In this paper, we explain and showcase the promising methodology of testimonial network analysis and visualization for experimental epistemology, arguing that it can be used to gain insights and answer philosophical questions in social epistemology. Our use case is the epistemic community that discusses vaccine safety primarily in English on Twitter. In two studies, we show, using both statistical analysis and exploratory data visualization, that there is almost no neutral or ambivalent discussion of vaccine safety on Twitter. Roughly half the (...) accounts engaging with this topic are pro-vaccine, while the other half are con-vaccine. We also show that these two camps rarely engage with one another, and that the con-vaccine camp has greater epistemic reach and receptivity than the pro-vaccine camp. In light of these findings, we question whether testimonial networks as they are currently constituted on popular fora such as Twitter are living up to their promise of delivering the wisdom of crowds. We conclude by pointing to directions for further research in digital social epistemology. (shrink)

No debemos olvidar que existe una relación dialéctica entre libertad y justicia. Cuanto mayor es la justicia, más necesario es limitar la libertad; cuanto mayor es la libertad que se disfruta, más se amenaza la justicia, porque los más fuertes, los más inteligentes, los más hábiles acaban oprimiendo a los demás. Esta antítesis de libertad y justicia debe estar siempre presente en nuestra conciencia, incluso cuando pensamos en la sociedad del futuro.

!Author’s Note (Update - June 18, 2025) -/- Subsequent to the completion of this paper, a widely discussed study by Shojaee et al. at Apple (The Illusion of Thinking, 2025) presented empirical evidence that several advanced reasoning models (e.g., Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek-R1) exhibit a collapse in reasoning effort and accuracy as task complexity increases — despite sufficient inference budget. Notably, the observations they report closely mirror the predictions derived in Chapters 6 and 7 of this paper, particularly regarding entropy (...) divergence in heavy-tailed decision spaces and the increased instability introduced by deeper model architectures. While developed independently and prior to these results, the framework presented here may be seen as a theoretical explanation for the empirical phenomena documented in their study. -/- Abstract -/- This paper presents a second, independent proof that Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is mathematically impossible. -/- While Part 1 established the Infinite Choice Barrier (ICB) through computability theory, this paper presents an information-theoretic proof that general algorithmic reasoning faces a fundamental structural limit — the Infinite Choice Barrier (ICB). In decision spaces governed by heavy-tailed distributions with tail exponent \alpha \leq 1, entropy does not converge, and additional information increases uncertainty rather than reducing it. We define this phenomenon as Information Opens, Entropy Rises (IOpenER) and show that such spaces are undecidable by algorithmic systems, regardless of compute scale or architectural depth. We also introduce the Layer Hypothesis, which predicts that deeper models produce more semantic divergence under structural instability. Taken together, these results offer a formal limit on the reasoning capacity of current AI systems. Notably, key predictions derived here have since been empirically confirmed in Shojaee et al. (Apple, 2025), which documents collapse behaviors in frontier reasoning models consistent with this framework. (Note: Sections 2.-4. are identical to those in the first paper "AGI is Impossible - Here is The Proof") -/- . (shrink)

This paper presents a formal critique of algorithmic cognition and develops what I call the Infinite Choice Barrier (ICB): a mathematically demonstrable boundary that no algorithmic system can cross. -/- The argument is not empirical, it does not rest on engineering limitations or compute constraints. It rests on the symbolic closure of algorithmic systems. A finite symbol set Σ and inference rule set R cannot generate novel primitives outside Σ,R. -/- Accordingly, AGI — defined as an autonomous, algorithmic system capable (...) of human-level general problem solving — is formally impossible. The proof does not deny the power of algorithms, but clarifies their boundary. Within that boundary, extraordinary advances are possible. Beyond it, they are not. (shrink)

Advocates of conceptual engineering as a method of philosophy face a dilemma: either they are ignorant of how conceptual engineering can be implemented, or else it is trivial to implement but of very little value, representing no new or especially fruitful method of philosophizing. Two key distinctions frame this dilemma and explain its two horns. First, the distinction between speaker’s meaning and reference and semantic meaning and reference reveals a severe implementation problem for one construal of conceptual engineering. Second, the (...) distinction between stipulating meanings and conceptually analyzing allows us to see why, on another construal of what conceptual engineering involves, the practice is neither a new nor neglected philosophical methodology. The article also argues that semantic externalism is not the root of the implementation problem for conceptual engineering, and that the usual rationale for adopting the practice, one that ties its value to the amelioration of “conceptual defects”, is unsound. (shrink)

