Online deliberation is one important instance of civic tech that is both for and by the citizens, through engaging citizens in Internet-supported deliberative discussions on public issues. This article explains the origins of a set of symposium articles in this journal issue based on the 2017 'International Conference on Deliberation and Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Civic Tech' held in Singapore. Symposium articles are presented in a sequence that flows from designing decision making systems to platforms to specific technological nudges.

In multi-scenario corporate deployments, generative artificial intelligence is frequently packaged as an “AI colleague/assistant”. While such framing can increase collaboration efficiency, it may also trigger responsibility diffusion, weaken prudential judgment, and erode organizational integrity. Grounded in virtue ethics and the concept of organizational virtue, this study employs policy analysis and qualitative content analysis to code and compare China’s relevant governance texts with international frameworks including UNESCO, OECD, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF), and the EU AI Act. We (...) examine how institutional mechanisms—transparent notice, human oversight, risk assessment, and traceable remedies—are institutionalized to promote prudence, responsibility, and fairness. We find that policies generally emphasize “controllability, accountability, and noticeability/explainability”, yet devote insufficient attention to attributional shifts caused by anthropomorphic narratives. We therefore recommend incorporating anthropomorphic-design risks into risk-assessment checklists, strengthening cues that reinforce human ultimate responsibility and internal accountability matrices, and refining requirements for transparency and uncertainty communication in conversational systems. (shrink)

According to a recent view of analogue representations, the “syntax” of analogue representations is specified in terms of semantics by appealing to the mapping relations between contents and vehicles—“syntax” is fully determined by semantic properties. In this paper, I point out that it is widely assumed in the cognitive sciences that syntax is not determined by semantics but is instead explanatorily autonomous. I will pose a dilemma for the syntactic account of analogue representational systems: either the vehicles of the analogue (...) representations do not have constituent parts, or the constituent structure of the analogue representational vehicles is fully determined by the semantics. In the former case, there is no room for syntax. In the latter case, there is no explanatory role offered by “syntax” over and above semantics. I conclude that analogue systems should be explained solely in terms of representational vehicles and semantics. (shrink)

Nathan Salmón has been conferred the title of Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Santa Barbara since 2024. In recognition of this significant milestone, Yuling Zhang conducted an interview with Professor Salmón, whose influential work in the theory of direct reference has cemented his reputation as a leading figure in the field of philosophy of language. The interview focuses on Nathan Salmón's contributions to contemporary philosophy, particularly his work related to Saul Kripke and David Kaplan.

E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.

Critical realism, championed by its proponents as the most promising post-positivist social science paradigm, has gained significant influence in the last few decades. This paper provides a critical evaluation of the critical realism movement in the hope of facilitating more fruitful dialogues between its proponents and rivalling schools of sociologists. Two concerns are raised about contemporary critical realism. First, critical realism is not the only philosophical school against positivism and not necessarily the best. Second, critical realists exaggerate the importance of (...) critical realism to social science and conflate philosophy of science with sociological theories. (shrink)

The gradation of know-how is a prominent challenge to intellectualism. Know-how is prima facie gradable, whereas know-that is not, so the former is unlikely to be a species of the latter. Recently, Pavese refuted this challenge by explaining the gradation of know-how as concerning either the quantity or the quality of practical answers one knows to a question. Know-how per se remains absolute. This paper argues, however, that in addition to the quantity and quality of practical answers, know-how also differs (...) in how reliably the agent is supposed to fulfil the task given her default constitution. Intellectualism is still troubled by the gradability challenge. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) now generate fluent, assertion-shaped text that circulates through scientific communication, public discourse, and institutional decision-making. This development pressures a familiar philosophical question: if LLMs do not literally believe what they output, can their outputs nevertheless be true in the sense targeted by classical theories of truth? This paper argues that they can. We model LLMs as belief-less asserters: systems that produce assertionshaped, truth-evaluable contents while lacking the psychological and normative profile of genuine asserters. We separate semantic (...) questions about truth from normative questions about assertion, and we use three truth-theoretic lenses with distinct roles: deflationism to show that truth does not conceptually depend on belief, correspondence to address aboutness, reference, and derived intentionality in socio-technical settings, and Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics to explain how interpretation and compositional meaning apply to sentence-incontext outputs without treating the producer as a believing agent. We then integrate leading objections as constraints on warranted reliance rather than on truth itself. The upshot is a sharpened distinction between truth and truthfulness: LLM outputs can be true even when epistemic accountability must be reassigned to surrounding human and institutional actors. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) often appear to vindicate a radical empiricist picture: train on vast corpora of experience-like text, and capacities emerge without explicit symbolic rules. Yet contemporary machine learning research repeatedly emphasizes that what is learned, how quickly it is learned, and how well it generalizes depend crucially on prior constraints: architectural structure, training objectives, optimization dynamics, and representational bottlenecks. These constraints constitute inductive biases in a precise, technical sense. This paper develops a philosophical argument that uses LLMs as (...) a case study to reassess the classical tabula rasa thesis associated with Locke and its descendants. I defend two claims. First, even the most ``data-driven'' generative models are saturated with structural priors that make learning possible at scale; thus, their success cannot be straightforwardly read as a triumph of unstructured empiricism. Second, once this is appreciated, the rhetorical appeal of a ``blank slate'' conception of the infant mind weakens further: if artificial systems trained on orders of magnitude more linguistic input than any child still require rich inductive biases, it is implausible that human cognition begins wholly unstructured. I then show how contemporary debates about whether LLMs ``understand'' language recapitulate the older dispute about whether experience alone can generate semantics and conceptual structure. The upshot is a more balanced, non-caricatured empiricism: experience matters, but explanation must explicitly account for the learning system's prior structure. (shrink)

