The inherently subjective nature of consciousness severely limits our ability to make progress on the problem of consciousness. The inability to acquire objective, publicly available data on the phenomenal aspect of consciousness makes evaluating alternative theories very difficult, if not impossible. However, the anomalous nature of subjective states with respect to our conventional theories of the physical world suggests the possibility of considering other anomalous data around consciousness that happen to be objective. For such purposes, I propose that we examine (...) the psi data gathered under laboratory conditions, which generally receive little attention. I wish to consider whether we have theories or frameworks of consciousness that attempt to account for subjective qualia but also fit the psi data. I argue that Russellian monism can be combined with an argument regarding quantum holism to arrive at a version of cosmopsychism that fits very well with the psi data. While I do not argue that such a framework exhausts the theoretical possibilities, I do suggest we can move forward with a framework that has attractive theoretical features and is also consistent with objective data currently on the table. (shrink)

The paper is written in response to those who fail to recognize the relation between a patient's mental competency and her state of pain. Some clinicians claim that a proper diagnosis can only be made in the absent of analgesia. Rather, the patient's state of pain directly affects her mental competency and thus her ability to give valid consent. Clinicians should rethink their approach to diagnosis when the patient is in pain.

The accent on scientific and empirical character of alchemy, especially from the field of the history of science, promotes the idea that one can understand the cryptic and metaphorical language of alchemy mainly through the laboratory chemical practice. As a result, the tendency is to interpret the spiritual and esoteric language of alchemy, as metaphors for laboratory work and the most representative research on historiography of alchemy that point the spiritual character as being contaminated by esoteric sciences and Victorian occultism. (...) This paper is paying attention to this dichotomy by attempting to understand the exclusivist position of the position that alchemy is a proto-chemistry and to see the consequences of such an interpretation. It is reviewed one of the most representative voices that interpret alchemy as spiritual by Carl. G. Jung and Mircea Eliade, and their rejection, as it is illustrated by William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe, showing the boundaries of both approaches and the hazarded character of understanding alchemy merely as part of the history of chemistry. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence systems are increasingly generating outputs that are regarded not only as information but also as inputs to decision-making and action in fields such as medicine, finance, governance, and public discourse. Current discussions about AI safety, hallucination, misinformation, and trust mainly focus on whether claims are deemed true, accurate, or backed by trusted sources. This paper contends that these debates are wrongly framed. The main issue is not establishing truth but instead establishing a principled epistemic ordering. -/- In diverse (...) societies marked by ongoing disagreements and uncertainty, relying on prior consensus about truth often results in gridlock, conflict, and post-hoc rationalizations. Drawing on the Doctrine of Legitimate Knowledge (DLK), this paper highlights a legitimacy gap in modern AI knowledge systems: a robust method for determining when and how claims may justifiably be treated as true for purposes of reliance and action. By emphasizing that legitimacy must be epistemically evaluated before declaring something as true, this paper shifts the focus of AI knowledge governance from facts or ideology to a structural issue of epistemic ordering. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence systems are increasingly involved in generating, mediating, and authorizing knowledge across scientific, clinical, civic, and organizational sectors. Although significant efforts have been made to improve factual accuracy, hallucination detection, and verification processes, these methods still fall short in providing clear guidance on when and how claims should be regarded as true and trusted to guide action. -/- The Doctrine of Legitimate Knowledge—Epistemic Assessment Framework (DLK-EAF) tackles this structural gap with a legitimacy-first governance approach that evaluates the maturity, robustness, (...) and real-world readiness of claims. Rooted in the Doctrine of Legitimate Knowledge (DLK), the framework offers a transparent, challenge-ready alternative to truth-based adjudication methods that often lead to gridlock, conflict, and post hoc rationalizations. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Doctrine of Legitimate Knowledge (DLK), a universal epistemic and ethical framework that establishes the structural and moral conditions under which knowledge becomes fit to guide decision-making, governance, and AI-supported action. The DLK defines a four-stage progression—Transparency → Facts → Truth → Trust—each governed by accountability, forming a lifecycle by which knowledge attains legitimacy, resilience, and authority. The framework addresses contemporary crises of epistemic legitimacy, including entrenched belief, institutional decay, and technological opacity, offering a structured methodology for (...) evaluating claims, governing automated systems, and ensuring trustworthy knowledge in public, scientific, and organizational contexts. (shrink)

One of the important questions which has faced philosophy since the rise of modern science concerns the relation between scientific knowledge and humanistic understanding. The growth and success of natural science has given rise to a view known as “scientism”, a philosophical conviction in the epistemic superiority of science and its right to impose its methods onto the territory of the humanities. This in turn has caused a backlash against the alleged epistemic superiority of scientific method, a backlash aiming to (...) expose scientific enquiry as a historical enquiry embedded in human practices, thereby purportedly showing that the reality scientific method uncovers is a historical construct, akin to the cultural norms by which human beings have led their lives in different periods of time. In this debate between proponents of the right of science to extend its methods onto the territory of the humanities, and denigrators of science who deny it is a sui generis mode of inquiry, Bernard Williams and Robin George Collingwood occupy the sensible and much neglected middle ground. They teach us that ‘scientism’ should not be understood merely as the view that the methods of science can be extended to answer the questions addressed by the humanities or as “a matter of putting too high a value on science in comparison with other branches of learning or culture.” (Sorell 1991: x) This is the most common use of the term, but scientism should also be understood more broadly as the attempt of any form of knowledge to impose its methods onto the subject matter of any another. On this broader understanding of “scientism”, historicism, understood as the claim that all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is historical, is a topsy-turvy form of epistemic imperialism which denies the sui generis nature of scientific knowledge. In so doing it reverses the power relations between the humanities and science, without challenging the epistemic power structures as such. As critics of scientism in both the narrow and the broader sense, Williams and Collingwood challenge the idea that it is possible to understand scientific reality through the lens of the humanities (as if nature were a social/historical construct); such attempts are just as misguided as the proposal to understand culture through the lens of scientific method. (shrink)

