The "companions in guilt argument" (CGA), challenges moral error theory by drawing parallels between moral and epistemic normativity. It argues that if one is going to be an error theorist about moral normativity, then one will also have to be an error theorist about epistemic normativity, which would be absurd. I contend that this analogy is flawed and the argument fails. First I argue that at best the CGA undermines arguments in favor of error theory, but doesn’t show that the (...) view is false; then I argue that the CGA doesn’t even succeed in undermining arguments for error theory. There are many disanalogies between moral and epistemic normativity—such as the connection of morality to voluntarism and desert—all of which undermine the force of the CGA. (shrink)

The moral error theorist faces the question of what we should do with moral discourse, once it has been decided that it is flawed. Three candidate answers are fictionalism, conservationism, and abolitionism. This paper defends fictionalism by comparing it, in turn, with the other two rivals.

It is widely believed that the Divine Command Theory is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma. This article first examines the Platonic dialogue of that name, and shows that Socrates’s reasoning is faulty. Second, the dilemma in the form in which many contemporary philosophers accept it is examined in detail, and this reasoning is also shown to be deficient. This is not to say, however, that the Divine Command Theory is true—merely that one popular argument for rejecting it is unsound. (...) Finally, some brief thoughts are presented concerning where the real problems lie for the theory. (shrink)

This paper addresses conceptual imprecision in debates over moral nativism by examining three critical nodes: the nature of innateness, the distinction between moral concepts and complete moral judgments, and the nature of moral judgment. I critique nativist positions that rely on general-purpose cognitive and emotional mechanisms. While sufficient for less demanding conceptions of what a moral judgment is, these accounts leave unaddressed cognitively rich elements, such as desert, transgression, and practical authority. The chapter concludes that moral nativism and anti-nativism may (...) both remain defensible, depending on how these various kinds of indeterminacy are precisified, underscoring the importance of clarifying theoretical targets. (shrink)

This paper addresses the "paradox of fiction," which questions how individuals can experience genuine emotions, such as fear, in response to fictional entities like monsters, given that they do not believe these entities exist. I critique Colin Radford's view that such emotional responses are irrational, proposing instead that emotions should be evaluated through the lens of practical rationality. I argue that engaging with fiction to elicit emotions can be a rational act if it serves the individual's purposes, such as enhancing (...) enjoyment or fostering empathy. I suggest that emotions in response to fiction can contribute to rational action by educating our sensibilities, thereby supporting the idea that such emotional responses are not inherently irrational. (shrink)

Suppose that the human tendency to think of certain actions and omissions as morally required – a notion that surely lies at the heart of moral discourse – is a trait that has been naturally selected for. Many have thought that from this premise we can justify or vindicate moral concepts. I argue that this is mistaken, and defend Michael Ruse's view that the more plausible implication is an error theory – the idea that morality is an illusion foisted upon (...) us by evolution. The naturalistic fallacy is a red herring in this debate, since there is really nothing that counts as a 'fallacy' at all. If morality is an illusion, it appears to follow that we should, upon discovering this, abolish moral discourse on pain of irrationality. I argue that this conclusion is too hasty, and that we may be able usefully to employ a moral discourse, warts and all, without believing in it. (shrink)

This paper examines the prospects of moral fictionalism as a response to error theory, distinguishing between hermeneutic and revolutionary approaches. Hermeneutic fictionalism interprets our actual moral discourse as akin to engagement with fiction: cognitivist versions treat moral judgments as truth-apt statements about a fictional moral world, while noncognitivist versions construe them as acts of make-believe, avoiding ontological commitment. Revolutionary fictionalism, by contrast, treats moral discourse as actually false but pragmatically useful, recommending that we adopt a fictional stance toward morality to (...) retain its motivational and social benefits. In order to clarify fictionalism I explore an analogy with metaphor, which is a familiar linguistic practice that enables speakers to communicate important truths even if the surface claim is false. (shrink)