A popular view holds that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome is proportional to the causal contribution of their actions to that outcome, all else being equal. This paper challenges this view. I argue that there are counterexamples because some causal difference-makers (i.e., factors that can influence the degree of causal contribution) are morally irrelevant. I further contend that the proportionality relation is not as explanatorily indispensable as its proponents claim. This is because differences in moral responsibility can be (...) explained by other theories, such as the quality of will account, without referencing causal contribution. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the development of a concept that profoundly shapes the legal and moral philosophy in the early modern period: Hugo Grotius’ notion of loose obligation, which registers an ought-claim of natural law with a distinct binding force. Loose obligation differs from obligation of natural law strictly speaking insofar as it is non-actionable; but loose obligation also differs from supererogatory counsel insofar as it is non-optional. The notion of loose obligation becomes one pillar of the modern natural law (...) school owing to Pufendorf’s popularization; but since Pufendorf’s reconstruction, its territory is so expanded that it encroaches upon the realm counsel used to occupy. Reexamining Grotius’ conceptual architectonics and its reception helps us see how the ‘jural’ outlook of modern moral philosophy takes shape. (shrink)

In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti propose a novel internalist account of epistemic justification called phenomenal explanationism, which combines phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. I argue that the current version of phenomenal explanationism faces a dilemma: either it omits the awareness requirement but implies an implausible form of logical-mathematical omniscience, or it preserves the requirement but leads to a vicious regress. I suggest how phenomenal explanationism might be revised to avoid this dilemma.

This paper presents a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conceptual architectonics ofparticular justice. It has been noticed that Aristotle’s account of just/unjust action is not informed by an account of the character trait of particularjustice/injustice, and this has sparked serious concern about whether Aristotle’s treatment of particular justice is consistent with his general programme of ethics. In response, I propose that at least on one possible construal, the ‘definitional priority of virtue’ thesis is not prescribed by Aristotle’s agent-centred approach to ethics. Aristotle (...) is thereby justified in ascribing definitional priority to just/unjust states of affairs in his investigation of particular justice, and this conceptual architectonics is both internally coherent and compatible with his agent-centred approach to ethics. (shrink)

Based on the ontological proposition, “life is the only attribute of mind, and mind also the only attribute of life”, a model of the human mind is hypothesized in this article. It may be deduced from the proposition and the model: 1. All the structures of a brain are the potentials of its intelligence. 2. Consciousness is only the language used in the communication of an awakened brain. 3. Qualia are the same mental language manipulated by different memories. 4. Life (...) is the only meaning of all mental languages. -/- . (shrink)

Duncan Pritchard recently proposed a Wittgensteinian solution to closure-based skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, all epistemic systems assume certain truths. The notions that we are not disembodied brains, that the Earth has existed for a long time and that one’s name is such-and-such all function as “hinge commitments.” Pritchard views a hinge commitment as a positive propositional attitude that is not a belief. Because closure principles concern only knowledge-apt beliefs, they do not apply to hinge commitments. Thus, from the fact that (...) a subject knows that he is sitting in a room, and the fact that the subject’s sitting in a room entails his bodily existence, it does not follow that the subject also knows that he is not an envatted brain. This paper rejects Pritchard’s non-belief reading of hinge commitments. I start by showing that the non-belief reading fails to solve the skeptical paradox because the reasons that Pritchard uses to support the non-belief reading do not exempt hinge propositions from closure principles. I then proceed to argue that the non-belief reading is false as it claims that hinge commitments, unlike ordinary beliefs, are rationally unresponsive—with the help of a scenario in which a subject’s experience is internally chaotic, we can safely conclude that the hinge commitment that one is not systematically mistaken about the world is equally responsive to one’s evidential situations. (shrink)

Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 303-311, December 2021.

