Showing 1–18 of 18 results for author: Happe, A

ATLAS: Discovering Agent Strategies through LLM-Guided Abstraction and Automata Learning

Authors: Ignacio D. Lopez-Miguel, Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito, Ezio Bartocci, Bettina Könighofer, Martin Tappler

Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly used for complex tasks such as software testing and cybersecurity assessment. While these agents demonstrate impressive capabilities, their behavior is difficult to understand, explain, and analyze. Existing evaluations focus mainly on task success and execution traces, offering limited insight into the strategies employed by the agent. We p… ▽ More Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly used for complex tasks such as software testing and cybersecurity assessment. While these agents demonstrate impressive capabilities, their behavior is difficult to understand, explain, and analyze. Existing evaluations focus mainly on task success and execution traces, offering limited insight into the strategies employed by the agent. We present ATLAS (Automata Learning for Agent Trajectory Analysis and Strategy Discovery), an approach for recovering interpretable behavioral models from agent trajectories. ATLAS combines trace abstraction with automata learning to infer finite-state models that capture observed agent-environment interaction strategies. These models provide human-interpretable insights and support automated analyses of recurring behaviors, decision points, successful task-completion paths, and failure loops. As a proof of concept, we apply ATLAS to trajectories generated by an LLM-based penetration-testing agent. The resulting models expose high-level behavioral strategies for exploiting vulnerable machines that are difficult to identify from raw execution traces alone. We discuss how learned behavioral models can support explainability, model-guided exploration, auditing, and analysis of agentic systems. We further demonstrate symbolic model-based knowledge transfer from powerful frontier models to compact language models. In addition, we show how model transformations can derive concise explanations of agent behavior in a penetration-testing case study comprising 12 vulnerable machines. ATLAS highlights a new opportunity for model-driven engineering: transforming agent trajectories into explicit behavioral models that enable systematic understanding and analysis of otherwise opaque AI agents. △ Less

Submitted 14 August, 2026; originally announced August 2026.

Comments: 7 pages, accepted for publication at ACM/IEEE MODELS 2026

The Ethics of Autonomous AI Agents for Offensive Security

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito, Jasmin Wachter

Abstract: LLM-driven autonomous agents are reshaping offensive security. Unlike traditional penetration-testing tooling - deterministic, narrowly scoped, and operated by trained practitioners - agentic security tools exhibit indeterminacy along three independent dimensions. First, their actions are drawn from a non-deterministic policy whose outputs resist both ex-ante and ex-post explanation. This complica… ▽ More LLM-driven autonomous agents are reshaping offensive security. Unlike traditional penetration-testing tooling - deterministic, narrowly scoped, and operated by trained practitioners - agentic security tools exhibit indeterminacy along three independent dimensions. First, their actions are drawn from a non-deterministic policy whose outputs resist both ex-ante and ex-post explanation. This complicates incident attribution and pre-deployment safety reviews. Second, their impact is open-ended due to their non-deterministic actions, agency of utilized models, and opaque LLM supply-chains. Third, their user population is indeterminate in both size and required skill: the operating skill floor for using or developing offensive capabilities has dropped sharply. These three properties are linked thematically, but are not derivable from one another. Combined with the structural cost asymmetry between offense and defense, they enable the industrialization of offensive capability. The net short-term effect favors attackers, even if the same technology may, in the long run, democratize access to defensive practice. Existing dual-use cybersecurity and AI-ethics frameworks struggle to address this combination. Our work analyzes how moral attribution becomes diffuse between users, tool-makers, and third parties when employing autonomous AI agents for offensive security. We also examine the stakeholder impact of this technology and provide stratified recommendations. △ Less

Submitted 7 August, 2026; v1 submitted 22 July, 2026; originally announced July 2026.

