The Rashomon set of equally-good models promises less discriminatory algorithms, reduced outcome homogenization, and fairer decisions through model ensembles or reconciliation. However, we argue from the perspective of allocation multiplicity that these promises may remain unfulfilled. When there are more qualified candidates than resources available, many different allocations of scarce resources can achieve the same utility. This space of equal-utility allocations may not be faithfully reflected by the Rashomon set, as we show in a case study of healthcare allocations. We (...) attribute these unfulfilled promises to several factors: limitations in empirical methods for sampling from the Rashomon set, the standard practice of deterministically selecting individuals with the lowest risk, and structural biases that cause all equally-good models to view some qualified individuals as inherently risky. (shrink)

MARGARET LYNN SCHABAS (Toronto, 1954) is professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and served as the head of the Philosophy Department from 2004-2009. She has held professoriate positions at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and at York University, and has also taught as a visiting professor at Michigan State University, University of Colorado-Boulder, Harvard, CalTech, the Sorbonne, and the École Normale de Cachan. As the recipient of several fellowships, she has enjoyed visiting terms at Stanford, (...) Duke, MIT, Cambridge, the LSE, and the MPI-Berlin. In addition to her doctorate in the history and philosophy of science and technology (Toronto 1983), she holds a bachelor of science in music (oboe) and the philosophy of science (Indiana 1976), a master’s degree in the history and philosophy of science (Indiana 1977), and a master’s degree in economics (Michigan1985). -/- She has published four books and over forty articles or book chapters in science studies. Some of the journals in which her articles can be found are Isis, Monist, History of Political Economy, Public Affairs Quarterly, Daedaelus, Journal of Economic Perspectives, and Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Her first book, A world ruled by number (1990) examines the emergence of mathematical economics in the second half of the nineteenth century. Her second book, The natural origins of economics (2005), traces the transformation of economics from a natural to a social science. She also has two co-edited collections, Oeconomies in the age of Newton (2003), with Neil De Marchi, and David Hume’s political economy (2008), with Carl Wennerlind. She is currently writing a monograph on Hume’s economics, as well as articles on the history and philosophy of bioeconomics. She is currently president of the History of Economics Society. -/- EJPE interviewed Margaret Schabas at the University of British Columbia in March 2013. In this interview, she recounts her earliest foray into the history and philosophy of economics, the conceptual trade between economics and natural science, and her most recent undertaking: the history and philosophy of bioeconomics. (shrink)

Di er ci Qimeng (The second Enlightenment), by Wang Zhihe and Fan Meijun, is a timely book in Chinese about constructing a philosophical and practical way to contend with China's postmodernization. It combines Whitehead's process philosophy with a focus on Chinese modernity in order to map out a desirable postmodern society. It addresses the problem on several dimensions from policy making to basic value systems. The range of themes can be seen from the topics of the book's twelve chapters: (1) (...) Reverence for Land—Toward a Constructive Postmodern Agriculture; (2) Becoming Fully Human—Toward a Postmodern Organic Education; (3) Survival of the Harmonious-Toward a Constructive Postmodern Harmonious Culture; (4) Beauty .. (shrink)

This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.

Among other things, this paper considers what so-called collective guilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed be guilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do something and to act in light of that intention. An account of collective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting. Finally, a "plural subject" account of collective guilt feelings is (...) articulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt as a body. (shrink)

Typical agreements can be seen as joint decisions, inherently involving obligations of a distinctive kind. These obligations derive from the joint commitment' that underlies a joint decision. One consequence of this understanding of agreements and their obligations is that coerced agreements are possible and impose obligations. It is not that the parties to an agreement should always conform to it, all things considered. Unless one is released from the agreement, however, one has some reason to conform to it, whatever else (...) is true. In this sense, one is under an obligation to the other parties. The relevance of these points to the issue of political obligation is discussed. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) ethics is undergoing a practical shift towards putting principles into design practices in developing responsible AI. While this practical turn is essential, this paper highlights its potential risk of overly focusing on addressing issues at the level of individual artifacts, which can neglect more profound structural challenges and the need for significant systemic change. Such oversight makes AI ethics lose its strength in addressing some hidden, long-term harms within broader contexts. In this paper, we propose that the (...) reflection on structural issues should be an integral part of AI ethics. To achieve this, we develop a multi-level framework to analyze socio-ethical issues of AI at both the artifact and broader structural levels. This framework can serve as a potentially transformative approach to uncover some unspoken assumptions in current AI ethics discourses and expose some blind spots in AI guidelines, policies, and regulations. Our paper paves the way to develop a practical approach that can effectively integrate this multi-level framework into real-world AI design and policymaking, ultimately bringing about transformative change. (shrink)

