Evolutionary Epistemology

I argue that The Metaethical Moral Relativism has been being used as a form of support in order to commit desire–belief actions against Human Biology Principia. The lacking of Moral Epistemology allows me illustrate and explain practical downsides in the Ontological part of Moral Knowledge. I recommend a departure from The Biological Basis of Morality in favor to avoid contemporary misuses in the Justification of The Metaethical Moral Relativism.

The debate between Dual Inheritance Theory (DIT) and Cultural Attractor Theory (CAT) often overlooks the temporal dynamics of transmission. The Ontogenetic Synthesis (Dağ, 2026) proposes that human agency is time-dependent. In this study, we operationalize this framework through a discrete-time asymptotic model (M0). We introduce "Cultural Conductivity" (K) not as a direct neurological measure, but as a phenomenological proxy for the rate of adaptation. We apply this model to longitudinal IT usage trends (TÜİK, 2024) and normative data (Haerpfer et al., (...) 2024). While the high fit (R2 > 0.98) is expected in cumulative diffusion models, the distinct fracture in conductivity parameters between cohorts (Fr ≈ 3.74) suggests that ontogenetic constraints provide a consistent algebraic framing for the divergence in adaptive trajectories. (shrink)

The mechanisms of cultural transmission have long been debated between two dominant frameworks: Dual Inheritance Theory (DIT) and Cultural Attractor Theory (CAT). This paper articulates the Ontogenetic Synthesis, a comprehensive framework positing that these mechanisms operate sequentially within the human life history. Central to this synthesis is the Ontogenetic Principle of Cultural Dynamics (OPCD). Using a formal derivation based on linear response approximations, we demonstrate that DIT and CAT can be understood not as competing alternatives, but as limiting cases of (...) a continuous ontogenetic parameterization governed by the maturation of agentic control. (shrink)

Current literature on cultural evolution is often polarized between Darwinian selection (Memetics) and Lamarckian guided variation. This paper proposes the Ontogenetic Principle of Cultural Dynamics (OPCD) as a unifying theoretical framework to bridge this divide. I argue that these two models are not mutually exclusive but operate sequentially based on the cognitive maturity of the agent. The hypothesis posits that cultural transmission in childhood functionally resembles “Passive Memetic Replication” (High-Fidelity), whereas adulthood shifts towards “Lamarckian-like Knowledge Evolution” (Reconstructive). Furthermore, this study (...) clarifies the terminology: while aligned with the concept of Guided Variation, we retain the term “Functionally Lamarckian” to emphasize the computational shift from ‘read-only’ access to ‘write-access’ regarding cultural information streams. The framework is supported by a stochastic hybrid model and computational illustration detailed in the Appendix. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) posits that the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable (R) is low or inscrutable given naturalism and evolution (N&E). Critics argue that adaptive behavior does not necessitate true beliefs. In this paper, I address this challenge by introducing a Deflationary Asymptotic Model within the framework of the Ontogenetic Synthesis (Dağ, 2026a,b). By redefining ”Truth” not as a metaphysical correspondence but as a thermodynamic equilibrium state (A), I argue that complex cognitive sys tems (...) are constrained to minimize metabolic cost by reducing the vector difference between internal models and environmental signals. While absolute truth remains structurally inaccessible (the asymptote), the algebraic rate of change (∆Ct) drives the belief state (Ct) to converge arbitrarily close to A as agency (w) increases. Thus, natural selection does not select for ”Truth” per se, but for ”Energy-Efficient Struc tural Alignment,” which is functionally indistinguishable from reliability in mature agents. (shrink)

Background: A fundamental tension exists between Rational Choice Theory (which predicts rapid optimization) and Sociological Theory (which predicts inertia and lag). Standard Evolutionary Game Theory models adoption as a linear function of utility, failing to account for ”Threshold Behavior” observed in social change. Method: We perform a formal synthesis of the standard Replicator Dynamic Equation and the Time-Dependent Agency model proposed by Da˘g (2026). By scaling the micro-level ontogenetic parameters to the macro-level, we derive a ”Sigmoidal Inertia Equation.” Results: We (...) demonstrate that cultural plasticity is not linear but logistic. The adoption of a new norm requires the utility gap (∆π) to exceed a specific ”Social Activation Energy.” Conclusion: This framework mathematically resolves four historical anomalies: Ogburn’s Cultural Lag, Granovetter’s Tipping Points, Pluralistic Ignorance, and Institutional Path Dependence. (shrink)

The is/ought problem, this paper argues, is not a metaphysical chasm to be bridged but an artifact of foundationalist epistemology. To reframe it, this paper develops *Emergent Pragmatic Coherentism (EPC)*, a descriptive model of moral knowledge. Building on Quine’s holism, EPC models all knowledge as an emergent hierarchy of shared “networks of predicates.” This social-epistemic architecture scales from the individual’s “web of belief” to encompass entire traditions of inquiry. Within this architecture, truth is treated deflationary as a functional label for (...) robust coherence within a pragmatically-tested network. This network-relative conception of truth is simultaneously disciplined by an external selective filter—evolutionary pragmatic selection—where the ultimate metric is not mere persistence but *pragmatic viability*: a system's homeostatic efficiency in propagating its structure with minimal coercive cost. Networks incurring high systemic costs collapse over time, while efficient, resilient networks propagate. This process grounds a form of procedural objectivity: while truth is a property internal to a network, networks themselves can be objectively ranked by their long-term viability. The ultimate regulative standard is the Apex Network—a theoretical model of a real, emergent historical object representing the cumulative record of predicates that have proven most viable. EPC’s central claim is conditional: if we begin from minimal naturalism, where endurance is a non-negotiable constraint, then EPC provides a robust account of moral progress. It locates normative authority not in metaphysical fiat or non-cognitive attitudes, but in the empirical lessons encoded in humanity’s most resilient social and epistemic structures. (shrink)

This paper introduces Civilizational Control Theory (CCT), a programmatic framework that models civilizations as open, dissipative, multi-layer control systems. CCT conceptualizes civilizational order as a stabilized non-equilibrium process maintained through information-energy regulation. We articulate ten foundational propositions concerning control bandwidth, mutual information, energy allocation gradients, spectral centralization, institutional evolution, and AI-induced compression of decision latency. These propositions reformulate civilizational dynamics as problems of stability, controllability, and adaptive feedback under entropy constraints.