A recent book by Niko Kolodny, The Pecking Order, makes the case that societal hierarchies deserve more attention than they have been given in political philosophy hitherto, and explores the descriptive and moral implications of societal hierarchies. Though a pathbreaking work, Kolodny’s elaboration is nevertheless flawed in several key respects. First, Kolodny’s descriptive approach to societal hierarchies lacks an account of ‘structure’. In response, I theorize several levels of ‘structurality’, and argue for the existence of ‘interactional hierarchies’, ‘meso-structural hierarchies’, and (...) ‘macro-structural hierarchies.’ Second, Kolodny neglects the moral notion of a “collective inferiority complaint”. To address this, I tie together several unconnected strands of thought in Kolodny’s text that imply that natural individuals have a collective moral claim against finding themselves in macro-structural relations of inferiority. Third, Kolodny attempts to justify the State and the capitalist firm through a series of “tempering factors” that allegedly mollify the societal hierarchies that these phenomena involve. I demonstrate that Kolodny’s “secondary” tempering factors are aimed at addressing meso-structural offices, only, and that they are insufficient to render even these morally un-objectionable. Further, I show they are not robust enough to meet our collective moral complaint against macro-structural relations of inferiority. Fourth and finally, I argue that anarchism offers a better alternative to a Kolodnian account of societal hierarchies. Anarchist philosophy provides additional tempering factors that render meso-structural hierarchies morally un-objectionable, and that transform macro-structural hierarchies into something else entirely. I theorize the contrast class to societal hierarchies: ‘interactional horizontalities, ‘meso-structural horizontalities, and ‘macro-structural horizontalities.’ I conclude that anarchism is best understood as an ideology that is: skeptical of all societal hierarchies, opposed only to macro-structural hierarchies, open to all societal horizontalities, and dedicated to macro-structural horizontalities. I suggest that this understanding of anarchism not only helps to complete Kolodny’s project, but also to resolve ongoing disputes in anarchist studies. (shrink)

Postmortem avatars (PMAs) — AI systems that simulate a deceased person by being fine-tuned on data they generated or that was generated about them — have attracted growing scholarly attention, yet their potential role in clinical settings remains largely unexplored. This paper examines the ethics of deploying PMAs as therapeutic tools in grief therapy. Drawing on the dual-process model of grief, the theory of continuing bonds, and the philosophical framework of fictionalism, we propose two potential therapeutic applications: incorporating PMAs into (...) established imaginal exercises such as the empty chair exercise, and treating the process of PMA creation as an art-therapeutic exercise in its own right. We consider five ethical objections to these applications and argue that none constitute knock-down arguments against therapeutic use, particularly given the risk-mitigating role of the clinical context. We conclude by identifying outstanding governance challenges and calling for empirical research, without which neither the promise nor the dangers of therapeutic PMAs can be adequately assessed. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider what the growing evidence in parapsychology can tell us about the nature of consciousness. Parapsychology remains controversial because it implies deviations from the understanding that many scientists and philosophers hold about the nature of reality. However, given the difficulties in explaining consciousness, a growing number of philosophers have called for new, possibly radical explanations, which include versions of dualism or panpsychism. In this spirit, I briefly review the evidence on psi to see what explanation of (...) consciousness might best be supported. After a brief survey of the evidence, I conclude that the best explanation would probably be neutral monism. I then explore a framework for neutral monism, using well-known features of quantum mechanics, to develop a ground or bridge between consciousness and matter. This framework, which I believe helps explain the psi evidence, suggests that a non-local proto-conscious field of potential or seed stuff underlies both matter and consciousness. (shrink)

The persistent interpretation problem for quantum mechanics may indicate an unwillingness to consider unpalatable assumptions that could open the way toward progress. With this in mind, I focus on the work of David Bohm, whose earlier work has been more influential than that of his later. As I’ll discuss, I believe two assumptions play a strong role in explaining the disparity: 1) that theories in physics must be grounded in mathematical structure and 2) that consciousness must supervene on material processes. (...) I’ll argue that the first assumption appears to lead us toward Everett’s many worlds interpretation, which suggests a red flag. I’ll also argue that the second assumption is suspect due to the persistent explanatory gap for consciousness. Later, I explore ways that Bohm’s later work holds some promise in providing a better fit with our world, both phenomenologically and empirically. Also, I’ll address the possible problem of realism. (shrink)