This paper investigates the origins of human moral judgment, focusing on whether it is a biological adaptation and the implications for ethical inquiry. It contrasts moral nativism, which treats moral judgment as an evolved adaptation, with spandrel theory, which views it as a byproduct of other cognitive and affective mechanisms. I emphasize the difficulty of empirically distinguishing adaptations from byproducts, noting that speculation about ancestral selective pressures is unavoidable. Comparing human moral capacities with nonhuman primates, I argue that while affective (...) mechanisms such as empathy and reciprocity form the “building blocks” of morality, fully-fledged moral judgment requires cognitive capacities, including beliefs about obligation, desert, and transgression. The paper proposes that the human brain may be predisposed to normative cognition, though moral content is learned and culturally variable. Finally, I consider the metaethical implications of this view, highlighting that moral beliefs (unlike most other evolved traits) can be evaluated for truth and justification. (shrink)

Genealogical investigation suggests that there is an evolutionary explanation of the human capacity to form moral beliefs which is entirely consistent with the systematic falsehoods of those beliefs. But what is the epistemological significance of this discovery? This chapter argues for a modest answer to this question: that it places a burden of proof on those who wish to maintain that some moral beliefs are justified to provide a positive believable account of how moral facts could explain the mechanisms and (...) forces that give rise to such beliefs. Further, such an account cannot simply presuppose that moral facts help explain moral beliefs, as epistemological conservatism seems to do. In the process, it is argued that evolutionary debunking arguments need not assume realism and that the epistemological doubts they raise are not best expressed in terms of the modal notions of sensitivity and safety. (shrink)

This is an encyclopedia entry (of approximately 4,500 words) on "error theory.".

This is the introduction (of approximately 2,500 words) to Richard Joyce’s collected papers titled “Essays in Moral Skepticism” (OUP, 2016). The blurb of that book is as follows: Moral skepticism is the denial that there is any such thing as moral knowledge. Since the publication of "The Myth of Morality" in 2001, Richard Joyce has explored the terrain of moral skepticism and has been willing to advocate versions of this radical view. Joyce's attitude toward morality is analogous to an atheist's (...) attitude toward religion: he claims that in making moral judgments speakers attempt to state truths but that the world isn't furnished with the properties and relations necessary to render such judgments true. Moral thinking probably emerged as a human adaptation, but one whose usefulness derived from its capacity to bolster social cohesion rather than its ability to track truths about the world. "Essays in Moral Skepticism" gathers together a dozen of Joyce's most significant papers from the last decade, following the developments in his ideas, presenting responses to critics, and charting his exploration of the complex landscape of modern moral skepticism. (shrink)

Joyce investigates human moral thinking as both an empirical and metaethical puzzle. Empirically, humans uniquely evaluate actions, people, and events morally—a capacity absent in other intelligent social species. He distinguishes moral thinking as either an adaptation shaped by natural selection or as a byproduct of other evolved cognitive traits, emphasizing that current evidence cannot decisively favor either account. Both approaches converge on the view that moral cognition promotes social cohesion and cooperation, highlighting its functional significance irrespective of truth. Moving to (...) metaethics, Joyce explores the implications for moral skepticism. He argues that evolutionary explanations of moral thinking can be endorsed by moral error theorists, suggesting that our moral beliefs may lack epistemic justification. Examining reliabilism, coherentism, intuitionism, and conservatism, he shows how genealogical considerations challenge the epistemic status of moral beliefs across these frameworks. (shrink)

This paper examines Descartes’ distinction between two forms of memory—corporeal and intellectual—referenced more in his correspondence than in his published works. I address two central, intertwined questions: (1) What is the nature of Descartes’ intellectual memory? and (2) Why, having established corporeal memory, did he deem it necessary to have intellectual memory as well? The first part of the article reconstructs Descartes’ conception of corporeal memory—showing how he viewed memory as mechanistic, functionally attainable by soulless machines. This sets the stage (...) for the core question: Why posit a second, intellectual memory? Though empirical considerations offer some considerations in favor of an answer, I argue that the real motivation lies in Descartes’ rationalist epistemological framework. (shrink)

This is an encyclopedia entry (of approximately 2,000 words) on "nihilism.".