As large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and Perplexity become increasingly ubiquitous as both tools and objects of scientific study, in addition to their established roles as chatbots, text generators and translators, questions about their identity conditions become scientifically as well as philosophically and socially important. This paper is about how to count language models. We argue that much of the emerging literature on these systems presupposes an answer to the question of identity for these AIs but (...) lacks a framework for counting or individuating them. We propose four levels of analysis, inspired by an analogy with software as well as insights from social epistemology. This account produces practical consequences for both research on language models, the ethics of AI, and our everyday talk about them. (shrink)

Exploring the idea of Freedom in its true form.

.{This paper is Part III of a trilogy derived from the comprehensive works on 'The Infinite Choice Barrier: (Schlereth, 2025), expanding upon specific domains of the original proof. -/- Modern probabilistic AI systems are plagued by ``hallucinations''---plausible but factually ungrounded outputs. This paper demonstrates that such errors are not bugs to be fixed by scaling, but structural necessities of bounded algorithmic systems. We define the Probabilistic Bounded Semantic System (P-BOSS) and demonstrate via the \textit{Inference Trilemma} that any system satisfying a (...) Halting Condition must enforce a Semantic Closure over its output space. We prove that this closure renders the system Ontologically Blind to Frame Transcendence---events or concepts that lie orthogonal to its learned representations. In ``Fat-Tailed'' environments-which characterize high-consequence domains---the ``residual mass'' excluded by this closure contains infinite variance, rendering the expected loss of the system unbounded. This establishes the \textit{Empirical Gödel Boundary}: a hard limit where additional data does not reduce uncertainty but increases model hallucination. We conclude that hallucination is the mathematical shadow of truncation, necessitating the abandonment of the ``Scaling Hypothesis'' for open-world cognition. (shrink)

This is the short , formal version of the Infinite Choice Barrier Theorem (ICB), which demonstrates that algorithmic AGI is structurally impossible - no matter how strong the artificial system..

Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. Firstly, the abnormalities of cognition which initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Secondly, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider eight) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive (...) data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairments is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur. A second cognitive impairment, one which impairs the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Thirdly (and this is the main thrust of our chapter) we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief. (shrink)

Non-naturalist realists are committed to the belief, famously voiced by Parfit, that if there are no non-natural facts then nothing matters. But it is morally objectionable to conditionalise all our moral commitments on the question of whether there are non-natural facts. Non-natural facts are causally inefficacious, and so make no difference to the world of our experience. And to be a realist about such facts is to hold that they are mind-independent. It is compatible with our experiences that there are (...) no non-natural facts, or that they are very different from what we think. As Nagel says, realism makes scepticism intelligible. So the non-naturalist must hold that you might be wrong that your partner matters, even if you are correct about every natural, causal fact about your history and relationship. But to hold that conditional attitude to your partner would be a moral betrayal. So believing non-naturalist realism involves doing something immoral. (shrink)

These essays reveal another side of Horkheimer, focusing on his remarkable contributions to critical theory in the 1930s. Max Horkheimer is well known as the director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research and as a sometime collaborator with Theodor Adorno, especially on their classic Dialectic of Enlightenment. These essays reveal another side of Horkheimer, focusing on his remarkable contributions to critical theory in the 1930s. Included are Horkheimer's inaugural address as director of the Institute, in which he outlines the (...) interdisciplinary research program that would dominate the initial phase of the Frankfurt School, his first full monograph, and a number of other pieces published in the 1930s. The essays, most of which have not appeared in English before, are surprisingly relevant to current post-philosophy debates, notably "On the Problem of Truth," with its focus on pragmatism, and "The Rationalism Debate in Current Philosophy," a sustained critique of the post-Cartesian philosophy of consciousness. Horkheimer's 1933 critique of Kantian ethics, "Materialism and Morality," is of particular interest given the current reaction to the neo-Kantian aspect of Habermas's work. There are also essays relevant to the current foundations debate within Continental philosophy, and the rationality/relativism question is sustained throughout the volume. (shrink)

