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Understanding Student Experiences with TLS Client Authentication
Authors:
Abubakar Sadiq Shittu,
Clay Shubert,
John Sadik,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
Mutual TLS (mTLS) provides strong, certificate-based authentication for both clients and servers, yet its adoption for user-facing websites remains rare. This paper presents a longitudinal study of mTLS usability, tracking 46 senior and graduate computer science students who configured client certificates from scratch, used them for routine authentication over a semester-long course, and managed c…
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Mutual TLS (mTLS) provides strong, certificate-based authentication for both clients and servers, yet its adoption for user-facing websites remains rare. This paper presents a longitudinal study of mTLS usability, tracking 46 senior and graduate computer science students who configured client certificates from scratch, used them for routine authentication over a semester-long course, and managed credentials across multiple devices. The results reveal that initial setup is a major bottleneck; while daily use was considered smooth, it did not improve long-term usability perceptions. Most concerningly, only 9% of participants fully understood the security implications of certificate-based authentication. We conclude that in a realistic, tooling-heavy deployment utilizing OpenSSL, a custom CA, and a 3072-bit minimum key requirement, even highly technical students struggled significantly. We argue this provides empirical evidence that today mTLS user experience is fundamentally misaligned with non-PKI specialists, and it is difficult to see a path toward mainstream adoption without substantial platform-level changes.
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Submitted 30 April, 2026; v1 submitted 15 April, 2026;
originally announced April 2026.
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Analysis of Commit Signing on Github
Authors:
Abubakar Sadiq Shittu,
John Sadik,
Farzin Gholamrezae,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
Securing the open-source software supply chain requires verifying the provenance of every code contribution. While end-to-end (E2E) cryptographic commit signing is widely promoted to achieve this, little is known about how developers actually use it at scale. We fill this gap by analyzing 2,737,649 GitHub accounts, identifying 71,694 active contributors, and examining 16,112,439 commits across 874…
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Securing the open-source software supply chain requires verifying the provenance of every code contribution. While end-to-end (E2E) cryptographic commit signing is widely promoted to achieve this, little is known about how developers actually use it at scale. We fill this gap by analyzing 2,737,649 GitHub accounts, identifying 71,694 active contributors, and examining 16,112,439 commits across 874,198 repositories to characterize their commit-signing and key-management practices throughout GitHub's history. We demonstrate that the vast majority of signed activity is generated automatically by GitHub's web interface rather than by individual developers. Genuine E2E commit signing is exceptionally rare, and the few developers who adopt it practice it erratically, frequently abandoning it over time or leaving expired keys unrevoked. Ultimately, we show that manual key management creates a false sense of security across the open-source community, and we outline structural platform interventions to resolve this failure.
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Submitted 23 July, 2026; v1 submitted 15 April, 2026;
originally announced April 2026.
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Passwords and FIDO2 Are Meant To Be Secret: A Practical Secure Authentication Channel for Web Browsers
Authors:
Anuj Gautam,
Tarun Yadav,
Garrett Smith,
Kent Seamons,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
Password managers provide significant security benefits to users. However, malicious client-side scripts and browser extensions can steal passwords after the manager has autofilled them into the web page. In this paper, we extend prior work by Stock and Johns, showing how password autofill can be hardened to prevent these local attacks. We implement our design in the Firefox browser and conduct ex…
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Password managers provide significant security benefits to users. However, malicious client-side scripts and browser extensions can steal passwords after the manager has autofilled them into the web page. In this paper, we extend prior work by Stock and Johns, showing how password autofill can be hardened to prevent these local attacks. We implement our design in the Firefox browser and conduct experiments demonstrating that our defense successfully protects passwords from XSS attacks and malicious extensions. We also show that our implementation is compatible with 97% of the Alexa top 1000 websites. Next, we generalize our design, creating a second defense that prevents recently discovered local attacks against the FIDO2 protocols. We implement this second defense into Firefox, demonstrating that it protects the FIDO2 protocol against XSS attacks and malicious extensions. This defense is compatible with all websites, though it does require a small change (2-3 lines) to web servers implementing FIDO2.