This paper critically evaluates the capacity, and limits, of neuroscience to inform metaethical debates. I zero in on two main issues: whether empirical findings may bolster moral emotivism, and whether they might undermine various forms of moral rationalism. Regarding moral emotivism, I highlight a key limitation: neuroscience can reveal that emotions cause or accompany moral decisions, but it cannot show that moral statements express emotions in a linguistic or conceptual sense. As such, neural evidence may speak to psychological processes, but (...) not to the truth-conditions of emotivist claims. On moral rationalism, I distinguish three forms: (i) Psychological rationalism, which holds that moral judgments derive from a rational faculty; (ii) Conceptual rationalism, suggesting that moral norms are conceptually tied to practical rationality; (iii) Justificatory rationalism, where moral wrongdoing is seen as rationally unjustifiable. I conclude that while neuroscience may illuminate the underpinnings of moral cognition, its reach into metaethics is narrowly confined: empirical data may inform psychological aspects, but cannot settle conceptual or justificatory questions. (shrink)

This paper examines the philosophical and practical dimensions of apologies, with particular attention to collective and representative cases. I begin by situating contemporary high-profile apologies—by heads of state, religious leaders, and institutions—within the broader context of “the Age of Apologizing,” noting the challenges posed when the apologizer has not personally committed the wrong. I argue that individuals can legitimately apologize on behalf of a group if they act as authorized representatives, whether for extant or defunct groups, emphasizing that authority may (...) derive from institutional or socially recognized mechanisms rather than personal involvement. I show that apologies need not depend on genuine personal remorse: an apology may succeed as a speech act even if insincere, provided it acknowledges wrongdoing and expresses regret or responsibility on behalf of the relevant agent. The paper also addresses the social function of apologies, highlighting their forward-looking purpose in reconciliation and harm repair. (shrink)

A symposium contribution on David Enoch's "Taking Morality Seriously" (2011).

This paper interrogates the common belief that Hume advocates an expressivist position through his so-called Motivation Argument. While popularly understood as an expressivist, Hume’s metaethical commitments are actually deeply ambiguous—ranging variously from expressivism to moral skepticism, dispositional theory, ideal observer theory, or cognitivist subjectivism. I express skepticism that Hume should be simply labeled an expressivist, arguing that such an interpretation lacks convincing textual grounding. Most of the chapter pivots away from textual exegesis to focus on the Motivation Argument itself. I (...) critically assess whether this argument successfully supports expressivism, ultimately finding that it does not. I then propose a hybrid metaethical position that melds elements of traditional expressivism with cognitivism. In closing, the paper tentatively entertains whether such a hybrid might align with Hume’s views, though I admit that this interpretation is speculative and not vigorously defended. (shrink)

The moral error theorist faces many kinds of opposition. One kind of opponent offers an identity claim between moral properties and certain naturalistic properties (e.g., of the format “Goodness = N-ness”). Usually the error theorist will object to the plausibility of this identity claim, but sometimes another kind of defense of the error theory is possible: when there is uncertainty whether the description of the naturalistic property in question (“N-ness”) even succeeds in denoting anything. Perhaps the naturalistic description is incomplete, (...) such that we can be confident that it fails to denote. Or perhaps the naturalistic description leaves it open whether it denotes anything; the advocate of the theory assumes that it does, but there are serious grounds for doubt. If we take such an identity claim seriously, but there exists doubt about whether the right-hand side of the equation denotes anything, then there is equal doubt about whether the left-hand side, the moral descriptor, denotes anything. Thus the would-be moral naturalist is, or may be, unwittingly advocating a moral error theory. Examples of this mistake are canvassed, including dispositional theories of moral value and virtue ethics. (shrink)

This is a précis (of about 2,300 words) of the author's book "The Evolution of Morality" (2006), written as part of a symposium. It is followed by critical commentaries by Stich, Carruthers and James, and Prinz, and then replies by Joyce.