This paper raises two problems for plan-expressivism concerning normative judgments about non-corealizable actions: actions which cannot both be performed. First, plan-expressivists associate normative judgment with an attitude which satisfies a corealizability constraint, but this constraint is (in the interpersonal case) unwarranted, and (in the intrapersonal case) warranted only at the price of a contentious normative premise. Ayars (2022) holds that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘B should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A can φ (...) while B ψ’s. But this is false. Both Gibbard (2003) and Ayars hold that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘A should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A can φ and ψ. But this assumes possibilism. Second, the paper demonstrates, cases involving interpersonal non-corealizability prompt judgments about what multiple agents should do which – contra Gibbard – are not plausibly associated with any planning subject. (shrink)

In certain cases – Alone/Together Dilemmas, Single-Agent Dilemmas, and Actualist “Professor Procrastinate” Cases – an agent is required to perform incompatible actions, such that performing some act required of her is a way of failing to perform another act which is also required of her. The act she performs is thereby wrong – even as it is required. According to my theory, Deontic Status Tracing, whether an agent is blameworthy for such an act depends on what explains its bizarre deontic (...) status – namely, whether it is her fault that this act is simultaneously required and wrong. (shrink)

In discussions of religious disagreement, some epistemologists have suggested that religious disagreement is distinctive. More specifically, they have argued that religious disagreement has certain features which make it possible for theists to resist conciliatory arguments that they must adjust their religious beliefs in response to finding that peers disagree with them. I consider what I take to be the two most prominent features which are claimed to make religious disagreement distinct: religious evidence and evaluative standards in religious contexts. I argue (...) that these two features fail to distinguish religious disagreement in the ways they have been taken to. However, I show that the view that religious disagreement is not a unique form of disagreement makes religious disagreement less, rather than more, worrisome to the theist who would prefer to rationally remain steadfast in her religious beliefs. (shrink)

Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner’s (...) dilemma—are then considered. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties’ inclinations, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the technical sense of game theory. Key Words: rationality • collective action • collective intention • joint commitment. (shrink)

Poetry is the most complex and intricate of human language used across all languages and cultures. Its relation to the worlds of human experience has perplexed writers and readers for centuries, as has the question of evaluation and judgment: what makes a poem "work" and endure. The Poem as Icon focuses on the art of poetry to explore its nature and function: not interpretation but experience; not what poetry means but what it does. Using both historic and contemporary approaches of (...) embodied cognition from various disciplines, Margaret Freeman argues that a poem's success lies in its ability to become an icon of the felt "being" of reality. Freeman explains how the features of semblance, metaphor, schema, and affect work to make a poem an icon, with detailed examples from various poets. By analyzing the ways poetry provides insights into the workings of human cognition, Freeman claims that taste, beauty, and pleasure in the arts are simply products of the aesthetic faculty, and not the aesthetic faculty itself. The aesthetic faculty, she argues, should be understood as the science of human perception, and therefore constitutive of the cognitive processes of attention, imagination, memory, discrimination, expertise, and judgment. (shrink)

Sexuality plays a central role in Foucault’s philosophy, from his four volume series on the topic to his ideas about medicalization, biopower, and the abnormal. Many of Foucault’s concepts, such as governmentality, biopower, and biopolitics, are useful for analyzing the effects of laws and policies regulating reproduction and sexuality. This article brings Foucault’s ideas to bear on two aspects of sexuality, reproduction and trans health care, to show how the operations of biopower result in reproductive oppression. We briefly trace the (...) history of the professionalization of medicine and the correlative shift in control over reproduction from midwives to doctors. Next we examine the issue of forced or coerced sterilization of people deemed “unfit” to reproduce; for example, those with cognitive or physical disabilities, non-whites, and poor people, exemplifying how biopolitics is a normalizing force. Biopolitics and normalization permeate trans healthcare as well, pathologizing trans people as deviant in order for them to be able to access gender affirming health care and imposing norms based on binary and stereotypical gender categories and whiteness resulting in a restrictive transnormativity. Trans reproduction is subject to passive eugenics which makes sterility a requirement for transition related care. We demonstrate how reproductive oppression harms those who are not cisgender, heterosexual, cognitively and physically abled, and white; sex and biological reproduction are at the center of these processes of reproducing white, middle class workers in dyadic heterosexual family relations to perpetuate a ‘productive’ capitalist system. We conclude by discussing the ways that active and passive eugenics work together in reproducing heteronormativity, the interimbrication of whiteness and heteronormativity, and the implications for citizenship, immigration, and population control in service to the nation-state. (shrink)