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Submitted 15 October, 2025; v1 submitted 2 September, 2025;
originally announced September 2025.
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Exploring Crowdworkers' Perceptions, Current Practices, and Desired Practices Regarding Using Non-Workstation Devices for Crowdwork
Authors:
Senjuti Dutta,
Scott Ruoti,
Rhema Linder,
Alex C. Williams,
Anastasia Kuzminykh
Abstract:
Despite a plethora of research dedicated to designing HITs for non-workstations, there is a lack of research looking specifically into workers' perceptions of the suitability of these devices for managing and completing work. In this work, we fill this research gap by conducting an online survey of 148 workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk to explore 1. how crowdworkers currently use their non-worksta…
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Despite a plethora of research dedicated to designing HITs for non-workstations, there is a lack of research looking specifically into workers' perceptions of the suitability of these devices for managing and completing work. In this work, we fill this research gap by conducting an online survey of 148 workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk to explore 1. how crowdworkers currently use their non-workstation devices to complete and manage crowdwork, 2. what challenges they face using those devices, and 3. to what extent they wish they could use those devices if their concerns were addressed. Our results show that workers unanimously favor using a desktop to complete and manage crowdwork. While workers occasionally use smartphones or tablets, they find their suitability marginal at best and have little interest in smart speakers and smartwatches, viewing them as unsuitable for crowdwork. When investigating the reason for these views, we find that the key issue is that non workstation devices lack the tooling necessary to automatically find and accept HITs, tooling that workers view as essential in their efforts to compete with bots in accepting high paying work. To address this problem, we propose a new paradigm for finding, accepting, and completing crowdwork that puts crowdworkers on equal footing with bots in these tasks. We also describe future research directions for tailoring HITs to non workstation devices and definitely answering whether smart speakers and smartwatches have a place in crowdwork.
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Submitted 6 September, 2024;
originally announced September 2024.
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Unveiling the Inter-Related Preferences of Crowdworkers: Implications for Personalized and Flexible Platform Design
Authors:
Senjuti Dutta,
Rhema Linder,
Alex C. Williams,
Anastasia Kuzminykh,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
Crowdsourcing platforms have traditionally been designed with a focus on workstation interfaces, restricting the flexibility that crowdworkers need. Recognizing this limitation and the need for more adaptable platforms, prior research has highlighted the diverse work processes of crowdworkers, influenced by factors such as device type and work stage. However, these variables have largely been stud…
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Crowdsourcing platforms have traditionally been designed with a focus on workstation interfaces, restricting the flexibility that crowdworkers need. Recognizing this limitation and the need for more adaptable platforms, prior research has highlighted the diverse work processes of crowdworkers, influenced by factors such as device type and work stage. However, these variables have largely been studied in isolation. Our study is the first to explore the interconnected variabilities among these factors within the crowdwork community. Through a survey involving 150 Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdworkers, we uncovered three distinct groups characterized by their interrelated variabilities in key work aspects. The largest group exhibits a reliance on traditional devices, showing limited interest in integrating smartphones and tablets into their work routines. The second-largest group also primarily uses traditional devices but expresses a desire for supportive tools and scripts that enhance productivity across all devices, particularly smartphones and tablets. The smallest group actively uses and strongly prefers non-workstation devices, especially smartphones and tablets, for their crowdworking activities. We translate our findings into design insights for platform developers, discussing the implications for creating more personalized, flexible, and efficient crowdsourcing environments. Additionally, we highlight the unique work practices of these crowdworker clusters, offering a contrast to those of more traditional and established worker groups.
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Submitted 6 September, 2024;
originally announced September 2024.
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A Large-Scale Survey of Password Entry Practices on Non-Desktop Devices
Authors:
John Sadik,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
Password managers encourage users to generate passwords to improve their security. However, research has shown that users avoid generating passwords, often giving the rationale that it is difficult to enter generated passwords on devices without a password manager. In this paper, we conduct a survey ($n=999$) of individuals from the US, UK, and Europe, exploring the range of devices on which they…
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Password managers encourage users to generate passwords to improve their security. However, research has shown that users avoid generating passwords, often giving the rationale that it is difficult to enter generated passwords on devices without a password manager. In this paper, we conduct a survey ($n=999$) of individuals from the US, UK, and Europe, exploring the range of devices on which they enter passwords and the challenges associated with password entry on those devices. We find that password entry on devices without password managers is a common occurrence and comes with significant usability challenges. These usability challenges lead users to weaken their passwords to increase the ease of entry. We conclude this paper with a discussion of how future research could address these challenges and encourage users to adopt generated passwords.
