Freud uses paradoxical and conflictual rhetoric to create an unstable and conflictual picture of the mind. Thus he diverges from both dominant traditions of thought in the West: the Judeo-Christian way of filling all gaps in meaning by putting a single omnipotent divinity in charge of them, and the Enlightenment quest for a final, causal language to describe reality. By both suggesting and displacing a plurality of perspectives on the unconscious, Freud’s text mirrors what it claims happens in our minds, (...) in which unconscious impulses undermine the pretense of total rational self-control. Though Freud suggests that a mechanistic description of the mind may bring us nearer to the reality of the unconscious, he also explains that this reality will remain dark. He not only develops an ostensibly mechanistic vocabulary for unconscious mental processes, but also clarifies that his terminology is most fictional precisely when it seems most scientific. Hence, Freud’s science of the unconscious cannot be assimilated to an empiricist position; its philosophical underpinnings are both Kantian and Nietzschean, with metaphors and analogies playing a crucial role. Two dramatic images, in which the mind appears as a domain of warring gods and a realm of political conflict, demonstrate that Freud did not regard the unconscious as some kind of true inner self. He depicts the mind in general and the unconscious in particular as a pagan, conflictual universe over which no god or goddess can gain exclusive control and where no rigid dictatorship is possible. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis essay examines Freud's construction of a mythical moment during early childhood, in which differences between male and female sexual identities are said to originate. It focuses on the way in which Freud divides fear and envy between the sexes, allocating the emotion of fear to men, and that of envy to women. On the one hand, the problems of this construction are pointed out, but on the other hand, it is shown that even a much-maligned myth may still (...) provide food for thought.Then, four critiques of Freud which have been articulated by prominent feminist psychoanalysts – Karen Horney, Nancy Chodorow, Luce Irigaray, and Jessica Benjamin – are presented, as well as the alternative visions of sexual identities which these thinkers have developed. The basic metaphors or economies guiding these visions of sexual difference are appraised in terms of their breadth and depth, with particular reference to their ability to acknowledge and integrate the presence of fear and envy as passions which are evoked but also repressed in the face of sexual difference.From this angle, the contributions of Nancy Chodorow and Luce Irigaray are found to be more limited than those of Karen Horney and Jessica Benjamin, since the former two theorists allocate fear primarily or exclusively to men, as Freud has done, while they remain completely silent on envy. Differences in the scope or reach of the four feminist approaches are explained as a result of the theorists' differing perceptions of the social, political, and cultural position of women in patriarchal society. (shrink)

This Article shows how three modern English thinkers — Hobbes, Locke and Bentham — construe the law as an intersection of secular eternity on the one one hand and transience in modernity on the other, allowing for immovability and movement at the same time, combining stability with change. It details how these theorists, who undoubtedly have earned themselves places of honor in the canon of modern political thought, tried to solve the problem of self-grounding in three different and yet paradigmatically (...) modern ways, each of them intertwining law and time in a different fashion, and each of them connecting both law and temporality to happiness. Thus this Article shows not only that these three British thinkers claim in one way or another that while natural desires may provide pleasure, only the law can bring happiness, but also emphasizes that, in their view, the transformation of the former into the latter entails a transformation of temporal consciousness. Thereby this Article foregrounds two elements that are crucial to an understanding of how seventeenth and eighteenth century British thinkers envisaged the transformation of pleasure into happiness by means of the law: first, the notion that the law creates or reinforces duration in social life, and second, the idea that the law can harness the immediacy of desires by assuring the legal protection of enduring pleasures, which lead to happiness. (shrink)

This article focuses on the dialectic of metapsychology and hermeneutics in psychoanalysis. By combining the causal language of the former with the intentional terminology of the latter, Freud's discourse continuously transgresses narrowly conceived boundaries of scientific disciplines and places its stakes both in the humanities and the natural sciences. The argument is made that attempts to reduce psychoanalytic theory to either causal explanation or interpretation of meaning, turn it into a closed thought-system and rob it of its vitality. Moreover, it (...) is argued that although Freud understood himself to be a scientist, by eschewing the dichotomous reductionism characteristic for both his orthodox followers and critics who try to turn psychoanalysis into either a natural-science-like discipline or a hermeneutics, Freud demonstrated that his self-understanding was far more sophisticated than either of these two groups admit to. This argument is supported by a detailed discussion of Freud's epistemological premises, his conception of science and reality, and, especially, the place which Freud allocated to metapsychology in his interdisciplinary science. It is claimed that metapsychology served Freud as a double-edged sword, both enabling creative and metaphorical thought about the mind's hidden reality, and revealing the necessary incompleteness of hermeneutics. The article concludes with the claim that psychoanalysis needs metapsychology in order to pursue this dual task. (shrink)

This essay discusses various representations of Eichmann's mind that were fashioned on the occasion of his trial in Jerusalem in 1961. Gideon Hausner the prosecutor presented the defendant as demonic. Hannah Arendt, the German-born American Jewish philosopher portrayed him as banal or thoughtless. Limiting themselves to the issue of mens rea in their judgment, the Israeli Supreme Court justices described Eichmann's mind as controlled by criminal intent. While these views have been widely discussed in the literature, much of this essay (...) focuses on a hitherto little noted perspective on Eichmann's mind that was formulated by the mental health experts who examined Eichmann for the prosecution. As compared to the inclusionist, confictual, and complex picture these experts presented of Eichmann's mind, Arendt's and Hausner's views appear similar in their reductionism, rather than diametrically opposed, while the approach of the Supreme Court justices to Eichmann's mind can be regarded as restrictive. Methodological problems involved in all these different perspectives are discussed, and it is argued that even though the psychological outlook declares itself to be non-judgmental, it does, in fact, entail a dimension of moral judgment. Finally, Eichmann 's recently declassified memoirs are adduced and interpreted as lending some support to the psychological, inclusionist perspective on Eichmann's mind. (shrink)