Weber's 'science as a vocation' has often been viewed as a therapeutic concept with no functional significance in the fully bureaucratized and professionalized modern science. However, development in the philosophy of science in the last century, especially the Kuhn thesis of the discontinuity of scientific progress and the Duhem-Quine thesis of underdetermination, shows that Weber's distinction between science as a vocation and science as a profession (career) can potentially answer one of the oldest questions in science studies: What makes scientific (...) breakthroughs possible? (shrink)

This paper deeply explores Karl Friston's Free Energy Principle (FEP) as a meta-theory with significant potential for unifying our understanding of individual existence (including survival and adaptation), the emergence of collective order (such as social norms and cultural systems), and the roots of human social value judgments. The paper first systematically outlines the core mechanism of the FEP: organisms continuously optimize their predictive models of the environment and guide adaptive behavior by minimizing variational free energy, which serves as an upper (...) bound on "surprise." Subsequently, this paper elaborates on how the FEP can explain individual-level homeostatic maintenance, emotional motivation, and societal-level phenomena such as shared generative models, communication, coordination, and cultural evolution, viewing them as manifestations of free energy minimization at different scales. A core innovative argument presented is the proposal to link the concept of "free energy gradients" (the trend of free energy change over time) within the FEP to the valuation of social behaviors. It posits that behaviors conforming to social norms and promoting collective well-being tend to decrease expected collective free energy, while contrary behaviors increase it. This perspective offers a novel theoretical pathway for understanding the cognitive and neural foundations of human value judgments. Furthermore, this paper explores the potential of integrating this FEP framework with decision support systems (DSS), particularly by leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and their self-attention mechanisms. The aim is to more accurately identify key social factors, optimize resource allocation strategies, and transcend the limitations of traditional economic indicators, thereby constructing decision support tools more aligned with overall and long-term human well-being. Finally, the paper comprehensively summarizes the theoretical advantages of this unifying framework, the practical challenges it faces (such as operationalization, falsifiability, and ethical concerns), and outlines key future research directions. It emphasizes its profound significance in promoting interdisciplinary understanding, advancing computational social science, and building more intelligent, equitable, and sustainable social systems. (shrink)

How do essentialist beliefs about categories arise? We hypothesize that such beliefs are transmitted via language. We subject large language models (LLMs) to vignettes from the literature on essentialist categorization and find that they align well with people when the studies manipulated teleological information -- information about what something is for. We examine whether in a classic test of essentialist categorization -- the transformation task -- LLMs prioritize teleological properties over information about what something looks like, or is made of. (...) Experiments 1 and 2 find that telos and what something is made of matter more than appearance. Experiment 3 manipulates all three factors and finds that what something is for matters more than what it's made of. Overall, these studies suggest that language alone may be sufficient to give rise to essentialist beliefs, and that information about what something is for matters more. (shrink)

This article reinterprets Levinas’s account of ethical subjectivity by centering the temporality of the pas encore (“not yet”) and drawing on new materials in Œuvres complètes. I argue that, in Totality and Infinity, eros and ethics are internally continuous: eros generates a responsible not yet of time, secured by fecundity and oriented to the Third. Unpublished notebooks and drafts show Levinas grounding subjectivity in the hopeful openness of the present and discerning in erotic life a hidden orientation toward the future—the (...) not-yet that gives a yet-to-come, a surplus that becomes responsibility. On this basis, time appears not primarily as projection toward a distant horizon but as an ethical delay within the present, a not yet that resists closure. The dossier of Totality and Infinity clarifies the links among enjoyment, Desire, fecundity, and mortality, and explains why the phrase from Entre Nous—“the future of death in the present of love”—becomes legible only in light of this background. The result is a distinct account of erotic temporality: love’s time is a responsible not yet that opens the present for the Other and, through fecundity, widens into the time of the Third. (shrink)