This chapter explores how online communication, particularly on social media, reshapes the reputational incentives that motivate speakers to communicate truthfully. Drawing on costly signalling theory (CST), it examines how online contexts alter the social mechanisms that sustain honest communication. Key characteristics of online spaces are identified and discussed, namely (i) the presence of novel speech acts like reposting, (ii) the gamification of communication, (iii) information overload, (iv) the presence of anonymous and unaccountable sources and (v) the increased reach and persistence (...) of online communication. Both epistemic pitfalls and potential benefits of these features are discussed, identifying promising avenues for further empirical investigation, and underscoring CST's value for understanding and tackling online misinformation. (shrink)

In this paper, I wish to criticize the notion that consensus is an epistemology. While I have never seen it explicitly claimed that “consensus is an epistemology,” I have nonetheless seen it implied in many scholarly (and layperson) articles. This occurs whenever articles cite, “a majority of scholars agree that…” or “most scientists/researchers think…” In our democratic, individualistic society, we put a value on high value votes and the quantification of majority viewpoints, whether it be in political polls (due to (...) living in a democracy), online on websites with ranking or voting systems such as Reddit, YouTube, or Instagram. The danger here is we may defer too much to the consensus view without appropriate justification. I will give several reasons why we should be skeptical of appeals to consensus (including a consensus of experts), which include its non-obvious link to ontology, the fact that consensus changes, and a lack of specificity of who counts as an ``expert,'' the lack of specificity on how to handle consensus (if it does occur), and epistemic undercutting defeaters from evolutionary epistemology. While an appeal to consensus may not tell us much about whether a theory is true, they can give us practical or pragmatic reasons for trusting a position. (shrink)

One of the mains challenges of biosemiotics is ‘to attempt to naturalize biological meaning’ [Sharov & all 2015]. That challenge brings to look at a possible evolutionary thread for biosemiotics based on meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction, starting with a pre-biotic entity emerging from a material universe. Such perspective complements and extends previous works that used a model of meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction (the Meaning Generator System) [Menant 2003a, b; 2011]. We propose to look at such an (...) evolutionary thread for biosemiotics in three steps. The first step presents the proposed emergence of a pre-biotic entity as a far from thermodynamic equilibrium volume constrained to maintains its status [Menant 2015]. Such constraint dependence introduces natural links with teleology and with meaning generation. It also introduces perspectives for evolutionary origins of agency, self, and autonomy, coming in addition to other biosemiotic perspectives [Tønnessen, 2015]. The next step recalls the MGS as being a system approach linking the agent containing it to its environment and bringing to the agent a control from within. We apply the MGS to animal life. Relations with the Umwelt, with constructivism and with the Peircean triadic approach are highlighted. The last step of the thread brings the evolution of life up to humans where specificities related to human mind have to be taken into account. Among them is self-consciousness for which an existing evolutionary scenario introduces anxiety management as a foundational human constraint [Menant, 2014]. We link that scenario to the evolutionary thread because it introduces specific human constraints and is based on the evolution of meaningful representations. A conclusion summarizes the steps of the proposed evolutionary thread. More work is needed on that subject. Possible continuations are introduced. (shrink)

Biosemiotics and Semiotics have similarities and differences. Both deal with signal and meaning. One difference is that Biosemiotics covers a domain (life) that is less complex that the one addressed by Semiotics (human). We believe that this difference can be used to have Biosemiotics bringing added value to Semiotics. This belief is based on the fact that a theory of meaning is easier to build up for living elements than for humans, and that the results obtained for life can make (...) available some tools for a higher level of complexity. Semiotic has been encountering some difficulties to deliver a scientific theory of meaning that can be efficient at the level of human mind. The obstacles come from our ignorance on the nature of human. As it is true that we do not understand the nature of human mind on a scientific basis. On the other hand, the nature and properties of life are better understood. And we can propose a modelization for a generation of meaningful information in the field of elementary life. Once such a modelization is established, it is possible to look at extending it to the domain of human life. Such an approach on a theory of meaning (begininig in Biosemiotics and aiming at Semiotics), is what we present in this paper. Taking an elementary living element as reference, we introduce the bases of a systemic theory of meaning. Using a simple living system submitted to a constraint, we define a meaningful information, a meaning generator system and some elements related to meaningful information transmission. We then try to identify the hypothesis that need to be taken into account so the results obtained for living elements can be extended to human. (shrink)

Justificationism is the epistemology that enjoins us to choose our beliefs according to this principle: choose all and only those beliefs and at an appropriate degree of confidence that one can justify, either by an intellectual certificate or empirical warrant. My article argues that most forms of justificationism require the truth of doxastic voluntarism, the doctrine that one may choose ones specific beliefs. However, since belief is involuntary, justificationism is severely undermined. Justificationism as stated couldn’t be practised; since believing is (...) not something we can do at will as a basic action. Although devastating to any subjectivist justificationism, it does not undermine our ability to cultivate, through long-term choices, the most rational attitude in the search for truth and the growth of knowledge. A major rival of subjective justiticationism (SJ) is critical rationalism (CR). CR is the doctrine that progress in the growth of knowledge occurs through the unrelenting criticism of competing unjustified conjectural attempts to solve problems. The objective methods and standards involved in CR are unaffected because following (or not) an objective method is something we can do at will. (shrink)

This paper extends Intelligence Frame Theory (IFT) into a cosmological register by examining how intelligence emerges, saturates, and recurses across universal epochs. IFT models intelligence as the iterative interaction of three Universal Intelligence Operators—Information Transfer, Competition & Collaboration, and Finding Limits—compressed and redirected by a Selector (Eureka). Applied across the Cosmic, Biological, Cognitive, and Generative / Artificial Frames, these dynamics yield a general architecture of evolving intelligence that persists beyond local substrates. -/- Framing Infinity explores eight cosmological questions: the ubiquity (...) of intelligence in the universe, the acceleration of recursion through frame transitions, the definition of life as UIO–Selector viability, the expansion and collision of intelligence horizons, the emergence of artificial affect, the prospects of alignment between biological and artificial agents, and the persistence of intelligence into the Degenerate and Dark Eras of the cosmos. It concludes with a speculative model in which intelligence becomes a cosmic actuator—a mechanism not merely shaped by physics but capable of modulating the constants and boundary conditions of future universes. -/- The result is a reframing of fine-tuning and cosmological evolution: intelligence is not incidental to the universe but a recursive driver of its iteration. (shrink)

Intelligence Frame Theory (IFT) models intelligence as a recurring structural dynamic across cosmic, biological, cognitive, and generative domains. Each frame arises from three operator primitives — recurrence, constraint, and persistence — closed by a selector that governs adaptive stability. IFT extends Universal Darwinism and cybernetics by formalizing selector migration, the shift of selection from external environments to internal models, reducing adaptive cost and accelerating iteration. This operator-level perspective explains transitions between Type I (recursion-dominant, fractal) and Type II (constraint-dominant, modular) architectures, (...) and clarifies derivative dynamics such as supra-coordination and the Eureka Constraint. Within cognition, the Emotional Compression Interface links biological heuristics to symbolic reframing, while General Transformational Sufficiency identifies when a substrate supports adaptive transformation rather than mere computation. IFT is presented as a unifying heuristic framework that reveals how the operator–selector cycle recurs across scales, driving the emergence, saturation, and renewal of intelligence-bearing frames. (shrink)

