, we prove a general version of the Lo-Popescu theorem, which lies at the foundations of the theory of pure-state entanglement. We then consider a resource theory of purity where free operations are random reversible transformations, modelling the scenario where an agent has limited control over the dynamics of a closed system. Our key result is a duality between the resource theory of entanglement and the resource theory of purity, valid for every physical theory where all processes arise from pure states and reversible interactions at the fundamental level. As an application of the main result, we establish a one-to-one correspondence between entropies and measures of pure bipartite entanglement and exploit it to define entanglement measures in the general probabilistic framework. In addition, we show a duality between the task of information erasure and the task of entanglement generation, whereby the existence of entropy sinks (systems that can absorb arbitrary amounts of information) becomes equivalent to the existence of entanglement sources (correlated systems from which arbitrary amounts of entanglement can be extracted). (shrink)

In quantum theory every state can be diagonalized, i.e. decomposed as a convex combination of perfectly distinguishable pure states. This elementary structure plays an ubiquitous role in quantum mechanics, quantum information theory, and quantum statistical mechanics, where it provides the foundation for the notions of majorization and entropy. A natural question then arises: can we reconstruct these notions from purely operational axioms? We address this question in the framework of general probabilistic theories, presenting a set of axioms that guarantee that (...) every state can be diagonalized. The first axiom is Causality, which ensures that the marginal of a bipartite state is well defined. Then, Purity Preservation states that the set of pure transformations is closed under composition. The third axiom is Purification, which allows to assign a pure state to the composition of a system with its environment. Finally, we introduce the axiom of Pure Sharpness, stating that for every system there exists at least one pure effect occurring with unit probability on some state. For theories satisfying our four axioms, we show a constructive algorithm for diagonalizing every given state. The diagonalization result allows us to formulate a majorization criterion that captures the convertibility of states in the operational resource theory of purity, where random reversible transformations are regarded as free operations. (shrink)

Il pensiero umanistico è stato influenzato nel profondo dal dibattito sull’Antropocene, nato all’interno del campo disciplinare della geologia nel tentativo di individuare un’epoca che faccia seguito all’Olocene, caratterizzata dalle tracce dell’attività umana sul pianeta. Dalla sua diffusione con Paul Crutzen e Eugene F. Stoermer, la questione dell’Antropocene ha valicato ampiamente i confini della geologia, riversandosi in altre discipline – dagli studi culturali alla filosofia – così come nei dibattiti pubblici e nell’attivismo ambientale. In questo volume il concetto di Antropocene viene (...) esaminato criticamente nelle sue principali implicazioni, affrontando temi quali il rapporto con la crisi ecologica, il femminismo, la tecnologia, i rifiuti, la democrazia, la relazione tra umano e non-umano, la sua periodizzazione, l’ecomodernismo, e altri ancora. (shrink)

Giorgio Colli (1917-1979) è stato uno dei maggiori intellettuali italiani del secolo scorso. Storico della filosofia, filologo ed editore, Colli ha ideato e curato, con Mazzino Montinari, la prima edizione critica mondiale delle opere di Friedrich Nietzsche; ha intrapreso un’innovativa edizione dei frammenti e delle testimonianze relativi a La sapienza greca (3 voll., 1977-1980); ha tradotto alcuni dei maggiori classici della filosofia, come l’Organon aristotelico e la Critica della ragion pura di Kant. Ma Colli è stato soprattutto un filosofo in (...) prima persona, che ha sviluppato un’originale e complessa riflessione storico-teoretica sulla natura della ragione e sul suo rapporto con la vita. Tale riflessione, che ha sempre orientato le altre attività, più note, di Colli, è culminata in uno dei testi più densi e impegnativi del Novecento, oggetto di una rinnovata attenzione negli ultimi anni: Filosofia dell’espressione (1969), a cui vanno affiancati i quaderni postumi de La ragione errabonda (1982). Il presente volume, composto di dieci saggi, ha origine da tre giornate di studio svoltesi all’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici (4-6 ottobre 2021), e interroga il pensiero di Colli nelle sue varie declinazioni: dall’interpretazione del pensiero antico al confronto con Nietzsche, dall’estetica alla metafisica e alla logica, dall’influenza del misticismo al rapporto con la filosofia italiana del Novecento. Ad emergere è il profilo di un pensatore che ha praticato e difeso una forma di filosofia come espressione della potenza ambigua, insieme costruttiva e distruttiva, della ragione umana – una filosofia che, mediante un’analisi vertiginosa della “distruttività” connaturata al logos, individua una ragione sana, purificata dagli eccessi “costruttivi” e riannodata alla vita quale techne del giusto bios. (shrink)

Giorgio Colli meditò sul pensiero di Leopardi non solo negli anni giovanili, ulteriormente stimolato dall’assidua frequentazione dei testi di Nietzsche, ma riservò al Recanatese parole di profonda stima filosofica anche nei decenni successivi, ad esempio in occasione della pubblicazione delle Operette morali all’interno della collana “Enciclopedia di autori classici” per l’editore Boringhieri, da lui ideata e diretta. Quello che, d’altra parte, sembra esser sfuggito all’acume ermeneutico del filosofo torinese è che Leopardi fece propria una concezione distruttiva della ragione umana, intesa (...) come arma di dissoluzione di credenze e saperi, che Colli certamente si trovava a condividere. Il presente saggio propone, dunque, di tematizzare il confronto tra le due diverse fisionomie di ragione distruttiva, indagando dapprima il significato, la genesi e gli usi di una siffatta concezione della ragione (§ 2), e in seguito analizzandone gli esiti e le possibili soluzioni (§ 3). Ciò che emergerà è un’inedita convergenza di tematiche e strategie argomentative, in parte derivate da comuni influenze storico-filosofiche, e anche una sostanziale continuità di prospettive sul ruolo dell’arte e, più in generale, dell’estetico. (shrink)

Alcune delle sfide più pressanti del mondo contemporaneo riguardano le generazioni future. La sostenibilità del sistema pensionistico e dei crescenti debiti pubblici, la denatalità, così come la crisi climatica, sono problemi che impatteranno principalmente sulle vite dei più giovani e di coloro che ancora non sono nati. Per secoli, la filosofia e le scienze umane si sono focalizzate sulle relazioni sincroniche, cioè tra individui che vivono nello stesso tempo. Oggi, i problemi transgenerazionali sono al centro del dibattito pubblico, e la (...) filosofia deve confrontarsi con “la sfida del domani”. Il volume offre una prospettiva interdisciplinare su questioni transgenerazionali di stretta attualità, per aiutare il lettore a orientarsi nella discussione. (shrink)

Among the cognitive processes involved in the construction of any kind of meaning, attention is fundamental in determining why, how and what we mean. Attention plays a primary role in the process of learning the meanings of words and more generally of acquiring knowledge; signification, discourse and persuasion; perceiving, representing and (re)framing reality; shaping the attitudes of the audience; conveying values and ideologies. Conversely, the meanings of words and more generally, of signs, convey the condensed instructions for the attentional operations (...) one has to perform in order to consciously experience what is expressed through and by them. Language, by addressing and guiding attention in specific ways, helps to select, amplify and support certain semantic components and concepts, and construct and communicate knowledge and values. This book is the first to present a comprehensive overview of the extant research on the relationships between attention and meaning. The contributions collected here offer an overview of the most prominent theories and models developed so far that aim to explain how attention determines meaning construction. This book will be of interest to students, researchers and teachers in the realm of linguistics, semantics, discourse studies, semiotics, psycholinguistics, computational linguistics, linguistic development, cognitive architectures of language, neuropsychology of linguistic function and social psychology. (shrink)