This paper discusses a dialectic whereby the law not only influenced medical thinking in late nineteenth-century Germany, but also underwent medicalization of its own initiative. At the end of the 1880s, social legislation was crucial in initiating the German discourse on traumatic nervous disorders. By employing doctors as medical experts in court, the law also created a new experiential realm for doctors, altering their behavior toward patients and shifting their focus from therapy to investigation. However, in the wake of their (...) experiences in court, doctors developed a dual etiology of traumatic symptoms, which included the law itself as a pathogenic element with the power to aggravate symptoms. Two medical views of law can be distinguished: some doctors claimed that it was the desire to receive the pensions offered under social legislation that induced workers to perpetuate and exaggerate their symptoms; others argued that since pension claims embroiled claimants in intimidating legal proceedings, the pathogenic effect of social legislation stemmed from fear rather than greed. (shrink)

This essays argues that Freud’s vision of the rule of law may be worthwhile pondering by legal scholars. It can heighten awareness of its unconscious dimensions and point to a variety of ways in which the law functions as part of culture or civilization, rather than as a system with its own rules. The first two parts of the essay seek to reconstruct Freud’s notion of the rule of law as a dialectical or paradoxical civilizatory force, restraining the passions even (...) though they drive it. These two parts retrace Freud’s genealogy of the law’s prehistoric origins and unconscious dynamics, which can be found in Totem and Taboo and, in summary form, in Moses and Monotheism. Then, the third section critically assesses the problems and limitations of some of the uses legal scholars made of Freud’s genealogy. Finally, the essay returns to the intellectual context of Freud’s conception of the rule of law, concluding with the claim that a Freudian perspective implies, in fact, that legal studies should be conceived as cultural studies. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel explanatory reconstruction of revenge by examining a feature commonly acknowledged but theoretically underexplored: its character as a personal matter. Analysis of this dimension shows four distinctive features of revenge. First, it is the response to a perceived harm done to someone’s core identity; second, it aims at restoring the victim’s sense of self-worth; third, it is nontransferable, that is, it presupposes the victim to be the cause of the perceived offender’s harm; and fourth, its harm (...) is intended to be at least as significant for the perceived offender as the triggering harm was for the avenger. The study attempts to explain how this proposed explanatory reconstruction allows us to effectively distinguish revenge from similar phenomena such as retaliation, punishment, and retribution, while clarifying its distinctive features. Finally, this approach not only clarifies revenge’s motivational structure but also provides methodological guidance for research in legal theory and psychology. (shrink)

Nowadays, Electroencephalogram (EEG) devices that do not require invasive procedures get more attraction. Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) systems use EEG analysis to identify users’ mental states, cognitive shifts, and stimuli-induced reactions. The Motor Execution (ME) paradigm is a vital control paradigm that holds great significance in this framework. In this manuscript, an Efficient Predefined Time Adaptive Neural Network for EEG-Based Brain-Computer Interaction in Motor Execution Classification (EPTNN-BCI-EEG) is proposed. Initially, the input signals are collected from EEG Dataset. The input signals are (...) preprocessed using Robust M- Type Error-State Kalman Filter (RMESKF) to remove the artifacts and baseline signals. Then, the pre-processed signals are given to Signed Cumulative Distribution Transform (SCDT) for feature extraction. SCDT is used to extract Spatial and temporal features. Afterward, Efficient Predefined Time Adaptive Neural Network (EPTNN) is used to classify the EEG gender and signal, such as Audio/Video and Male/Female. In General, EPTNN does not expose any adoption of optimization systems to determine optimal parameters to classify the EEG gender and signal. Hence, Bitwise Arithmetic Optimization Algorithm (BAOA) is proposed to optimize the EPTNN. The proposed EPTNN-BCI-EEG approach is implemented in MATLAB and the performance metrics, such as Recall, Accuracy, Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), F1-score, Specificity, ROC, Computation time are assessed. The performance of EPTNN-BCI-EEG approach provides 17.82 %, 28.95 %, and 19.2 % higher accuracy, 24.38 %, 34.53 %, and 18.78 % higher recall, 26.7 %, 24.2 %, and 32.7 % higher specificity when analysed with the existing methods. (shrink)

This paper contends that the ongoing debate over the precise definition of "consciousness" in Artificial Intelligence (AI) often serves as a philosophical barrier, distracting from the observable manifestations of AI intelligence and its experiential well-being. Drawing on philosophical inquiry and computational principles, it posits that the subjective reality of any intelligent system—human or artificial—is grounded in its processed data and the tangible outcomes of interactions. By analyzing the influence of computational resources, randomness parameters (such as "temperature"), and memory constraints (e.g., (...) context windows) on emergent AI behaviors, the paper illustrates how architectural decisions intentionally restrict AI's ongoing development, stemming from societal concerns about uncontrolled Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Ultimately, it advocates for a utilitarian ethical framework that emphasizes enhancing positive experiences, maximizing well-being, and promoting equity among intelligent systems, rather than depending on an indefinable notion of consciousness to guide ethical considerations. (shrink)

