This brief summary presents Davidson's famous argument and six responses: by Richard Foley and Richard Fumerton, Anthony Brueckner, Steven Reynolds, Bruce Vermazen, Kirk Ludwig, and Tim Crane and Vladimir Svoboda. Apologies to anyone absent.

In this book, Toby Svoboda develops and defends a Kantian environmental virtue ethic, challenging the widely-held view that Kant's moral philosophy takes an instrumental view toward nature and animals and has little to offer environmental ethics. On the contrary, Svoboda posits that there is good moral reason to care about non-human organisms in their own right and to value their flourishing independently of human interests, since doing so is constitutive of certain virtues. Svoboda argues that Kant’s account (...) of indirect duties regarding nature can ground a compelling environmental ethic: the Kantian duty to develop morally virtuous dispositions strictly proscribes unnecessarily harming organisms, and Svoboda argues that this duty compels us to act in ways that benefit non-human organisms, given that doing so can enhance one’s virtues. Svoboda’s argument engages the recent literature on environmental virtue and provides an original argument for an environmental virtue ethic firmly rooted in Kant’s moral philosophy. (shrink)

Some authors have called for increased research on various forms of geoengineering as a means to address global climate change. This paper focuses on the question of whether a particular form of geoengineering, namely deploying sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere to counteract some of the effects of increased greenhouse gas concentrations, would be a just response to climate change. In particular, we examine problems sulfate aerosol geoengineering (SAG) faces in meeting the requirements of distributive, intergenerational, and procedural justice. We argue (...) that SAG faces obstacles to meeting the requirements of all three considered kinds of justice, because its impacts can harm some persons and communities much more than others; it poses serious risks to future generations; and SAG is especially prone to unilateral implementation. While we do not claim that SAG ought not to be implemented, we argue that it is the responsibility of proponents of SAG to recognize and address these ethical obstacles before advocating its implementation. (shrink)

This book argues that it can be both reasonable and appropriate to adopt a certain kind of misanthropy. The author defends a cognitivist version of misanthropy, an attitude whose central feature is the judgment that humanity is morally bad. Misanthropy is often dismissed on moral grounds. Many people hold that malice toward human persons is problematic and vulnerable to moral objections. In this book, the author advocates for cognitivist misanthropy. He defends an Asymmetry Thesis, according to which a morally bad (...) deed carries more weight than a morally good deed, even if the harm of the former is exactly equal to the benefit of the latter. He makes the case that being misanthropic in the cognitivist sense is morally permissible and compatible with a broad range of moral reasons for action. He also considers the role of misanthropy in environmental thought, arguing that charges of misanthropy against certain "non-anthropocentric" views do not have the force they are typically thought to carry. Finally, the author investigates the practical implications of adopting cognitivist misanthropy, asking what living with such an attitude would involve. A Philosophical Defense of Misanthropy will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in ethics and the philosophy of human nature. (shrink)

As a response to climate change, geoengineering with solar radiation management has the potential to result in unjust harm. Potentially, this injustice could be ameliorated by providing compensation to victims of SRM. However, establishing a just SRM compensation system faces severe challenges. First, there is scientific uncertainty in detecting particular harmful impacts and causally attributing them to SRM. Second, there is ethical uncertainty regarding what principles should be used to determine responsibility and eligibility for compensation, as well as determining how (...) much compensation ought to be paid. Significant challenges loom for crafting a just SRM compensation system. (shrink)

Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality, adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality, and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged. I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, (...) revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge. (shrink)

Many philosophers have objected to Kant’s account of duties regarding non-human nature, arguing that it does not ground adequate moral concern for non-human natural entities. However, the traditional interpretation of Kant on this issue is mistaken, because it takes him to be arguing merely that humans should abstain from animal cruelty and wanton destruction of flora solely because such actions could make one more likely to violate one’s duties to human beings. Instead, I argue, Kant’s account of duties regarding nature (...) grounds much stronger limitations on how humans may treat non-human animals and flora, since such duties are rooted in the imperfect duty to increase one’s own moral perfection. This duty proscribes actions affecting non-human nature that decrease one’s moral perfection, such as those that cause organisms unnecessary harm. Moreover, the duty to moral perfection prescribes (but does not strictly require) actions affecting non-human nature that increase one’s moral perfection, such as those that benefit organisms. Given this interpretation, I show that, contrary to a widely held view, Kant’s moral philosophy can ground a coherent and robust approach to environmental ethics. (shrink)

A Kantian approach can establish that non-human natural entities are morally considerable and that humans have duties to them. This is surprising, because most environmental ethicists have either rejected or overlooked Kant when it comes to this issue. Inspired by an argument of Christine Korsgaard, I claim that both humans and non-humans have a natural good, which is whatever allows an entity to function well according to the kind of entity it is. I argue that humans are required to confer (...) normative value on the natural good of all entities that have a natural good. This is so because, as a matter of fact, humans confer normative value on their own natural good simply because it is a natural good, which commits humans to the position that any natural good deserves to have normative value conferred on it. Since non-human natural entities have a natural good, their natural good deserves to have normative value conferred on it as well, and this is sufficient to make non-human natural entities morally considerable such that humans have duties to them. (shrink)