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Submitted 4 September, 2024;
originally announced September 2024.
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Passwords Are Meant to Be Secret: A Practical Secure Password Entry Channel for Web Browsers
Authors:
Anuj Gautam,
Tarun Kumar Yadav,
Kent Seamons,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
Password-based authentication faces various security and usability issues. Password managers help alleviate some of these issues by enabling users to manage their passwords effectively. However, malicious client-side scripts and browser extensions can steal passwords after they have been autofilled by the manager into the web page. In this paper, we explore what role the password manager can take…
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Password-based authentication faces various security and usability issues. Password managers help alleviate some of these issues by enabling users to manage their passwords effectively. However, malicious client-side scripts and browser extensions can steal passwords after they have been autofilled by the manager into the web page. In this paper, we explore what role the password manager can take in preventing the theft of autofilled credentials without requiring a change to user behavior. To this end, we identify a threat model for password exfiltration and then use this threat model to explore the design space for secure password entry implemented using a password manager. We identify five potential designs that address this issue, each with varying security and deployability tradeoffs. Our analysis shows the design that best balances security and usability is for the manager to autofill a fake password and then rely on the browser to replace the fake password with the actual password immediately before the web request is handed over to the operating system to be transmitted over the network. This removes the ability for malicious client-side scripts or browser extensions to access and exfiltrate the real password. We implement our design in the Firefox browser and conduct experiments, which show that it successfully thwarts malicious scripts and extensions on 97\% of the Alexa top 1000 websites, while also maintaining the capability to revert to default behavior on the remaining websites, avoiding functionality regressions. Most importantly, this design is transparent to users, requiring no change to user behavior.
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Submitted 8 February, 2024;
originally announced February 2024.
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Security Advice for Parents and Children About Content Filtering and Circumvention as Found on YouTube and TikTok
Authors:
Ran Elgedawy,
John Sadik,
Anuj Gautam,
Trinity Bissahoyo,
Christopher Childress,
Jacob Leonard,
Clay Shubert,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
In today's digital age, concerns about online security and privacy have become paramount. However, addressing these issues can be difficult, especially within the context of family relationships, wherein parents and children may have conflicting interests. In this environment, parents and children may turn to online security advice to determine how to proceed. In this paper, we examine the advice…
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In today's digital age, concerns about online security and privacy have become paramount. However, addressing these issues can be difficult, especially within the context of family relationships, wherein parents and children may have conflicting interests. In this environment, parents and children may turn to online security advice to determine how to proceed. In this paper, we examine the advice available to parents and children regarding content filtering and circumvention as found on YouTube and TikTok. In an analysis of 839 videos returned from queries on these topics, we found that half (n=399) provide relevant advice. Our results show that of these videos, roughly three-quarters are accurate, with the remaining one-fourth containing factually incorrect advice. We find that videos targeting children are both more likely to be incorrect and actionable than videos targeting parents, leaving children at increased risk of taking harmful action. Moreover, we find that while advice videos targeting parents will occasionally discuss the ethics of content filtering and device monitoring (including recommendations to respect children's autonomy) no such discussion of the ethics or risks of circumventing content filtering is given to children, leaving them unaware of any risks that may be involved with doing so. Ultimately, our research indicates that video-based social media sites are already effective sources of security advice propagation and that the public would benefit from security researchers and practitioners engaging more with these platforms, both for the creation of content and of tools designed to help with more effective filtering.
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Submitted 5 February, 2024;
originally announced February 2024.