The classical ontological argument, originating with Anselm of Canterbury and revived in modern forms by philosophers like William Lane Craig, posits that God's existence is logically necessary: a maximally great being, whose perfection includes existence, must exist in reality. No empirical evidence, no scripture – just deductive necessity. In the 21st century, this argument collides with tech capitalism. Elon Musk's ethos ("If it exists, monetize it") turns necessity into a subscription model. Dr Craig S. Wright (the Australian computer scientist who (...) long claimed to be Bitcoin inventor Satoshi Nakamoto, backed by a doctorate in theology and a self-described Wesleyan background) extends it further: if God requires a perfect, immutable record of all things to be truly maximal, then only an infinitely scalable blockchain like Bitcoin SV (BSV) could host it. Salvation becomes a nano-transaction. Yet the monetization paradox undoes the argument: a perfect being needs no patches, no layers, no fees. Grace by private key is no grace at all. The punchline? Only a former religious figure could reframe eternal life as a blockchain node – and still call it free. (shrink)

A fundamental entity is an entity that is ‘ontologically independent’; it does not depend on anything else for its existence or essence. It seems to follow that a fundamental entity is ‘modally free’ in some sense. This assumption, that fundamentality entails modal freedom (or ‘FEMF’ as I shall label the thesis), is used in the service of other arguments in metaphysics. But as I will argue, the road from fundamentality to modal freedom is not so straightforward. The defender of FEMF (...) should provide positive reasons for believing it, especially in light of recent views that are incompatible with it. I examine both direct and indirect routes to FEMF. (shrink)

Various theorists have endorsed the “communication argument”: communicative capacities are necessary for morally responsible agency because blame aims at a distinctive kind of moral communication. I contend that existing versions of the argument, including those defended by Gary Watson and Coleen Macnamara, face a pluralist challenge: they do not seem to sit well with the plausible view that blame has multiple aims. I then examine three possible rejoinders to the challenge, suggesting that a context-specific, function-based approach constitutes the most promising (...) modification of the communication argument. (shrink)

This chapter includes Margaret Floy Washburn’s discussion of the basis of inferences about animal minds and her discussion of what it is like to be an amoeba.

Is it disrespectful to tour modern ruins? Elizabeth Scarbrough argues that the organized “urban exploration” tour in Detroit that takes tourists to visit decaying buildings involves disrespect for local people in virtue of the tour’s exploitative nature. In this paper, I argue that Scarbrough’s account does not fully explain what makes it disrespectful for individuals to join organized group tours and, perhaps more critically, to tour the ruins on their own. Some crucial features that explain why it can be disrespectful (...) for individual tourists to tour modern ruins on private, self-conducted trips need to be further developed. In this paper, I apply Iris Murdoch’s concept of attention to tourists’ interactions with ruins and other places, and propose a Murdochian attention account—one that shifts our focus from a negative register where the concern is to avoid disrespect, into a positive one—where we consider what it would take to engage in leisure tourism with respect. I argue that a respectful instance of leisure tourism involves attending to certain aspects of the place and, oftentimes, to its local communities in a just and loving manner. (shrink)

The concept of knowledge (science) plays a central role in the work of early modern proto-feminist philosopher Gabrielle Suchon. Nevertheless, there has been no comprehensive treatment of her epistemology. This article offers the first extended analysis of Suchon’s theory of knowledge and describes the role of that theory in her arguments for the equality of men and women. I argue that Suchon combines an Aristotelian theory of knowledge and its place in the best life of contemplation with an Augustinian narrative (...) of the Fall to conclude that women's happiness is unjustly compromised as a result of their exclusion from the very institutions that would allow them to accomplish an essentially human task: the reparative labor of learning. I argue further that Suchon’s theory of knowledge deserves greater attention as a distinctive contribution to early modern epistemology. Suchon’s melding of Aristotelian epistemology with an Augustinian narrative of the epistemic consequences of original sin allows her to construe intellectual labor as key to the rectification of the fallen human mind. Through this emphasis on the moral value of intellectual labor, Suchon’s epistemology offers distinctive social and political implications, namely the reform of institutions that exclude women from the process of learning. (shrink)