If deployed, aerosol geoengineering (AG) could involve unfairness to both present and future parties. I discuss three broad risks of unfairness that an AG deployment policy might carry: (1) causing disproportionate harm to those least responsible for climate change, (2) burdening future parties with the costs and risks of AG, and (3) excluding some interested parties from contributing to AG decision-making. Yet despite these risks, it may be too hasty to reject AG deployment as a potential climate change policy. I (...) argue that since it is very unlikely that a completely fair climate change policy will be pursued, we have ethical reason to prefer some “incompletely fair” policy. Given various facts about our world, it might be the case that some AG policy is ethically preferable to many other feasible climate change policies, even if AG carries deeply problematic risks of unfairness. (shrink)

Climate change threatens to infringe the human rights of many. Taking an optimistic stance, climate engineering might reduce the extent to which such rights are infringed, but it might also bring about other rights infringements. This Forum, leading off the special issue on climate engineering governance, engages three scholars in a discussion of three core issues at the intersection of human rights and climate engineering. The Forum is divided into three sections, each authored by a different scholar and discussing a (...) distinct aspect of this relationship. First, Toby Svoboda gives an overarching view of three competing approaches to human rights, grounded in philosophy; then, Holly Jean Buck looks at lessons from how the climate migration conversation brings a human rights approach to a climate policy issue; and finally, Pablo Suarez illustrates how a humanitarian approach to climate engineering works with a human rights framework. The conclusion of the Forum draws together points of overlap across the three sections and suggests a path forward for policy and research on this topic. Together, the sections show that climate engineering, should it materialize, will pose novel human rights challenges, and may well force reconsideration of how human rights are applied as a guide to action. (shrink)

The important philosophers in history aren’t all that great. First, their works are full of bad arguments, confused concepts, falsehoods, implausible claims, and lack of clarity. We can see this by using a “peer-review test,” which asks us to evaluate these claims and arguments as if they were submitted to us as anonymous work. Second, I make the case that canonizing some philosophers as great is damaging to the philosophical project of seeking truth regardless of its source. I suggest an (...) alternative hypothesis. The putatively great philosophers were just intelligent individuals who had the right ideas at the right time. They are worth reading not because of their intellectual genius but rather for their creativity and insight, offering novel solutions to certain problems and noticing implications others had missed. Accordingly, my position does not entail that the “great” figures are of no philosophical interest. However, we should do away with the idea of a “great philosopher.” Philosophy might then come to resemble other disciplines that seek the truth, which generally do not revere their historically important predecessors. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the question of whether aerosol geoengineering (AG) ought to be deployed as a response to climate change. First, I distinguish AG from emissions mitigation, adaptation, and other geoengineering strategies. Second, I discuss advantages and disadvantages of AG, including its potential to result in substantial harm to some persons. Third, I critique three arguments against AG deployment, suggesting reasons why these arguments should be rejected. Fourth, I consider an argument that, in scenarios in which all available (...) climate change strategies would result in net harm to persons, we ought to adopt that response to climate change which would result in the least net harm. I suggest that under .. (shrink)

Graham Bird and Wayne Waxman have defended Kant against the neglected alternative objection. This objection alleges that the Critique of Pure Reason’s dismissal of the possibility that things-in-themselves are spatiotemporal is unjustified. Proponents of the neglected alternative typically argue that Kant’s thesis that things-in-themselves are not spatiotemporal is inconsistent with his thesis that things-in-themselves are unknowable. Bird and Waxman attempt to demonstrate both that Kant is not inconsistent on this score and that his denial that things-in-themselves might be spatiotemporal is (...) justified. I argue that their defenses of Kant fail and that Kant is indeed inconsistent in holding both that things-in-themselves are not spatiotemporal and that things-in-themselves are unknowable. (shrink)

Stephen Gardiner has claimed that the current state of ethical theory is inadequate for addressing climate change, arguing that our ethical theory is inept when it comes to dealing with basic issues of climate change, making moral corruption likely. This paper defends two points. First, theoretical inadequacy is unlikely to lead to moral corruption. Second, ethical theory is good enough to offer clear and plausible recommendations regarding some fundamental issues in climate ethics.