Comments: accepted at FAIEMA 2026

Cochise: A Reference Harness for Autonomous Penetration Testing

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: Recent work on LLM-driven autonomous penetration testing reports promising results, but existing systems often bundle architectural, prompting, and tool-integration choices together. This makes it difficult to determine what is gained over a simple agent and harness. We present Cochise, a 630 LOC Python reference implementation for autonomous penetration-testing experiments. Cochise connects to a… ▽ More Recent work on LLM-driven autonomous penetration testing reports promising results, but existing systems often bundle architectural, prompting, and tool-integration choices together. This makes it difficult to determine what is gained over a simple agent and harness. We present Cochise, a 630 LOC Python reference implementation for autonomous penetration-testing experiments. Cochise connects to a Linux execution host over SSH and supports attacking controlled target environments reachable from that jump host. The prototype implements a Planner--Executor architecture in which long-term state is maintained by the planner, while a ReAct-style executor issues commands over SSH and self-corrects based on command outputs. The scenario prompt can be adapted to different target environments. We evaluate the harness against a live third-party testbed, Game of Active Directory (GOAD). Cochise is intended not as a state-of-the-art penetration-testing agent, but as a reusable experimental infrastructure for comparing models, agent architectures, and penetration-testing traces. Alongside the prototype, we release replay and analysis tools: (i) cochise-replay for offline visualization of captured runs, (ii) cochise-analyze-logs and cochise-analyze-graphs for cost, token, duration, and compromise analysis, and (iii) a corpus of JSON trajectory logs from GOAD runs, so that researchers can study agent behavior without provisioning the 48--64 GB RAM / 190 GB storage testbed themselves. Tool demo video available at https://youtu.be/2mQimB1ufyI. △ Less

Submitted 3 August, 2026; v1 submitted 12 May, 2026; originally announced May 2026.

Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents

Authors: Benjamin Probst, Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: Cloud-based Large Language Models (LLMs) can perform autonomous penetration-testing sub-tasks such as Linux privilege escalation, but raise security, privacy, and sovereignty concerns. Locally hosted open-weight models avoid these issues, yet prior work reports that small open-weight models succeed on only 8-16% of standardized privilege-escalation tasks, far below frontier cloud models. This pape… ▽ More Cloud-based Large Language Models (LLMs) can perform autonomous penetration-testing sub-tasks such as Linux privilege escalation, but raise security, privacy, and sovereignty concerns. Locally hosted open-weight models avoid these issues, yet prior work reports that small open-weight models succeed on only 8-16% of standardized privilege-escalation tasks, far below frontier cloud models. This paper is an empirical study of why small models fail at this task and which engineering techniques close the gap. From execution traces we distill six recurring failure modes, map each to an established enhancement technique, and evaluate five (chain-of-thought prompting, retrieval-augmented generation, structured prompting, history compression, and reflective analysis) as reproducible extensions to the open-source hackingBuddyGPT framework. Under a single shared harness and matched conditions, the set of techniques we evaluate raise two SLMs (Llama3.1 8B, Qwen2.5 7B) from 8% to 67% with guidance, matching guided GPT-4o. A larger open-weight reference model (Llama3.1 70B) reaches 83%. A full-factorial ablation shows that reflection-based techniques contribute most and reveals vulnerability discovery, not exploitation, as the main constraint for local models. We report these as transferable lessons for building reliable local offensive agents as well as to inform defenders. △ Less

Submitted 12 August, 2026; v1 submitted 29 April, 2026; originally announced April 2026.

Comments: Accepted at RAISE workshop (https://raise-workshop.github.io/)

Towards Reliable Local Security Agents: Verifiable Post-Training for Linux Privilege Escalation

Authors: Philipp Normann, Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito, Daniel Arp

Abstract: LLM agents are becoming increasingly important in the security domain, but leading systems are often closed-source, cloud-based, hard to reproduce or use with sensitive code. This creates a need for small, local models that can perform security tasks under strict resource constraints, though effective methods for developing them remain unexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by proposing a… ▽ More LLM agents are becoming increasingly important in the security domain, but leading systems are often closed-source, cloud-based, hard to reproduce or use with sensitive code. This creates a need for small, local models that can perform security tasks under strict resource constraints, though effective methods for developing them remain unexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by proposing a two-stage post-training recipe that turns a small local language model into a security agent. To this end, we focus on Linux privilege escalation as a representative setting to systematically study the training of local models, as the task is both automatically verifiable and requires multi-step interactive reasoning. Using an experimental setup that mitigates data leakage, we post-train a small 4B model in two stages: supervised fine-tuning on traces from procedural privilege-escalation environments, followed by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. On a held-out benchmark of 12 Linux privilege-escalation scenarios, supervised fine-tuning doubles the baseline success rate under a tight budget of 20 interaction rounds, and subsequent reinforcement learning training improves our model, PrivEsc-LLM 4B, to 93.3% success, behind only Claude Opus 4.7 at this budget. At the same time, the expected inference cost per successful escalation decreases by more than 80x. Our findings not only show that small local models can be adapted to complex security tasks, but also document the challenges involved, offering guidance for transferring this recipe to other settings. △ Less