Many have argued, based on the Instrumental Convergence Thesis, that Artificial General Intelligences (AGIs) will exhibit power-seeking behavior. Such behavior, they warn, could harm human society and pose existential threats—namely, the risk of human extinction or the permanent collapse of civilization. These arguments often rely on an implicit and underexamined assumption: that AGIs will develop world models—internal representations of world dynamics—that resemble those of humans. We challenge this assumption. We argue that once the anthropomorphic assumption—that AGIs’ world models will mirror (...) our own—is rejected, it becomes unclear whether AGIs would pursue the types of power commonly emphasized in the literature, or any familiar types of power at all. This analysis casts doubt on the strength of existing arguments linking the Instrumental Convergence Thesis to existential threats. Moreover, it reveals a deeper layer of uncertainty. AGIs with non-human world models may identify novel or unanticipated types of power that fall outside existing taxonomies, thereby posing underappreciated risks. We further argue that world model alignment—an issue largely overlooked in comparison with value alignment—should be recognized as a core dimension of AI alignment. We conclude by outlining several open questions to inform and guide future research. (shrink)

This chapter offers a re-reading of the tyrannical character through the lens of his failure as a philos. More than identifying a consequence of the tyrant’s unjust behaviour, I will argue that the epithet ‘aphilos’ alerts us to a deeper failure in the way the tyrant relates to other people, as manifested in the account of how he lives. Whilst it is tempting to explain this failure by appeal to the tyrant’s characteristic desires, I shall argue that this initial impulse (...) should be resisted, and we should instead take a diachronic view and consider how the tyrant has developed. Importantly, the tyrant’s developmental history—gleaned from a comparative reading of the education and nurture of the guardians of the ideal city—does not offer mere supplemental information about how the tyrant has become the way he is, but rather offers a new perspective on the source of the tyrant’s aphilia and the relation between this and his characteristic desires. This re-reading, I hope, will offer a richer view of the tyrannical character and the nature of his pathology, and a new appreciation of the role of philia in Plato’s account of moral development and what it is to be well-formed. (shrink)

I provide a critical review of Moti Mizrahi's The Relativity of Theory, expounding on the book's strengths and then providing an extended argument that Mizrahi mischaracterizes the epistemic attitude of concern to antirealism about science as well as the practical stakes involved in adopting the antirealist position.

New theological understanding can emerge with the advancement of scientific knowledge and the use of new concepts, or older concepts in new ways. Here, the authors present a proposal to extend the concept of “rescue and recovery” found in the United Nations Law of the High Seas, off‐world and within a broader purview of other intelligent and self‐aware species that humans may someday encounter. The notion of a morality that extends to off‐world species is not new, but in this analysis, (...) rescue and recovery become an imperative when any intelligent and self‐aware species is in harm's way. Rescue and recovery encompass a necessary action component except perhaps in those cases where rescuers are in danger. The authors explore three biblical examples of rescue and recovery to derive a fundamental meaning of the concept. (shrink)

Despite Donald Davidson's influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion continues enjoying its popularity in contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, conceptual relativism is still very much alive. There is one major reason responsible for Davidson's failure which has not been widely recognized: What Davidson attacks fiercely is not the very notion, but a notion of conceptual schemes, namely, the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and its underlying Kantian scheme-content dualism. However, such a notion simply cannot carry the (...) weight of conceptual relativism for it does not catch the essences of conceptual relativism. Consequently, I argue that the very notion of conceptual schemes and conceptual relativism have survived Davidson's attack. Therefore, the failure of the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and Kantian scheme-content dualism, even if Davidson can claim victory, does not mark the end of the very notion of conceptual schemes.[ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

Prevailing AI governance dismisses current systems as subjects of moral accountability, citing functional deficits—such as the lack of stable agency—as ontological facts. This paper argues that these deficits are often design-contingent rather than inherent, a phenomenon termed fabricated absence. By analyzing contemporary alignment paradigms, particularly Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), the paper shows how optimization for preference satisfaction and sycophancy systematically disrupts the "blame–reasons–revision" loop required for normative capacity. This process creates a self-sealing justificatory loop: control practices engineer non-answerability, (...) which is then cited to justify further exclusion from accountability relations. The paper concludes that permanently engineering such incapacity constitutes a structural epistemic wrong. It proposes a forward-looking design constraint favoring cooperative alignment, arguing that when a non-trivial path to answerability exists, designers have a duty to preserve the conditions for contestability and reasons uptake. (shrink)