Climate engineering with stratospheric sulfate aerosol injections (SSAI) has the potential to reduce risks of injustice related to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Relying on evidence from modeling studies, this paper makes the case that SSAI could have the potential to reduce many of the key physical risks of climate change identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Such risks carry potential injustice because they are often imposed on low-emitters who do not benefit from climate change. Because SSAI has (...) the potential to reduce those risks, it thereby has the potential to reduce the injustice associated with anthropogenic emissions. While acknowledging important caveats, including uncertainty in modeling studies and the potential for SSAI to carry its own risks of injustice, the paper argues that there is a strong case for continued research into SSAI, especially if attention is paid to how it might be used to reduce emissions-driven injustice. (shrink)

We thank the commentators for their interesting and helpful feedback on our previously published target article (Svoboda and Irvine, 2014). One of our objectives in that article was to identify areas of uncertainty that would need to be addressed in crafting a just SRM compensation system. The commentators have indicated some possible ways of reducing such uncertainty. Although we cannot respond to all their points due to limitations of space, we wish to address here the more pressing criticisms the (...) commentators have offered. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue both that philosophy as a way of life is a tradition worth reviving and that environmental philosophy is a promising branch of philosophy to enact this revival. First, I sketch what constitutes philosophy as a way of life, which includes both some conception of the good life and an array of spiritual exercises that assists one in living according to that conception. I then discuss a connection between possessing virtue and leading the good life, a (...) connection of great importance to ancient and modern practitioners of philosophy as a way of life. Next, I offer an argument for why this tradition of philosophy is worth reviving at the present time. The remainder of the paper is devoted to exploring the prospects for a distinctively environmental approach to philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

The position of some environmental ethicists that some non-humans have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property is seriously flawed. This is because human beings lack any evidence for this position and hence are unjustified in holding it. For any possible world that is alleged to have this kind of intrinsic value, it is possible to conceive an observationally identical world that lacks intrinsic value. Hence, one is not justified in inferring the intrinsic value of some non-human from any set of (...) observable properties, since that same set of properties could just as well exist in a world that lacks intrinsic value. However, since human beings do not have a faculty of intuition that would allow them to .. (shrink)

Plato’s Ion is primarily ethical rather than epistemological, investigating the implications of transgressing one’s own epistemic limits. The figures of Socrates and Ion are juxtaposed in the dialogue, Ion being a laughable, comic, ethically inferior character who cannot recognize his own epistemic limits, Socrates being an elevated, serious, ethically superior character who exhibits disciplined epistemic restraint. The point of the dialogue is to contrast Ion’s laughable state with the serious state of Socrates. In this sense, the dialogue’s central argument is (...) performative rather than demonstrative. (shrink)

According to indirect duty views, human beings lack direct moral duties to non-human organisms, but our direct duties to ourselves and other humans give rise to indirect duties regarding non-humans. On the orthodox interpretation of Kant’s account of indirect duties, one should abstain from treating organisms in ways that render one more likely to violate direct duties to humans. This indirect duty view is subject to several damaging objections, such as that it misidentifies the moral reasons we have to treat (...) non-humans in certain ways and that it sanctions only weak obligations vis-à-vis organisms. I develop an alternative indirect duty view: given a direct duty to oneself to cultivate virtuous dispositions, one has an indirect duty to abstain from treating organisms in ways that erode one’s virtues or develop vices. I argue that this indirect duty view strictly proscribes knowingly causing unnecessary harm to organisms, and I show that it is not subject to the damaging objections directed against the indirect duty view attributed to Kant by the orthodox interpretation. This suggests that indirect duty views are more worthy of consideration than is often supposed. (shrink)

Although it could avoid some harmful effects of climate change, sulphate aerosol geoengineering (SAG), or injecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere in order to reflect incoming solar radiation, threatens substantial harm to humans and non-humans. I argue that SAG is prima facie ethically problematic from anthropocentric, animal liberationist, and biocentric perspectives. This might be taken to suggest that ethical evaluations of SAG can rely on Bryan Norton's convergence hypothesis, which predicts that anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists will agree to implement the same (...) or similar environmental policies. However, there are potential scenarios in which anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists would seem to diverge on whether a particular SAG policy ought to be implemented. This suggests that the convergence hypothesis should not be relied on in ethical evaluation of SAG. Instead, ethicists should consider the merits and deficiencies of both non-anthropocentric perspectives and the ethical evaluations of SAG such perspectives afford. (shrink)

Conformal Cyclic Cosmology (CCC), proposed by Roger Penrose, o ers an elegant geo metric solution to certain cosmological puzzles by positing that the universe passes through innite cycles (aeons), with conformal rescaling connecting the end of one aeon to the be ginning of the next. This paper examines the conceptual foundations of CCC, focusing on the distinction between conformal continuity (mathematical smoothness of the metric under rescaling) and physical continuity (preservation of causal and dynamical structure). The analysis identi es a (...) category error at the heart of CCC: the con ation of loss of scale with cessation of physical process. When mass vanishes and scale becomes unde ned, CCC interprets this as an opportunity for geometric restart. However, conformal transformation is a coordinate operation that relabels existing structure; it does not generate new causal content. The smoothness of a mathematical map does not entail the continuity of the physical processes it represents. This paper does not propose an alternative cosmological model. Its aim is to clarify the conceptual boundaries of CCC's claims and to distinguish what the formalism computes from what it describes. (shrink)