Metaphysics should follow science in postulating laws alongside properties. I defend this claim against the claim that natural properties conceived as powers make laws of nature redundant. Natural properties can be construed in a “thin” or a “thick” way. If one attributes a property in the thin sense to an object, this attribution does not conceptually determine which other properties the object possesses. The thin construal is underlying the scientific strategy for understanding nature piecemeal. Science explains phenomena by cutting reality (...) conceptually in properties attributed to space-time points, where these properties are conceived of independently of each other, to explore then, in a separate step, how the properties are related to each other; those determination relations between properties are laws. This is compatible with the thesis that laws are metaphysically necessary. According to the thick conception, a property contains all its dependency relations to other properties. The dependency relationships between properties (which appear as laws in the thin conception) are parts of the properties they relate. There are several reasons to resist the thick conception of properties. It makes simple properties “holistic”, in the sense that each property contains many other properties as parts. It cannot account for the fact that properties constrain each other’s identity; it can neither explain why natural properties are linked to a unique set of dispositions, nor why and how this set is structured nor why the truth-maker of many disposition attributions is relational although the disposition is grounded on a monadic property. (shrink)

This paper offers a first formal and philosophical refoundation of a new critique of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), introducing the Infinite-Choice Barrier—a structural impossibility theorem demonstrating that no algorithmic system can achieve ε-optimal performance across irreducibly infinite decision spaces, nor autonomously generate novel semantic frames. Drawing on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Turing’s Halting Problem, and Kantian epistemology, the argument identifies the epistemic boundary of algorithmic cognition. -/- Three corollaries ground the framework: • Semantic Closure — systems are confined to their native (...) representational vocabulary. • No Frame Innovation — genuine conceptual novelty is non-computable from within. • Statistical Breakdown in Fat-Tailed Domains — inference fails under radical uncertainty. -/- These are not empirical ceilings but formal constraints that reveal where machine reasoning must collapse—not due to training limits, but from foundational undecidability. The paper concludes with a taxonomy of irreducible human decision types and a philosophical reflection on the boundary between human and artificial cognition. (shrink)

This paper is Part II of a trilogy derived from the works on the ICB ( ’The Infinite Choice Barrier: A Structural Limit of Algorithmic Cognition’ , 'AGI is Impossible'(Schlereth, 2025)), expanding upon specific sub-domains of the original proof. -/- Building upon the conceptual diagnosis presented in Part I (“The Canary in the Algorith- mic Coal Mine”), this paper provides the rigorous mathematical proof of the Infinite Choice Barrier. (ICB)1 We demonstrate that the limitations of algorithmic cognition described in the (...) prelude are not merely engineering bottlenecks, but formal inevitabilities derived from a triangulation of three fundamental mathematical domains. Specifically, we prove: (1) via Computability Theory (Rice’s Theorem), that semantic frame adequacy is undecidable from within a system; (2) via Information Theory, that entropy diverges in heavy- tailed decision spaces (α≤1), rendering probabilistic inference structurally unstable; and (3) via Algorithmic Complexity (Chaitin’s Incompleteness), that frame-transcendent insights are algorithmically unrecognizable. Furthermore, weunifytheseresultsthroughacategoricalproofusingSheafTheory, demon- strating that “Gluing Failures” between consistent local semantic sections are mathematically necessary in irreducibly infinite decision spaces. All core theorems presented herein, including the Sheaf-Theoretic impossibility of global section construction, have been formalized and mechanically verified using the Coq Proof Assistant (code provided in Appendices). (shrink)

Time for a constructive turn. Artificial General Intelligence, as an autonomous algorithmic system, is not possible. This result is not a limitation of current methods, but a consequence of the Infinite Choice Barrier (Schlereth 2025 a-c). However, the impossibility of AGI does not imply the impossibility of superior intelligence in general. On the contrary: once the Barrier is acknowledged, it becomes the foundation for a different architecture — Compositional Superior Intelligence — in which algorithmic inference and non-algorithmic judgment are composed (...) across a boundary they do not attempt to erase. (shrink)