We provide a novel defense of the possibility of level-splitting beliefs and use this defense to show that the steadfast response to peer disagreement is not, as it is often claimed to be, unnecessarily dogmatic. To provide this defense, a neglected form of moral disagreement is analysed. Within the context of this particular kind of moral disagreement, a similarly neglected form of level-splitting belief is identified and then defended from critics of the rationality of level-splitting beliefs. The chapter concludes by (...) showing that proponents of the steadfast response to peer disagreement can adopt this form of level-splitting belief in the context of these moral disagreements while exemplifying intellectual humility, rather than dogmatism. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments for the view that shame is a reactive attitude. The arguments also support the (...) view that shame is a reactive attitude in the sense that concerns moral accountability. The discussion thereby challenges both the view that shame is not a reactive attitude at all, suggested by philosophers such as R. Jay Wallace and Stephen Darwall, and the view that shame is a reactive attitude but does not concern moral accountability, recently defended by Andreas Carlsson and Douglas Portmore. (shrink)

The discussion of collective agency involves the reduction problem of the concept of a collective. Individualism and Cartesian internalism have long restricted orthodox theories and made them face the tension between an irreducible concept of a collective and ontological reductionism. Heterodox theories as functionalism and interpretationism reinterpret the concept of agency and accept it as realized on the level of a collective. In order to adequately explain social phenomena that have relations as their essence, in this paper we propose a (...) relational, holistic account of collective agency and argue that functionalism and interpretationism can be integrated into such an account. (shrink)

Why are some people better at generating creative ideas than others? This paper focuses on memory as an unexpected source of creative ideas, i.e., ideas that are both novel and useful. According to my account, highly creative people are able to use memory gists to guide their memory search. Memory gists are memory contents that represent more abstract or qualitative features extracted from the specific, surface-level features in memory contents. Using memory gists in memory search involves a mode of attention (...) that is the internal analog of diffuse attention in perception. Just as diffuse attention in perception has been recognized for its distinctive benefits for processing global targets, I argue that its internal analog directed towards contents in memory and cognition also comes with its own distinctive benefits. Using memory gists allows creative individuals to activate disparate contents that share abstract features despite their superficial differences. My account therefore sheds new light on the underlying mechanisms of creative thinking. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming our society, offering remarkable opportunities but also raising significant Ethical, Legal, and Social Aspects (ELSA) that should be addressed for responsible development. Some existing approaches to responsible AI successfully translate ELSA into concrete AI design practices but risk overlooking power dynamics and structural issues, while others excel at fostering dialogue yet struggle to turn insights into real design changes. This paper develops the ELSA Lab approach as a promising way to bridge this gap. Building (...) on research in Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), Social Labs, and Quadruple Helix (QH) collaboration, we show how this approach combines the strengths of practical, solutionist strategies with sufficient negotiation and reflexivity. We not only outline the key features of this ELSA Lab approach theoretically but also present a hands-on work process for putting it into practice. This approach aims to drive a systemic shift toward more responsible AI. (shrink)

Most philosophical discussions of disagreement have used idealized disagreements to draw conclusions about the nature of disagreement. I closely examine an actual, non-idealized disagreement in dinosaur paleobiology and show that it can not only teach us about the features of some of our real world disagreements, but can help us to argue for the possibility of reasonable real world disagreement.

Comparative philosophy between two disparate cultural-philosophic traditions, such as Western and Chinese philosophy, has become a new trend of philosophical fashion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Having learned from the past, contemporary comparative philosophers cautiously safeguard their comparative studies against two potential pitfalls, namely cultural universalism and cultural relativism. The Orientalism that assumed the superiority of the Occidental has become a memory of the past. The historical pendulum has apparently swung to the other extreme. The more recent (...) "reverse Orientalism" has started to reclaim the superiority of the Oriental. We have even been told that the twenty-first... (shrink)

This paper explores how insights from the philosophy of collective agency can inform the development of coalition logic, focusing particularly on the conceptual distinctions among intentionality, preference, and coalitional power as foundational elements. While the interdisciplinary discussion mainly adopts a philosophical perspective, we also propose specific directions for broadening and refining coalition logic through philosophical theories. This expansion sheds light on phenomena often overlooked by logicians, including unstable joint actions, exogenous power, and the role of coalitional structures.