This paper extends Intelligence Frame Theory (IFT) to explain why systems—from brains to civilizations—lose coherence under stress. Each intelligence frame (Biological, Cognitive, Generative) virtualizes selection from its parent substrate, operating at a faster tempo but drawing on the same energy base. When substrate energy (E_sub) can no longer sustain the selector’s refresh rate and cost (f_sigma × k_sigma), regulation collapses to the slower, more embodied frame beneath it. This Frame Regression Law predicts a universal pattern: impulsivity under intoxication, authoritarian regression (...) in states, and war at global scale. Empirical proxies allow computation of a Coherence Stress Index (CSI) and cross-scale testing via neural, institutional, and geopolitical data. The model yields falsifiable predictions—variance-based early warnings and bandwidth-sensitivity of deterrence—and proposes resilience design through redundant selectors operating at multiple tempos. IFT reframes intelligence as the universe’s progressive virtualization of selection—and collapse as its temporary reversal. (shrink)

This paper introduces a philosophical framework that reconceptualizes human knowledge and reasoning as dynamically structured apertures. Rather than accumulating static facts, knowing is depicted as a continual, reflexive process of structurally modulating one's epistemic aperture—the cognitive interface through which meaning and perception become intelligible. Integrating insights from phenomenology, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and cultural theory, this framework addresses how early emotional experiences shape lifelong epistemic patterns, how epistemic constraints become invisible "dogmas," and how epistemological traditions can be reframed as apertural (...) genealogies. By advocating structural pluralism and epistemic resonance over singular truth and rigid dogma, the Atlas of Knowing aims to cultivate reflexive cognition capable of holding multiplicity and tension without collapsing into relativism or dogmatism. (shrink)

Physicalism is the default position in science and in the philosophy of mind, but it should not be, I argue, because of two errors. By its epistemological error, physicalism gives physics priority over the evidence of first person experience. Only what I experience in first person is certain, so observation is prior to any theory. Physics itself is based on observation, avoiding the epistemological error, and then physics can progress, even changing its own ontology. However, physicalism imposes the ontology of (...) physics on every science, and in physics everything is causal. By its ontological error, physicalism tries to explain causally what is intentional. And it happens that causality and intentionality are mutually exclusive, showing that the ontology of physics is insufficient wherever intentions are present. This ontological insufficiency prevents that physicalism can repeat the success of physics with any science where intentions play a rôle, and thus it is blocking the advance of both the social sciences and the philosophy of mind. To overcome this obstacle, I propose to go back to the essentials: we should consider again the transcendental problem raised by Descartes and its solutions by Hume and Kant. On top of this subjectivist solution, we should take advantage of Darwin and Turing, and we should extend our ontology beyond causality to include intentionality, and here my proposal is problem solving. Then you could join our Post-Kantian subjectivism and say with me: The world is not a huge machine, as physicalism proposes, but an enigmatic problem. (shrink)

What is time? This question has vexed philosophers since antiquity and physi- cists since the birth of their science. Newton declared time absolute, flowing equably without relation to anything external. Einstein proved time relative, dilating with velocity and bending near mass. Quantum mechanics treats time as a parameter, fundamentally different from space. Thermodynamics sees time’s arrow in entropy increase. Each view captures truth, yet none satisfies completely. We propose a geometric answer that unifies these fragments: Time is the horizontal arc-length (...) of existence density accumulated along trajectories through curved geometry. This is not metaphor but mathematical definition. Just as probability emerges from vertical integration over hidden fibers (as demonstrated in our companion volume Principia Probabilitatis), time emerges from horizontal integration along observable paths. The existence density e−Heff serves as both: • A vertical measure producing probability when integrated over fibers • A horizontal metric producing time when integrated along curves This duality is the key. Probability and time are not separate phenomena but complementary projections of a single geometric structure—the effective Hamilto- nian Heff = κ + log JΠ. Herein we prove: First, that proper time along any worldline equals the accumulated existence density, providing geometric meaning to duration. Second, that time dilation, gravitational redshift, and relativistic effects arise naturally from variations in the effective Hamiltonian without appeal to spacetime curvature per se. vii viii Principia Temporis Third, that clocks are geometric odometers, accumulating arc-length in a curved manifold weighted by existence density. Fourth, that the evolution of probability obeys a continuity equation driven by gradients of the effective Hamiltonian, unifying quantum, thermal, and classical dynamics. Fifth, that what we call “potential energy” is the curvature (Laplacian) of the effective Hamiltonian—a measure of geometric convexity in hidden dimensions. We write in the classical manner because time deserves classical treatment. Let those who would understand duration prepare to think geometrically. (shrink)

What makes us persons? Is it our bodies, our minds, or our consciousness? For centuries, philosophers have sought to answer these questions. While some believe humans are physical or biological, others claim we have an immaterial soul. This book proposes a new alternative. Selves were formed in evolution through connections and commitments to others when early hominins lived in tribal groups and developed languages. As humans learned to fulfill these commitments, they not only cultivated relationships but also created their personal (...) identities. Their habits of responsibility established their characters and therefore their reputations within their communities. This naturalistic approach proposes that a self is defined by the history of its commitments to cultural and personal norms. While brain processes are required, the self is not some internal, private mind but primarily a role within its community. As technology advances, selfhood could in the future be enabled by electronic, quantum, or other non-biological means. So if a self is formed through norms, could artificial intelligence evolve to have self-identity? (shrink)

Abstract: This article introduces “Historical Darwinism” – also referred to as “Civilizational Evolution” or “Civilizational Renaissance” – as a universal framework for understanding the evolution of civilizations, a framework built on patterns analogous to biological natural selection. It is argued that, throughout world history, long-lasting civilizations have emerged, adapted, and declined through processes resembling cultural survival and regeneration. For instance, the Hittites arose from the Hattians, the Greeks from the Mycenaeans, and the Babylonians from Sumerian and Akkadian civilizations, defining their (...) identities in continuity with their predecessors. From this perspective, myths are not merely products of imagination; rather, they are repositories of collective memory that encode the historical experiences of ancient societies preceding “Civilizational Evolution” in the literary forms of societies after “Civilizational Evolution.” Although “Historical Darwinism” represents a general principle applicable to all long-lived civilizations, this article specifically applies it to Iranian mythology. By examining the narratives of the Shahnameh and other Iranian sources, it is shown that the myths of the Shahnameh and the Avesta reflect civilizational transformations, migrations, and cultural renaissances across the vast land of Aryana during the Bronze and Iron Ages. Apparent contradictions in Iranian sources—such as divergent accounts of origins and the duality of Zoroastrian traditions—are interpreted within this framework not as evidence of historical fabrication but as signs of successive historical reconstructions during the course of “Civilizational Renaissance.” Accordingly, “Historical Darwinism” emerges as a novel approach in the philosophy of mythology, aiming to uncover the historical cores of ancient myths and connect them to the processes of civilizational development and renewal. (shrink)

