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Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory

arXiv:1911.08365 (cs)
[Submitted on 19 Nov 2019 (v1), last revised 30 Mar 2022 (this version, v2)]

Title:Approval-Based Apportionment

Authors:Markus Brill, Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Kai Wilker
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Abstract:In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by casting approval ballots. This approval-based apportionment setting generalizes traditional apportionment and is a natural restriction of approval-based multiwinner elections, where approval ballots range over individual candidates instead of parties. Using techniques from both apportionment and multiwinner elections, we identify rules that generalize the D'Hondt apportionment method and that satisfy strong axioms which are generalizations of properties commonly studied in the apportionment literature. In fact, the rules we discuss provide representation guarantees that are currently out of reach in the general setting of multiwinner elections: First, we show that core-stable committees are guaranteed to exist and can be found in polynomial time. Second, we demonstrate that extended justified representation is compatible with committee monotonicity (also known as house monotonicity).
Comments: 29 pages including appendix. Revised version of AAAI paper
Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:1911.08365 [cs.GT]
  (or arXiv:1911.08365v2 [cs.GT] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1911.08365
arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5553
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Submission history

From: Dominik Peters [view email]
[v1] Tue, 19 Nov 2019 15:50:57 UTC (42 KB)
[v2] Wed, 30 Mar 2022 14:58:56 UTC (34 KB)
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Markus Brill
Paul Gölz
Dominik Peters
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Kai Wilker
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