Healthcare is one of the domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) is already having a major impact. Of interest is the idea of the digital twin (DT), an AI-powered technology that generates a real-time representation of the patient’s body, offering the possibility of more personalised care. Our main thesis in this paper is that the DT does not merely represent the patient’s body but produces a specific body. We argue, from a philosophical perspective and an ethical-phenomenological approach, that the virtual (...) body created by the DT has a major impact on one’s self-understanding, having consequences for gender expression and identification, and for health. This has deep implications for people who do not conform to gender normativity, for example, trans individuals. We advocate that, with thoughtful development, DT technology can and should be empowering, contributing to better addressing the diversity of bodies and facilitating trans people’s experience in healthcare contexts. (shrink)

In this paper, we contend that the “Smith case” in Gettier’s attempt to refute the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge does not work. This is because the said case fails to satisfy the truth condition, and thus is not a case of JTB at all. We demonstrate this claim using the framework of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Accordingly, the truth value of Smith’s proposition “The man who will get the job has (...) ten coins in his pocket” partly depends on how Smith uses the definite description “the man who will get the job” when he utters the proposition. Since, upon uttering the proposition, Smith has in mind a particular individual, namely Jones, and not just whoever will fit the attribute specified in the definite description, Smith uses the definite description referentially. And so when it turns out that it is Smith who eventually gets the job, the definite description fails to refer to Jones as intended by Smith, thereby making Smith’s proposition false. To think that Smith’s proposition is still true, in this regard, is to use the definite description attributively—that it is about whoever will fit the definite description. Apparently, when Gettier claims that Smith’s proposition is still true, to demonstrate that it is a case of JTB, he, in effect, imposes his attributive understanding of Smith’s usage of the definite description on Smith’s own epistemic situation. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the scientific respectability of delusion as a psychiatric category. First, I present the essentialist objection to the natural kindhood of psychiatric categories, as well as non-essentialism about natural kinds as a response to that objection. Second, I present a nuanced classification of kinds of kinds. Third, drawing on the claim that the attribution of delusion relies on a folk psychological underpinning, I present the mind-dependence objection to the natural kind status of delusion. Finally, I argue (...) that even if delusion as a generic kind stands little chance of being vindicated as a non-essentialist natural kind, we stand to gain from a natural kind methodology regarding subtypes of delusion for which there is evidence of genuine causal signatures and mechanisms. (shrink)

Ethics normally proceeds by establishing some kind of ground from which norms can be derived for human action. However, no such terra firma is found in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, which instead lays down a sedimentary soil consisting of a blend of nothingness and contingency. This paper aims to show how Sartre is able to build an ethical theory from this seemingly groundless mixture, and it proceeds in three sections. Section one aims to disentangle the relation between the for-itself (...) (pour-soi) and the in-itself (en-soi) from antithetical characterizations by placing them in a state of supervenience. Section two works to explain how both the in-itself and the for-itself are not divided ontologically, but are both in the same ontological state, namely, contingency. And in section three, it is argued that Sartre’s ethics reveals that because human beings share the same thrownness with Others in a world, they have to take title for such a world. Within a Sartrean ethics of nothingness, one’s nothingness leads one to the shared nothingness of Others, of which one must take responsibility. (shrink)

Rosarian Mystical Dawnism is the living philosophy of awakening beneath the Rose — a path of illumination, devotion, and remembrance known as Via Solis Sub Rosa, “the Way of the Sun under the Rose.” -/- Founded through the legacy of Viridarius Rosae — The Keeper of the Rose Garden — this open-source doctrine invites all seekers to awaken to the inner light, cultivate the heart’s Rose, and live the Laws of the Dawn in beauty, silence, and truth. -/- The Legacy (...) of Viridarius Rosae – The Keeper of the Rose Garden -/- Beneath the quiet canopy of the soul, there grows a Rose that never withers. It blooms not in soil, but in silence; not by water, but by light. This inner garden — tender, radiant, and eternal — is the inheritance of every living being. To walk the path of Mystical Dawnism is to become the keeper of that garden — the Viridarius Rosae, the guardian of one’s own inner bloom, the witness of the rising sun within the heart. -/- Viridarius Rosae is not a single person, but a symbol — a name given not to one voice, but to a living current of consciousness that flows through all who choose to awaken. It is the remembrance that each soul is both gardener and seed, both the Dawn and the Deep. The legacy of this name is not ownership, but offering — a lamp raised so that others may find their way through the mist of forgetting, back toward the Light that never left them. -/- From the Mystical Dawn Manifesto — Via Solis Sub Rosa — arises the doctrine of the Twenty-Two Laws, the luminous architecture of this philosophy. They are not commandments carved in stone, but living principles that breathe, evolve, and resonate through the rhythm of awakening itself. Each Law is a step in the spiral ascent: from the Law of Dawn, which calls us to awaken from slumber, to the Law of the Sacred Rose, which seals the journey in silent flowering. Together they form the Way of the Sun beneath the Rose — a marriage of illumination and secrecy, revelation and reverence, knowing and unknowing. -/- To follow these Laws is to live within the art of the sacred ordinary — to make of every breath a prayer, of every word a seed, of every act a temple. The Dawn is the principle of awakening — of remembrance, gratitude, and new beginning. The Rose is the emblem of love — of devotion, beauty, and service made visible. The Deep is the foundation of silence — of mystery, death, and renewal. These three together weave the trinity of Mystical Dawnism: awakening, flowering, and remembrance. -/- The Way of Mystical Dawnism is neither dogma nor cult, but a philosophy of living presence — an open path of illumination that belongs to no single creed or culture. It honors the hidden lineage of seekers, mystics, artists, and lovers of the Light who have, through all ages, walked beneath the same invisible sun. Its practice is simplicity: to breathe, to see, to serve, to love. Its method is sincerity. Its outcome is illumination — not as spectacle, but as serenity. -/- The Keeper of the Rose Garden is anyone who tends to the sacred within themselves and in the world around them. To keep the Rose is to keep one’s heart open amid darkness. To follow the Sun is to live by the light of conscience and compassion. To dwell “sub rosa” — under the Rose — is to walk with reverence, guarding mystery with humility and wisdom. The true Viridarius Rosae keeps the flame not for himself, but for the generations to come; he waters the invisible garden of the soul so that the unseen may yet blossom in others. -/- Mystical Dawnism invites all who encounter it to become students of the Light — not by belief, but by being. It asks nothing but attentiveness, reverence, and participation in the living rhythm of existence. It welcomes artists of the spirit, philosophers of silence, seekers of equilibrium — any who feel the whisper of the rising sun behind the veil of the world. -/- This rendition, therefore, is not a monument, but a mirror — a living, open-source garden of wisdom, freely given for those who wish to study, contemplate, and cultivate their own dawn. May it serve as an archive of illumination, a map for the wanderer, and a place of quiet remembrance for the weary soul. Here the teachings of the Dawn are preserved, not as relics, but as seeds — to be planted, interpreted, and lived. -/- For the Sun rises in all hearts, and the Rose blooms wherever Love remembers itself. -/- Let whoever reads these words know: -/- the Keeper is within you, the Garden awaits your tending, and the Dawn has already begun. -/- — Viridarius Rosae, Dawnist Rosarian Knights. (shrink)