This paper critically evaluates whether pervasive moral disagreements support a skeptical view of morality. I first examine Mackie’s classic argument that widespread variation in moral beliefs implies the absence of objective moral facts—but counter that such disagreement could stem from social conditioning rather than evidence of moral falsehood or nonexistence. I then discuss the possibility that widespread variation in moral beliefs shows that we lack epistemic justification for our moral judgments.

A version of moral fictionalism is presented and defended, modeled on Coleridge’s “suspension of disbelief” and Mill’s solution to the paradox of happiness. The key observation is that sometimes, in order to achieve our goals, we must come at them obliquely—practicing “self-distraction.” This, it is argued, is the case with our Humean values: “in order to get them, one must forget them” (as Sidgwick put it). More specifically, in order to satisfy these non-moral goals we must dress them in a (...) Kantian moral veneer, which renders our judgments false but also more practically efficacious. After this version of moral fictionalism is defended, the question is posed whether similar arguments might support religious fictionalism. Kant’s “moral hazard argument” for religious fictionalism is discussed. Ultimately, it is argued that ambitious religious fictionalism faces challenges that don’t arise for a comparably ambitious moral fictionalism. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Mackie’s concept of moral objectification, the idea that the sense of moral prescriptions being “objective” stems from our tendency to project emotional attitudes onto external situations—a move rooted in Humean projectivism. I argue that Mackie needs this thesis as a supplementary bridge to bolster his primary skeptical arguments—namely, the arguments from moral relativity and from queerness. These foundational arguments alone, I contend, fail to fully dispel our strong intuitions in favor of morality unless supported by an (...) explanation of how such intuitions arise. I conclude that while the thesis of objectification plays a critical role in Mackie’s overall case for metaethical skepticism, it remains inadequately supported. (shrink)

The first objective of this chapter is to clarify what might be meant by the claim that human morality is innate. The second is to argue that if human morality is indeed innate an explanation may be provided that does not resort to an appeal to group selection, but invokes only individual selection and so-called “reciprocal altruism” in particular. A shorter version of this paper was published in "Philosophy After Darwin" (2009) edited by M. Ruse.

This is a 6000-word introduction to the collection edited by Joyce and Garner. It presents the metaethical theory of moral error theory, situating it in relation to noncognitivism, naturalism, constructivism, and realism. It introduces the options for the moral error theorist: abolitionism, fictionalism, and conservationism.

Replies are offered to commentaries by Stich, Carruthers and James, and Prinz, as part of a symposium on the author's book "The Evolution of Morality" (2006).

This paper critically examines William Harms's argument that if human morality is a product of natural selection, moral realism follows. Harms claims that the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs support their status as objective truths. I contend that even if it is true that morality evolved through natural selection, this does not imply moral realism. I argue that moral beliefs could be adaptive without being true, since the utterance of mistaken moral statements might enhance reproductive fitness. Therefore, I conclude, Harms's (...) teleosemantic approach fails to establish moral realism. (shrink)

This paper explores how early Stoics confronted the ancient problem of akrasia—the phenomenon of acting against one's better judgment. Since the early Stoics adopted a monistic, partless soul model, the idea of akrasia as internal conflict (Plato's interpretation) appears unavailable to them. Using the example of Euripides' Medea, I argue that early Stoic system had the resources to accommodate the notion of akrasia.