Meritocracy claims to reward the meritorious with more resources, thereby achieving social efficiency and justice in a level playground. This article argues that the rise of meritocracy in a society is the institutional consequence of adopting progressive humanism, an ideal-type worldview that advocates the harmonious co-realization of individual achievement and social contribution. However, meritocracy is a self-defeating illusion because, even in a level playground, it only rewards conspicuous and wasteful display of ‘merit’ rather than genuine contributions to society. Similar to (...) the promise of an afterlife to Catholicism, the illusion of meritocracy constitutes an indispensable theodicy to progressive humanism. For societies holding such worldviews, meritocracy is a necessary illusion that cannot be dispelled by institutional reforms or political movements. (shrink)

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” can be understood as “ X is reduced to Y.” Here, svabhāva functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the third (...) layer of the reduction system, the article suggests that svabhāva has only played a limited role in defining dharma types. (shrink)

Contemporary metaphysics faces a persistent impasse between physicalism, which struggles to accommodate consciousness and semantic content, and various forms of dualism or panpsychism, which struggle to establish causal relevance. This paper introduces Selective Reality Theory (SRT), a novel ontological framework that proposes selection as the fundamental primitive underlying both physical matter and phenomenal experience. Drawing on Whitehead’s process philosophy, quantum decoherence theory (specifically Quantum Darwinism), and information-theoretic thermodynamics, we develop a tripartite ontology consisting of the Potential Domain (L0), the Manifest (...) Domain (L1), and the Convergence Domain (L2). We posit that "existence" is not a static property of substances but a dynamic artifact of selection processes anchored by a "Ghost Operator" (G). This framework dissolves the hard problem of consciousness by re-describing it as a category error—mistaking the selection process for its output—and offers a unified, formalizable mechanism for how "bits" of information become "its" of physical reality (Wheeler's It from Bit). We conclude by demonstrating how SRT resolves the tension between causal closure and mental efficacy through the concept of "Ontological Friction." -/- . (shrink)

This paper develops a computational metaphysical framework, the Disaster-Recovery Universe (DRU) hypothesis, and applies it to two problems: the accessibility structure of temporal states and the principled limits of scientific explanation. DRU is formulated as six propositions (P1–P6), each independently motivated. The central explanandum is not the (contested) impossibility of time travel, but why past states persist only as records in the present rather than as operationally accessible states. I argue that DRU yields a structural account of this accessibility asymmetry (...) that complements, rather than competes with, thermodynamic approaches, and it supports an epistemological constraint I call evidential channel closure. I address key objections, clarify theoretical costs, and locate DRU within contemporary simulation metaphysics. The aim is not to establish DRU’s truth, but to show that it is a coherent framework whose explanatory payoffs and liabilities merit philosophical assessment. (shrink)

Valuing something is complicated. Philosophers have offered different stories about what we do when we value something. However, we have not paid enough attention to the thought that, sometimes, valuing something is what makes us the kind of practical agents we are. In this paper, I offer a novel account of valuing, which I call thick valuing, to capture this special phenomenon in which our valuing makes us who we are. This requires us to recognize that the cognitive, motivational, and (...) affective components of thick valuing do not merely co-occur. More importantly, it is key to focusing on how thickly valuing something partially constitutes, and indeed crucially expresses, our practical identities. Beyond that, the account sheds new light on how we can better understand inauthenticity—to act without authenticity is to act from what one thickly values but where that which one thickly values are not values of one’s own. (shrink)

Discussions of know-how typically focus on task-types. This paper discusses know-how about non-repeatable task-tokens. I define ‘non-particular’ know-how as knowledge of how to complete a task-type and ‘particular’ know-how as knowledge of how to complete a task-token. Particular know-how holds philosophical value by exhibiting interesting features. First, based on an empirical study, I argue that particular know-how makes stronger ability requirements than non-particular know-how. This disparity arises, I propose, because particular know-how is relative to actual rather than normal circumstances. Second, (...) the concept of downstream luck is applicable to particular know-how, not to non-particular know-how. The upshot is a multi-faceted pluralist approach to the essence of know-how. (shrink)