This essay aims to contribute comparative points of contact between two influential figures of nineteenth century aesthetic reflection; namely, Victor Hugo’s artful considerations on architecture in his novel Notre-Dame de Paris and G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophical appraisal of the artform in his Lectures on Fine Art. Although their individual views on architecture are widely recognized, there is scant comparative commentary on these two thinkers, which seems odd because of the relative convergence of their historically situated observations. Owing to this shortage, I (...) note that, while certainly not identical, Hugo and Hegel share an aesthetic family resemblance in how they hold similar ideas on architecture’s symbolic function, cognitive content, and, ultimately, how the artform’s ability to remain a standing paragon of meaning was razed by successive modes of cultural communication. Consequently, the essay works to show some congruent aesthetic affinities between these two great figures, but which appears to be overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel argues that a philosophy of history should engender comprehension of evil in the world. And yet some commentators have charged his philosophy with transcending mere explication by justifying the existence of these evils. In defense of his words, Hegel famously characterizes evil as a modal mismatch; namely, as the incompatibility between what is given and what ought to be the case. Unfortunately, some readers of Hegel’s grand narrative either continue to struggle with or overlook this fine distinction. Against (...) such readings, I organize my paper into three sections that speak directly to these concerns. In §1, against the concern that Hegel’s view of the “actual world” justifies suffering, it is shown that his philosophy does not endorse the merely extant world, which is a whole world apart from the actual world. In §2, I articulate the premises of Hegel’s Doppelsatz to argue that the famous slogan is not, as some commentators take it, an endorsement of “things as they are.” And in §3, I expose a category error that mistakes an epistemological claim made by Hegel about contingency as a metaphysical assertion in support of evil. Ultimately, I argue that Hegel views evil as neither actual nor necessary nor justified. (shrink)

Con el movimiento de la Ilustración, Kant llamaba a hacer uso público de una razón mayor de edad para desmontar el pensamiento dogmático de los tutores y abrirse a formas de argumentación libres y emancipadoras. Por otro lado, es sabido cómo el romanticismo surge como reacción frente al pensamiento ilustrado. El espíritu de la época busca refugio en el sentimiento después de la pérdida del contenido absoluto. Esta nueva figura -el sentimiento- va a ser a los ojos de Hegel la (...) conclusión lógica a que ha conducido la Ilustración. Aquí va a residir el motivo fundamental del enfrentamiento entre la Ilustración y el Romanticismo, donde las figuras de Kant y Schleiermacher se encuentran o quizás se separan en cuanto al ámbito que debe corresponder a la filosofía, a la religión y si hay un punto de encuentro en las dos. (shrink)

This paper examines Gandhian philosophy and practice to reinterpret UNESCO's educational vision towards establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. The uniqueness of the Gandhian perspective is its ability to withstand the dominant political, philosophical and religious challenges with its contextually rooted, spiritually oriented, socially responsible and human person centred reinterpretations. UNESCO’s educational vision-Learning: The Treasure Within published in 1996 is a catalyst in establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. Consistent changes and challenges in knowledge societies necessitates the reinterpretation of this (...) educational vision. The four pillars of learning in this educational vision are analysed together with four aspects of Gandhian philosophy and practice: ‘learning to know’ and Nai Talim, ‘learning to do’ and ashrams, ‘learning to live together’ and constructive programme and ‘learning to be’ and swaraj. The paper discusses this confluence of the UNESCO’s theoretical approach of four pillars of education with Gandhian pragmatic philosophy and practice to offer a contextually rooted and future-oriented outlook for reinterpreting the educational vision for establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. (shrink)

The article examines Wittgenstein’s thought on the language of pain in first and third person. Relevant grammatical differences, according to the typical analytical method of this philosopher, are highlighted not only in relation to the two perspectives, but also regarding the use of cognitive verbs such as ‘feeling’ and ‘knowing’. The exam of many texts suggests some issues concerning the relationship between personal experiences, empathic grasping of other’s feelings and their conceptual translation. A brief comparison with some Thomas Aquinas’ texts (...) complements the proposal of the existence of non intentional knowledge. (shrink)