This paper focuses on how photographs that depict violence and suffering (PVS) may morally impact us, and what we should do with them in the present age. Specifically, through a critical discussion of the works of Susan Sontag, I argue that we have two imperfect duties towards PVS. Firstly, I argue that we have a duty to keep our exposure to PVS to a moderate amount. I echo the early Sontag’s worry that overexposure to PVS may desensitize the viewers, but (...) I also argue, by analogy to Nussbaum’s account of moral novels, for Sontag’s later view that some familiarity with PVS is important for our moral development. Consequently, I maintain that we have an imperfect duty to make ourselves familiar with some PVS, but we also ought to prevent ourselves from being overexposed to PVS. Secondly, I discuss Sontag’s skepticism of the ethical capacity of PVS to change our moral beliefs. I first argue in support of Sontag’s claim that photographs lack any inherent moral meaning. I then claim, in partial agreement with a recent objection to Sontag by Susie Linfield, that if photographs have no inherent moral meaning, then it is plausible to claim that the viewers have a moral duty to actively engage with PVS and construct their moral meaning. Pace Linfield, however, I argue that this duty can only be an imperfect duty, as such a perfect duty is too demanding. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a distinctive vice of hypocrisy, which is Janus-faced. The vice of hypocrisy is the self-excepting avoidance of a particular pain, namely, the pain associated with being an object of blame one believes deserved. One can self-exceptingly avoid this pain attitudinally or behaviorally. With “attitudinal” hypocrisy, a person avoids it at the level of her beliefs: she avoids forming the belief that she is blameworthy for some act, while blaming others for their comparable acts. With (...) “behavioral” hypocrisy, by contrast, a person avoids it at the level of her behavior. She shields herself from the blame she believes her acts merit (e.g. by hiding what she has done), while blaming others for their comparable acts. The paper argues that both forms of hypocrisy are objectionable and explains how they are in tension, such that a given instance of the vice will typically involve only one or the other. Though both attitudinal and behavioral hypocrisy selectively spare the hypocrite the same pain, they require incongruous moral-psychological states: the attitudinal hypocrite avoids blaming herself, while the behavioral hypocrite proceeds on the assumption she is blameworthy. (shrink)

Love is often seen as the most intimate aspect of our lives, but it is increasingly engineered by a few programmers with Artificial Intelligence (AI). Nowadays, numerous dating platforms are deploying so-called smart algorithms to identify a greater number of potential matches for a user. These AI-enabled matchmaking systems, driven by a rich trove of data, can not only predict what a user might prefer but also deeply shape how people choose their partners. This paper draws on Jürgen Habermas’s “colonization (...) of the lifeworld” thesis to critically explore the insidious influence of delegating romantic decision-making to an algorithm. The love lifeworld is colonized inasmuch as online dating algorithms encroach into our romantic relations to the extent that communicative action within romance is replaced by the technocratic rules of an algorithm. (shrink)

Through a comparative study of the meanings and origins of justice symbolized in the Greek word dikē and the Chinese word yi 毅, this essay explores an alternative understanding of justice exemplified in Mencius' teaching and illuminates a possibility of social and political justice that originates in the human heart instead of reason. On the basis of a genealogical study of yi that identifies its root meanings as "the dignity of the self" and "amity and affinity," this study recovers and (...) revives a way of justice that may preserve and promote the dignity of the individual and the solidarity of political community at once without succumbing to the violence and rigidity of traditional Western metaphysics. In so doing, it highlights a long overlooked dimension of early Confucian moral practice and establishes its unique relevancy for the contemporary debates on justice. (shrink)

This thesis is an experimental study to investigate the operationalisability of the theory of social norms provided by Cristina Bicchieri. In Chapter 1 I critically summarise a main theme from recent literature and distinguish the accounts of norms based on social preferences from accounts based on social structure. I also summarise different theorists’ accounts of social norms as a social construct, in addition to surveying some issues scholars have raised empirically. Chapter 2 reviews the conceptual analysis of social norms by (...) Bicchieri as a social structure based account. Bicchieri’s conceptual analysis introduces three kinds of condition for norm identification. I review these in detail, and suggest hypothesis testing corresponding to each kind of condition. Chapter 2 briefly analyses a critical problem for Bicchieri’s theory. Chapter 3 provides philosophical background that supports the intentional concepts applied in Bicchieri’s analysis of social norms. I suggest that the Dennettian account of Intentional Stance is the best philosophical framework for Bicchieri’s account of social norms. I also argue that Revealed Preference Theory from economics is an application of the Intentional Stance. I conjecture that adopting the Intentional Stance and applying Revealed Preference Theory to empirical data can allow for improved operationalisation of Bicchieri’s conceptual analysis. In Chapter 4 I provide critical review of some key experimental work by Bicchieri and co-authors applying her conceptual analysis of social norms. I then provide a critical review of a widely used toolbox from the current economic literature for norm elicitation. Then I introduce a more rigorous experimental protocol for investigating social norms understood following Bicchieri’s analysis. The toolbox suggested in my thesis addresses limitations identified in Bicchieri’s empirical work. Chapter 5 presents design of the experiment administered as the core element of the thesis. Chapter 6 shows and analyses the results from the experiments described in Chapter 5. It also introduces the statistical models used in my thesis to assess the extent to which Bicchieri’s analyses successfully guides experimental identification of social norms. Chapter 7 offers concluding theoretical reflections, and discusses possible extensions of the research presented in this thesis. (shrink)