This article presents a fresh reconstruction of Emmanuel Levinas’ constellation of references to Plato (Platonica) in Totality and Infinity, with particular attention to Levinas’ transformation of the Platonic desire for the Good into the ethical significance of eros. Although Levinas critiques a Platonic metaphysics of presence, he reactivates Platonic motifs—especially the Good beyond being and the erotic structure of transcendence—in service of a phenomenology of ethical responsibility. Drawing on Plato’s Symposium, Phaedrus, Republic, and Apology, the study shows how Levinas reorients (...) eros from a teleological ascent toward the intelligible into an asymmetrical opening to the Other. The Good, no longer a sovereign Idea, becomes an imperative trace that commands without appearing, while eros, reimagined through desire and fecundity, reveals the contours of ethical transcendence through bodily vulnerability. Levinas’ anachronistic but creative retrieval of Platonic symbols is not a repetition of doctrinaire Platonism, but what he calls a return “in a new way”—one that relocates transcendence from the heights of metaphysical vision to the immediacy of the imploring face. By situating Levinas’ ethics within and against the Platonic tradition, the article reframes the ethical relation as a speech-initiated rupture rather than a harmonious ascent, offering a distinctive alternative to classical accounts of justice, knowledge, and love—and a new frame for reading Plato through an ethics of alterity and eros. (shrink)

Practical knowledge is discussed in close relation to practical expertise. For both anti-intellectualists and intellectualists, the knowledge of how to φ is widely assumed to entail the practical expertise in φ-ing. This paper refutes this assumption. I argue that non-experts can know how to φ via other experts’ knowledge of φ-ing. Know-how can be ‘outsourced’. I defend the outsourceability of know-how, and I refute the objections that reduce outsourced know-how to the knowledge of how to ask for help, of how (...) to get things done, or of external contents. Interestingly, outsourcing differs from social cooperation, collective agency, testimonial transmission, and many other notions in social-epistemological debates. Thus, outsourcing provides not only a hitherto unconsidered form of know-how but also a novel way for knowledge to be social. Furthermore, outsourcing plausibly involves a ‘social’ cognitive extension that does not rest on EMT or HEC. Given the outsourceability of know-how, we must reconsider the nature of know-how and expertise, as well as the relation between non-experts and experts. (shrink)

传统内在基础主义于近年的知识论研究中有所复兴。该理论的核心论点之一，是人类具有确定无疑的认知辩护。富莫尔顿尤其尝试以亲历理论解释确定辩护。可惜，确定辩护会受到来自“梯度”现象的挑战。针对梯度挑战，富莫 尔顿曾先后提出“事实性”“典型案例”“语义模糊”三个应对策略。本文将分别考察这三个策略，并指明其不足。.

I have conceptualized a triadic framework, with matter, energy, and life as its components, each defined as a different ontological change. In this talk, I will explore how time might be defined and understood within such a framework.

This paper proposes Attention Agent Theory (AAT), a foundational framework aiming to provide a unified understanding of the constitution and dynamics of reality, including consciousness. AAT adopts a radical ontological stance: the fundamental basis of the universe is not matter or energy, but an intrinsic, universal "agency" or "propensity for selection" (Universal Agencies, UAs). In AAT's view, "selection" itself is the ontology, and the things/objects we perceive are dynamic "agents" constructed by UAs to achieve better selections. The core feature of (...) UAs is their universal "attention" mechanism—a fundamental tendency and capacity to direct energy/resources towards specific states that confirm their "Existence" and maximize "Order" (Existence and Order). The hierarchical structure and complexity of reality, from basic physical interactions to life, consciousness, and social systems, are seen as self-organized "Agents" formed by UAs under this fundamental drive, embodying relative stability and functionality. These agents simultaneously exhibit structural stability (the basis for agency/representation) and an intrinsic drive (agency) to optimize their own existence and order. AAT specifically proposes that subjective experience (qualia) emerges in complex agents as an ontologically non-informational mechanism that efficiently processes attentional information. It is conceptualized as an "Attention Copy/Proxy with intrinsic Valence," where "Valence" is an intrinsic, non-informational, ontological assessment of the information's relevance to the agent's own "Existence and Order." This "feeling" itself is, ontologically, the very realization of its function as an efficient information assessment mechanism, thereby directly addressing the "hard problem" of consciousness. This paper details AAT's core assumptions, key concepts (UA, Attention, Agent, Existence and Order), crucial dynamic mechanisms (Attention Copy/Qualia/Proxy, Broadcasting, Feedback Learning), and its ontological (selection/process/information-based), epistemological (constructivist), and teleological implications. Comparisons with existing theories, explanatory potential, and future research directions are also discussed. (shrink)