Throughout the debate on psi, skeptics have almost universally insisted on different standards for evaluating the evidence, claiming that psi represents a radical departure from our current scientific understanding. Thus, there is considerable ambiguity about what standard of evaluation psi must meet. Little attention has been paid to the possible harm to the integrity of scientific investigation from this resulting inconsistency in testing standards. Some have proposed using a Bayesian framework as an improvement on this dilemma in order to more (...) explicitly model beliefs, assumptions, and background scientific knowledge, especially when evaluating a controversial hypothesis. Recently, Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, which constrains scientific research within bound- aries believed to be most productive, has been incorporated into a Bayesian framework. Within this framework, I explore a likely paradigm or meta-theory used by skeptics that typically constrains research and makes it difficult for psi evidence to be accepted. It appears that such a paradigm would in many respects have difficulty accounting for consciousness, which is fundamental to an understanding of psi. I discuss why psi data are likely to play a key role in making progress in solving the problem of consciousness. Thus, applying different standards of evaluation to psi data is likely counterproductive. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a framework that supports both free will and anomalous mind-matter interaction (psychokinesis). I begin by considering the argument by the physicist Sean Carroll that the laws of physics as we understand them rule out psychokinesis (and other modes of psi). I find Carroll’s claims problematic, in part due to what I believe are misunderstandings of arguments borrowed from David Hume. I proceed to consider a more dispositional notion of causality (in contrast to one characterized by (...) universal and necessary laws) which I argue is more hospitable to both psychokinesis and free will. I then incorporate recent work from the philosophy of mind and science to arrive at a framework that supports both real volition and psychokinesis, which I argue are intimately linked. This approach is fundamentally dispositional, but grounded in an ontologically prior field of awareness and potentiality. I also consider that the regularities (or causal natures) we observe in our physical world are ultimately supported by what we might term teleological “intentions” within a nonlocal, mind-like quantum ground. (shrink)

Reber and Alcock have recently made a sharp attack on the entire psi literature, and in particular a recent overview by Cardeña of the meta-analyses across various categories of psi. They claim the data are inherently fl awed because of their disconnect with our current understanding of the world. As a result, they ignore the data and identify key scientific principles that they argue clash with psi. In this Commentary, I argue that these key principles are diffi cult to apply (...) in areas where our understanding remains poor, especially quantum mechanics and consciousness. I also explore how the psi data may fi t within these two domains. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the link between consciousness and quantum mechanics. Often explanations that invoke consciousness to help explain some of the most perplexing aspects of quantum mechanics are not given serious attention. However, casual dismissal is perhaps unwarranted, given the persistence of the measurement problem, as well as the mysterious nature of consciousness. Using data accumulated from experiments in parapsychology, I examine what anomalous data with respect to consciousness might tell us about various explanations of quantum mechanics. I (...) examine three categories of quantum mechanics interpretations that have some promise of fitting with this anomalous data. I conclude that explanations that posit a substratum of reality containing pure information or potentia, along the lines proposed by Bohm and Stapp, off er the best fit for various categories of this data. (shrink)

"Nothing Better Than Death" is a comprehensive analysis of the near-death experiences profiled on the www.near-death.com website. This book provides complete NDE testimonials, summaries of various NDEs, NDE research conclusions, a Question and Answer section, an analysis of NDEs and Christian doctrines, famous quotations about life and death, a NDE bibliography, book notes, a list of NDE resources on the Internet, and a list of NDE support groups associated with IANDS.org - the International Association for Near-Death Studies. The unusual title (...) of this book, "Nothing Better Than Death," was inspired by NDE experiencer Dr. Dianne Morrissey who once said, "If I lived a billion years more, in my body or yours, there's not a single experience on Earth that could ever be as good as being dead. Nothing.". (shrink)

Continuum physics represents states as real- or complex-valued fields and dynamics as operators on infinite-dimensional function spaces. Under an ontic interpretation, however, fundamental evolution must be semantically total: it must take every admissible state specification to a successor state specification in which all admitted magnitudes remain denoting. We make this requirement explicit using standard admissible representations, in which denotation is characterized by bounded finite-precision input dependence on state descriptions. We show that standard continuum dynamics can violate this semantic closure requirement (...) even when the underlying PDE is linear, well posed, and uniquely solvable. The obstruction is forced extensional totalization: a regional readout can require joint control over countably many individually well-behaved contributions in a way that destroys bounded input dependence and hence denotation. Because locality commits a field ontology to treating spatial restrictions on compact regions as single physical magnitudes, this failure mode cannot be avoided by appealing to pointwise readouts or sequential access. Reanalyzed in these terms, the Pour-El and Richards Theorem 2 construction for the three-dimensional wave equation provides a concrete witness: admissible finite energy initial data evolve to states whose regional field restrictions do not admit admissible names in the required function space topology. The obstruction is semantic rather than epistemic: it does not concern what can be computed or observed, but the failure of continuum evolution to preserve denotation under realist locality commitments. The conclusion is eliminative: unrestricted continuum field ontology cannot serve as the basis of a semantically closed fundamental dynamics. (shrink)