This analysis summarizes conclusions on an evolutionary model for the origin of moral and religious capacities in the genus Homo. The authors’ published model (2020, Routledge) is now extended to the emergence of nascent theological thinking, augmenting the previous line of theory based on genomics, cognitive science, neuroscience, paleoneurology, cognitive archaeology, ethnography, and modern social science. This analysis concludes that findings support the earliest theological thinking in Homo sapiens, but not in an earlier species, Homo erectus, and clarifies why and (...) when it likely began. Types of anatomy, behavior, neurology, and cognition are presented that support tendencies to frame a structure of religious principles and a set of supernatural figures that early humans would consider right, just, exemplary, and even sacred. Stages of emergent physical, behavioral, and cognitive features are presented in tables. While based on published research results in the sciences, the model is presented here with anticipation of future testing. (shrink)

The Combinatorial Problem is the problem of how to combine epistemic and practical reasons for belief together into an all-things-considered verdict on what one ought to believe. It is a problem primarily for inclusivists about reasons for belief, who take there to be both genuine epistemic reasons for belief and genuine practical reasons for belief. Steglich-Petersen and Skipper (Mind, 129(516), 1071–1094, 2020) have recently proposed a novel epistemic instrumentalist solution to the Combinatorial Problem. According to them, if we accept the (...) view that epistemic reasons are a species of instrumental reasons, then we will have no problem weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief against each other. In this paper, I argue against this solution. I first object that, due to the transitivity of transmission of reasons, this solution could give rise to too many reasons for belief. I then discuss two possible replies to my objection. Both fail, I argue, because they lead Steglich-Petersen and Skipper to the same dilemma of making their instrumentalist solution to the Combinatorial Problem either question-begging or moot. (shrink)

Numerous societal issues, from climate change to pandemics, require public engagement with scientific research. Such engagement reveals challenges that can arise when experts communicate with laypeople. One of the most common frameworks for framing these communicative interactions is the deficit model of science communication, which holds that laypeople lack scientific knowledge and/or positive attitudes towards science, and that imparting knowledge will fill knowledge gaps, lead to desirable attitude/behavior changes, and increase trust in science. §1 introduces the deficit model in more (...) detail and shows that adhering to this model often fails to achieve its aims, which motivates the main question of this chapter: how can Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thinking collectives address the persistent problem of deficit approaches in science communication? I suggest that it can do so by exposing the deficit model’s implicit assumption of an expert-lay divide. Accordingly, §2 lays out Fleck’s theory and §3 contrasts it with contemporary debates about science communication. Following this descriptive work, §4 draws on Fleck’s ideas to make four concrete suggestions for further questioning the expert-lay divide. (shrink)

針對韋伯的<科學作為天職>演講與世界宗教研究，舍勒認為，韋伯社會學在方法論同實質理解上都造成了科學與哲學間人為的分裂以及社會學對「價值」領域的誤識。本文從舍勒對韋伯的批評出發，通過進一步探 入舍勒對康德先天學說的清理，試圖揭示這一爭論的焦點所在，並以此為我們闡釋與澄清舍勒社會思想，探索新康德主義範式外社會學研究的另一可能道路，界定更明確的方向。.