چکیده: این مقاله "داروینیسم تاریخی" یا "نوزایی تمدنی" را به‌عنوان یک چارچوب جهان‌شمول برای فهم تکامل تمدن‌ها معرفی می‌کند؛ چارچوبی که بر الگوهایی مشابه انتخاب طبیعی زیستی بنا شده است. استدلال می‌شود که در سراسر تاریخ جهان، تمدن‌های دراز مدت در فرآیندهایی شبیه بقا و نوزایی فرهنگی پدید آمده، سازگار شده و افول کرده‌اند: برای نمونه، هیتی‌ها از حاتی‌ها، یونانی‌ها از میسینی‌ها، و بابلی‌ها از تمدن سومر و اکد برخاسته و هویت خود را در امتداد ایشان تعریف نموده‌اند. در این (...) چشم‌انداز، اسطوره‌ها صرفاً ساخته‌های خیال‌پردازانه نیستند، بلکه گنجینه‌هایی از حافظه جمعی‌اند که تجربه‌های تاریخی جوامع کهن پیش از "نوزایی تمدنی" را در قالب‌های ادبی جوامع پس از "نوزایی تمدنی" رمزگذاری کرده‌اند. هرچند "داروینیسم تاریخی" یک قانون کلی برای همه تمدن‌های درازمدت است، اما این مقاله آن را به ‌طور خاص در اسطوره‌شناسی ایرانی به کار می‌گیرد. با بررسی روایت‌های شاهنامه و دیگر منابع ایرانی، نشان داده می‌شود که اسطوره‌های شاهنامه و اوستا بازتاب‌دهنده دگرگونی‌های تمدنی، مهاجرت‌ها و نوزایی‌های فرهنگی در سرزمین وسیع آریانا در عصر برنز و آهن هستند. تناقض‌های ظاهری در منابع ایرانی ــ همچون روایت‌های متفاوت از خاستگاه‌ها و دوگانگی سنت‌های زرتشتی ــ در این چارچوب نه نشانی از جعل تاریخ، بلکه شواهدی از بازسازی‌های متوالی تاریخی در جریان "نوزایی تمدنی" تفسیر می‌شوند. بر این اساس، "داروینیسم تاریخی" به ‌مثابه رهیافتی نو در فلسفه اسطوره‌شناسی، کوششی است برای کشف هسته‌های تاریخی اساطیر کهن و پیوند دادن آنها با روند شکل‌گیری فرگشت و نوزایی‌های تمدنی. (shrink)

Knowledge is a real process instantiated in time, matter, and energy. Real processes operate under resource constraints. Any epistemology that ignores these constraints is therefore structurally incomplete. This paper argues that the economic principle understood as allocation under scarity is not a domain-specific assumption imported from economics, but a foundational condition of any physically realized epistemic system. Once epistemic activity is treated as a cost-bearing process, ideals such as completeness, unlimited recursion, and maximal rationality are shown to be structurally incoherent (...) rather than merely impractical. The argument is strictly descriptive: scarcity is not invoked as a normative criterion, but as a constraint delimiting which epistemic norms can be meaningfully instantiated at all. The implications are illustrated for scientific inquiry as an institutional epistemic system and for artificial intelligence as a limit case of epistemic compression, where diminishing returns and instability expose the consequences of ignored epistemic budgets. (shrink)

This essay argues that the human form is not final: : natural selection continues within a second-order natural environment, technogenic in nature, which the spe-cies itself fabricates. Understanding “form” as an integrated configuration (body, cognitive and relational dispositions, technical-symbolic couplings), it shows how the displacement of risk from early mortality to effective reproductive fitness re-parameterises evolution. In the technogenic niche, informational mediation of encounter (metric proximity, catalogue–algorithmic hierarchisation–filter) favours assortativity and quantile pairing; functional externalisation redistributes cognitive costs; and mental health (...) operates as a selective channel, from extreme cut to chronic friction that delays parenthood. A verification programme is proposed with comparable indicators (childlessness, age at first child, assortativity coefficients, prevalences of sexual inactivity), defending that data operate as philosophical oper-ators that make capillary selection measurable. The conclusion is that, by reconfig-uring the environment, we reconfigure the pressures that shape us: the evolutionary future of the human is the multigenerational resultant of the ecologies we construct. (shrink)

In this article, I draw on the social intentionality hypothesis to develop an account of cognitive integration. My account sheds light on the variety of cognitive integration that has been of most interest to epistemologists by arguing that it is best understood as the intrapersonal analogue of a paradigmatically interpersonal problem. Furthermore, the intrapersonal version of the problem is solved by simulating the solution to the interpersonal version. Consequently, we better understand the intrapersonal version of the problem relevant to epistemology (...) by considering the interpersonal version. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to clarify the nature of the shift in Feyerabend’s philosophical thinking in the 1970s, focusing on issues of realism, relativism, and pluralism. Contra-Preston, I argue that realism-relativism is a misleading variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in the 1970s. Rather, I characterize this shift as Feyerabend’s expansion of pluralism and suggest that this shift appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in the late-1960s (e.g., Feyerabend 1968b, 1969b, 1970a, 1970c). Adopting the terminology of Brown and Kidd (2016), (...) this shift is characterized by a move from arguments for pluralism within science to broader arguments for pluralism in society. I argue that this shift was largely due to: (1) Feyerabend’s rejection of an empiricist demarcation criterion for science in the mid-1960s, and (2) Feyerabend’s incorporation of Mill’s arguments for pluralism into his own publications starting in 1970. This shift can be characterized as a broadening or expanding the scope of Feyerabend’s arguments for pluralism from contexts of scientific knowledge to the broader context of social or cultural (including ethical) knowledge. I articulate this argument with reference to the framework for classifying Feyerabend’s works formulated by Brown and Kidd (2016). Against Brown and Kidd (and Preston), I argue that realism-relativism is a red-herring as a variable for distinguishing Feyerabend’s early and middle works. Brown and Kidd’s distinction between pluralism within science and pluralism in society is a more useful variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in thinking in the 1970s. Whereas Preston (1997) and Brown and Kidd (2016) identify the beginning of Feyerabend’s pluralism in society phase in 1978 with the publication of Science in a Free Society (Feyerabend 1978), I suggest that the relevant shift occurs much earlier, and it appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in 1970 (Feyerabend 1970a, 1970b). On this understanding, Feyerabend’s philosophical shift (c. 1970) should be viewed as an expansion (or broadening) of the scope of application of his pluralist arguments, inspired by Mill’s ethical arguments for pluralism in society (Mill 1859/1977). (shrink)