Computable Wavefunction Realism (CWFR) is a finite-information ontological framework for quantum theory derived from the semantic commitments of explanatory realism. Explanatory realism requires denotation stability of physical magnitudes and closure of admissible states under lawful evolution. Literal continuum ontology challenges these constraints through aggregation instability in the dynamical domain and resolution instability in the range of real-valued magnitudes. CWFR enforces semantic stability via four structural postulates: Lorentz-invariant spectral band-limitation, restriction to ontic states whose amplitude functionals depend Type-2 computably on admissible (...) configurations, admissible successor dynamics total on the admissible domain, and restriction of physically meaningful predicates to those with open truth sets. The present paper develops the structural consequences of these constraints and establishes non-vacuity via explicit admissible successor constructions. CWFR is not proposed as a replacement for continuum quantum mechanics at the level of mathematical formalism, but as a restriction on ontological interpretation imposed by semantic stability conditions. Macroscopic structure arises from refinement geometry induced by admissible stability predicates, and probability assignments operate on locally finite refinement partitions. Extension to realistic interacting quantum field theories is identified as a programmatic direction rather than a completed result. (shrink)

(Added April 2023: This draft is superseded by Briggs, R.A., & George, B.R. (2023). 'What Even Is Gender?'. Routledge. DOI 10.4324/9781003053330, and in particular by the first three chapters thereof. While this much earlier draft remains available for archival purposes, you are encouraged to read and cite the 2023 book and to use its terminology.) -/- This paper presents a new taxonomy of sex/gender concepts based on the idea of starting with a few basic components of the sex/gender system, (...) and exhausting the possible types of simple associations and identities based on these. The resulting system is significantly more fine-grained than most competitors, and helps to clarify a number of points of confusion and conceptual tension in academic and activist conversations about feminism, transgender politics, and the social analysis of gender. (shrink)

The preferred basis problem has resisted resolution because it is doubly ill-posed. First, it seeks an ontological solution to a structural problem: every proposed solution encounters the same difficulty, indicating that its source is architectural rather than interpretive. Second, it demands an answer in the language of orthonormal bases, presupposing that classical alternatives must correspond to orthogonal decompositions of a state space. They need not. Classical worlds require only logical incompatibility of stabilized distinctions, not linear-algebraic orthogonality. This paper develops refinement (...) geometry, a theory-neutral structural framework that reframes rather than solves the preferred basis problem by identifying its root cause. Physical histories are partially ordered by prefix extension. Stability predicates are existential claims over history prefixes, necessarily monotone since what has occurred cannot be uncertified by later extension, and admissible only if their truth sets are open under finite variation. Monotonicity and admissibility together induce a directed refinement structure admitting a canonical maximal partition. The root cause is then identifiable: purely synchronic refinement cannot reproduce maximal refinement structure because admissible stability predicates are defined over history prefixes and carry monotone certification semantics that no instantaneous state description can fully encode. A synchronic procedure powerful enough to recover the canonical maximal partition must implicitly reconstruct and traverse the prefix order, collapsing into diachronic refinement in disguise rather than achieving a genuinely synchronic result. In contrast, diachronic refinement, accumulating certified distinctions monotonically along histories, converges to the canonical maximal partition without basis selection or orthogonality. Significantly, quantum interference requires no special treatment: non-singleton partition blocks represent histories not yet separated by any certified distinction. Decoherence generates the stability predicates that resolve such blocks; classical worlds are the limit of that resolution. Persistence of distinctions, irreversibility, and absence of merging follow from predicate semantics alone, independent of dynamical law and without presupposing Hilbert-space structure or ontological commitments. (shrink)

We formalize a general semantic constraint on physically admissible procedures: discrete outcomes must exhibit bounded input dependence, meaning that determinate outcomes are supported by finite stability margins in the underlying state space. We prove that any such procedure can discriminate only properties corresponding to open regions of state space. Properties whose truth sets are topologically thin, having empty interior with dense complement, are operationally unresolvable under admissible physical semantics. This limitation is structural rather than computational. It arises from topological constraints (...) induced by stability at the semantic interface and applies uniformly across continuum ontologies. Stability is shown to be preserved under lawful continuous dynamics, implying that thin distinctions cannot be amplified into operational differences by finite physical evolution followed by admissible readout. Computability provides a canonical representative example. Computable and noncomputable elements form interwoven dense subsets of continuum domains, so computability is not a topological property of states but a property of representation structure. As such, it cannot be operationally extracted by bounded-input-dependent procedures. Restrictions motivated by bounded input dependence thus express ontological parsimony: they eliminate distinctions incapable of supporting stable physical discrimination. The result provides a semantic foundation for aligning ontological commitments with structurally admissible distinctions in realist physical theories. -/- . (shrink)

This paper establishes a general semantic constraint on physical ontology in continuum theories under explanatory realism and finite-information access. Working in the framework of represented state spaces, we show that ontic predicates must satisfy bounded input dependence: once true, their truth must persist under sufficiently small perturbations of state. This requirement forces the extension of any ontic predicate to be open in the representation topology. As a consequence, predicates defined by exact equalities, lower-dimensional subspaces, digit-level conditions, or algorithmic properties are (...) structurally non-denoting, even though they are mathematically well defined. Ontic structure in continuum physics must therefore take the form of open stability regions, not sharp boundary conditions. The result is theory-agnostic and applies to any physical framework whose states are modeled in continuum spaces and accessed through finite procedures, including classical field theories, dynamical systems, and quantum models. The theorem clarifies the boundary between mathematical structure and ontological structure in continuum descriptions and connects denotation to operational discrimination constraints. (shrink)