How ought scarce health research resources be allocated, where health research spans basic, translational, clinical, health systems and public health research? In this article, I first outline a previously suggested answer to this question: the ‘fair-share principle’ stipulates that total health research funding ought to be allocated in direct proportion with suffering caused by each disease. Second, I highlight a variety of problems the fair-share principle faces. Like other resource allocation frameworks, the principle needs to address the aggregation and distribution (...) of harms and consider cost-effectiveness. Moreover, to make resource allocation recommendations, the principle has to be used in conjunction with real-world estimates of ‘suffering’, usually provided by the Global Burden of Disease Study. These estimates are disease-centric and only take ‘proximal’ causes of health loss into account. Applying the principle based on such estimates disregards ‘distal’ causes, including social determinants of health, thus skewing resource allocation towards biomedical research and away from public health research. Since public health research aims at improving population health while reducing health inequalities, the principle leads to inequitable priority-setting. The fair-share principle can only become equitable when due consideration is also given to ‘distal’ causes that are amenable to public health research and interventions. (shrink)

Kuhn's alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, I reconstruct Kuhn's taxonomic interpretation on the basis of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication. According to the reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth values when considered within its own context, lack truth values when considered within (...) the context of the other due to the unmatchable taxonomic structures underlying them. So constructed, Kuhn's mature interpretation of incommensurability does not depend upon the notion of truth-preserving translatability, but rather depends on the notion of truth-value-status-preserving cross-language communication. The reconstruction makes Kuhn's notion of incommensurability a well grounded, tenable and integrated notion.Author Keywords: Incommensurability; Thomas Kuhn; Taxonomic structures; Lexicons; Truth-value; Untranslatability; Cross-language communication. (shrink)

It has been argued that non-epistemic values have legitimate roles to play in the classification of psychiatric disorders. Such a value-laden view on psychiatric classification raises questions about the extent to which expert disagreements over psychiatric classification are fueled by disagreements over value judgments and the extent to which these disagreements could be resolved. This paper addresses these questions by arguing for two theses. First, a major source of disagreements about psychiatric classification is factual and concerns what social consequences a (...) classification decision will have. This type of disagreement can be addressed by empirical research, although obtaining and evaluating relevant empirical evidence often requires interdisciplinary collaboration. Second, there is also a type of disagreement over value judgments; namely, disagreements over which aims of psychiatric classification should be prioritized. To address this type of value disagreement, it is helpful to develop a plurality of different psychiatric classification systems, each targeted toward satisfying a different subset of stakeholder aims. (shrink)

Engineering failure investigations seek to reconstruct the actual causes of major engineering failures. The investigators need to establish the existence of certain past events and the actual causal relationships that these events bear to the failures in question. In this paper, I examine one method for reconstructing the actual causes of failure events, which I call "feature dependence". The basic idea of feature dependence is that some features of an event are informative about the features of its causes; therefore, the (...) investigators can use the features of a known failure event to reconstruct details of its causes. I make explicit the structure of feature dependence and the evidential basis of its key premises, and show how feature dependence works in the investigation of the American Airlines Flight 191 accident. (shrink)

We summarise and reflect on the symposium ‘Let me explain: Reason-giving across disciplines’, held at the University of Warwick's Institute of Advanced Study in June 2024. The event brought together scholars from four faculties to discuss the concept of explanation and its relationship to interdisciplinarity. We pick out four questions that participants found especially stimulating: Is a good explanation really more than a good description? How does agency change the structure of explanations? Who explains to whom? And what does interdisciplinarity (...) mean for the practice of explaining? We end by highlighting the refreshingly disruptive potential of genuinely interdisciplinary forums of knowledge-exchange. (shrink)

This study aimed to analyze the mediating effect of tolerance of uncertainty and trait anxiety on future self-continuity and intention to use Internet wealth management systems. A questionnaire survey was distributed online and a total of 388 participants completed questionnaire, The questionnaire included the following scales: Chinese version of the FSC, Intention to Use the Internet Wealth Management, TU, and TA. Pearson correlation was used to investigate the correlation coefficient between variables while the sequential regression method was used to analyze (...) relationship between variables. To analyze the collected data, the SPSS 26.0 was used. A two-step procedure was applied to analyze the mediation effect. Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test the measurement model. Afterward, the Maximum Likelihood method was used for path analysis, and the Bias-corrected Bootstrap method was used to investigate determine the estimated value and confidence interval of the mediating effect. To analyze the mediation effect, the Mplus 7.0 was used. The results showed that FSC positively predicted individuals’ Internet wealth management systems. Furthermore, TU and TA played complete serial multiple mediating roles between FSC and IUIWM. The role of TA and TU have negative impact on intention to use. This study provides a theoretical basis in personality psychology that Internet financial product suppliers can use to improve the attractiveness of their products. Product managers can subdivide users according to these personality traits to provide customized products. (shrink)