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Ocassionally Secure: A Comparative Analysis of Code Generation Assistants
Authors:
Ran Elgedawy,
Porter Dosch,
John Sadik,
Senjuti Dutta,
Anuj Gautam,
Konstantinos Georgiou,
Farzin Gholamrezae,
Fujiao Ji,
Kyungchan Lim,
Qian Liu,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
$ $Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly utilized in various applications, with code generations being a notable example. While previous research has shown that LLMs have the capability to generate both secure and insecure code, the literature does not take into account what factors help generate secure and effective code. Therefore in this paper we focus on identifying and understan…
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$ $Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly utilized in various applications, with code generations being a notable example. While previous research has shown that LLMs have the capability to generate both secure and insecure code, the literature does not take into account what factors help generate secure and effective code. Therefore in this paper we focus on identifying and understanding the conditions and contexts in which LLMs can be effectively and safely deployed in real-world scenarios to generate quality code. We conducted a comparative analysis of four advanced LLMs--GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using ChatGPT and Bard and Gemini from Google--using 9 separate tasks to assess each model's code generation capabilities. We contextualized our study to represent the typical use cases of a real-life developer employing LLMs for everyday tasks as work. Additionally, we place an emphasis on security awareness which is represented through the use of two distinct versions of our developer persona. In total, we collected 61 code outputs and analyzed them across several aspects: functionality, security, performance, complexity, and reliability. These insights are crucial for understanding the models' capabilities and limitations, guiding future development and practical applications in the field of automated code generation.
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Submitted 29 September, 2025; v1 submitted 1 February, 2024;
originally announced February 2024.
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The Emperor's New Autofill Framework: A Security Analysis of Autofill on iOS and Android
Authors:
Sean Oesch,
Anuj Gautam,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
Password managers help users more effectively manage their passwords, encouraging them to adopt stronger passwords across their many accounts. In contrast to desktop systems where password managers receive no system-level support, mobile operating systems provide autofill frameworks designed to integrate with password managers to provide secure and usable autofill for browsers and other apps insta…
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Password managers help users more effectively manage their passwords, encouraging them to adopt stronger passwords across their many accounts. In contrast to desktop systems where password managers receive no system-level support, mobile operating systems provide autofill frameworks designed to integrate with password managers to provide secure and usable autofill for browsers and other apps installed on mobile devices. In this paper, we evaluate mobile autofill frameworks on iOS and Android, examining whether they achieve substantive benefits over the ad-hoc desktop environment or become a problematic single point of failure. Our results find that while the frameworks address several common issues, they also enforce insecure behavior and fail to provide password managers sufficient information to override the frameworks' insecure behavior, resulting in mobile managers being less secure than their desktop counterparts overall. We also demonstrate how these frameworks act as a confused deputy in manager-assisted credential phishing attacks. Our results demonstrate the need for significant improvements to mobile autofill frameworks. We conclude the paper with recommendations for the design and implementation of secure autofill frameworks.
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Submitted 28 September, 2021; v1 submitted 20 April, 2021;
originally announced April 2021.
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SoK: Blockchain Technology and Its Potential Use Cases
Authors:
Scott Ruoti,
Ben Kaiser,
Arkady Yerukhimovich,
Jeremy Clark,
Robert Cunningham
Abstract:
Bitcoin's success has led to significant interest in its underlying components, particularly Blockchain technology. Over 10 years after Bitcoin's initial release, the community still suffers from a lack of clarity regarding what properties defines Blockchain technology, its relationship to similar technologies, and which of its proposed use-cases are tenable and which are little more than hype. In…
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Bitcoin's success has led to significant interest in its underlying components, particularly Blockchain technology. Over 10 years after Bitcoin's initial release, the community still suffers from a lack of clarity regarding what properties defines Blockchain technology, its relationship to similar technologies, and which of its proposed use-cases are tenable and which are little more than hype. In this paper we answer four common questions regarding Blockchain technology: (1) what exactly is Blockchain technology, (2) what capabilities does it provide, and (3) what are good applications for Blockchain technology, and (4) how does it relate to other approache distributed technologies (e.g., distributed databases). We accomplish this goal by using grounded theory (a structured approach to gathering and analyzing qualitative data) to thoroughly analyze a large corpus of literature on Blockchain technology. This method enables us to answer the above questions while limiting researcher bias, separating thought leadership from peddled hype and identifying open research questions related to Blockchain technology. The audience for this paper is broad as it aims to help researchers in a variety of areas come to a better understanding of Blockchain technology and identify whether it may be of use in their own research.