摘要：本文旨在从中国哲学的视角，为“先有鸡还是先有蛋”这一古老悖论提供一个根本 性的哲学解答。本文认为，该问题的困境源于将生命创生视为线性因果链条的还原论 思维。本文通过构建一个名为“元条件‑相感‑成一”的动态生成论模型，提出鸡与蛋并非 存在先后，而是在一个生成性过程中作为生命连续统的不同状态而“同时”涌现。该模型 以《周易》的“太极阴阳”思想和“感通”理论为基础，批判性地吸收了郭象的“自生独化” 与怀特海过程哲学的洞见。该模型的核心论点是：万物之生源于非意向性的“元条件”； 当元条件具足，宇宙间的基本要素通过动态的“相感”（即阴阳相干）而相互作用；每一 次“相感”的完成，都会凝结为一个新的、具有内在统一性的存在者，此即“成一”。这一 过程是宇宙“生生不息”的根本机制。.

Error Management Theory (EMT) suggests that cognitive adaptations evolve to minimize the cost of false negative and false positive errors in detections of consequential environmental conditions. These adaptations manifest as biases tailored to specific environmental conditions. This paper proposes that the same selection pressure fostered the evolution of a self-biasing ability, allowing us to minimize such costs based on experience and culturally transmitted information. The research indicates that this ability specifically applies to productions of belief or doubt about the existence (...) of an environmental condition that is not adequately perceptible to the senses, e.g., doubt that the man is being honest. A model of this self-biasing process, rooted in signal detection theory, is developed and its explanatory reach is demonstrated through many diverse examples from epistemological and social psychological literatures. These examples feature an evidentiary standard for belief that appears too high or low, or seems to have modulated. This study aims to correct and to significantly enhance EMT by introducing this evolved self-biasing ability. (shrink)

I present the two philosophies of science developed by Theodore de Laguna and Grace Andrus de Laguna in America before the 1930s arrival of the logical positivists there. I also provide a contextualised comparison of these pre-logical positivist views with the post-positivist views of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. We will see that the de Lagunas articulate the key influential aspects of the philosophies of science of Popper and Kuhn and, with the help of a more developed theoretical framework than (...) that of Popper or Kuhn, address what came to be key challenges to these later thinkers’ views. We will also see that ‘Kuhnian’ ideas were ubiquitous in America during the 1930s and 1940s. These observations allow me to further support the recent thesis that the logical positivists were proposing a narrowing down and winding back of philosophy of science when they arrived in America. Indeed, it will be challenging to rationally reconstruct the history of the philosophy of science which developed later. It was still, even after Kuhn in the early 1960s, playing catch up with the speculative tradition to which the de Lagunas belonged. My observations also suggest that Kuhn was an important conduit through which ideas from the speculative tradition made their way into analytic philosophy of science. (shrink)

This paper delves into the intersection between Kant’s moral theory and evolutionary perspectives on _personhood_. It explores how Kant’s emphasis on rationality in moral agency aligns with evolutionary studies on the development of moral behaviors. By examining the transcendental implications of Kant’s _Categorical Imperative_ (CI) and the evolutionary origins of moral agency, this study aims to illuminate the link between Kant’s conception of moral agency and personhood. Additionally, it investigates how Kant’s call for CI resonates with evolutionary insights on the (...) adaptive nature of social cooperation in human societies. Through this analysis, we seek to deepen our understanding of the cognitive, social dimensions of moral agency and moral status within the framework of Kant’s moral theory and evolutionary perspectives on personhood. (shrink)

John Dewey is a pragmatic and evolutionary philosopher who, with his instrumentalist philosophy, seeks to apply philosophy as well as to update philosophy based on new findings in the field of experimental science. He believed that with the introduction of the Darwinian origin scheme, a great event had taken place in the world of natural sciences and a revolution had taken place in the thinking and way of thinking of the time. Dewey enters his new philosophy by using the problem (...) of changing the types and concepts that are inferred from it. According to Dewey, epistemology and conventional ethics have come to an end, and we need to bring about a fundamental transformation and revision. Keywords such as the essence of objects, the fundamental principles, the invisible objects that regulate or control our lives and our world, are challenged by Darwin's theory. Dewey's philosophy of inquiry criticizes absolute principles. Dewey's philosophy of ethics and epistemology is realized in nature, along with natural selection and with the mechanism of the principles of adaptation of living beings. Individual and society, opinion and action, world and hereafter, right and wrong, are two parts that Dewey tries to unite. He considers man and society as a single, continuous, organ-like or organic matter. Dewey's evolutionary ethics and epistemology can be useful as a new tool for the philosophical society of Iran, with the consideration that its practical results in our society should be constantly evaluated. (shrink)

В данной статье вводится концепция «Исторического дарвинизма» — также называемая «Цивилизационной эволюцией» или «Цивилизационным ренессансом» — как универсальная рамка для понимания эволюции цивилизаций, основанная на закономерностях, аналогичных биологическому естественному отбору. В статье утверждается, что на протяжении мировой истории длительно существовавшие цивилизации возникали, адаптировались и приходили в упадок посредством процессов, напоминающих культурное выживание и регенерацию. Например, хетты возникли из хаттов, греки — из микенцев, а вавилоняне — из шумерской и аккадской цивилизаций, формируя свою идентичность в преемственности с предшественниками. С этой точки (...) зрения, мифы — это не просто продукты воображения; они являются хранилищами коллективной памяти, кодирующими исторический опыт древних обществ, предшествовавших «Цивилизационной эволюции», в литературных формах обществ, существовавших после «Цивилизационной эволюции». Хотя «Исторический дарвинизм» представляет собой общий принцип, применимый ко всем длительно существующим цивилизациям, в данной статье он специально применяется к иранской мифологии. Анализируя повествования Шахнаме и других иранских источников, показано, что мифы Шахнаме и Авесты отражают цивилизационные трансформации, миграции и культурные ренессансы на обширной территории Арьяны в бронзовом и железном веках. Очевидные противоречия в иранских источниках — такие как различные версии происхождения и дуализм зороастрийских традиций — интерпретируются в рамках данной концепции не как свидетельства исторической выдумки, а как признаки последовательных исторических реконструкций в ходе «Цивилизационного ренессанса». Таким образом, «Исторический дарвинизм» выступает как новый подход в философии мифологии, направленный на выявление исторического ядра древних мифов и их связь с процессами цивилизационного развития и обновления. (shrink)