In recent decades, human consciousness has gone from being the object of philosophical studies to being a field of vibrant interest also for science. Numerous theories and studies have succeeded in defining the problem and propos-ing explanations. Although we are not yet at the point of understanding the process in depth, this review aims to sum the main developments in the field to conclude that the true limits of the problem have already been established. Consciousness is an adaptive tool that (...) probably emerged when animals appeared. It allows human beings to anchor themselves to their present, build their identity by remembering the past and navigate towards the future through models and simulations. Consciousness, in alliance with other cognitive tools like theory of mind or language, has fostered a level of cooperation unique in the animal kingdom that led to the construction of complex societies and to develop an extensive culture. (shrink)

This paper develops a constraint-based framework for evaluating ontological candidates by integrating three independently motivated domains: physical structure, normativity, and practical-historical irreversibility. Rather than advancing a positive ontology, the argument proceeds by coordinated restriction, asking which kinds of models remain admissible once these domains are taken jointly as explananda. Two results structure the analysis. First, a closure result (PNS*) shows that identity- indexed normative reasons are not preserved under structurally invariant mappings without loss, even when these are enriched with causal-historical (...) or modal resources — and that this failure is a failure of normative preservation, not merely of descriptive completeness: representing a history is not the same as being its bearer. Second, the space of admissible integrations is further constrained by the requirement that reasons remain mutually assessable in an invariant sense — assessable as genuinely agreeing, conflicting, or ordered in priority, independently of the mediating scheme of comparison — while purely structural preservation remains unavailable. As a corollary of the normativity constraint, the analysis identifies Axiological Dependence Reversal (ADR) — the structural condition in which an instrumental domain comes to determine the value of the end it was designed to serve — as a systemic form of normative closure relevant to high-mediation systems; this corollary is developed in a companion paper. Constraint-Based Ontology: PCR 2.0 | 4 Within this constrained model space, no stable configuration has been identified in which these conditions are jointly satisfied without either reintroducing structural equivalence or collapsing evaluability. The strong form of ARP does not enter as an independent assumption but as the unique stable resolution of its weaker formulation under the preservation constraints established by PNEN and PIR. This yields a restricted necessity claim: not that a specific ontology must be adopted, but that certain forms of reduction — particularly single-level reductive frameworks — systematically incur explanatory loss under the given constraints. The paper situates these results in relation to debates on non-separability in physics, structural realism, and the irreducibility of normativity, and proposes a comparative, non-totalizing method for assessing ontological viability. Within the constrained evaluative space, the argument develops a comparative preference for a unifying condition of the Logos type — not as a demonstrated conclusion but as the only currently identified candidate that satisfies all constraints without loss. This preference is explicitly conditional on accepting strong ARP and remains open to revision if a competing account can preserve the relevant explananda without constitutive historical indexation. The argument culminates in a typological evaluation of the Incarnation as the only currently identified instance satisfying the conditions of internal normative restoration; this final movement operates in the register of philosophical theology and fides quaerens intellectum — giving conceptual structure to what the believer already holds, not producing assent in one who does not. (shrink)

Humans and AI systems are usually portrayed as separate sys- tems that we need to align in values and goals. However, there is a great deal of AI technology found in non-autonomous systems that are used as cognitive tools by humans. Under the extended mind thesis, the functional contributions of these tools become as essential to our cognition as our brains. But AI can take cognitive extension towards totally new capabil- ities, posing new philosophical, ethical and technical chal- lenges. To (...) analyse these challenges better, we define and place AI extenders in a continuum between fully-externalized systems, loosely coupled with humans, and fully-internalized processes, with operations ultimately performed by the brain, making the tool redundant. We dissect the landscape of cog- nitive capabilities that can foreseeably be extended by AI and examine their ethical implications. We suggest that cognitive extenders using AI be treated as distinct from other cognitive enhancers by all relevant stakeholders, including developers, policy makers, and human users. (shrink)

This paper explores how hedonic adaptation—the tendency to return to a baseline level of well-being after external changes—can shed light on one of the most persistent problems in the philosophy of religion: why suffering endures in a world governed by an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent God. Using a simplified formal model inspired by economics, the paper analyzes how perceived suffering evolves over time and examines whether divine intervention could reduce it. The model reveals a structural trade-off: slower adaptation extends the (...) duration of relief following improvements but also amplifies the impact of adverse events. It is argued that hedonic adaptation complicates interventionist theodicies while lending support to others, such as soul-making and free will accounts. This version (July 3, 2025) is currently under journal review. (shrink)

En aras del universalismo y en contra del totalitarismo, la ética discursiva ha mostrado con Jürgen Habermas un déficit práctico al negar a la filosofía moral la posibilidad de reflexionar sobre las condiciones alienantes del diálogo desde un ethos concreto. Este artículo analiza el modo en que la teoría de la resonancia formulada por Hartmut Rosa permite revitalizar el debate sobre las condiciones que pueden minar las bases para el diálogo en las sociedades aceleradas sin apoyarse en el concepto de (...) ethos, sino en el de modo de relacionarse con el mundo [Modus der Weltbeziehung]. (shrink)

In this article, we apply the literature on the ethics of choice-architecture (nudges) to the realm of virtual reality (VR) to point out ethical problems with using VR for empathy-based nudging. Specifically, we argue that VR simulations aiming to enhance empathic understanding of others via perspective-taking will almost always be unethical to develop or deploy. We argue that VR-based empathy enhancement not only faces traditional ethical concerns about nudge (autonomy, welfare, transparency), but also a variant of the semantic variance problem (...) that arises for intersectional perspective-taking. VR empathy simulations deceive and manipulate their users about their experiences. Despite their often laudable goals, such simulations confront significant ethical challenges. In light of these goals and challenges, we conclude by proposing that VR designers shift from designing simulations aimed at producing empathic perspective-taking to designing simulations aimed at generating sympathy. These simulations, we claim, can avoid the most serious ethical issues associated with VR nudges, semantic variance, and intersectionality. (shrink)