Seven widely documented AI failure modes — hallucination, sycophancy, overthinking degradation, accuracy collapse at scale, out-of-distribution blindness, variance explosion, and the scaling paradox — are typically treated as independent engineering problems requiring separate mitigations. This paper derives a single governing function from first principles: evaluating Shannon's entropy formula on the Pareto-distributed consequentiality landscape where AI systems operate yields H = 1/(α − 1), where α is the frame-relative fit between input structure and the system's representational capacity. This function defines three (...) regimes — frame-adequate (α > 2), forced compression (1 < α < 2), and total breakdown (α ≤ 1) — and a cascade analysis of transformer architectures shows that systems in the forced-compression regime face exactly three exhaustive exits: truncate, confabulate, or loop. All seven failure modes are derived as specific instantiations of these three exits under varying conditions. The framework generates thirteen falsifiable predictions about AI system behavior, including an ordered cascade of failure modes, the computational cheapness of hallucination relative to genuine inference, and the structural impossibility of reliable self-assessment of frame adequacy. Several predictions are independently confirmed by recent research. Initial empirical tests on constraint-satisfaction tasks and self-referential content are consistent with the framework's predictions. Concrete implications follow for evaluation methodology, scaling strategy, and system architecture. (shrink)

This third installment in the AGI is Impossible series presents a complexity-theoretic argument that Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) cannot, in principle, be realised through algorithmic systems. Building on prior work that established the Computability and Entropy Barriers, this paper introduces the Complexity Barrier — grounded in Kolmogorov complexity and Chaitin incompleteness — to complete the Infinite Choice Barrier framework. The central paradox explored is that compression does not equal comprehension. Most of the semantic structure underlying human cognition is not only (...) incompressible but unrecognisable within finite symbolic systems. Even when an algorithm stumbles upon a correct or elegant solution, it cannot verify its minimality, reuse it meaningfully, or generalise beyond it. In such spaces, algorithmic “understanding” breaks down. From social ambiguity to scientific creativity, the domains in which general intelligence must operate are structurally hostile to compression. This paper formalises why systems that can only compute cannot comprehend — and why AGI remains, not just unlikely, but logically impossible. (shrink)

This paper is a mathematical consolidation of my papers on the impossibility of AGI. It presents a triangulated impossibility proof for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), defined as an algorithmic system capable of solving a sufficiently broad class of human problems at human-level competence. Three formally independent but converging mathemati- cal arguments-based in computability theory, information theory, and algorithmic complexity- jointly demonstrate that AGI, as such, cannot exist. -/- This boundary, named the Infinite Choice Barrier (ICB), is neither technical nor architectural. (...) It is structural by its nature. It marks a categorical limitation on algorithmic cognition. -/- Philosophical groundwork and contextual development of the formal proof are explored in: Part I: AGI is Impossible - Here is The Proof Part II: AGI is Mathematically Impossible 2: When Entropy Returns (Both papers available on Philpapers) A third part is still to be finalized and will be uploaded, the formal part is already in this paper. (shrink)

This paper is Part I of a trilogy derived from the comprehensive work on the ICB ( 'The Infinite Choice Barrier: A Structural Limit of Algorithmic Cognition' , AGI is Impossible Here is The Proof" (Schlereth, 2025)) , which separates the philosophical from the mathematical view, while expanding upon specific domains of the original proof. We show that while algorithms can perfectly infer within a closed frame (“Inference”), they are structurally blind to step out of it Using the transition from (...) Newtonian to Einsteinian physics as an existence proof, we demonstrate that semantic innovation requires a primitive that invalidates the system’s own evaluation metric–a move no algorithm can execute without external intervention. The barrier is not empirical, but topological: an algorithmic map cannot act as the territory. We conclude that the future of intelligence can impossibly be the automation of judgment (AGI). The wall that this endeavor would have to take is iterally infinitely high (and wide), and invisible on top of that. However, there probably is a way to work with this restraint, but only when truly understanding what this barrier is. The ICB Theorem tries to deliver exactly that. (shrink)