This article explores moral nativism and its implications for moral philosophy. Moral nativism ranges from the claim that humans possess an innate capacity for moral judgment to the view that specific moral concepts or biases are biologically prewired. Evolutionary accounts suggest that moral thinking evolved to promote cooperation, signal trustworthiness, or simplify complex deliberation. Evidence includes early developmental emergence, cross-cultural universality, and poverty-of-the-stimulus effects, though alternative explanations, such as by-products of other cognitive faculties, remain plausible. Philosophically, evolutionary insights yield two (...) contrasting trajectories. Vindication approaches emphasize the adaptive or functional value of morality, but struggle to provide genuine action-guiding normativity. Debunking approaches, such as those advocated by Ruse and Street, exploit moral nativism to challenge the truth, objectivity, or justification of moral judgments. (shrink)

The moral error theorist maintains that our ordinary use of moral discourse involves ontological commitments that the world fails to satisfy. What, then, should we do with our broken moral discourse? The revolutionary fictionalist recommends maintaining it but removing the problematic ontological commitment, in a manner modeled on our familiar engagements with fictions. The hermeneutic fictionalist, by contrast, claims that this is already how we use moral discourse. One problem for the revolutionary fictionalist is that there is a multitude of (...) possible moral fictions, so why prefer one to another? One problem for the hermeneutic fictionalist is that it really doesn’t feel as if moral discourse resembles an engagement with fiction. Reflection on the nature of the familiar “mini-fictions” of metaphorical language—whereby we say something false as a way of conveying something true—helps solve both these problems in the moral fictionalist’s favor. (shrink)

This paper explores the landscape of moral skepticism by delineating three principal forms. First, noncognitivism denies that moral judgments express beliefs at all, rejecting their status as propositions. Second, error theory accepts that moral judgments are truth-apt but contends they are uniformly false. Third, justification skepticism allows moral beliefs may be true but holds that agents are never epistemically justified in believing them. These positions are systematically clarified and contrasted.

This article examines the consequences of Darwinian moral nativism for moral truth, theory, and justification. Moral nativism holds that humans possess an evolved moral faculty that promoted social cohesion, but it does not ensure that moral judgments track objective truths. I distinguish three forms of evolutionary debunking. Truth debunking challenges the existence of objective moral facts, as in Ruse’s claim that the perception of objectivity is an adaptive illusion. Theory debunking, exemplified by Street, targets moral realist theories while leaving constructivist (...) accounts intact. Justification debunking, advocated by Joyce, questions the epistemic warrant of moral beliefs, arguing that faculties not designed to track moral truth undermine justification. This article emphasizes that evolutionary findings do not definitively refute morality but rather shift the burden of proof to moralists, who must defend the reliability and justification of moral judgments. (shrink)

This paper explores the landscape of moral skepticism by delineating three principal forms. First, noncognitivism denies that moral judgments express beliefs at all, rejecting their status as propositions. Second, error theory accepts that moral judgments are truth-apt but contends they are uniformly false. Third, justification skepticism allows moral beliefs may be true but holds that agents are never epistemically justified in believing them. These positions are systematically clarified and contrasted.

This paper explores the compatibility and coexistence of moral naturalism and moral skepticism as legitimate metaethical positions. The central argument is that these are not mutually exclusive adversaries, but potentially undecidable metaethical options. Drawing on philosophical precedents—including David Lewis’s reflections on indeterminacy between naturalism and error theory, and Rudolf Carnap’s openness to rival interpretations—I explore an attitude of metaethical ambivalence: one that recognizes that both moral naturalism and skepticism remain reasonable and permissible alternatives.

This is an encyclopedia entry (of approximately 3,300 words) on "altruism and biology.".

This is a critical commentary (of approximately 4,000 words) on Debra Lieberman’s chapter "Moral sentiments relating to incest: Discerning adaptations from by-products.".