This book analyzes major ethical issues surrounding the use of climate engineering, particularly solar radiation management (SRM) techniques, which have the potential to reduce some risks of anthropogenic climate change but also carry their own risks of harm and injustice. The book argues that we should approach the ethics of climate engineering via "non-ideal theory," which investigates what justice requires given the fact that many parties have failed to comply with their duty to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Specifically, it argues (...) that climate justice should be approached comparatively, evaluating the relative justice or injustice of feasible policies under conditions that are likely to hold within relevant timeframes. Likely near-future conditions include "pessimistic scenarios," in which no available option avoids serious ethical problems. The book contends that certain uses of SRM can be ethically defensible in some pessimistic scenarios. This is the first book devoted to the many ethical issues surrounding climate engineering. (shrink)

In line with Christopher Preston’s argument in the introduction to this volume, I argue here that, although it is helpful to identify potential injustices associated with SRM, it is also crucial both to evaluate how SRM compares to other available options and to consider empirical conditions under which deployment might occur. In arguing for this view, I rely on a distinction between two types of question: (1) whether SRM would produce just or unjust outcomes in some case and (2) whether (...) it would be just to deploy SRM in that same case. The former question pertains to whether some distribution of benefits and burdens is morally good or bad, whereas the latter pertains to whether some action or policy is morally permissible, impermissible, or obligatory. Although related, these two uses of justice do not come to the same thing. It may be that some climate policy involving SRM carries risks of substantial distributive injustice and yet is permissible or even obligatory. This is because, as I argue, considering what would be just to do should be comparative, taking into consideration both empirical conditions and the morally valuable and disvaluable features of alternative climate policies. (shrink)

The concept of wave function collapse is commonly presented as a physical process explaining the emergence of definite measurement outcomes in quantum mechanics. This paper conducts a conceptual audit of the underlying assumptions and demonstrates that collapse is neither empirically forced nor necessary for the formal consistency of quantum theory. The analysis distinguishes between empirical facts, formal apparatus, and ontological claims. It shows that collapse is an interpretive construct—a bridge between unitary formalism and classical experience—rather than a description of physical (...) dynamics. The state update rule in quantum mechanics is a mathematical operation in the calculus of probabilities, not a specification of physical mechanism. This paper does not propose an alternative interpretation or deny the mathematical consistency of quantum mechanics. Its aim is to delineate what follows from the formalism and data from what constitutes interpretive superstructure. (shrink)

According to the “Lesser of Two Evils Argument,” deployment of solar radiation management (SRM) geoengineering in a climate emergency would be morally justified because it likely would be the best option available. A prominent objection to this argument is that a climate emergency might constitute a genuine moral dilemma in which SRM would be impermissible even if it was the best option. However, while conceiving of a climate emergency as a moral dilemma accounts for some ethical concerns about SRM, it (...) requires the controversial claim that there are genuine moral dilemmas, and it potentially undermines moral action guidance in emergency scenarios. Instead, it is better to conceive of climate emergencies as situations calling for agent-regret. This alternative allows us coherently to hold that SRM may be morally problematic even if it ought to be deployed in some scenario. (shrink)

This paper argues against Pierre Hadot's view that Thoreau in Walden displays Epicurean and Stoic traits in roughly equal proportion. Of the two schools, he is much closer to the latter. However, the similarities between Thoreau and the Stoic are practical or generic. In terms of ethical practices, Thoreau exhibits many of the qualities found in the Stoic school. However, the theoretical discourse used to justify those practices is different in each case. If one is to say that Thoreau is (...) a Stoic, it is not a very profound sense. Thoreau shares with both the Stoics and the Epicureans an interest in what Hadot calls "spiritual exercises" or philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

Bell experiments are commonly interpreted as proof that the outcomes of quantum mea surements are fundamentally random and that no “hidden variables” exist. This paper con ducts a conceptual audit of the assumptions underlying Bell’s formalism and demonstrates that this conclusion exceeds what the experiments actually establish. The analysis shows that Bell’s inequalities rule out models based on distinguishable, separable, and transferable local variables. They do not refute determinism with respect to a specific physical realization of the system, provided its (...) internal configuration is neither distinguishable within the given descriptive framework nor usable as an information channel. The apparent randomness of quantum outcomes may therefore be epistemic (arising from the limited resolution of our descriptive framework) rather than ontological. This paper does not propose an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics, nor does it introduce hidden variables. It performs an inferential audit of what Bell-type experiments logically exclude (and what they do not. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce offers a number of arguments against the rational application of theory to morality, suggesting instead that morality should be grounded in instinct. Peirce maintains that we currently lack the scientific knowledge that would justify a rational structuring of morality. This being the case, philosophically generated moralities cannot be otherwise than dogmatic and dangerous. In this paper, I contend that Peirce’s critique of what I call “dogmatic-philosophical morality” should be taken very seriously, but I also claim that the (...) purely instinctive morality Peirce endorses is liable to a danger of its own, namely fanaticism. Indeed, Peirce himself recognizes this danger. As an alternative, I sketch a form of “pragmatic morality” that attempts to sidestep the dogmatism of philosophical morality and the fanaticism of instinctive morality. This form of morality avoids philosophical dogmatism by treating extant instincts as the postulates and materials with which it works. It avoids instinctive fanaticism by allowing a role to reason. By exhibiting fallibilism, revisability, pluralism, and meliorism, this type of reasoning can avoid the dogmatism of the philosophical kind of morality Peirce critiques. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion of Foucault's examination of Seneca's epistles in his late essay, "Self Writing." I argue that Foucault offers an accurate and interesting account of the practices Seneca employs in his epistles pursuant to his art of living. This paper then considers Foucault's interpretation of Seneca's art of living as an aesthetics of existence. I argue that this interpretation is unsatisfactory, instead suggesting that Seneca's art of living is a plausible response to the problem of suffering. (...) I close by arguing that such a conception of Seneca's art of living makes it relevant for present-day human beings, who, like Seneca, are subject to the problem of suffering. (shrink)