Submitted 3 July, 2026; v1 submitted 18 March, 2026; originally announced March 2026.

Can LLMs Hack Enterprise Networks? -- Replicated Computational Results (RCR) Report

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: This is the Replicated Computational Results (RCR) Report for the paper ``Can LLMs Hack Enterprise Networks?" The paper empirically investigates the efficacy and effectiveness of different LLMs for penetration-testing enterprise networks, i.e., Microsoft Active Directory Assumed-Breach Simulations. This RCR report describes the artifacts used in the paper, how to create an evaluation setup, and hi… ▽ More This is the Replicated Computational Results (RCR) Report for the paper ``Can LLMs Hack Enterprise Networks?" The paper empirically investigates the efficacy and effectiveness of different LLMs for penetration-testing enterprise networks, i.e., Microsoft Active Directory Assumed-Breach Simulations. This RCR report describes the artifacts used in the paper, how to create an evaluation setup, and highlights the analysis scripts provided within our prototype. △ Less

Submitted 2 March, 2026; originally announced March 2026.

Adversarial Bug Reports as a Security Risk in Language Model-Based Automated Program Repair

Authors: Piotr Przymus, Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) - based Automated Program Repair (APR) systems are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows, offering automated patches in response to natural language bug reports. However, this reliance on untrusted user input introduces a novel and underexplored attack surface. In this paper, we investigate the security risks posed by adversarial bug reports… ▽ More Large Language Model (LLM) - based Automated Program Repair (APR) systems are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows, offering automated patches in response to natural language bug reports. However, this reliance on untrusted user input introduces a novel and underexplored attack surface. In this paper, we investigate the security risks posed by adversarial bug reports -- realistic-looking issue submissions crafted to mislead APR systems into producing insecure or harmful code changes. We develop a comprehensive threat model and conduct an empirical study to evaluate the vulnerability of APR systems to such attacks. Our demonstration comprises 51 adversarial bug reports generated across a spectrum of strategies, ranging from manual curation to fully automated pipelines. We test these against a leading LLM-based APR system and assess both pre-repair defenses (e.g., LlamaGuard variants, PromptGuard variants, Granite-Guardian, and custom LLM filters) and post-repair detectors (GitHub Copilot, CodeQL). Our findings show that current defenses are insufficient: 90% of crafted bug reports triggered attacker-aligned patches. The best pre-repair filter blocked only 47%, while post-repair analysis -- often requiring human oversight -- was effective in just 58% of cases. To support scalable security testing, we introduce a prototype framework for automating the generation of adversarial bug reports. Our analysis exposes a structural asymmetry: generating adversarial inputs is inexpensive, while detecting or mitigating them remains costly and error-prone. We conclude with recommendations for improving the robustness of APR systems against adversarial misuse and highlight directions for future work on secure APR. △ Less

Submitted 26 January, 2026; v1 submitted 4 September, 2025; originally announced September 2025.