Mechanistic interpretability (MI) aims to explain how neural networks work by uncovering their underlying causal mechanisms. As the field grows in influence, it is increasingly important to examine not just models themselves, but the assumptions, concepts and explanatory strategies implicit in MI research. We argue that mechanistic interpretability needs philosophy: not as an afterthought, but as an ongoing partner in clarifying its concepts, refining its methods, and assessing the epistemic and ethical stakes of interpreting AI systems. Taking three open problems (...) from the MI literature as examples, this position paper illustrates the value philosophy can add to MI research, and outlines a path toward deeper interdisciplinary dialogue. (shrink)

Continuum physical theories model states as real- or complex-valued fields and dynamics as linear operators on infinite dimensional spaces. Under explanatory realism, an ontic interpretation incurs two semantic commitments: (i) real-valued physical magnitudes must denote relative to the theory’s admissible state interface, and (ii) the theory must be semantically closed under its own evolution and readout rules. Denotation is interface-relative: it requires the existence of a total continuous witness on names. Equivalently, it requires bounded input dependence at each fixed finite (...) precision. Failure of bounded input dependence is captured by forced extensional totalization (FET), in which even coarse output precision cannot be stabilized by any finite prefix of a state name. We give a physics-facing construction of FET for the three dimensional wave equation with Kirchhoff point readout. We construct a countable family of smooth, compactly supported, finite-energy initial states localized on pairwise disjoint shrinking latitude belts on the Huygens sphere, and restrict the admissible domain to states containing at most one localized contingency. Each nonzero belt perturbation is normalized to contribute the same order-one amount to the readout, while the zero state contributes none. Under any non-oracular state interface satisfying a minimal locality-of-access condition, no finite prefix can rule out activation of some sufficiently deep belt. The induced point readout therefore behaves like the existential predicate ``some belt is active'', exhibits FET at the zero state, and fails to denote. Semantic closure fails: the evolution--readout pipeline yields a localized point magnitude that is non-denoting relative to the fixed state interface. The result isolates a semantic obstruction to ontic readings of continuum dynamics. It is independent of computability, predictability, or measurement feasibility, and it holds despite smooth compact support, finite energy, and classical well-posedness. (shrink)

Refinement geometry defines a directed subdivision structure over history-prefix spaces generated by admissible stability predicates. This paper analyzes the effective realizability of that structure within represented-space semantics. Stability predicates are formalized in uniformly semi-decidable witness form, yielding certified fact sets that evolve monotonically under refinement. A partitioning functional Pi maps finite-information access to a history into the corresponding directed family of refinement partitions. We prove that Pi is Type-2 computable: every finite portion of refinement structure depends on only finitely many (...) oracle interactions. Refinement asymmetry arises as a direct consequence of witness-based predicate semantics. Certified distinctions accumulate monotonically and are never revoked, establishing irreversibility at the level of refinement structure independent of dynamical assumptions. We further show that the canonical maximal partition induced by admissible predicates is computably generable through directed refinement of finite certification stages. Worlds, defined as blocks of the canonical maximal partition, therefore form a recursively enumerable set. Worldhood need not be decidable, and maximality is not finitely certifiable, yet every world arises through effective generation of finite refinement prefixes. In the effective setting, each refinement stage induces a computably presented equivalence relation on a countable domain of names, and branching corresponds to monotone contraction of indistinguishability rather than enlargement of the underlying history space. These results provide a computability-theoretic classification of refinement geometry, establishing constructive generation of maximal distinction structure under finite-information semantics and clarifying the effective consequences of stability-based refinement. (shrink)

Continuum physical theories represent states as real- or complex-valued fields and dynamics as linear operators on infinite dimensional spaces. When interpreted ontically under explanatory realism, such theories are committed to a semantic closure requirement: admissible physical magnitudes must be denoted, and physical evolution must preserve denotation. The work of Pour-El and Richards shows that even well-posed linear continuum dynamics can violate effective uniformity and computability. In this paper we identify a more elementary semantic obstruction. We present a self-contained construction showing (...) that linear continuum evolution, when coupled to an entirely standard localized averaging readout, can force the aggregation of countably many independent contingencies into a single demanded real-valued magnitude. The resulting scalar is extensionally equivalent to the halting real. Under any admissible semantics, its specification is non denoting, since approximating it to arbitrary precision requires forced extensional resolution of a non-total predicate. The construction uses only smooth, compactly supported, finite-energy initial data for the three-dimensional wave equation and does not rely on function-space semantics, regional statehood assumptions, or modulus-of-continuity arguments. It therefore establishes a minimal semantic obstruction for ontic readings of continuum dynamics, isolating forced extensional totalization as the operative mechanism behind failures of semantic closure. (shrink)

This article investigates the claim that some truths are fundamentally or really true — and that other truths are not. Such a distinction can help us reconcile radically minimal metaphysical views with the verities of common sense. I develop an understanding of the distinction whereby Fundamentality is not itself a metaphysical distinction, but rather a device that must be presupposed to express metaphysical distinctions. Drawing on recent work by Rayo on anti-Quinean theories of ontological commitments, I formulate a rigourous theory (...) of the notion. In the final sections, I show how this package dovetails with ' interpretationist' theories of meaning to give sober content to thought that some things — perhaps sets, or gerrymandered mereological sums — can be 'postulated into existence'. (shrink)