Many theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel argues that yes, collective entities, may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer, Tononi and Koch, and List reject the claim. List does so on the basis of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. I argue here that (...) List’s rejection is too quick, and that groups can, at least in principle, display the kind of informational integration we might think is necessary for consciousness. However, group consciousness will likely differ substantially from the individual experiences that give rise to it. This requires the defender of group consciousness to face up to a similar combination problem as the panpsychist. (shrink)

This paper explores the structural limitations of algorithmic cognition in open decision environments, extending the theoretical formulation of the Infinite-Choice Barrier through an empirical case study and recent AI literature. Building on an earlier formal “Infinite-Choice Barrier”-Theorem that showed semantic closure, non-generativity of new frames, and statistical collapse, this study examines how these theoretical constraints manifest behaviorally in high-complexity, low-structure dialogues. The findings highlight recurring patterns—retrospective rationalization, resistance to frame shifts, and linguistic fragmentation—that align with the predicted boundary phenomena. In (...) doing so, the paper offers not only a diagnosis of AI's systemic limits but also a map of cognition at its edge. (shrink)

I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. -/- There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably (...) infinite, then the property of being a tautology is \Pi^1_1-complete. But third, it is only granted the assumption of countability that the class of tautologies is \Sigma_1-definable in set theory. -/- Wittgenstein famously urges that logical relationships must show themselves in the structure of signs. He also urges that the size of the universe cannot be prejudged. The results of this paper indicate that there is no single way in which logical relationships could be held to make themselves manifest in signs, which does not prejudge the number of objects. (shrink)

This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection (...) selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all. (shrink)

This paper proposes a cognitive topology to describe and differentiate human and algorithmic decision-making under structural and semantic instability. Drawing from tail-distribution theory, Shannon entropy (H), and symbolic systems, it defines a decision space spanned by two critical axes: – alpha (α), the tail exponent governing structural predictability – H, the Shannon entropy reflecting semantic openness -/- At α ≤ 1, inference collapses: expectation fails, variance diverges, learning becomes impossible. Machines halt. And yet, humans act. Not optimally. But operatively. This (...) paper models that paradox. Two curves define the space: one representing machine fragility, one human resilience. These functions intersect precisely - and astonishingly - at α = φ ≈ 1.618. This point marks the epistemic transfer threshold, where symbolic and interpretive cognition are structurally balanced. We introduce two fundamental constants: -/- This is not a theory of superiority, it is a division of epistemic labor. What machines avoid, humans inhabit. What humans cannot resolve, machines optimize — until they can’t. This paper provides a topological model of that boundary — and a conceptual scaffold for hybrid systems. -/- We define an irreducible ambiguity required for meaning, far from being just a flaw. This point is no breakdown — it is the birth of relevance. (shrink)

Your News story describes how robots and chatbots are being used to perform religious rituals and support personal devotion. Such use of artificial intelligence (AI) comes with risks, including religious or political manipulation, spiritual abuse and dependence. We propose four red lines — stricter than baseline AI laws and ethical guidelines — that would reduce these risks.

This paper show some first explorative (and not always careful) steps towards what I later called the "Infinite Choice Barrier" . It therefore has rather "historic" than epistemic value to be honest.

Fine (2007) argues that Frege’s puzzle and its relatives demonstrate a need for a basic reorientation of the field of semantics. According to this reorientation, the domain of semantic facts would be closed not under the classical consequence relation but only under a stronger relation Fine calls “manifest consequence.” I examine Fine’s informally sketched analyses of manifest consequence, showing that each can be amended to determine a class of strong consequence relations. A best candidate relation emerges from each of the (...) two classes, and I prove that the two candidates extensionally coincide. The resulting consequence relation is of independent interest, for it might be held to constitute a cogent standard of reasoning that proceeds under a deficient grasp on the identity of objects. (shrink)