Abstract: Dieser Artikel führt den Begriff des „Historischen Darwinismus“ – auch bezeichnet als „zivilisationelle Evolution“ oder „zivilisationelle Renaissance“ – als universellen Rahmen zur Erklärung der Entwicklung von Zivilisationen ein, ein Rahmen, der auf Mustern basiert, die der biologischen natürlichen Selektion analog sind. Es wird argumentiert, dass im Verlauf der Weltgeschichte langlebige Zivilisationen entstanden, sich angepasst und wieder verfallen sind durch Prozesse, die kulturellem Überleben und Regeneration ähneln. So entstanden beispielsweise die Hethiter aus den Hattiern, die Griechen aus den Mykenern und (...) die Babylonier aus den sumerischen und akkadischen Zivilisationen, wobei sie ihre Identitäten in Kontinuität mit ihren Vorgängern definierten. Aus dieser Perspektive sind Mythen nicht bloß Produkte der Vorstellungskraft; vielmehr sind sie Speicher kollektiver Erinnerung, die die historischen Erfahrungen antiker Gesellschaften codieren, die der zivilisationellen Evolution vorausgingen, und diese in literarischer Form in Gesellschaften nach der zivilisationellen Evolution weitergeben. Obwohl der Historische Darwinismus ein allgemeines Prinzip darstellt, das auf alle langlebigen Zivilisationen anwendbar ist, wendet dieser Artikel es spezifisch auf die iranische Mythologie an. Durch die Analyse der Erzählungen des Schāhnāme und anderer iranischer Quellen wird gezeigt, dass die Mythen des Schāhnāme und des Avesta zivilisatorische Transformationen, Migrationen und kulturelle Wiederaufleben auf dem weiten Land von Aryana während der Bronze- und Eisenzeit widerspiegeln. Offensichtliche Widersprüche in den iranischen Quellen – wie divergierende Herkunftserzählungen und die Dualität der zoroastrischen Traditionen – werden innerhalb dieses Rahmens nicht als Beweis historischer Fiktion, sondern als Zeichen aufeinanderfolgender historischer Rekonstruktionen im Verlauf der zivilisationellen Renaissance interpretiert. Dementsprechend erweist sich der Historische Darwinismus als ein neuartiger Ansatz in der Philosophie der Mythologie, der darauf abzielt, die historischen Kerne antiker Mythen aufzudecken und sie mit den Prozessen der zivilisatorischen Entwicklung und Erneuerung zu verbinden. (shrink)

Résumé : Cet article présente le « Darwinisme historique » – également appelé « Évolution civilisatrice » ou « Renaissance civilisatrice » – comme un cadre universel pour comprendre l’évolution des civilisations, un cadre construit sur des schémas analogues à la sélection naturelle biologique. Il est avancé que, tout au long de l’histoire mondiale, des civilisations durables ont émergé, se sont adaptées et ont décliné à travers des processus ressemblant à la survie et à la régénération culturelles. Par exemple, les (...) Hittites sont issus des Hattiens, les Grecs des Mycéniens, et les Babyloniens des civilisations sumérienne et akkadienne, définissant leur identité en continuité avec leurs prédécesseurs. Dans cette perspective, les mythes ne sont pas de simples produits de l’imagination ; au contraire, ils constituent des réservoirs de mémoire collective qui codifient les expériences historiques des sociétés anciennes précédant la « Évolution civilisatrice », sous des formes littéraires des sociétés postérieures à la « Évolution civilisatrice ». Bien que le « Darwinisme historique » représente un principe général applicable à toutes les civilisations de longue durée, cet article l’applique spécifiquement à la mythologie iranienne. En examinant les récits du Shâhnâmeh et d’autres sources iraniennes, il est démontré que les mythes du Shâhnâmeh et de l’Avesta reflètent les transformations civilisationnelles, les migrations et les renaissances culturelles à travers la vaste terre de l’Aryana durant les âges du Bronze et du Fer. Les contradictions apparentes dans les sources iraniennes – telles que les récits divergents des origines et la dualité des traditions zoroastriennes – sont interprétées dans ce cadre non comme des preuves de fabrication historique, mais comme des signes de reconstructions historiques successives au cours de la « Renaissance civilisatrice ». En conséquence, le « Darwinisme historique » émerge comme une approche novatrice en philosophie de la mythologie, visant à découvrir les noyaux historiques des mythes anciens et à les relier aux processus de développement et de renouvellement civilisationnels. (shrink)

I introduce the key ideas of foundationalist, coherentist and pragmatist theories of knowledge. I then use these ideas as background for presenting the work on knowledge and perception in this part, work by Grace Andrus de Laguna and Marie Collins Swabey. We will see that these authors critique the idea of sense data that was central to the foundationalist theories of knowledge of Bertrand Russel and other early analytic thinkers, though de Laguna’s critique leads to perspectivism about perception and knowledge (...) while Swabey rejects perspectivism. So too, we will see that de Laguna and Swabey develop epistemologies with strong coherentist elements, much as did their idealist teacher James Edwin Creighton. De Laguna’s, developed jointly with her husband, Theodore de Laguna, is a sophisticated form of naturalism that is built on a critique of pragmatist naturalism and is similar to the one made famous later by Willard V. Quine. Swabey rejects all forms of naturalism, arguing that knowledge requires an a priori foundation in reason. (shrink)

In this essay, I consider an evolutionary debunking argument (EDA) that purports to undermine the epistemic justification of the belief in the reliability of our belief-forming processes, and an evolutionary vindicating argument (EVA) that seeks to establish that such a belief is epistemically justified. Whereas the EDA in question seems to fall prey to crippling self-defeat, the EVA under consideration seems to fall prey to vicious circularity. My interest in those arguments and the problems they face lies in what they (...) might tell us about the possibly aporetic nature of reason. For, if we take the EDA and the EVA in question to consist of true or plausible premises and valid inferences at which we arrive through a meticulous use of reason, then their falling victim to either crippling self-defeat or vicious circularity might be regarded as a sign that, when we push rational reflection on the reliability, or lack thereof, of our belief-forming capacities to the limit, we end up in a situation of aporia from which there seems to be no escape. (shrink)

This chapter explores global debunking arguments, debunking arguments that aim to give one a global defeater. I defend Alvin Plantinga’s view that global defeaters are possible and, once gained, are impossible to escape by reasoning. They thereby must be extinguished by other means: epistemically propitious actions, luck, or grace. I then distinguish between three types of global defeater—pure-undercutters, undercutters-because-rebutters, and undercutters-while-rebutters—and systematically consider how one can deflect such defeaters. Lastly, since I draw insights from the literature on perhaps the most (...) widely discussed global debunking argument in the literature, Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism, I end up responding to many potential problems for it. This includes the so-called conditionalization problem, as well as those raised by Bergmann (2002), Law (2012), Deem (2018), Hendricks and Anderson (2020), and Wielenberg (in Craig and Wielenberg (2021)). (shrink)