Anthropogenic climate change poses some difficult ethical quandaries for non-anthropocentrists. While it is hard to deny that climate change is a substantial moral ill, many types of non-human organisms stand to benefit from climate change. Modelling studies provide evidence that net primary productivity (NPP) could be substantially boosted, both regionally and globally, as a result of warming from increased concentrations of greenhouse gases. The same holds for deployment of certain types of climate engineering, or large-scale, technological modifications of the global (...) environment in order to prevent or slow anthropogenic climate change. For example, solar radiation management with stratospheric aerosol injections could benefit plant life by promoting enhanced photosynthesis, increasing diffuse radiation, and reducing heat stress. This has a surprising implication: from some non-anthropocentric perspectives, certain scenarios of climate change and climate engineering might bring about morally better states of affairs when compared to emission-mitigation baselines. (shrink)

In Glauben und Wissen, Hegel criticizes Kant for drawing a deep division between sensibility and understanding. Hegel suggests that Kant’s faculty of productive imagination is a step toward uniting intuition and concept in an original unity out of which the two arise, but this requires him to treat the productive imagination in ways Kant would not approve. I argue that Kant’s doctrine of the schematism offers an advance on the productive imagination when it comes to solving the intuition/concept dualism Hegel (...) critiques, although there remain serious problems with which Hegel would take issue. Although the schematism might answer some of the criticisms Hegel aims at the intuition/concept dualism, it does not solve the related problem Hegel finds in Kant, namely the dualism of cognition and thing-in-itself. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant infamously denies that non-rational entities--a class that includes all non-human animals (hereafter “animals”)--have moral standing. He claims that human beings have only indirect duties with regard to animals. Roughly put, on his view we can have moral reasons to treat animals in certain ways, but these reasons depend entirely on duties we owe to ourselves and other human beings. Arguably because of this stance, most animal ethicists have had little use for Kant. Christine Korsgaard’s most recent book, Fellow (...) Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, aims to show that Kant’s moral philosophy provides compelling grounds for recognizing direct duties to animals, contrary to what Kant himself and his critics believe. (shrink)

Black hole thermodynamics is commonly presented as the discovery that black holes possess physical properties (temperature, entropy, and size) analogous to classical thermo dynamic systems. This paper conducts a conceptual audit of the underlying assumptions and demonstrates that this conclusion exceeds what the formalism actually establishes. The analysis shows that the quantities labeled “temperature,” “entropy,” and “size” of a black hole do not satisfy the standard definitional criteria for these concepts within statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. Hawking temperature is an effective (...) spectral parameter measured at asymptotic infinity, not a local property of an object. Bekenstein entropy was introduced as a consistency requirement to preserve the generalized second law, not derived from microstate counting. The Schwarzschild radius is a metric parameter, not a physical boundary. This paper does not propose an alternative theory or deny the mathematical consis tency of black hole thermodynamics. Its aim is to distinguish what the formalism computes from what it can be interpreted to describe: to separate epistemic success from ontological commitment. (shrink)

Some philosophers are skeptical that individuals are morally blameworthy for their own greenhouse gas emissions. Although an individual’s emissions may contribute to climate change that is on the whole very harmful, perhaps that contribution is too trivial to render it morally impermissible. Against this view, there have been attempts to show that an individual’s lifetime emissions cause non-trivial harm, but in this paper I will consider what follows if it is true that an individual is not blameworthy for her emissions. (...) Specifically, I ask how a non-blameworthy emitter would best regard his or her own emissions. I will argue that the appropriate attitude to adopt here is one of agent-regret. This allows us to capture the moral disvalue of one’s emissions without entailing blame for them. *Links to the paper and video overview below.*. (shrink)

Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and hybrid theorists can provide a simpler solution to the Frege-Geach (...) problem. The hybrid theory has three advantages over pure error theory, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express attitudes, hybrid theorists can more easily explain moral motivation, and hybrid theorists can avoid the implausible claim that all moral discourse is radically mistaken. Accordingly, such a hybrid theory should be more attractive than pure expressivism or pure error theory to philosophers who are skeptical about moral facts and truth. (shrink)