On the Surprising Efficacy of LLMs for Penetration-Testing

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: This paper presents a critical examination of the surprising efficacy of Large Language Models (LLMs) in penetration testing. The paper thoroughly reviews the evolution of LLMs and their rapidly expanding capabilities which render them increasingly suitable for complex penetration testing operations. It systematically details the historical adoption of LLMs in both academic research and industry,… ▽ More This paper presents a critical examination of the surprising efficacy of Large Language Models (LLMs) in penetration testing. The paper thoroughly reviews the evolution of LLMs and their rapidly expanding capabilities which render them increasingly suitable for complex penetration testing operations. It systematically details the historical adoption of LLMs in both academic research and industry, showcasing their application across various offensive security tasks and covering broader phases of the cyber kill chain. Crucially, the analysis also extends to the observed adoption of LLMs by malicious actors, underscoring the inherent dual-use challenge of this technology within the security landscape. The unexpected effectiveness of LLMs in this context is elucidated by several key factors: the strong alignment between penetration testing's reliance on pattern-matching and LLMs' core strengths, their inherent capacity to manage uncertainty in dynamic environments, and cost-effective access to competent pre-trained models through LLM providers. The current landscape of LLM-aided penetration testing is categorized into interactive 'vibe-hacking' and the emergence of fully autonomous systems. The paper identifies and discusses significant obstacles impeding wider adoption and safe deployment. These include critical issues concerning model reliability and stability, paramount safety and security concerns, substantial monetary and ecological costs, implications for privacy and digital sovereignty, complex questions of accountability, and profound ethical dilemmas. This comprehensive review and analysis provides a foundation for discussion on future research directions and the development of robust safeguards at the intersection of AI and security. △ Less

Submitted 1 July, 2025; originally announced July 2025.

Recognition Without Mitigation: Ethical Frameworks in Autonomous Offensive-LLM Agent Research

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: Large language models have moved from advising on offensive security to autonomously conducting it. A growing literature presents agents that execute reconnaissance, exploitation, and privilege escalation against real or simulated targets. Such an agent is a deployable, re-pointable capability whose harm potential scales with the underlying model. The papers that introduce it therefore carry an un… ▽ More Large language models have moved from advising on offensive security to autonomously conducting it. A growing literature presents agents that execute reconnaissance, exploitation, and privilege escalation against real or simulated targets. Such an agent is a deployable, re-pointable capability whose harm potential scales with the underlying model. The papers that introduce it therefore carry an unusual ethical burden, which top security venues have begun to encode as hard policy in 2025-2026 ethics-section mandates. We present a systematic, reproducible audit of ethics-and-risk reporting in this literature. From a pre-registered Scopus query (Channel A, n=35) plus a reproducible forward-snowball of two seed papers via the Semantic Scholar citation graph (Channel B, n=19, all Scopus-absent) we assemble 54 autonomous offensive-LLM penetration-testing prototypes (2023-2026). We score each against a nine-dimension instrument derived both top-down from the Menlo Report, and bottom-up from the 2025-26 venue mandates. Our central result is a recognition-without-mitigation gap: dual-use risk is reported as recognized in 39% of papers but a concrete mitigation is reported in only 7%, roughly a 5:1 gap. Of the papers, 17% are anti-safeguard, reporting the defeat of model safety controls with no countermeasure. The near-universal safeguards reported are research-integrity controls that protect the experiment, not the public; institutional-review (2%) and coordinated-disclosure (6%) practice is almost absent and confined to Channel B. Measured against the new mandates, the corpus defines a pre-regulation baseline: current practice does not meet the substantive requirements. We argue this audit is itself defensive intelligence on the offensive-agent ecosystem, and we distill a minimal containment checklist for future work. △ Less

Submitted 29 July, 2026; v1 submitted 10 June, 2025; originally announced June 2025.

Comments: Accepted at AutonomousCyber 2026

Benchmarking Practices in LLM-driven Offensive Security: Testbeds, Metrics, and Experiment Design

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a powerful approach for driving offensive penetration-testing tooling. Due to the opaque nature of LLMs, empirical methods are typically used to analyze their efficacy. The quality of this analysis is highly dependent on the chosen testbed, captured metrics and analysis methods employed. This paper analyzes the methodology and benchmarking practices u… ▽ More Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a powerful approach for driving offensive penetration-testing tooling. Due to the opaque nature of LLMs, empirical methods are typically used to analyze their efficacy. The quality of this analysis is highly dependent on the chosen testbed, captured metrics and analysis methods employed. This paper analyzes the methodology and benchmarking practices used for evaluating Large Language Model (LLM)-driven attacks, focusing on offensive uses of LLMs in cybersecurity. We review 19 research papers detailing 18 prototypes and their respective testbeds. We detail our findings and provide actionable recommendations for future research, emphasizing the importance of extending existing testbeds, creating baselines, and including comprehensive metrics and qualitative analysis. We also note the distinction between security research and practice, suggesting that CTF-based challenges may not fully represent real-world penetration testing scenarios. △ Less

Submitted 16 June, 2025; v1 submitted 14 April, 2025; originally announced April 2025.