The article approaches the epistemological question on the concept of time from an anthropological psychology perspective. The differentiation between imminent perceptions and existence beyond imminent perception has been the earliest conceptualization of time found so far in the traces of human civilizations. The research differentiated psychological time from modern physics and astronomy as the basic hypothesis in the inquiries on the concept of time in physics and modern astronomy – is the physical unit of time an ontological existence of things (...) or an inter-subjective concept? The research adopts transcendental philosophy in the questioning of unconsciousness in the sociology of knowledge with a dissection between psychological time and physical units of time. With further questioning into the physics of time, and the nonphysical nature of time, I second with the primordial graviton background’s pragmatic approach, despite of the falsifiability of the Big Bang theory and inflation. (shrink)

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson became an international celebrity, profoundly influencing contemporary intellectual and artistic currents. While Bergsonism was fashionable, L. Susan Stebbing, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap launched different critical attacks against some of Bergson’s views. This book examines this series of critical responses to Bergsonism early in the history of analytic philosophy. Analytic criticisms of Bergsonism were influenced by William James, who saw Bergson as an ‘anti-intellectualist’ ally of (...) American Pragmatism, and Max Scheler, who saw him as a prophet of Lebensphilosophie. Some of the main analytic objections to Bergson are answered in the work of Karin Costelloe-Stephen. Analytic anti-Bergsonism accompanied the earlier refutations of idealism by Russell and Moore, and later influenced the Vienna Circle’s critique of metaphysics. It eventually contributed to the formation of the view that ‘analytic’ philosophy is divided from its ‘continental’ counterpart. (shrink)

Applied Evolutionary Epistemology is a scientific-philosophical theory that defines evolution as the set of phenomena whereby units evolve at levels of ontological hierarchies by mechanisms and processes. This theory also provides a methodology to study evolution, namely, studying evolution involves identifying the units that evolve, the levels at which they evolve, and the mechanisms and processes whereby they evolve. Identifying units and levels of evolution in turn requires the development of ontological hierarchy theories, and examining mechanisms and processes necessitates theorizing (...) about causality. Together, hierarchy and causality theories explain how biorealities form and diversify with time. This paper analyzes how Applied EE redefines both hierarchy and causality theories in the light of the recent explosion of network approaches to causal reasoning associated with studies on reticulate and macroevolution. Causality theories have often been framed from within a rigid, ladder-like hierarchy theory where the rungs of the ladder represent the different levels, and the elements on the rungs represent the evolving units. Causality then is either defined reductionistically as an upward movement along the strands of a singular hierarchy, or holistically as a downward movement along that same hierarchy. Upward causation theories thereby analyze causal processes in time, i.e. over the course of natural history or phylogenetically, as Darwin and the founders of the Modern Synthesis intended. Downward causation theories analyze causal processes in space, ontogenetically or ecologically, as the current eco-evo-devo schools are evidencing. This work demonstrates how macroevolution and reticulate evolution theories add to the complexity by examining reticulate causal processes in space–time, and the interactional hierarchies that such studies bring forth introduce a new form of causation that is here called reticulate causation. Reticulate causation occurs between units and levels belonging to different as well as to the same ontological hierarchies. This article concludes that beyond recognizing the existence of multiple units, levels, and mechanisms or processes of evolution, also the existence of multiple kinds of evolutionary causation as well as the existence of multiple evolutionary hierarchies needs to be acknowledged. This furthermore implies that evolution is a pluralistic process divisible into different kinds. (shrink)

This special issue for the Journal for General Philosophy of Science is devoted to exploring the impact and many ramifications of current research in evolutionary epistemology. Evolutionary epistemology is an inter- and multidisciplinary area of research that can be divided into two ever-inclusive research avenues. One research avenue expands on the EEM program and investigates the epistemology of evolution. The other research avenue builds on the EET program and researches the evolution of epistemology. Since its conception, EE has developed three (...) schools of thought: adaptationist, non-adaptationist, and applied EE. Although diverse in outlook and theoretical background, these research avenues and schools share the same agenda of understanding how knowledge evolves, and how it relates to the world. In this paper, we first explain wherefrom evolutionary epistemological schools of thought developed, and then we highlight current debates in EE by briefly reviewing the papers that form part of this special issue. (shrink)

Both biosemiotics and evolutionary epistemology are concerned with how knowledge evolves. (Applied) Evolutionary Epistemology thereby focuses on identifying the units, levels, and mechanisms or processes that underlie the evolutionary development of knowing and knowledge, while biosemiotics places emphasis on the study of how signs underlie the development of meaning. We compare the two schools of thought and analyze how in delineating their research program, biosemiotics runs into several problems that are overcome by evolutionary epistemologists. For one, by emphasizing signs, biosemiotics (...) needs to delineate a semiotic threshold, which is a problem not encountered by evolutionary epistemologists. Instead, the latter recognizes that all organisms are knowers that evolve knowledge, which they recognize to extend toward phenomena produced by organisms such as behavior, cognition, language, culture, science, and technology. Secondly, biosemiotics attempts at continuing adaptationist notions on how organisms relate to their environment, while especially Applied Evolutionary Epistemology comes to redefine the nature of the organism–environment relationship in such a way that it recognizes the spatiotemporal boundedness of existence, which in turn makes adaptationist accounts obsolete. (shrink)

Revisionary ontologies seem to go against our common sense convictions about which material objects exist. These views face the so-called Problem of Reasonableness: they have to explain why reasonable people don’t seem to accept the true ontology. Most approaches to this problem treat the mismatch between the ontological truth and ordinary belief as superficial or not even real. By contrast, I propose what I call the “uncompromising solution”. First, I argue that our beliefs about material objects were influenced by evolutionary (...) forces that were independent of the ontological truth. Second, I draw an analogy between the Problem of Reasonableness and the New Evil Demon Problem and argue that the revisionary ontologist can always find a positive epistemic status to characterize ordinary people’s beliefs about material objects. Finally, I address the worry that the evolutionary component of my story also threatens to undermine the best arguments for revisionary ontologies. (shrink)

The article proposes to further develop the ideas of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis by including into evolutionary research an analysis of phenomena that occur above the organismal level. We demonstrate that the current Extended Synthesis is focused more on individual traits (genetically or non-genetically inherited) and less on community system traits (synergetic/organizational traits) that characterize transgenerational biological, ecological, social, and cultural systems. In this regard, we will consider various communities that are made up of interacting populations, and for which the (...) individual members can belong to the same or to different species. Examples of communities include biofilms, ant colonies, symbiotic associations resulting in holobiont formation, and human societies. The proposed model of evolution at the level of communities revises classic theorizing on the major transitions in evolution by analyzing the interplay between community/social traits and individual traits, and how this brings forth ideas of top-down regulations of bottom-up evolutionary processes (collaboration of downward and upward causation). The work demonstrates that such interplay also includes reticulate interactions and reticulate causation. In this regard, we exemplify how community systems provide various non-genetic ‘scaffoldings’, ‘constraints’, and ‘affordances’ for individual and sociocultural evolutionary development. Such research complements prevailing models that focus on the vertical transmission of heritable information, from parent to offspring, with research that instead focusses on horizontal, oblique and even reverse information transmission, going from offspring to parent. We call this reversed information transfer the ‘offspring effect’ to contrast it from the ‘parental effect’. We argue that the proposed approach to inheritance is effective for modelling cumulative and distributed developmental process and for explaining the biological origins and evolution of language. (shrink)