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Submitted 26 September, 2019;
originally announced September 2019.
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That Was Then, This Is Now: A Security Evaluation of Password Generation, Storage, and Autofill in Thirteen Password Managers
Authors:
Sean Oesch,
Scott Ruoti
Abstract:
Password managers have the potential to help users more effectively manage their passwords and address many of the concerns surrounding password-based authentication, however prior research has identified significant vulnerabilities in existing password managers. Since that time, five years has passed, leaving it unclear whether password managers remain vulnerable or whether they are now ready for…
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Password managers have the potential to help users more effectively manage their passwords and address many of the concerns surrounding password-based authentication, however prior research has identified significant vulnerabilities in existing password managers. Since that time, five years has passed, leaving it unclear whether password managers remain vulnerable or whether they are now ready for broad adoption. To answer this question, we evaluate thirteen popular password managers and consider all three stages of the password manager lifecycle--password generation, storage, and autofill. Our evaluation is the first analysis of password generation in password managers, finding several non-random character distributions and identifying instances where generated passwords were vulnerable to online and offline guessing attacks. For password storage and autofill, we replicate past evaluations, demonstrating that while password managers have improved in the half-decade since those prior evaluations, there are still significant issues, particularly with browser-based password managers; these problems include unencrypted metadata, unsafe defaults, and vulnerabilities to clickjacking attacks. Based on our results, we identify password managers to avoid, provide recommendations on how to improve existing password managers, and identify areas of future research.
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Submitted 10 December, 2019; v1 submitted 8 August, 2019;
originally announced August 2019.
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SoK: Securing Email -- A Stakeholder-Based Analysis (Extended Version)
Authors:
Jeremy Clark,
P. C. van Oorschot,
Scott Ruoti,
Kent Seamons,
Daniel Zappala
Abstract:
While email is the most ubiquitous and interoperable form of online communication today, it was not conceived with strong security guarantees, and the ensuing security enhancements are, by contrast, lacking in both ubiquity and interoperability. This situation motivates our research. We begin by identifying a variety of stakeholders who have an interest in the current email system and in efforts t…
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While email is the most ubiquitous and interoperable form of online communication today, it was not conceived with strong security guarantees, and the ensuing security enhancements are, by contrast, lacking in both ubiquity and interoperability. This situation motivates our research. We begin by identifying a variety of stakeholders who have an interest in the current email system and in efforts to provide secure solutions. We then use the tussle among stakeholders to explain the evolution of fragmented secure email solutions undertaken by industry, academia, and independent developers. We also evaluate the building blocks of secure email -- cryptographic primitives, key management schemes, and system designs -- to identify their support for stakeholder properties. From our analysis, we conclude that a one-size-fits-all solution is unlikely. Furthermore, we highlight that vulnerable users are not well served by current solutions, account for the failure of PGP, and argue that secure messaging, while complementary, is not a fully substitutable technology.
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Submitted 22 October, 2021; v1 submitted 20 April, 2018;
originally announced April 2018.
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TrustBase: An Architecture to Repair and Strengthen Certificate-based Authentication
Authors:
Mark O'Neill,
Scott Heidbrink,
Jordan Whitehead,
Scott Ruoti,
Dan Bunker,
Kent Seamons,
Daniel Zappala
Abstract:
We describe TrustBase, an architecture that provides certificate-based authentication as an operating system service. TrustBase enforces best practices for certificate validation for all applications and transparently enables existing applications to be strengthened against failures of the CA system. The TrustBase system allows simple deployment of authentication systems that harden the CA system.…
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We describe TrustBase, an architecture that provides certificate-based authentication as an operating system service. TrustBase enforces best practices for certificate validation for all applications and transparently enables existing applications to be strengthened against failures of the CA system. The TrustBase system allows simple deployment of authentication systems that harden the CA system. This enables system administrators, for example, to require certificate revocation checks on all TLS connections, or require STARTTLS for email servers that support it. TrustBase is the first system that is able to secure all TLS traffic, using an approach compatible with all operating systems. We design and evaluate a prototype implementation of TrustBase on Linux, evaluate its security, and demonstrate that it has negligible overhead and universal compatibility with applications. To demonstrate the utility of TrustBase, we have developed six authentication services that strengthen certificate validation for all applications.