What is it to be a woman? What is it to be a man? We start by laying out desiderata for an analysis of 'woman' and 'man': descriptively, it should link these gender categories to sex biology without reducing them to sex biology, and politically, it should help us explain and combat traditional sexism while also allowing us to make sense of the activist view that gendering should be consensual. Using a Putnam-style 'Twin Earth' example, we argue that none of (...) the existing analyses in the feminist literature succeeds in meeting all of our desiderata. Finally, we propose a positive account that we believe can satisfy all the desiderata outlined. According to our theory, the genders 'woman' and 'man' are individuated not by their contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their historical continuity with classes that were originally closely connected to sex biology. (shrink)

This paper examines two puzzles of indeterminacy. The first puzzle concerns the hypothesis that there is a unified phenomenon of indeterminacy. How are we to reconcile this with the apparent diversity of reactions that indeterminacy prompts? The second puzzle focuses narrowly on borderline cases of vague predicates. How are we to account for the lack of theoretical consensus about what the proper reaction to borderline cases is? I suggest (building on work by Maudlin) that the characteristic feature of indeterminacy is (...) alethic normative silence, and use this to explain both plurality and lack of consensus. (shrink)

Computable Wavefunction Realism (CWFR) is an ontological framework for quantum theory grounded in the semantic requirements of explanatory realism. Standard continuum ontology violates two stability conditions: domain instability, in which well-posed dynamics can map admissible states to states with non-denoting magnitudes; and range instability, in which predicates defined on topologically thin sets cannot ground stable physical distinctions. CWFR enforces the minimal corrections via four structural postulates: Lorentz-invariant spectral band-limitation; restriction to computable ontic states; admissible successor dynamics closed on the ontic (...) domain; and predicate admissibility requiring open truth sets. The continuum Hilbert-space formalism is retained as semantic scaffolding rather than ontological furniture. Classical worlds emerge from refinement geometry as maximal diachronic threads through stability-predicate certifications, dissolving the preferred basis problem by identifying classical alternatives as history-dependent objects rather than components of an instantaneous state decomposition. Branching irreversibility follows as a logical consequence of witness-based certification, not a dynamical postulate. Probability operates on finite Boolean event algebras at every refinement stage, rendering standard frameworks for recovering the Born rule applicable without measure-theoretic idealization. This primer is self-contained and accessible to graduate students in physics, mathematics, and the philosophy of physics. -/- . (shrink)

This book is the first interlinear bilingual edition of the core Inner Chapters of the book Zhuangzi, which must be counted among the most famous texts in Chinese intellectual and literary history. A special feature of this edition is that it follows the specific rhythm and rhyme of the text in the translation, making it possible to experience the particular style of this most exciting of the ancient Chinese philosophers. -/- An extensive introduction explains the history and the literary nature (...) of the text, and in particular it tells the story of how this text was appreciated and commented upon in China and translated into foreign languages through the ages. Extensive footnotes are provided to enable Western readers to read the text through the eyes of the enthusiastic Chinese commentators who have annotated the text over the centuries: traditional Chinese literary as well as philosophical commentaries are presented in detail in the original classical Chinese and in translation. -/- For the general reader this book will offer a rare opportunity to approach one of the most outrageously unconventional texts of world literature with the philosophical and philological perspectives of the greatest of its literate Chinese connoisseurs. For the student of Chinese this book will serve as a bilingual cornucopia of spirited classical Chinese discourse on a fiercely contested and always controversially discussed crucial text in the Daoist tradition of ancient China. (shrink)

This is the main handout for my “Zhuangzi Month” public talk, Sept 26/27, 2025, hosted by the Division of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Fāng Yǐzhì’s (方以智, 1611–1671) Yàodì Páo Zhuāng 藥地炮莊 (ca. 1663; “Monk Yàodì Concocts a Zhuāngzǐ”) is an exceptionally complex text. The present talk introduces one of the most distinctive essays contained within Yàodì Páo Zhuāng, an early work of “fan fiction” entitled Huìzǐ yǔ Zhuāngzǐ shū 惠子與莊子書 (“A Letter from Huìzǐ to (...) Zhuāngzǐ”), in which Huìzǐ writes to Zhuāngzǐ from beyond the grave to complain about how he is depicted in the Zhuāngzǐ, among other concerns. This work of “fan fiction”, modeled on Zhāng Zìliè’s (張自烈; 1597–1673) Yǔ gǔrén shū 與古人書 “Letters to the Ancients”, is known as one of the Lúshān èr shū 廬山二書 “Two Writings from Lúshān” finished in 1652. The other of these “two writings”, which shall be discussed en passant, is the complex Xiàng Zǐqī yǔ Guō Zǐxuán shū 向子期與郭子玄書 (“A Letter from Xiàng Zǐqī [Xiàng Xiù (向秀; ca. 227–272)] to Guō Zǐxuán [i.e., Guō Xiàng (郭象; ca. 252–312)]”). This talk will argue that Fāng Yǐzhì’s use of this “fan fiction” format is not merely a literary novelty, but a sophisticated philosophical method for re-engaging and resolving long-standing interpretive problems in Zhuāngzǐ studies. (shrink)