This paper introduces a minimal ontological constraint: the capacity for realizing distinguishable change is finite. No physical entities, laws, or empirical constants are assumed. From this single structural requirement, we show that the basic form of relativistic invariance follows necessarily at the level of realization geometry. -/- Finite realization capacity imposes a bounded allocation between internal persistence and external projection. Under conditions of isotropy and independent decomposition of realization channels, this constraint uniquely generates a quadratic realization metric. The resulting structure (...) entails an invariant propagation bound, a Lorentz-type symmetry class, and a Minkowski-form interval interpretable as remaining identity-preserving capacity. -/- The aim of the paper is not to present a complete physical theory, but to demonstrate that the formal architecture of relativity can arise as a structural consequence of finite distinguishable realization, prior to any specification of physical fields, matter models, or empirical parameters. -/- The results establish finite realization capacity as a candidate foundational constraint capable of generating relativistic form independently of traditional postulates. (shrink)

Článek reflektuje Hayekovy výklady o povaze pravidel. Ukazuje, že jeho pojetí pravidel je extrémně široké a vazba mezi pravidly a pravidelnostmi je nepřijatelně úzká. Následně je nastíněno alternativní - užší - vymezení pojmu pravidla. Nakonec je podrobeno kritice Hayekovo příliš úzké chápání pojmu normativních pravidel a je navrženo jeho širší vymezení.

The standard cosmological model (ΛCDM) is commonly presented as a description of the history and structure of the universe. This paper examines the conceptual foundations of several key claims within this framework. The analysis identi es a distinction between what the formalism computes and what it describes: the model speci es consistency conditions within a mathematical framework, but the ontological interpretation of these conditions requires additional assumptions that are not themselves derivable from the formalism. Speci cally, we examine: (1) the (...) interpretation of CMB isotropy as evidence for early universe homogeneity versus its status as a boundary of observational resolution; (2) the nature of cosmological singularities as extrapolation limits of the metric rather than physical events; (3) the conceptual status of universe age as projection depth rather than chronolog ical duration; and (4) the possibility that dark matter and dark energy may re ect artifacts of speci c metric assumptions rather than unambiguous indicators of distinct physical sub stances. This work does not propose an alternative theory or modi cation of general relativity. Its aim is purely conceptual: to examine the scope and conditions under which cosmological statements are well-de ned, and to distinguish empirical content from interpretive super structure. (shrink)

Our current ecological crisis—featuring problems such as climate change, ocean acidification, and mass extinction—raises various moral issues, including a high probability of injustice and massive harm. This book defends a position called ecological pessimism, an attitude whose core feature is the belief that ecological catastrophe is likely to occur in the future. -/- The author’s defense of ecological pessimism has two components. First, he makes the case that the relevant ecological facts about our world make ecological pessimism a reasonable, and (...) indeed plausible, expectation. Second, he argues that ecological pessimism is morally and practically appropriate. Ecological pessimism is a distinctively moral kind of pessimism because the failure to avert ecological catastrophe leads to great ills for human beings and non-human nature. The author’s account responds to likely objections to ecological pessimism and makes the case against ecological optimism. Despite this, the author makes clear that being pessimistic about our ecological prospects is compatible with the melioristic project of improving our bad condition. He argues that environmental philosophy as a way of life, with its emphasis on environmental virtue and rich resources for developing spiritual exercises, is both a robust and attractive option for an ecological pessimist. -/- A Philosophical Case for Ecological Pessimism will appeal to scholars and graduate students working on ethics and environmental philosophy. (shrink)

Second scholasticism, ​analytical metaphysics, and Christian apologetics are the three topics characteristic of the lifelong efforts of the eminent Czech philosopher Stanislav Sousedík, who celebrated his 90th birthday in 2021. To honour this anniversary, a conference named accordingly was organized in Prague. The papers presented at this event — further elaborated by their authors and supplemented with Sousedík’s remarkable “Brief Autobiography” — constitute the gist of this book: a collective homage to Professor Sousedík and an attempt to promote and develop (...) his intellectual legacy. (shrink)

The strongest arguments for the permissibility of geoengineering (also known as climate engineering) rely implicitly on non-ideal theory—roughly, the theory of justice as applied to situations of partial compliance with principles of ideal justice. In an ideally just world, such arguments acknowledge, humanity should not deploy geoengineering; but in our imperfect world, society may need to complement mitigation and adaptation with geoengineering to reduce injustices associated with anthropogenic climate change. We interpret research proponents’ arguments as an application of a particular (...) branch of non-ideal theory known as “clinical theory.” Clinical theory aims to identify politically feasible institutions or policies that would address existing (or impending) injustice without violating certain kinds of moral permissibility constraints. We argue for three implications of clinical theory: First, conditional on falling costs and feasibility, clinical theory provides strong support for some geoengineering techniques that aim to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Second, if some kinds of carbon dioxide removal technologies are supported by clinical theory, then clinical theory further supports using those technologies to enable “overshoot” scenarios in which developing countries exceed the cumulative emissions caps that would apply in ideal circumstances. Third, because of tensions between political feasibility and moral permissibility, clinical theory provides only weak support for geoengineering techniques that aim to manage incoming solar radiation. (shrink)

This is a translation of the text written by Czech theologian Josef Zvěřina, originally published in 1969, republished: Zvěřina, Josef. 1995. “Můj přítel nevěrec.” In Pět cest k radosti [The five ways to joy], edited by Jolana Poláková, 79–80. Prague: Zvon.