In this chapter I zoom in on a topic in climate ethics that has not previously received academic scrutiny: the intersection between evolutionary ethics and climate change. I argue that in the context of climate discourse, an evolutionary perspective can be illuminating, but may also invite moral corruption and reasoning fallacies. Relating my discussion to the general theme of the book, I argue that academic philosophy is well-positioned to fulfil a specific societal role, which is particularly important in the age (...) of popular science: to raise awareness of the ethical predicaments to which scientific findings can give rise, and to highlight the normative assumptions implicit in the reasoning of science communicators. (shrink)

Abstract -/- The objective of this article is to understand, in the Phenomenology of the spirit, how the dialectical movement that occurs in consciousness takes place as soon as it is recognized as self-consciousness. For this, it is of vital importance to re-visit the first whole movement that makes consciousness, in Phenomenology, in order to understand how it is capable of recognizing itself as a self-consciousness. -/- .

Disagreement and debunking arguments threaten religious belief. In this paper, I draw attention to two types of propositions and show how they reveal new ways to respond to debunking arguments and disagreement. The first type of proposition is the epistemically self-promoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that one reliably believes it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield an epistemically circular argument in response to (...) certain debunking arguments. The second type of proposition is the epistemically others-demoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that others are unreliable with respect to it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield a question-begging argument to respond to certain types of disagreement. (shrink)

この巨大な専門用語を積んだ(この本は本当に用語集が必要です!)、重い学術的な仕事が教育を受けた世界でベストセラーになったことは驚くべきことであり、フィッティングです。専門用語を学び、551ページのテキ ストと238ページのノートを耕すために専用する必要があります。私たちは何度も何度も言われていますが、これは来るものの輪郭に過ぎないと言われています! 彼は3つの運動の行き過ぎを厳しく批判するが、これは非常にリベラルで精神的な観点から、宗教、哲学、行動科学の非建設的でNew年齢の神秘的でポストモダンな解釈である。 彼は哲学、心理学、社会学、宗教の様々な世界観を詳細に分析し、彼らの致命的な還元主義的欠陥を(主に)ケアと輝きの気持ちで暴露するが、彼が分析する情報源のほとんどは今日はほとんど関連性がない。 彼らは20年前に研究と執筆をしていたときにすでに時代遅れだった用語や概念を使用しています。一つは、専門用語の無限のページをスローする必要があります - ハーバーマス、カント、エマーソン、ユングet.alの議論を積んだ。真珠にたどり着くために。 あなたは悪い書き込み、混乱し、時代遅れのアイデアと時代遅れの専門用語の素晴らしいサンプリングを得る。 現在の教育が良ければ、この本を読むのは二重に苦痛です(そして、ほとんどの人間の行動に関する書き込み)。 それは非常に拷問と混乱しているので、痛みを伴う、そして、あなたがそれが現代の心理学と哲学でいかに単純であるかを認識したときに再び。用語とアイデアは恐ろしく混乱し、日付が付いています(しかし、ウィルバー 自身の分析では、彼の情報源よりもそれほどではありません)。 著者のほとんどはそれに気づいていませんでしたが、この本とその情報源のほとんどは心理学のテキストです。それは、なぜ私たちが私たちがどのように考え、行動するのか、そして将来どのように変わるのかについて、人 間の行動と推論についてです。しかし、(最近までそのような議論のように)説明のどれも本当に説明ではないので、彼らは人間の行動に関する洞察を与えなくなります。誰も関係する精神的なメカニズムについて議論しま せん。これは、ステアリングホイールについて話し合うエンジン、燃料、またはドライブトレインの知識なしに、ハンドルと金属と塗料について議論する車の仕組みを説明するようなものです。実際には、ほとんどの古い' 説明'の行動と同様に、テキストはここでdを引用し、Wilberによるコムメントは、多くの場合、彼らが説明として受け入れる(そして省略する)ものの種類、そしてhey 実際のコンテンツよりも推論の種類のためにより興味深いです。 哲学と認知と進化心理学に取り組むならば、そのほとんどは古風です。ほぼすべての人(学者と公共の人)と同じように-e.g.、デネットの自由の進化や他の本の私のレビューを参照してください)、彼は宗教と倫理の 基礎を理解していない - 実際には、すべての人間の行動は、私たちの遺伝子にプログラムされています。彼が多くの本を書いている間、私たち自身を理解する革命が起こり、それが彼を通り過ぎました。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

In this work, we will try to state the opposition between two approaches to the problem of the overall reliability of human knowing capacities, and a possible solution to that conflict. On the one hand, as we will point out, there exist a number of approaches that fall under the broad term of “evolutionary reliabilism” and according to which the reasons that we have for believing in the reliability of human cognition are empirical in character. Namely, the adaptive success of (...) our species in a biological environment characterised by the survival of the fittest provides us with a reason to believe that our belief-forming mechanisms are truth-tracking; if they were not, we would have gone extinct. On the other hand, nevertheless, we find analyses—of which we will focus on the case of Ernest Sosa—according to which the tenet that our knowing capacities are reliable cannot be empirically based, and thus contingent; on the contrary, they point out that we need to presuppose—without need of a proof—that such capacities are trustworthy. Given this conflict between an “empirical” defence and a defence “in principle” of our knowing capacities, we will consider two possible objections against Sosa’s proposal and try to answer them. (shrink)

The development of synthetic biology calls for accurate understanding of the critical functions that allow construction and operation of a living cell. Besides coding for ubiquitous structures, minimal genomes encode a wealth of functions that dissipate energy in an unanticipated way. Analysis of these functions shows that they are meant to manage information under conditions when discrimination of substrates in a noisy background is preferred over a simple recognition process. We show here that many of these functions, including transporters and (...) the ribosome construction machinery, behave as would behave a material implementation of the informationmanaging agent theorized by Maxwell almost 150 years ago and commonly known as Maxwell’s demon (MxD). A core gene set encoding these functions belongs to the minimal genome required to allow the construction of an autonomous cell. These MxDs allow the cell to perform computations in an energy-efficient way that is vastly better than our contemporary computers. (shrink)