This is a supplemental handout for my “Zhuangzi Month” public talk, Sept 26/27, 2025, hosted by the Division of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Scholarship is a process of continual refinement. In my 2022 Monumenta Serica article, “An Annotated Translation of Fang Yizhi’s Commentary on Zhuangzi’s ‘Butterfly Dream’ Story,” I offered a first English rendering of Fang Yizhi’s dense and allusive remarks on this well-known passage. The present is a reattempt at that early effort. That (...) earlier effort was too literal and imprecise. (shrink)

In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000), I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to familiar inference-patterns (...) such as reductio and conditional proof. (shrink)

The context for biological emergence is modular hierarchical structures; their existence is what enables functional complexity to arise. Because of the openness of organisms to their environment, complete initial data (position, momentum) of all particles making up their structure is insufficient to determine future outcomes, because unpredictable new matter, energy, and information impacts each organism from the exterior. Consequently, through Darwinian evolution, life has developed processes to handle this issue functionally on short time scales as well on longer developmental timescales. (...) Symbolism and technology are the transforming factors handling this issue at the social levels, which is where the most sophisticated outcomes of openness occur. Considering the cosmological context, the issue is, should the universe itself be regarded as an open system over time? I make the case that is indeed so, because radically new outcomes occur such as the existence of aircraft, iPads, and the internet, which could not plausibly have been encoded in some form of data on the Last Scattering Surface in the expanding universe. (shrink)

This paper outlines Lewis’s favoured foundational account of linguistic representation, and outlines and briefly evaluates variations and modifications. Section 1 gives an opinionated exegesis of Lewis’ work on the foundations of reference—his interpretationism. I look at the way that the metaphysical distinction between natural and non-natural properties came to play a central role in his thinking about language. Lewis’s own deployment of this notion has implausible commitments, so in section 2 I consider variations and alternatives. Section 3 briefly considers a (...) buck-passing strategy involving fine-grained linguistic conventions. (shrink)

This book provides a glimpse into 17th-century Zhuāngzǐ (莊子; ca. 4th through 3rd century BCE) studies by introducing the works of Hānshān Déqīng (憨山德清; 1546–1623), Wáng Fūzhī (王夫之; 1619–1692), and Lín Yúnmíng (林雲銘; 1628–1697), which give a sense of diverse approaches to Zhuāngzǐ during this period. -/- The three commentators represent three distinct orientations as reflected by their respective roles, with Hānshān Déqīng being a Buddhist monk, Wáng Fūzhī a philosopher, and Lín Yúnmíng a literary critic. Their understanding of "carefree (...) wandering" (逍遙遊) is spelled out, followed by a complete translation of the Péng–bird 鵬 passage through their eyes. The author concludes how this amounts to a conception of human flourishing. -/- This is the first monograph on Zhuāngzǐ studies of any of these three thinkers in English. General readers or specialists of ancient Chinese philosophy can gain insight into how Zhuāngzǐ was read in culturally relevant contexts. (shrink)

Replication time is among the most important components of a bacterial cell's reproductive fitness. Paradoxically, larger cells replicate in less time than smaller cells despite the fact that assembling a larger cell requires collecting and combining increased quantities of raw materials. This feat is accomplished through the prodigious use of parallel processing, chiefly the translation of mRNA into protein by tens of thousands of ribosomes acting in parallel. The massive over-expression of ribosomes permits protein synthesis, the limiting step in replication, (...) to occur at a rate and scale that would be otherwise impossible. In computer science, spatial parallelism is the distribution of work across the nodes of a distributed-memory multicomputer system. Despite the fact that a non-negligible fraction of artificial life research is grounded in spatially parallel substrates, there have been no examples of artificial organisms that exploit spatial parallelism to replicate in less time than smaller organisms. This paper describes artificial cells defined in a combinator-based artificial chemistry that replicate in less time than smaller cells. This is achieved by employing extra copies of programs implementing the limiting steps in the process used by the cells to synthesize their component parts. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

To advance our understanding of both the Book of Zhuāngzǐ 莊子 (c. fourth to third century BCE) and Qián Mù 錢穆 (1895–1990)’s Zhuāngzǐ studies 莊學, I aim to squarely face one of the more obscure passages in the former with recourse to an explanation from the latter. The passage in question is that from the second chapter beginning with the claim ‘there is a beginning’ (有始也者) and culminating with the claim that ‘there has not yet begun to be a “there (...) has not yet begun to be nothing”’ (有未始有夫未始有無也者). I hope to show that Qián offers a compelling and novel interpretation of this difficult passage worthy of our consideration. (shrink)