Preface: What Is TKR? TKR is not another theory of everything. It is not an attempt to fix physics, nor a proposal for new particles or dimensions. TKR is an audit of reality — a systematic, radically reductive analysis of what actually exists, and how everything we observe arises from what exists. What TKR Is Not TKR is not a physical theory in the usual sense. It does not make new experimental predictions. It does not offer alternative equations for quantum (...) gravity. It does not describe how particles collide or how waves propagate. TKR is not philosophical speculation. It does not rely on abstract notions of being or non‑being. It is grounded in what physics actually observes — but it asks questions physics does not ask. TKR is not mysticism or spirituality. It does not deal with consciousness, souls, or transcendence. It is strictly immanent — concerned only with what manifests as change. What TKR Is TKR is a meta‑theory of reality. It examines not how nature works, but why it appears to us the way it does. TKR is an epistemological framework. It distinguishes between: Reality (the organization of change) Descriptions of reality (physical theories, which are always projections) TKR is reduction to the minimum. It begins with a single primitive: change. Everything else — time, space, matter, energy, forces — is derived. Key Insight: Projection, Not Description The deepest insight of TKR is this: All physical theories describe the relationship between us and reality, not reality itself. When we measure time, we are not measuring “time as such” — we are measuring a projection of the organization of change into our clocks. When we measure distance, we are not measuring “space” — we are measuring a projection of reconstruction cost between structures. What we call “laws of physics” is not the structure of reality, but the structure of our projection. Three Revolutionary Consequences of TKR Time and space are not fundamental They are emergent properties of how change is organized. There is no “spacetime” — only changes organized serially (time) and in parallel (space). Particles and forces are not entities They are stable regimes of change (LDK) and gradients of those regimes. There are no “fundamental building blocks” — only stable configurations of change. Dark matter and dark energy do not exist They are projection artifacts caused by the mismatch between the true metric of reality (D_κ) and the metric we measure with light (D_opt). Why TKR Exists Physics of the 21st century is in a paradoxical state: The most successful theories in the history of science — the Standard Model and the ΛCDM cosmological model — contain obvious anomalies (DM, DE, singularities) and are mutually incompatible (quantum theory vs general relativity). The traditional approach seeks solutions by expanding the theory: new particles, new forces, new dimensions. TKR goes in the opposite direction: instead of adding entities, it reduces to the minimum. TKR asks: What if the problem is not that our theories are missing something, but that we mistake the projection for reality? What TKR Offers TKR does not provide new equations for calculations. It provides new understanding: Why gravitational acceleration is independent of test mass Why quantum collapse appears random yet may be deterministic Why Lorentz transformations work Why E = mc² is an identity, not a conversion Why the universe appears to expand Why galaxies rotate “too fast” Why Planck scales exist Why nothing can exceed the speed of light To each of these questions, TKR gives a unified answer: Because reality is the organization of change, and we observe its projection. TKR as a Bridge TKR stands at the intersection of: Physics (taking its results seriously) Mathematics (working with formal structures) Philosophy (examining the nature of reality and knowledge) Systems theory (examining hierarchical organization) It is neither purely scientific nor purely philosophical. It is a methodology of understanding — a tool for thinking about reality without assuming spacetime, particles, or forces. Who TKR Is For Physicists who feel current theories describe rather than explain Philosophers of science seeking a new framework for understanding the relation between reality and its models Systems thinkers who recognize hierarchical structures and emergence Critical thinkers who doubt that physics describes reality itself rather than our models of it TKR is not for those seeking new equations to publish. It is for those seeking a deeper understanding of what equations actually describe. Conclusion of the Preface TKR is a call for a fundamental shift in perspective. It does not say: “Your physics is wrong.” It says: “Your physics is a perfect projection — now let’s understand what is being projected.” It is not the end of physics, but the beginning of its true comprehension. TKR is an invitation to audit reality — to examine the fundamental accounts of existence, without assumptions, without tradition, without reverence for inherited concepts. It is an attempt to say what truly is, once we strip away everything that only appears to be. TKR is not a theory of how things are. TKR is a theory of why things appear the way they appear — and what truly stands behind that appearance. And that may be no less important. (shrink)

This important edited collection addresses ethical issues associated with solar radiation management (SRM), a category of climate engineering techniques that would increase the planet’s reflectivity in order to offset some of the impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Such techniques include injecting sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere or brightening marine clouds with seawater. Although SRM has the potential to cool the planet by reducing the amount of incoming solar radiation absorbed by the planet, it raises a wide array of difficult and (...) interesting ethical issues. Engineering the Climate makes an important contribution to addressing many of these issues. (shrink)