In his contribution to this volume, Paul Bloomfield analyzes and attempts to answer the question “Why is it bad to be bad?” I too use this question as my point of departure; in particular I approach the matter from the perspective of a moral error theorist. This discussion prefaces one of the principal topics of this paper: the relationship between morality and self-interest. Again, my main goal is to clarify what the moral error theorist might say on this subject. Against (...) this background, the final portion of this paper is a discussion of moral fictionalism, defending it from some objections. (shrink)

This introduction presents a general characterization of fictionalism as a type of theory that proposes to remove problematic ontological commitment from a discourse via modeling it in some respect on familiar fictional engagement (e.g., reading novels, acting, etc.). The focus is on two well-known types of fictionalism: moral fictionalism and religious fictionalism. A fictionalist of the hermeneutic variety claims that the target discourse (in this case, morality or religion) is already sufficiently similar to familiar fictional talk that the offending ontological (...) commitments are in fact only apparent. A revolutionary fictionalist, by contrast, claims that the extant discourse really is in error, but offers fictionalism as an alteration that could be made to thought and speech so as to remove these errors. This introduction discusses the hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalist projects in turn, outlining challenges for each and identifying some common misunderstandings. The thirteen chapters of this collection are then summarized sequentially. (shrink)

Dictionary entry on "evolutionary ethics.".

Suppose that the human tendency to think of certain actions and omissions as morally required – a notion that surely lies at the heart of moral discourse – is a trait that has been naturally selected for. Many have thought that from this premise we can justify or vindicate moral concepts. I argue that this is mistaken, and defend Michael Ruse's view that the more plausible implication is an error theory – the idea that morality is an illusion foisted upon (...) us by evolution. The naturalistic fallacy is a red herring in this debate, since there is really nothing that counts as a 'fallacy' at all. If morality is an illusion, it appears to follow that we should, upon discovering this, abolish moral discourse on pain of irrationality. I argue that this conclusion is too hasty, and that we may be able usefully to employ a moral discourse, warts and all, without believing in it. (shrink)

Dictionary entry on "evolutionary arguments.".

This paper investigates the origins of human moral judgment, focusing on whether it is a biological adaptation and the implications for ethical inquiry. It contrasts moral nativism, which treats moral judgment as an evolved adaptation, with spandrel theory, which views it as a byproduct of other cognitive and affective mechanisms. I emphasize the difficulty of empirically distinguishing adaptations from byproducts, noting that speculation about ancestral selective pressures is unavoidable. Comparing human moral capacities with nonhuman primates, I argue that while affective (...) mechanisms such as empathy and reciprocity form the “building blocks” of morality, fully-fledged moral judgment requires cognitive capacities, including beliefs about obligation, desert, and transgression. The paper proposes that the human brain may be predisposed to normative cognition, though moral content is learned and culturally variable. Finally, I consider the metaethical implications of this view, highlighting that moral beliefs (unlike most other evolved traits) can be evaluated for truth and justification. (shrink)

This paper traces the resurgence of evolutionary ethics, which lay dormant since Darwin’s era and Herbert Spencer’s early speculations, until a late-20th-century revival sparked vigorous philosophical debate. I highlight three central Darwinian theses with potential ethical significance: (1) humans are the product of natural selection; (2) humans are inherently social organisms shaped by that process; and (3) humans possess an innate moral sense forged by evolution. While the first two are largely uncontested, I critically scrutinize the claim of moral nativism, (...) questioning whether moral judgment reflects a specialized evolutionary adaptation or emerges from cultural learning rooted in broader psychological traits. (shrink)

Shaun Nichols and Leonard Katz have written critical commentaries on the author's chapter "What neuroscience can (and cannot) contribute to metaethics" (2008). This is a response to those commentaries.

A review of Elijah Milgram’s "Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory" (2005).

A review of "Moral Reality" by Paul Bloomfield (2001).

A review of Jesse Prinz's "The Emotional Construction of Morals" (2007).

A review of Neil Levy's "What Makes Us Moral".

A review of Rush Rhees’ "Moral Questions" (1999).

A review of Kaebnick and Murray (eds.), "Synthetic Biology and Morality: Artificial Life and the Bounds of Nature" (2013).