Empirical adaptationism is often said to be an empirical claim about nature, which concerns the overall relative causal importance of natural selection in evolution compared with other evolutionary factors. Philosophers and biologists who have tried to clarify the meaning of empirical adaptationism usually share, explicitly or implicitly, two assumptions: (1) Empirical adaptationism is an empirical claim that is scientifically testable; (2) testing empirical adaptationism is scientifically valuable. In this article, I challenge these two assumptions and argue that both are unwarranted (...) given how empirical adaptationism is currently formulated. I identify a series of conceptual and methodological difficulties that makes testing empirical adaptationism in a biologically non-arbitrary way virtually impossible. Moreover, I show that those in favor of testing empirical adaptationism have yet to demonstrate the distinctive value and necessity of conducing such a test. My analysis of the case of empirical adaptationism also provides reasons for scientists to reconsider the value and necessity of engaging in scientific debates involving the notion of overall relative causal importance. (shrink)

The Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion mainly suggest that emotions can be reduced to evaluative beliefs or judgments. Specifically, evaluative beliefs are necessary but not sufficient conditions for evaluative judgments. And reducing emotions to evaluative judgments requires the subject’s conceptualizing ability. However, the Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion has many problems, including that evaluative beliefs are neither sufficient nor necessary for emotions; the evaluative judgment theory of emotion presupposes the subject’s conceptual content, but conceptual content is not a necessary and (...) sufficient condition for emotions; the requirement of conceptualization ability for evaluative judgments is too high, which makes emotions overintellectualize; and the add-on strategy of emotions cannot save the evaluative judgment theory of emotions as well. (shrink)

Understanding consciousness and agency, particularly regarding free will, remains a significant challenge. This paper introduces the Attention-Agency Theory (AAT), a novel framework designed to integrate these phenomena. AAT posits Universal Attention (UA) as a fundamental property and Attentional Copies (ACs) as the core mechanism generating both subjective experience and agentic control. By directly linking attentional dynamics to the causal efficacy of an agent, the theory aims to bridge the explanatory gap between physical processes, phenomenal awareness, and purposeful action. Drawing on (...) interdisciplinary insights from philosophy, cognitive science, and physics, AAT offers a new perspective on the nature of agency and its relation to conscious states. It explores potential compatibilist solutions to the free will problem and suggests connections to other frameworks like the Free Energy Principle via attentional mechanisms. AAT provides a structured, though theoretical, foundation for future investigation into the mind's active role. (shrink)

A popular solution to the causal exclusion problem in the non-reductive physicalist camp is the trope identity solution. But this solution is haunted by the “quausation problem” which charges that the trope only confers causal powers qua physical, not qua mental. Although proponents of the trope solution have responded to the problem by denying the existence of properties of tropes, I do not find their reply satisfactory. Rather, I believe they have missed the core presupposition behind the quausation problem. I (...) will argue that the presupposition is the generalist notion of causation. Then, for the trope theorists to solve the quausation problem, they need to abandon the generalist notion and adopt the singularist notion of causation. However, making that move will lead them to a new quausation problem, rendering irreducible mental types causally irrelevant and mental causal explanations reducible. Either adopting a generalist notion or a singularist notion of causation, a quausation problem awaits the trope solution. Given this dilemma, my conclusion is that the trope identity solution cannot solve the exclusion problem in a non-reductive way. Moreover, the dilemma can be generalized, showing that token physicalism is a shaky position. (shrink)

Montesquieu believes that human beings have three kinds of natures: self-preserving, imperfect knowledge and passions. The first and the third nature tend to conflict with each other, and the result is the state of war, in which human natures could not be satisfied. Montesquieu uses this theory of human nature to judge all the kinds of governments, and finds that the virtuous republic, despotism and monarchy all have important defects. Especially, the monarchy by nature tends to degenerate into despotism, which (...) is a realistic threat to him and his contemporaries. To solve this political problem, Montesquieu himself develops a two-fold solution: he wants to establish a certain kind of positive laws to satisfy the first nature, and wants to promote commerce to satisfy the third nature. Moreover, his ideal-government has important differences with the English political system. (shrink)

From Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals and Critique of practical reason, we can deduce Kant's interpretation of the concept of freedom, which has undergone a change from practical freedom to transcendental freedom, and the deduction of freedom has been perfected, the rational facts have been put forward to provide the basis of free deduction. The reason for the change is that freedom as the basis of theoretical practice is assumed and predetermined, how the cause and effect of freedom as (...) will may not be explained, and the nature of freedom is not defined clearly, the legitimacy and authority of the moral law is not established. After the transformation, the problem was solved. Although rigour raises questions about the universality of Kant’s moral law, Onora Sylvia O’Neill and others argue that Kant’s moral law is a product of virtue ethics, not a normative ethic, Kant's moral law still can instruct us in ethical life. (shrink)

Wuwei (nonaction) is one of the core concepts of Daoist ethics. Edward Slingerland pointed out that wuwei involves a paradox, and Arthur C. Danto questioned whether wuwei could support a genuine moral theory and the idea of right action. To defend Daoist ethics and its concept of right action, it is necessary to envisage Danto’s criticism and the problems raised by Slingerland. According to Ivanhoe, Wuwei is not a paradox, but a riddle or mystery about self-cultivation. He thinks that if (...) people could find the trick to the riddle, they can realize Wuwei. Ivanhoe’s analysis failed. Nickolas Knightly argues that we must acknowledge the paradox of Wuwei squarely. Based on criticizing Ivanhoe’s and Knightly’s schemes, this paper further analyzes the strategies to deal with the paradox of Wuwei. Wuwei should be placed in a specific situation and context. Wuwei requires the agents to have the corresponding psychological motivation, which will not continuously interfere with the purpose of action. Wuwei, as the behavior evaluation word of Daoist ethics, corresponds to moral anti-realism and nonassertive moral abolitionism. (shrink)

The development of cognitive neuroscience allows scientists to locate areas of brain activity corresponding to consciousness activities through advanced technology. The philosophical basis of cognitive neuroscience is physicalism, which reduces the activity of consciousness into the product of biological brain activity, but there are many drawbacks to this strong physicalism reductionism. Mind-brain identity theory in neuroscience and the computational doctrine in cognitive science show that the theory of physical reductionism can never explain the causal relationship between mental properties and physical (...) properties and physicalism contains the tendency of dualism. In addition, dualism combines with materialism to develop a new dualism of naturalistic tendencies and gain new opportunities for development. It is further demonstrated that the rationality of dualism and mental state cannot be wholly reduced to a physical state. (shrink)

"我思"是笛卡尔《第一哲学沉思集》的阿基米德点,也是当代哲学众多议题的源头。在笛卡尔看来,我思不可怀疑,而当代哲学对我思的关注也往往基于我思的确定性。根据对笛卡尔的经典解释,我思不 可怀疑的原因在于其背后的自我意识结构:沉思者为追寻确定的知识而怀疑了感知、悬置了数学,并最终发现怀疑中的思想本身不可怀疑。然而,我思自我意识的经典解释并非自明,它对应于自我检验的"独白&qu ot;式怀疑语境。除独白之外,怀疑也能发生在笛卡尔和怀疑论者的"公共对话"之中。本文从语境的角度探讨"我思"和怀疑之间的种种关联,并指出自我意识的经典视角对解释 我思的核心特征并无显著优势。在现当代哲学的开端,我思有着难以抹消的歧义。.

The Cartesian thesis that some justifications are infallible faces a gradation puzzle. On the one hand, infallible justification tolerates absolutely no possibility for error. On the other hand, infallible justifications can vary in evidential force: e.g. two persons can both be infallible regarding their pains while the one with stronger pain is nevertheless more justified. However, if a type of justification is gradable in strength, why can it always be absolute? This paper explores the potential of this gradation challenge by (...) rejecting Fumerton's recent ‘semantic decision' solution. On Fumerton's suggestion, the putative gradation of infallible justifications is essentially semantic. It concerns only how we use the relevant term but not how well we perceive the truth. Regardless of its intuitive appeal, Fumerton's solution does not cover all the related situations. There is an irreducibly epistemic sense in which infallible justifications vary in degrees. (shrink)

In order to have an effective and reliable understanding of the basic moral concepts, moral propositions and moral reasoning in Daoist ethical thoughts, it is necessary to use the methods of doing philosophy and doing ethics to engage in research work, and thus draw an intellectual conclusion about Daoist ethics. The methods of Daoist ethics mainly include analysis, explanation and comparison. The method of analysis focuses on logical analysis and language analysis of moral language in the classic texts of Daoist (...) ethics. The method of interpretation focuses on effective translation and understanding of moral language with unclear meaning in Daoist ethics. The method of comparison focuses on critical dialogue between ancient Daoist ethical thoughts and contemporary ethical theories and comparison between Confucian, Buddhist and Daoist ethics. Explaining the method of doing Daoist ethics clearly will promote the dialogue and understanding between Daoist ethics and contemporary ethics. (shrink)