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Submitted 26 October, 2016;
originally announced October 2016.
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MessageGuard: A Browser-based Platform for Usable, Content-Based Encryption Research
Authors:
Scott Ruoti,
Jeff Andersen,
Tyler Monson,
Daniel Zappala,
Kent Seamons
Abstract:
This paper describes MessageGuard, a browser-based platform for research into usable content-based encryption. MessageGuard is designed to enable collaboration between security and usability researchers on long-standing research questions in this area. It significantly simplifies the effort required to work in this space and provides a place for research results to be shared, replicated, and compa…
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This paper describes MessageGuard, a browser-based platform for research into usable content-based encryption. MessageGuard is designed to enable collaboration between security and usability researchers on long-standing research questions in this area. It significantly simplifies the effort required to work in this space and provides a place for research results to be shared, replicated, and compared with minimal confounding factors. MessageGuard provides ubiquitous encryption and secure cryptographic operations, enabling research on any existing web application, with realistic usability studies on a secure platform. We validate MessageGuard's compatibility and performance, and we illustrate its utility with case studies for Gmail and Facebook Chat.
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Submitted 16 May, 2016; v1 submitted 29 October, 2015;
originally announced October 2015.
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Why Johnny Still, Still Can't Encrypt: Evaluating the Usability of a Modern PGP Client
Authors:
Scott Ruoti,
Jeff Andersen,
Daniel Zappala,
Kent Seamons
Abstract:
This paper presents the results of a laboratory study involving Mailvelope, a modern PGP client that integrates tightly with existing webmail providers. In our study, we brought in pairs of participants and had them attempt to use Mailvelope to communicate with each other. Our results shown that more than a decade and a half after \textit{Why Johnny Can't Encrypt}, modern PGP tools are still unusa…
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This paper presents the results of a laboratory study involving Mailvelope, a modern PGP client that integrates tightly with existing webmail providers. In our study, we brought in pairs of participants and had them attempt to use Mailvelope to communicate with each other. Our results shown that more than a decade and a half after \textit{Why Johnny Can't Encrypt}, modern PGP tools are still unusable for the masses. We finish with a discussion of pain points encountered using Mailvelope, and discuss what might be done to address them in future PGP systems.
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Submitted 13 January, 2016; v1 submitted 28 October, 2015;
originally announced October 2015.
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"We're on the Same Page": A Usability Study of Secure Email Using Pairs of Novice Users
Authors:
Scott Ruoti,
Jeff Andersen,
Scott Heidbrink,
Mark O'Neil,
Elham Vaziripour,
Justin Wu,
Daniel Zappala,
Kent Seamons
Abstract:
Secure email is increasingly being touted as usable by novice users, with a push for adoption based on recent concerns about government surveillance. To determine whether secure email is for grassroots adoption, we employ a laboratory user study that recruits pairs of novice to install and use several of the latest systems to exchange secure messages. We present quantitative and qualitative result…
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Secure email is increasingly being touted as usable by novice users, with a push for adoption based on recent concerns about government surveillance. To determine whether secure email is for grassroots adoption, we employ a laboratory user study that recruits pairs of novice to install and use several of the latest systems to exchange secure messages. We present quantitative and qualitative results from 25 pairs of novice users as they use Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. Participants report being more at ease with this type of study and better able to cope with mistakes since both participants are "on the same page". We find that users prefer integrated solutions over depot-based solutions, and that tutorials are important in helping first-time users. Hiding the details of how a secure email system provides security can lead to a lack of trust in the system. Participants expressed a desire to use secure email, but few wanted to use it regularly and most were unsure of when they might use it.
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Submitted 11 January, 2016; v1 submitted 28 October, 2015;
originally announced October 2015.