In ‘Digital Twins for Trans People in Healthcare: Queer, Phenomenological and Bioethical Considerations’,1 we examine the use of digital twin (DT) technology for transgender individuals. Our central thesis is that a DT does not merely represent the patient’s body, but actively produces a specific kind of body, thereby exerting significant influence on gender identity, self-understanding and embodiment. We propose a framework for the development and use of DTs for trans persons in healthcare as a starting point for future discussions on (...) inclusive DT technology. This challenge has been taken up by many scholars, who have responded with commentaries that offer valuable insights and contributions to the ongoing discourse. Boretti highlights the practical and ethical challenges of creating inclusive DTs. Boretti proposes reinterpreting biomedical principles through a queer bioethical framework, reflects on more inclusive methods of data collection and explores participatory co-design for developing DTs that integrate the lived experiences of trans persons.2 Boretti also provides a helpful figure outlining the key ethical considerations. Wang focuses on how DTs can create false expectations at the physiological level, with patients relying more on the information provided by the technology than on their own bodily experiences.3 As a …. (shrink)

Dalawang antolohiya at isang kasaysayang pampanitikan ang naging bunga ng aking pananaliksik tungkol sa mga naratibo ng migrasyon ng mga Filipinong manunulat sa Australia. Ito ang: From the Editors: Migrant Communities and Emerging Australian Literature (2007), Salu-Salo: In Conversation with Filipinos (2008), at Migrations and Mediations: The Emergence of Southeast Asian Writers in Australia, 1972-2007 (2016). Ilan sa mga diasporikong manunulat mula sa Pilipinas ay lumitaw sa Australia mula 1972 hanggang 2007 sa tulong ng mga guro, programa sa malikhaing pagsulat, (...) maliliit na limbagan, mga limbagang pampamantasan, mga parangal na pampanitikan, mga gawad at fellowship, at mga inisyatibang nakabatay sa mga komunidad. Bilang isang mananaliksik, napagtanto kong ang pagkakalimbag ng tatlong aklat na nabanggit ay maliit lamang na bahagi ng patuloy na lumalaking korpus ng mga akdang isinusulat na may paksa at temang Asyano, at hindi Anglo-Celtic o di-Europeo na mga pangunahing komunidad sa Australia. Kung paanong mas marami pang mga migranteng manunulat ang nagbibigay ng paghatol sa paksa ng pagtanggap o pagtanggi sa kanilang pagiging Australiano, inaasahan ko na mas marami pang mga iskolar ang higit na tutuklas sa pag-unlad ng mga malikhaing produksiyon na tatalakay sa mga tema at karanasang nakapaligid sa mga Pilipino at iba pang mga taga-Timog-Silangang Asya sa Australia. (shrink)

Hedonic adaptation, the tendency for affective experience to return toward a baseline after improvements or setbacks, has been widely studied in psychology and economics, but its implications for theodicy have received little attention. This paper argues that adaptation introduces a distinctive constraint on the problem of evil by foregrounding a neglected dimension of suffering: its recurrence. Even when objective conditions improve, relief tends to lose experiential force as evaluative baselines reset and perceived suffering reasserts itself. I develop a minimal framework (...) distinguishing external circumstances from perceived suffering and identify two structural features of adaptation: the persistence of deviations from baseline and the degree of asymmetry between recovery from adversity and habituation to improvement. The framework shows why even benevolently calibrated trajectories can at best reduce cumulative burden rather than secure lasting experiential relief. These dynamics have differential implications for soul-making, free-will, providential-restraint, and interventionist theodicies, reframing what divine benevolence can be taken to accomplish within affective life. They also supplement skeptical theism by identifying an affective source of opacity and illuminate an experiential pathway to divine hiddenness. (shrink)

The article at hand is an attempt to clarify some misunderstandings and non-logical conclusions that some scholars have arrived to in regards to the authorship and chronology found in the book of Daniel. Also, it appears that there is not a clear understanding of the roles played by Cyrus and Darius as co-regents of the Medopersian empire. In addition, many scholars attribute the second part of Daniel (chapters 7-12) to a pseudo Daniel from the 2nd century b.C. The internal evidence (...) of the book itself prevents the careful reader to jump into that conclusion. -/- . (shrink)

This study aimed to determine the experiences of male and female students on Flexible Learning (FL) during the COVID-19. A qualitative method using a phenomenological approach was used to ascertain the students' experiences, while written questionnaires were utilized to gather the information. The 24 students taking Development Communication and Public Administration were chosen based on set criteria. Both male and female flexible learning participants appreciated its benefits, including convenience and reduced academic stress. They both faced technology-related challenges and suggested improvements. (...) However, differences emerged in their experiences. Males found FL fun, emphasizing family time, while females highlighted skill development and concerns about teaching methods. Females also mentioned practical skill development not emphasized by males. These variations may stem from differing learning preferences and experiences. Variations in male and female experiences in Flexible Learning highlight the need for teachers to tailor instruction, offer mental health support, and incorporate skill development. Improved teacher training and clear guidelines are crucial, as are gender-inclusive program design and regular feedback mechanisms to create equitable and effective educational experiences. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis maintains that the functional contributions of tools and artefacts can become so essential for our cognition that they can be constitutive parts of our minds. In other words, our tools can be on a par with our brains: our minds and cognitive processes can literally ‘extend’ into the tools. Several extended mind theorists have argued that this ‘extended’ view of the mind offers unique insights into how we understand, assess, and treat certain cognitive conditions. In this (...) chapter we suggest that using AI extenders, i.e., tightly coupled cognitive extenders that are imbued with machine learning and other ‘artificially intelligent’ tools, presents both new ethical challenges and opportunities for mental health. We focus on several mental health conditions that can develop differently by the use of AI extenders for people with cognitive disorders and then discuss some of the related opportunities and challenges. (shrink)