This paper constitutes a foundational extension of The Principles of Defining Philosophy. Building upon the established epistemology centered on “Definition” with “Comparison” as its meta-operation, its core aim is to construct the ontological foundation. This involves clarifying the process of Sensory Compilation from the Essence of Existence to the Concept of Existence, and demonstrating that Distortion is a necessary and ineliminable property inherent in this conversion and in all subsequent operations of Narrow Definition. From this foundation, the paper proposes and (...) rigorously argues for the Theorem of Multi-Subjective World Cross-Verification, providing an operational criterion based on definitional practice for core ontological commitments and for social reality. Ultimately, by incorporating the theory itself without exception into its analytical framework, achieving a logically self-consistent self-reference, the paper completes the closure of the Defining Philosophy system. (shrink)

Intertextuality (mutual illustration) is a common rhetorical device in ancient Chinese and has been used many times in Laozi (Dao Dejing). Intertextuality (mutual illustration) is of unique significance for understanding the linguistic structure and philosophical thoughts of Lao-zi. According to the current research on mutual illustration rhetoric on ancient Chinese, the forms of this rhetoric in Laozi can be divided into mutual illustration of single sentence, of multiple sentences and of ellipsis and antisense. There are only two references to mutual (...) illustration in the annotations of Laozi in the past dynasties, and most of the commentators ignore the importance of mutual illustration in understanding Laozi. By interpreting Laozi through mutual illustration rhetoric, we can make innovations in understanding methods, understanding contents and philosophical thoughts. (shrink)

Strauss’s analysis of Machiavelli is both about his argument and action. He looks Machiavelli’s argument through the lens of classicalpolitical philosophy especially Plato’s political philosophy. He believed Machiavelli had not achieved important theoretical innovation. He looks Machiavelli’s action through the lens of modernity. He believed Machiavelli’s political thought did not perform a good function as it did in the last several centuries any more. Moreover, Strauss supplement Machiavelli’s political thought with a discussion of the problem of technique. Strauss’s caution of (...) the technical innovation makes sense, but his distinction between theoretical science and technique is not convincing. (shrink)

Plato's view on time, a key aspect of his doctrine of forms, is influenced by his reception of Parmenides, but the way in which Plato takes up and modifies Parmenides' view is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate. In this article, the author analyzes Plato's revision of Parmenidean time by exploring four temporalities: the eternal present, timeless eternity, the enduring present, and the instant between time and eternity. Through this examination, she uncovers the common origin of both the eternal present (...) of Parmenides' fragment B8 and the flowing present of the phenomenal realm in the instant (ἐξαίφνης) in Plato's Parmenides. This perspective on time offers a promising solution to Plato's problem of participation, bridging the gap between the eternal being of the form and the being in time of the particulars. (shrink)

Only on the basis of the understanding of life is it possible to define and explain consciousness. However, many concepts grounded in monistic or dualistic presuppositions—whether “substance,” “property,” “relation,” or “process”—can define neither life nor consciousness, let alone explain consciousness through life. For this reason, the author constructs a triadic framework centered on a complete, self-consistent, and universally applicable definition of life, interpreting and elucidating being qua being as three irreducible changes: matter, energy, and life. Within this framework, the paper (...) deduces the definition and explanation of consciousness from multiple dimensions—ontology, epistemology, and semantics: • Consciousness is universal: it is the difference between energy and matter. • Consciousness is unique: it is the formalization, singularization, and individualization of energy by matter. • Consciousness is language without meaning, whereas life is meaning without language. • The dualities of subject and object, of self and world, in consciousness, originate from the asymmetry and directionality of life’s change. Consciousness, as consciousness, lies not only in matter as matter and in energy as energy, but also in life as life—in living toward death. The incompleteness and inconsistency of many theories of consciousness often arise from a fundamental misunderstanding of life, of the organism, and above all, of the human as such. -/- . (shrink)

The author argues that consciousness and its meaning may only be defined and explained within an ontological system. Such a system is proposed in this article, with matter, energy, and life as its components, and with all its components defined as changes. The systematic relations between matter and energy and the semantic relations among all its components together may define and explain what and how consciousness is, why there is consciousness, where and when it may occur, and what is its (...) significance or meaning. (shrink)