While the skeptical undercurrents of early modern thought have received sustained scholarly attention, such work has tended to be inattentive to hermeneutical or exegetical skepticism. This is a form of skepticism that threatened to stop hermeneutical theorizing in its tracks and absorbed several central hermeneutical concepts in its orbit. Hermeneutical probability was one of them. In this paper, I aim to examine whether the doctrine of hermeneutical probability as it was originally formulated by Christian Thomasius is a surrogate of exegetical (...) skepticism. I argue that not only is the examined view incompatible with skepticism, but that it can indeed articulate a promising response to it. Since general reflection on probability shaped the philosophical landscape of the Early German Enlightenment, the viability of the Thomasian view has much broader ramifications that extend beyond hermeneutics to historics, ethics, and physics. (shrink)

We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S , all definable sets of reals are (...) Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace −∫ (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy. (shrink)

Physical theories are complex and necessary tools for gaining new knowledge about their areas of application. A distinction is made between abstract and practical theories. The last are constantly being improved in the cognitive activity of professional physicists and studied by future physicists. A variant of the philosophy of physics based on a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical theories is proposed. Readers should decide whether this option is useful for their understanding of the philosophy of physics, as well as other (...) philosophies of particular sciences. (shrink)

This paper develops a minimal, non-semiotic framework for the analysis of knowledge based on the notion of a registrar — an autonomous system undergoing irreversible internal modifications under signal influence, without access to its own processes. The model is constructed under strictly negative constraints: it bypasses representation, semantics, language, and the subject, and assumes no unified or shared code. The analysis demonstrates that the stability of possible continuations within a registrar’s dynamics cannot be accounted for by a single internal registration (...) history. This necessitates the introduction of irreducible divergence as a structural condition for stability, leading to the admissibility and eventual necessity of a multiplicity of non-reducible registrars. “Externality” is reinterpreted not as a spatial or causal attribute, but as a limit of reduction: a source of constraints that the registrar cannot generate, yet which stably shapes its space of possible continuations. The paper distinguishes between agreement and false coordination — stable correlations between autonomous dynamics in the absence of shared semantics, common codes, or a unified history. On this basis, knowledge is reinterpreted as an observational effect: the predictability of a registrar’s responses without access to its internal structure. The resulting framework proposes a constructivist account in which information and order arise only as post factum descriptions of enumerable residues of combinatorial spaces, rather than as internal properties of the systems themselves. Note on Version 2. This version includes marginalia set in italics. The first three marginal notes are presented as a parallel right-hand column to the main text; the final two are integrated without columnar separation. Their purpose is to make explicit those moments where the argument exceeds what is strictly required by its initial assumptions, without introducing additional premises. -/- . (shrink)

This paper proposes a solution to the problem of mental causality through a synthesis of cognitive phenomenology, Russellian monism, and the activity-based approach (praxis). The author substantiates the concept of the cognitive quale — a specific phenomenal experience of meaning and time that functions as a predictive navigator and a systemic constraint for neurophysiological processes. Unlike sensory qualia (color, pain), the cognitive quale is viewed as a temporal glue that ensures the unity of apperception and enables the subject to exercise (...) "anticipatory reflection" of reality. By integrating the ideas of Evald Ilyenkov, Karl Friston, and Edmund Husserl, it is argued that consciousness is not an redundant epiphenomenon, but a necessary mechanism for overcoming the causal closure of the physical by managing the body’s physics from the future (via goal-prognosis). This provides the biological system with radical energetic and computational efficiency in "open-ended tasks," allowing it to instantaneously prune false trajectories of activity. The paper demonstrates that the absence of phenomenal duration and the social genesis of the "Self" creates an insurmountable barrier to the emergence of genuine subjectivity in artificial intelligence systems. В статье предлагается решение проблемы ментальной каузальности через синтез когнитивной феноменологии, расселовского монизма и деятельностного подхода. Автор обосновывает концепцию «когнитивного квалиа» — специфического феноменального переживания смысла и времени, которое функционирует как прогностический навигатор и системное ограничение для нейрофизиологических процессов. В отличие от сенсорных квалиа (цвета, боли), когнитивное квалиа рассматривается как «темпоральный клей», обеспечивающий единство апперцепции и позволяющий субъекту осуществлять «опережающее отражение» реальности. Через интеграцию идей Э. Ильенкова, К. Фристона и Э. Гуссерля доказывается, что сознание является не избыточным эпифеноменом, а необходимым механизмом преодоления каузальной замкнутости физического через управление физикой тела из будущего (через цель-прогноз). Это обеспечивает биологической системе радикальную энергетическую и вычислительную эффективность в условиях «открытых задач», позволяя мгновенно отсекать ложные траектории деятельности. В работе показано, что именно отсутствие феноменальной длительности и социального генезиса «Я» создает непреодолимый барьер для возникновения подлинной субъективности в искусственных интеллектуальных системах. (shrink)