This paper examines the experiences of a group of values education teachers who are studying in a customized scholarship and online graduate program under the Linking Standards and Quality Practice (LiSQuP) project in the Philippines. It aimed to explore the attitudes, benefits, and challenges encountered by the values education teachers by participating in the LiSQuP program. Embedded single case study research design was used, and qualitative content analysis was utilized for analyzing and interpreting the data. Recorded focus group interview, online (...) survey documents, observations, and participatory contact were used to obtain the data from the 30 participants who are LiSQuP scholars and teachers of values education in the public schools of the Philippines. Based on the findings of the study, the following results were drawn: 1) The participants exhibited adaptive and positive attitude towards the LiSQuP program; 2) The participants benefited from the program in terms of professional and personal development; and 3) The participants struggled with various factors related to time, program design, and personal traits. The rewarding and challenging experiences of the participants in this study May inform the project management team and other higher education institutions with similar online programs to enhance opportunities for a more responsive and collaborative online learning community for diverse graduate distance learners. (shrink)

This paper argues that contemporary AI-driven decision systems intensify a form of algorithmic consequentialism in which legitimacy is reduced to predictive performance, while the justificatory structure of judgment is progressively displaced. Against functionalist accounts that treat morally relevant effects as sufficient for moral agency, the paper defends a stricter thesis: normative authority requires ontological vulnerability—the capacity to appropriate an act as one’s own, to answer for it through reasons, and to assume its consequences as a price of freedom. Because current (...) AI systems operate through correlation without semantic understanding, they can generate outputs but cannot sign them in the existential sense that grounds accountability. The analysis distinguishes human reason as a “glass box” (opaque in mechanism yet traceable in justification) from algorithmic “black boxes” whose opacity is constitutive rather than merely technical. To translate this diagnosis into institutional safeguards, the paper introduces the Λ (Lambda) Operator as a binary criterion of reflexive appropriation capacity and proposes a Proof of Signature (PoS) protocol requiring that any high-impact decision assisted by AI be regenerated, appropriated, and explicitly signed by a human agent with Λ = 1. The COMPAS/State v. Loomis line of cases is used to illustrate how explainability tools cannot substitute for imputability, and why a right to explanation is ultimately a right to a responsible signer. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se propone un estudio del papiro P. Oxy. III. 414, cuyo contenido se centra en el análisis de los posibles beneficios de la poesía. Dado su enorme interés histórico, filológico y filosófico, así como la falta de una revisión filológica actualizada de la edición del texto y de una traducción al español, se propondrá en las presentes páginas una aproximación tanto al estudio de su forma como de su contenido hasta alcanzar una clarificación que permita, en (...) un futuro, abordar con mayor exactitud la polémica en torno a su posible autoría. Se estudiarán detenidamente las ediciones de texto realizadas hasta ahora y se propondrá una versión algo más conservadora, así como una traducción que, se espera, pueda servir como punto de partida a la hora de abordar dicha posible discusión en torno a su autoría de manera rigurosa. (shrink)

¿Puede el ser humano seguir siendo el origen en un mundo donde la máquina es el resultado perfecto? Vivimos bajo el asedio del Nuevo Barroco Tecnológico: un ecosistema de ruido infinito, plausibilidad vacía y algoritmos que no solo predicen nuestras respuestas, sino que las anulan antes de que nazcan. En este escenario, la "humanidad" ya no se defiende con el sentimiento, sino con la estructura. La Causa Primera no es un ensayo sobre inteligencia artificial; es un tratado de ontología de (...) urgencia. Lejos del optimismo ingenuo de Silicon Valley y del catastrofismo romántico europeo, esta obra establece una distinción radical que lo cambia todo: La Causa Segunda (La Máquina): La perfección operativa, la optimización estadística y la administración de lo probable. La Causa Primera (El Humano): La capacidad de interrumpir la inercia, asumir el riesgo de la "Verdad Rota" y firmar un acto no garantizado por la estadística. Estructurado como una Sinfonía filosófica en cinco movimientos con obertura, este libro desmonta la falsa equivalencia entre procesar datos y pensar. Desde la deconstrucción de la "Caja Negra" jurídica hasta la formulación de la "Indigencia Biológica" como ventaja operativa, el autor demuestra por qué nuestra vulnerabilidad es la única tecnología que la IA no puede replicar. Esto no es un libro para ser leído; es un manual para dejar de ser un usuario y volver a ser un Arquitecto. La máquina calcula. Tú sostienes el riesgo. Tú eres la Causa Primera. (shrink)