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Private Webmail 2.0: Simple and Easy-to-Use Secure Email
Authors:
Scott Ruoti,
Jeff Andersen,
Travis Hendershot,
Daniel Zappala,
Kent Seamons
Abstract:
Private Webmail 2.0 (Pwm 2.0) improves upon the current state of the art by increasing the usability and practical security of secure email for ordinary users. More users are able to send and receive encrypted emails without mistakenly revealing sensitive information. In this paper we describe user interface traits that positively affect the usability and security of Pwm 2.0: (1) an artificial del…
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Private Webmail 2.0 (Pwm 2.0) improves upon the current state of the art by increasing the usability and practical security of secure email for ordinary users. More users are able to send and receive encrypted emails without mistakenly revealing sensitive information. In this paper we describe user interface traits that positively affect the usability and security of Pwm 2.0: (1) an artificial delay to encryption that enhances user confidence in Pwm 2.0 while simultaneously instructing users on who can read their encrypted messages; (2) a modified composition interface that helps protect users from mistakenly sending sensitive information in the clear; (3) an annotated secure email composition interface that instructs users on how to correctly use secure email; and (4) inline, context-sensitive tutorials, which improved view rates for tutorials from less than 10% in earlier systems to over 90% for Pwm 2.0. In a user study involving 51 participants we validate these interface modifications, and also show that the use of manual encryption has no effect on usability or security.
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Submitted 8 August, 2016; v1 submitted 28 October, 2015;
originally announced October 2015.
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User Attitudes Toward the Inspection of Encrypted Traffic
Authors:
Scott Ruoti,
Mark O'Neil,
Daniel Zappala,
Kent Seamons
Abstract:
This paper reports the results of a survey of 1,976 individuals regarding their opinions on TLS inspection, a controversial technique that can be used for both benevolent and malicious purposes. Responses indicate that participants hold nuanced opinions on security and privacy trade-offs, with most recognizing legitimate uses for the practice, but also concerned about threats from hackers or gover…
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This paper reports the results of a survey of 1,976 individuals regarding their opinions on TLS inspection, a controversial technique that can be used for both benevolent and malicious purposes. Responses indicate that participants hold nuanced opinions on security and privacy trade-offs, with most recognizing legitimate uses for the practice, but also concerned about threats from hackers or government surveillance. There is strong support for notification and consent when a system is intercepting their encrypted traffic, although this support varies depending on the situation. A significant concern about malicious uses of TLS inspection is identity theft, and many would react negatively and some would change their behavior if they discovered inspection occurring without their knowledge. We also find that there are a small but significant number of participants who are jaded by the current state of affairs and have no expectation of privacy.
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Submitted 10 June, 2016; v1 submitted 16 October, 2015;
originally announced October 2015.
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TLS Proxies: Friend or Foe?
Authors:
Mark O'Neill,
Scott Ruoti,
Kent Seamons,
Daniel Zappala
Abstract:
The use of TLS proxies to intercept encrypted traffic is controversial since the same mechanism can be used for both benevolent purposes, such as protecting against malware, and for malicious purposes, such as identity theft or warrantless government surveillance. To understand the prevalence and uses of these proxies, we build a TLS proxy measurement tool and deploy it via Google AdWords campaign…
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The use of TLS proxies to intercept encrypted traffic is controversial since the same mechanism can be used for both benevolent purposes, such as protecting against malware, and for malicious purposes, such as identity theft or warrantless government surveillance. To understand the prevalence and uses of these proxies, we build a TLS proxy measurement tool and deploy it via Google AdWords campaigns. We generate 15.2 million certificate tests across two large-scale measurement studies. We find that 1 in 250 TLS connections are TLS-proxied. The majority of these proxies appear to be benevolent, however we identify over 3,600 cases where eight malware products are using this technology nefariously. We also find numerous instances of negligent, duplicitous, and suspicious behavior, some of which degrade security for users without their knowledge. Distinguishing these types of practices is challenging in practice, indicating a need for transparency and user awareness.
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Submitted 28 May, 2015; v1 submitted 26 July, 2014;
originally announced July 2014.