Can LLMs Hack Enterprise Networks? Autonomous Assumed Breach Penetration-Testing Active Directory Networks

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: Enterprise penetration-testing is often limited by high operational costs and the scarcity of human expertise. This paper investigates the feasibility and effectiveness of using Large Language Model (LLM)-driven autonomous systems to address these challenges in real-world Active Directory (AD) enterprise networks. We introduce a novel prototype designed to employ LLMs to autonomously perform Ass… ▽ More Enterprise penetration-testing is often limited by high operational costs and the scarcity of human expertise. This paper investigates the feasibility and effectiveness of using Large Language Model (LLM)-driven autonomous systems to address these challenges in real-world Active Directory (AD) enterprise networks. We introduce a novel prototype designed to employ LLMs to autonomously perform Assumed Breach penetration-testing against enterprise networks. Our system represents the first demonstration of a fully autonomous, LLM-driven framework capable of compromising accounts within a real-life Microsoft Active Directory testbed, GOAD. We perform our empirical evaluation using five LLMs, comparing reasoning to non-reasoning models as well as including open-weight models. Through quantitative and qualitative analysis, incorporating insights from cybersecurity experts, we demonstrate that autonomous LLMs can effectively conduct Assumed Breach simulations. Key findings highlight their ability to dynamically adapt attack strategies, perform inter-context attacks (e.g., web-app audits, social engineering, and unstructured data analysis for credentials), and generate scenario-specific attack parameters like realistic password candidates. The prototype exhibits robust self-correction mechanisms, installing missing tools and rectifying invalid command generations. We find that the associated costs are competitive with, and often significantly lower than, those incurred by professional human pen-testers, suggesting a path toward democratizing access to essential security testing for organizations with budgetary constraints. However, our research also illuminates existing limitations, including instances of LLM ``going down rabbit holes'', challenges in comprehensive information transfer between planning and execution modules, and critical safety concerns that necessitate human oversight. △ Less

Submitted 11 September, 2025; v1 submitted 6 February, 2025; originally announced February 2025.

Got Root? A Linux Priv-Esc Benchmark

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: Linux systems are integral to the infrastructure of modern computing environments, necessitating robust security measures to prevent unauthorized access. Privilege escalation attacks represent a significant threat, typically allowing attackers to elevate their privileges from an initial low-privilege account to the all-powerful root account. A benchmark set of vulnerable systems is of high importa… ▽ More Linux systems are integral to the infrastructure of modern computing environments, necessitating robust security measures to prevent unauthorized access. Privilege escalation attacks represent a significant threat, typically allowing attackers to elevate their privileges from an initial low-privilege account to the all-powerful root account. A benchmark set of vulnerable systems is of high importance to evaluate the effectiveness of privilege-escalation techniques performed by both humans and automated tooling. Analyzing their behavior allows defenders to better fortify their entrusted Linux systems and thus protect their infrastructure from potentially devastating attacks. To address this gap, we developed a comprehensive benchmark for Linux privilege escalation. It provides a standardized platform to evaluate and compare the performance of human and synthetic actors, e.g., hacking scripts or automated tooling. △ Less

Submitted 6 May, 2024; v1 submitted 3 May, 2024; originally announced May 2024.