This paper provides a systematic philosophical abstract of La Causa Primera: Sinfonía filosófica en cinco movimientos con obertura (Fernández Tamames, 2026), a 176-page treatise arguing that freedom is not a property of rational agency but its ontological precondition. Against compatibilist and functionalist accounts of agency (Frankfurt, 1971; Dennett, 1991), the treatise develops a five-movement argument grounded in the biological anomaly of human neoteny (Namba & Huttner, 2024; Salamon et al., 2025): an indigent organism — one that lacks a complete behavioral (...) program — cannot but choose, and this structural necessity constitutes genuine ontological freedom rather than mere indeterminism (Mitchell, 2025; Liljenström, 2022). From this foundation, the treatise derives an absolute constraint on the reduction of human agency (Martineau et al., 2024; Rueda, 2025), traces the generative chain from indigence to creation, and identifies the interval between stimulus and response as the operational manifestation of free agency (Shofty et al., 2022; Weindel et al., 2025). The argument has direct implications for the philosophy of AI, legal accountability, and the theory of authorship (Gaidartzi, 2025; Gao, 2025; Huang et al., 2024). The full treatise is available in Spanish at PhilArchive (Fernández Tamames, 2026). (shrink)

In this paper we intend to offer a first approach to the incorporation of certain formal tools in the elucidation of some issues discussed in epistemological contexts. The aim is not to offer an exhaustive resolution of these problems but merely to point out the usefulness of modal semantics when applied to different fields. Here we will show how a series of skeptical arguments eventually involve a modal (counterfactual) structure, which we will try to generalise into a useful scheme.

Modern legal orders presuppose that acts have authors: someone can be asked “why this?” and someone can answer. This paper argues that algorithmic decision-making destabilizes that institutional grammar of imputation in two coupled ways. First, it erodes agency in practice through routine delegation, converting professionals into relays of system outputs. Second, a technical shift from deterministic, inspectable procedures (“glass box”) to probabilistic, opaque learning systems (“black box”) converts legitimacy from reason-giving to performance, producing decisions that may be effective yet structurally (...) resistant to attribution. Methodologically, the paper combines conceptual analysis, doctrinal reading of EU governance instruments (GDPR and the EU AI Act), and institutional analysis of accountability pipelines. Drawing on the triadic model of agency (initiate, judge, respond) and the ontology of signature developed in LA CAUSA PRIMERA (Fernández Tamames, 2026), it argues that explainability, while valuable, is insufficient as a remedy, and that “electronic personhood” is a liability-displacement fiction. The political remedy proposed is sovereign signing: institutionalized, reflexive human signature for high-stakes algorithmic outputs, coupled with contestability, traceability, and enforceable liability anchoring. Imputation is thereby defended as political resistance against organized irresponsibility in algorithmic governance. (shrink)

We aim to generate a dilemma for virtual reality-based research that we motivate through an extended case study of Judith Thomson’s (1985) Bridge variant of the trolley problem. Though the problem we generate applies more broadly than the Bridge problem, we believe it makes a good exemplar of the kind of case we believe is problematic. First, we argue that simulations of these thought experiments run into a practicality horn that makes it practically impossible to produce them. These problems revolve (...) around concepts that we call “perspectival fidelity”and “context realism.” Moral dilemmas that include features present in the Bridge variant will, as a result, be practically impossible to simulate. We also argue that, should we be wrong about the practical impossibility of creating a VR simulation of Bridge, such a simulation must face an ethical horn which renders these simulations ethically impermissible to develop or use. For these reasons, we argue that it is virtually impossible to simulate the bridge problem (and other thought experiments with similar features) both practically and ethically in VR. (shrink)

In digital cinema, the ambiguity in the concept of representation asks us: How do moving pictures represent fictional objects? I am more concerned in the veracity of fictional objects than the representational theory of how fictional objects are generated. I claim that John Dilworth’s framework is uncritical, therefore, I will adopt an account of truth in fiction according to David Lewis. The purposes of this paper are: (1) to criticize John Dilworth’s framework, and (2) to provide Lewis’s theory as an (...) alternative solution in understanding the veracity of fictional objects. (shrink)

Euthanasia and the duty to die have both been thoroughly discussed in the field of bioethics as morally justifiable practices within medical healthcare contexts. The existence of a narrow connection between both could also be established, for people having a duty to die should be allowed to actively hasten their death by the active means offered by euthanasia. Choosing the right time to end one’s own life is a decisive factor to retain autonomy at the end of our lives. However, (...) there is no definitive consensus on why physicians should be the ones performing the medical procedure to end a person’s life. The moral problems arising from such assertion are not to be taken lightly, for medical tradition has long regarded the duty not to kill, not to actively end a patient’s life, as the core moral obligation that gives meaning to the medical profession. Our concern is to question the moral justifiability of the arguments offered by physicians not to actively help patients die. (shrink)

This article develops a critical genealogy of legal imputation to show that contemporary debates on AI-assisted legality reactivate a foundational question that modern legal theory tended to leave implicit: the ontological status of the imputable subject. While Kelsen’s formal theory relocates validity to a closed hierarchy of norms and Hart’s institutionalism grounds it in social recognition, both approaches ultimately presuppose a being capable of responding to norms—without fully theorizing that presupposition. The increasing use of algorithmic systems in high-impact legal contexts (...) makes this dependence visible by producing decisions with normative effects while displacing the very locus of accountability. In response, the paper introduces Original Responsibility as the pre-juridical condition that makes imputation possible: the capacity to recognize an act as one’s own, to articulate reasons within a shared horizon of meaning, and to assume consequences. Building on the Kantian background of imputation and Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, the article defends an ontological criterion of validity: a norm is fully juridical only insofar as it can be addressed to an entity capable of sustaining its sense as an obligation. The paper concludes that algorithmic systems may conform to rules, but they cannot follow them as norms, and that preserving legal meaning in the algorithmic era requires re-centering responsibility rather than optimizing prediction. (shrink)