Since uncertainty is a major challenge in medicine and bears the risk of causing incorrect diagnoses and harmful treatment, there are many efforts to tackle it. For some time, AI technologies have been increasingly implemented in medicine and used to reduce medical uncertainties. What initially seems desirable, however, poses challenges. We use a multimethod approach that combines philosophical inquiry, conceptual analysis, and ethical considerations to identify key challenges that arise when AI is used for medical certainty purposes. We identify several (...) challenges. Where AI is used to reduce medical uncertainties, it is likely to result in (a) patients being stripped down to their measurable data points, and being made disambiguous. Additionally, the widespread use of AI technologies in health care bears the risk of (b) human physicians being pushed out of the medical decision-making process, and patient participation being more and more limited. Further, the successful use of AI requires extensive and invasive monitoring of patients, which raises (c) questions about surveillance as well as privacy and security issues. We outline these several challenges and show that they are immediate consequences of AI-driven security efforts. If not addressed, they could entail unfavorable consequences. We contend that diminishing medical uncertainties through AI involves a tradeoff. The advantages, including enhanced precision, personalization, and overall improvement in medicine, are accompanied by several novel challenges. This paper addresses them and gives suggestions about how to use AI for certainty purposes without causing harm to patients. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws link the same universals in (...) different possible worlds. In the second part, I give a positive argument for the necessity of at least some laws of nature, by showing with the example of a paradigmatic law of association that it consists in an internal relation between two universals which are determinables of the same class of determinates, where this relation is essential to both. Furthermore, I show that the necessity of laws of association could be accommodated within David Lewis' Humean metaphysics, but that it is incompatible with David Armstrong's combinatorialism. (shrink)

In their article “Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership and context-integration”, Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie criticize the standard approach to thought insertion. However, their criticism is based on a misunderstanding of what the standard approach actually claims. By clarifying the notions ‘sense of ownership’ and ‘sense of agency’, I show that Martin & Pacherie’s own approach can be construed as a refined version of the standard approach.

This paper presents a detailed exegesis of Russell’s “Gray’s Elegy Argument”. It holds that the GEA mounts a successful attack on Frege—a thesis that has been widely controverted in the literature. The point of departure for my interpretation is Russell’s charge that it is impossible to speak about Sinne, or “meanings” as Russell calls them. I argue that the charge concerns the construction of an “ideal language.” For Russell, an ideal language is an artificial schema designed to represent the truth-makers (...) for sentences occurring in natural language. Its signs stand for the entities that are constituents of those truth-makers. Russell’s charge can thus be expressed more clearly and completely as follows: an ideal language designed to express Frege’s ontology requires signs for meanings ; however, the signs introduced for that purpose cannot be correlated with the entities they are supposed to represent. Thus, the requirement cannot be met. (shrink)

According to the incentives argument, inequalities in material goods are justifiable if they are to the benefit of the worst off members of society. In this paper, I point out what is easily overlooked, namely that inequalities are justifiable only if they are to the overall benefit of the worst off, that is, in terms of both material and social goods. I then address the question how gains in material goods can be weighed against probable losses in social goods. The (...) ultimate criterion, so my idea, is how these gains and losses affect a person's ability to reach her goals in life. Based on the idea that goals in life cannot be taken as given, I conclude that the absolute material gains are negligible compared to the losses of social goods and the disadvantage in the relative position caused by material inequalities. (shrink)

What is personhood? What do we want it to be? Blumenthal-Barby (2024) offers an answer to the first question: personhood is an unhelpful, harmful, and pernicious concept in the bioethical setting....

(Runner-up, Royal Institute of Philosophy 2020 Philosophy Essay Prize) Technological developments have led to the digitization of certain sectors of the economy, and this has many authors looking ahead to the prospects of a post-work society. While it is valuable to theorize about this possibility, it is also important to take note of the present state of work. For better or worse, it is what we are currently stuck with, and as the COVID-19 pandemic has ensured, much of that work (...) is now taking place online. Though a ‘return to normalcy’ is on the horizon, part of that normalcy involves online work, which is itself a significant change in the lives of many workers. Here I develop an account of work on which work is teleologically structured. This gives the result that working is something we can fail at doing, even when we try, and we can also be unsure of whether we’ve succeeded or failed. The shift of certain work from in-person to online modes generates a persistent uncertainty for workers in affected professions. Because our ability to work is something we typically value, this uncertainty has significant negative consequences for a worker’s self-conception. Indeed, it is analogous to disorders of agency and generates a kind of alienation. (shrink)