One of the most beloved passages in the Zhuang-Zi text is a dialogue between Hui Zi and Zhuang Zi at the end of the “Qiu-shui” chapter. While this is one of many vignettes involving Hui Zi and Zhuang Zi in the text, this particular vignette has recently drawn attention in Chinese and comparative philosophy circles. The most basic question concerning these studies is whether or not the passage represents a substantial philosophical dispute, or instead idle chitchat between two friends. This (...) vignette has not only received much attention as of late, but commentators from at least Guo Xiang onward have taken the conversation as substantial rather than merely charming. Of the traditional readings that take the passage as substantial, there are two main strategies for taking Zhuang Zi as “winning” a substantial dispute: One that argues Zhuang Zi is undermining Hui Zi’s position without offering a positive position, and another that argues that Zhuang Zi is undermining Hui Zi’s position by offering a positive position. Guo Xiang’s “official commentary” is paradigmatic of the first “negative” strategy, while Wang Fuzhi’s reading is paradigmatic of the second “positive” strategy. The goal in the present article is to present these two strategies for reading the passage by translating and analyzing Guo’s and Wang’s annotations, thereby showing how the passage might be and has been taken as more than frivolous chitchat. (shrink)

The present article presents Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-1692 C.E.)’s reading of the eighteenth chapter of the Zhuang-Zi 莊子 (ZZ) by looking at his entry from Zhuang-Zi-Tong 莊子通 and other key glosses from Zhuang-Zi-Jie 莊子解. The philosophical upshot, I aim to show, is that Wang takes ZZ as presenting the consummation of “the greatest joyousness” (zhi-le 至樂) as requiring getting rid of joyousness as one’s desideratum. Using Derek Parfit’s work as a point of reference, I aim to show that this is (...) not paradoxical or even inconsistent or even (directly or indirectly) self-defeating but is instead an interesting instance of a self-effacing theory. (shrink)

This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central (...) topics such as the nature of consciousness. Next a counterfactual account of intuitions proposed by Sosa is criticized. Finally, in response to certain questions raised by Sosa, the explanation of the evidential status of intuition offered in the original paper receives further elaboration. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 64-66.

*This work has turned into a bigger project, and some of it is published in "Lewis on reference".* Some things, argues Lewis, are just better candidates to be referents than others. Even at the cost of attributing false beliefs, we interpret people as referring to the most interesting kinds in their vicinity. How should this be accounted for? In section 1, I look at Lewis’s interpretationism, and the reference magnetism it builds in (not just for ‘perfectly natural’ properties, but for (...) certain kinds of auxiliary apparatus). In section 2, I draw on (Field, 1975) to argue that what properties are reference magnetic may be an ultimately conventional matter—though in the Lewisian setting, there may be an objectively best conventional choice to make. But Lewis’s own account has implausible commitments, so in section 3 I consider variations and alternatives, all of which have problems. In section 4, I look in more detail at eligibility-based interpretationism that do not appeal to naturalness, arguing that there are credible metasemantic theories of this form. (shrink)

*This work is no longer under development* Two major themes in the literature on indicative conditionals are that the content of indicative conditionals typically depends on what is known;1 that conditionals are intimately related to conditional probabilities.2 In possible world semantics for counterfactual conditionals, a standard assumption is that conditionals whose antecedents are metaphysically impossible are vacuously true.3 This aspect has recently been brought to the fore, and defended by Tim Williamson, who uses it in to characterize alethic necessity by (...) exploiting such equivalences as: A⇔¬A A. One might wish to postulate an analogous connection for indicative conditionals, with indicatives whose antecedents are epistemically impossible being vacuously true: and indeed, the modal account of indicative conditionals of Brian Weatherson has exactly this feature.4 This allows one to characterize an epistemic modal by the equivalence A⇔¬A→A. For simplicity, in what follows we write A as KA and think of it as expressing that subject S knows that A.5 The connection to probability has received much attention. Stalnaker suggested, as a way of articulating the ‘Ramsey Test’, the following very general schema for indicative conditionals relative to some probability function P: P = P 1For example, Nolan ; Weatherson ; Gillies. 2For example Stalnaker ; McGee ; Adams. 3Lewis. See Nolan for criticism. 4‘epistemically possible’ here means incompatible with what is known. 5This idea was suggested to me in conversation by John Hawthorne. I do not know of it being explored in print. The plausibility of this characterization will depend on the exact sense of ‘epistemically possible’ in play—if it is compatibility with what a single subject knows, then can be read ‘the relevant subject knows that p’. If it is more delicately formulated, we might be able to read as the epistemic modal ‘must’. (shrink)

"Nothing Better Than Death" is a comprehensive analysis of the near-death experiences profiled on my website at www.near-death.com. This book provides complete NDE testimonials, summaries of various NDEs, NDE research conclusions, a question and answer section, an analysis of NDEs and Christian doctrines, famous quotations about life and death, a NDE bibliography, book notes, a list of NDE resources on the Internet, and a list of NDE support groups associated with IANDS.org - the International Association for Near-Death Studies. -/- The (...) unusual title of this book, "Nothing Better Than Death," was inspired by NDE experiencer Dr. Dianne Morrissey who once said, "If I lived a billion years more, in my body or yours, there's not a single experience on Earth that could ever be as good as being dead. Nothing." -/- Having read every NDE book I could get my hands on, I didn't want to create just another NDE book. My motivation was to give readers a large variety of information about NDEs challenging both the seasoned NDE enthusiast as well as the novice. This book gives readers the means to understand the NDE phenomenon from the perspective of a large number of some of the most profound NDEs ever documented. My hope is that you will enjoy this book, my labor of love, and that you will be truly blessed by the heavenly insights within it. (shrink)