Comments: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2310.11409

LLMs as Hackers: Autonomous Linux Privilege Escalation Attacks

Authors: Andreas Happe, Aaron Kaplan, Juergen Cito

Abstract: Penetration-testing is crucial for identifying system vulnerabilities, with privilege-escalation being a critical subtask to gain elevated access to protected resources. Language Models (LLMs) presents new avenues for automating these security practices by emulating human behavior. However, a comprehensive understanding of LLMs' efficacy and limitations in performing autonomous Linux privilege-esc… ▽ More Penetration-testing is crucial for identifying system vulnerabilities, with privilege-escalation being a critical subtask to gain elevated access to protected resources. Language Models (LLMs) presents new avenues for automating these security practices by emulating human behavior. However, a comprehensive understanding of LLMs' efficacy and limitations in performing autonomous Linux privilege-escalation attacks remains under-explored. To address this gap, we introduce hackingBuddyGPT, a fully automated LLM-driven prototype designed for autonomous Linux privilege-escalation. We curated a novel, publicly available Linux privilege-escalation benchmark, enabling controlled and reproducible evaluation. Our empirical analysis assesses the quantitative success rates and qualitative operational behaviors of various LLMs -- GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4-Turbo, and Llama3 -- against baselines of human professional pen-testers and traditional automated tools. We investigate the impact of context management strategies, different context sizes, and various high-level guidance mechanisms on LLM performance. Results show that GPT-4-Turbo demonstrates high efficacy, successfully exploiting 33-83% of vulnerabilities, a performance comparable to human pen-testers (75%). In contrast, local models like Llama3 exhibited limited success (0-33%), and GPT-3.5-Turbo achieved moderate rates (16-50%). We show that both high-level guidance and state-management through LLM-driven reflection significantly boost LLM success rates. Qualitative analysis reveals both LLMs' strengths and weaknesses in generating valid commands and highlights challenges in common-sense reasoning, error handling, and multi-step exploitation, particularly with temporal dependencies. Cost analysis indicates that GPT-4-Turbo can achieve human-comparable performance at competitive costs, especially with optimized context management. △ Less

Submitted 11 February, 2026; v1 submitted 17 October, 2023; originally announced October 2023.

Understanding Hackers' Work: An Empirical Study of Offensive Security Practitioners

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: Offensive security-tests are a common way to pro-actively discover potential vulnerabilities. They are performed by specialists, often called penetration-testers or white-hat hackers. The chronic lack of available white-hat hackers prevents sufficient security test coverage of software. Research into automation tries to alleviate this problem by improving the efficiency of security testing. To ach… ▽ More Offensive security-tests are a common way to pro-actively discover potential vulnerabilities. They are performed by specialists, often called penetration-testers or white-hat hackers. The chronic lack of available white-hat hackers prevents sufficient security test coverage of software. Research into automation tries to alleviate this problem by improving the efficiency of security testing. To achieve this, researchers and tool builders need a solid understanding of how hackers work, their assumptions, and pain points. In this paper, we present a first data-driven exploratory qualitative study of twelve security professionals, their work and problems occurring therein. We perform a thematic analysis to gain insights into the execution of security assignments, hackers' thought processes and encountered challenges. This analysis allows us to conclude with recommendations for researchers and tool builders to increase the efficiency of their automation and identify novel areas for research. △ Less

Submitted 23 August, 2023; v1 submitted 14 August, 2023; originally announced August 2023.

Getting pwn'd by AI: Penetration Testing with Large Language Models

Authors: Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito

Abstract: The field of software security testing, more specifically penetration testing, is an activity that requires high levels of expertise and involves many manual testing and analysis steps. This paper explores the potential usage of large-language models, such as GPT3.5, to augment penetration testers with AI sparring partners. We explore the feasibility of supplementing penetration testers with AI mo… ▽ More The field of software security testing, more specifically penetration testing, is an activity that requires high levels of expertise and involves many manual testing and analysis steps. This paper explores the potential usage of large-language models, such as GPT3.5, to augment penetration testers with AI sparring partners. We explore the feasibility of supplementing penetration testers with AI models for two distinct use cases: high-level task planning for security testing assignments and low-level vulnerability hunting within a vulnerable virtual machine. For the latter, we implemented a closed-feedback loop between LLM-generated low-level actions with a vulnerable virtual machine (connected through SSH) and allowed the LLM to analyze the machine state for vulnerabilities and suggest concrete attack vectors which were automatically executed within the virtual machine. We discuss promising initial results, detail avenues for improvement, and close deliberating on the ethics of providing AI-based sparring partners. △ Less

Submitted 17 August, 2023; v1 submitted 24 July, 2023; originally announced August 2023.