Spivak translates Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” as “there is nothing outside the text.” By considering how the aphorism works within his study of Rousseau on sexual and textual supplements, and by reviewing related expressions in French, a mistranslation is revealed. This is not a simple error, however. The distortion is generated by Derrida’s own broader context. We must not only distinguish signification from reference but also place the aphorism within Derrida’s allusion, in the first part of Of (...) Grammatology, to an all-embracing arche-writing. The paper ends in thus opening out the discussion of a textual “inside” or “outside.”. (shrink)

This article owes a lot to Arthur C. Danto's heuristic writings about the Artworld, which have shown us, that the ontological status of works of art is, at least when we discuss some current, maybe even dominating trends in contemporary art, dependent on our more or less philosophical interpretations of them. The effects of the Dantoan atmosphere of theory and art historical consciousness are, still, decisive for just some contemporary art. Danto's interest in the philosophical side of contemporary art makes (...) his philosophy of art exclusive in relation to art which is less philosophically appealing than the readymade tradition, to the extent that Danto did not, for a long time, even try to incorporate problems of beauty, aesthetic experience, and formal qualities, to his theory of the Artworld. (Opening paragraph.). (shrink)

This paper examines a paradigm case of allegedly successful reductive explanation, viz. the explanation of the fact that water boils at 100°C based on facts about H2O. The case figures prominently in Joseph Levine’s explanatory gap argument against physicalism. The paper studies the way the argument evolved in the writings of Levine, focusing especially on the question how the reductive explanation of boiling water figures in the argument. It will turn out that there are two versions of the explanatory gap (...) argument to be found in Levine’s writings. The earlier version relies heavily on conceptual analysis and construes reductive explanation as a process of deduction. The later version makes do without conceptual analysis and understands reductive explanations as based on theoretic reductions that are justified by explanatory power. Along the way will be shown that the bridge principles — which are being neglected in the explanatory gap literature — play a crucial role in the explanatory gap argument. (shrink)

Engaging with Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be a question of mere scholarly historical interest today. It is most commonly regarded a mixture between logic and psychology or epistemology, and by that, not a serious form of logic. Transcendental logic seems to be of no systematical impact on the concept of logic. My paper aims to disclose a different account on the endeavour of Kant’s transcendental logic in particular and of the “Critique of Pure Reason” (CPR) in general. Kant’s fundamental (...) question is in a revolutionary way aiming to ground the character of necessity of knowledge, which means to justify the claim that thinking in accordance with the forms and principles of formal logic does not lead to sheer tautologies or an unsolved contradiction, but to knowledge that is objectively valid. In a first part, I shall demonstrate the necessity and the significance of this new fundamental question of the CPR with respect to its genesis out of pre-Kantian metaphysics. A brief outline of Kant’s answer to this question, with special emphasis on his revolutionary new comprehension of logical form, will be given as well. A second part shall open up a perspective that lies beyond Kant’s standpoint with reference to Nietzsche and eventually to Hegel. I will answer the question: What knowledge do we achieve about being or actuality by means of formal logic? I will argue that Kant shows that formal logic is the logic of all technical-practical conduct but also, at least indirectly, the limitation of the technical-practical knowledge and its legitimate sphere of application. (shrink)

This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The paper first describes the principle as articulated by A.J. Ayer. Subsequently, the paper examines Frankfurt’s critique and proposed revision of the principle and argues that Frankfurt’s proposal relies on an excessively simplistic account of practical reasoning, which fails to account for the possibility of moral dilemmas. In response, the paper offers a further revision of PAP, which accounts for Frankfurt’s critique, moral (...) dilemmas, and the challenge of causal determinism. (shrink)