Discriminant chronicles mining: Application to care pathways analytics

Authors: Yann Dauxais, Thomas Guyet, David Gross-Amblard, André Happe

Abstract: Pharmaco-epidemiology (PE) is the study of uses and effects of drugs in well defined populations. As medico-administrative databases cover a large part of the population, they have become very interesting to carry PE studies. Such databases provide longitudinal care pathways in real condition containing timestamped care events, especially drug deliveries. Temporal pattern mining becomes a strategi… ▽ More Pharmaco-epidemiology (PE) is the study of uses and effects of drugs in well defined populations. As medico-administrative databases cover a large part of the population, they have become very interesting to carry PE studies. Such databases provide longitudinal care pathways in real condition containing timestamped care events, especially drug deliveries. Temporal pattern mining becomes a strategic choice to gain valuable insights about drug uses. In this paper we propose DCM, a new discriminant temporal pattern mining algorithm. It extracts chronicle patterns that occur more in a studied population than in a control population. We present results on the identification of possible associations between hospitalizations for seizure and anti-epileptic drug switches in care pathway of epileptic patients. △ Less

Submitted 11 September, 2017; originally announced September 2017.

Comments: Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, Jun 2017, Vienna, Austria. 2017, 16th Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Medicine

Advances in Security in Computing and Communications

Authors: Jaydip Sen, Javier Franco-Contreras, Gouenou Coatrieux, Nilay K Sangani, Haroot Zarger, Faouzi Jaidi, Bob Duncan, Alfred Bratterud, Andreas Happe, Chin-Feng Lin, Che-Wei Liu, Walid Elgeanidi, Muftah Fraifer, Thomas Newe, Eoin OConnell, Avijit Mathur, Ruolin Zhang, Eric Filiol

Abstract: In the era of Internet of Things (IoT) and with the explosive worldwide growth of electronic data volume, and associated need of processing, analysis, and storage of such humongous volume of data, several new challenges are faced in protect-ing privacy of sensitive data and securing systems by designing novel schemes for secure authentication, integrity protection, encryption, and non-repudiation.… ▽ More In the era of Internet of Things (IoT) and with the explosive worldwide growth of electronic data volume, and associated need of processing, analysis, and storage of such humongous volume of data, several new challenges are faced in protect-ing privacy of sensitive data and securing systems by designing novel schemes for secure authentication, integrity protection, encryption, and non-repudiation. Lightweight symmetric key cryptography and adaptive network security algo-rithms are in demand for mitigating these challenges. This book presents some of the state-of-the-art research work in the field of cryptography and security in computing and communications. It is a valuable source of knowledge for re-searchers, engineers, practitioners, graduates, and doctoral students who are working in the field of cryptography, network security, and security and privacy issues in the Internet of Things (IoT). It will also be useful for faculty members of graduate schools and universities. △ Less

Submitted 29 July, 2017; originally announced July 2017.

Comments: 190 pages, 8 Chapters. Published by Intech Open Publishers, Croatia, July 2017

Declarative Sequential Pattern Mining of Care Pathways

Authors: Thomas Guyet, André Happe, Yann Dauxais

Abstract: Sequential pattern mining algorithms are widely used to explore care pathways database, but they generate a deluge of patterns, mostly redundant or useless. Clinicians need tools to express complex mining queries in order to generate less but more significant patterns. These algorithms are not versatile enough to answer complex clinician queries. This article proposes to apply a declarative patter… ▽ More Sequential pattern mining algorithms are widely used to explore care pathways database, but they generate a deluge of patterns, mostly redundant or useless. Clinicians need tools to express complex mining queries in order to generate less but more significant patterns. These algorithms are not versatile enough to answer complex clinician queries. This article proposes to apply a declarative pattern mining approach based on Answer Set Programming paradigm. It is exemplified by a pharmaco-epidemiological study investigating the possible association between hospitalization for seizure and antiepileptic drug switch from a french medico-administrative database. △ Less

Submitted 26 July, 2017; originally announced July 2017.

Journal ref: Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Medicine in Europe, Jun 2017, Vienna, Austria. 24, pp.1161 - 266, 2017