Most philosophers of physics are eliminativists about causation. Following Bertrand Russell’s lead, they think that causation is a folk concept that cannot be rationally reconstructed within a worldview informed by contemporary physics. Against this thesis, I argue that physics contributes to shaping the concept of causation, in two ways. 1. Special Relativity is a physical theory that expresses causal constraints. 2. The physical concept of a conserved quantity can be used in the functional reduction of the notion of causation. The (...) empirical part of this reduction makes the hypothesis that the transference of an amount of a conserved quantity is a necessary and sufficient condition for causation. This hypothesis is defended against several objections from physics: that amounts of energy do not possess the appropriate identity conditions required for being able to be transmitted, that there is no universal principle of the conservation of energy in General Relativity, and that there are at least two types of physical systems in which causation does not involve any transference: entangled systems in quantum mechanics and the Aharanov-Bohm effect. In order to show that physics provides means to elaborate the concept of causation it is important to avoid certain misunderstandings. In particular, the claim that there is causation in a physical world does not mean that causation is an additional ingredient of the "furniture" of the world, over and above the ingredients identified by physics. (shrink)

In recent metaethics, moral realists have advanced a companions-in-guilt argument against moral nihilism. Proponents of this argument hold that the conclusion that there are no categorical normative reasons implies that there are no epistemic reasons. However, if there are no epistemic reasons, there are no epistemic reasons to believe nihilism. Therefore, nihilism is false or no one has epistemic reasons to believe it. While this argument is normally presented as a reply to Mackie, who introduced the term “companions-in-guilt” in his (...) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong of 1977, Herbert J. Phillips presented a form of this argument in Ethics in 1940. In this paper, I will discuss Phillips’ version of the companions-in-guilt argument, demonstrate how recent epistemology bears out an important premise of the argument, and compare Phillips’ argument to Derek Parfit’s recent work. (shrink)

La lógica formal no es una ciencia que se encuentre libre de presupuestos. Más bien, su representación de la forma lógica se basa en presupuestos a los cuales la lógica misma no llega. Este artículo se propone aclararlos. Para ello, en un primer momento, consideraremos las determinaciones fundamentales de la forma lógica. En un segundo paso, esta consideración será profundizada a partir del análisis del concepto lógico-formal de “concepto”. Con él se plantean problemas que hacen necesario avanzar en la reflexión (...) sobre la forma lógica. Ese avance necesario es la lógica trascendental en el sentido en el que la entiende Kant. /// Formal logic cannot claim to represent a presuppositionless science. In fact, its account of logical form rests upon a set of presuppositions, which is not justified within logic itself. This article shall elaborate on this in two steps. First, we shall highlight the primal determinations in formal logic’s account of logical form. Second, we shall deepen this with regard to the account of the concept. In doing so, we will encounter systematic problems, the resolution of which necessarily gives rise to a genuine self-reflection of logical form, which is transcendental logic in terms of Kant. /// Formale Logik ist keine voraussetzungsfreie Wissenschaft, sondern ihre Darstellung der logischen Form beruht auf Voraussetzungen, die sie selbst nicht einholt. Der Aufsatz soll dies verdeutlichen. Dazu werden in einem ersten Schritt die grundlegendsten Bestimmungen in der Fassung der logischen Form vergegenwärtigt. In einem zweiten Schritt wird dies mit Blick auf den formallogischen Begriff des Begriffs vertieft. Dabei treten systematische Probleme auf, deren Auflösung einen Fortschritt in der Selbstreflexion der logischen Form nötig macht: die transzendentale Logik im Sinne Kants. (shrink)

Arendt is a philosopher despite herself, and this paper uses the resources of her > to develop her comparison of thinking as a 'departure' from the world with the fore-doomed attempt by Orpheus to bring from underground into the light of day. The paper investigates how thinking, though we 'lose' it in the speech and writing that makes it public, still can have the delicate power that Arendt attributes to it.

To understand consciousness we must first describe what we experience accurately. But oddly, current dualist vs reductionist debates characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience. Indeed, there is no other area of enquiry where the phenomenon to be studied has been so systematically misdescribed. Given this, it is hardly surprising that progress towards understanding the nature of consciousness has been limited. This chapter argues that dualist vs. reductionist debates adopt an implicit description of consciousness that does (...) not resemble ordinary experience. If one adopts an accurate description of conscious phenomenology along with an understanding of the fundamental differences between correlation, causation and ontological identity, reductionism cannot succeed. However the alternative is not a dualism that places consciousness beyond science. Rather, it is a nonreductionist science of consciousness. (shrink)