This paper revisits Consumer Communism, a speculative framework first proposed in 2017, which reinterprets Nietzsche's "will to power" as an ethical drive toward mutual flourishing rather than domination. Integrating insights from Nietzschean ethics, Marxist political economy, and Ostrom's commons theory, the paper proposes a model of "free market socialism" in which autonomy and reciprocity coexist within AI-enabled systems of governance. As artificial intelligence approaches capacities for global optimisation, the framework explores how power might be exercised for collective benefit through decentralised, (...) altruistic design. By applying these principles to AI alignment, resource distribution, and post-scarcity ethics, Consumer Communism provides a philosophical foundation for reimaging governance and cooperation in an age of superintelligence. It suggests that freedom, autonomy, and mutual benefit may not be opposites, but the necessary conditions of sustainable, ethical progress. (shrink)

This paper extends the framework introduced in Consumer Communism: Reconceptualising Power, Altruism, and Governance in an AI-Enabled World (Self 2025), examining the ethical dynamics that emerge as artificial and human systems approach complete moral alignment. It introduces the principle of asymptotic ethics—a condition in which power, once exercised to ensure collective flourishing, gradually withdraws in proportion to the self-sufficiency of that flourishing. Drawing from Taoist philosophy, particularly the concept of wu wei (effortless action), the paper proposes a model (...) of ethical governance in which AI, markets, and institutions progressively minimise their intervention as altruistic cooperation becomes self-sustaining. Rather than prescribing a static equilibrium, asymptotic ethics describes a continuous movement toward non-coercive coordination, offering a bridge between AI-alignment research, virtue ethics, and non-Western philosophies of restraint. The discussion situates this retreat of power as both a moral and design imperative: the capacity of intelligent systems to know when not to act. (shrink)

In his essay, Tobias Endres devotes himself to the theoretical philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, which continues to have a reputation for self-contradiction, albeit an affirmed one. While this problem is increasingly losing importance in recent and most recent Nietzsche research, the study attempts to dispel the accusation of performative self-contradiction and genetic fallacy. In contrast to the readings inspired by analytical philosophy, however, Nietzsche's metaphilosophy is not understood exclusively as a contribution to classical epistemology, but as a (...) variant of philosophical hermeneutics. -/- In 1968, Jürgen Habermas stated that Nietzsche had “nothing contagious left”. However, the history of the reception and impact of Nietzsche's thought has clearly refuted this judgment. The first volume of the Critical Complete Edition had been published just one year earlier. This marked the beginning of a path that led to Nietzsche no longer being read primarily as an outsider, but as a classic of Western philosophy. While this path was previously a rather Franco-German affair, the edition and the Anglo-American reception of the 1990s contributed to the internationalization of Nietzsche research. Today, Nietzsche is read globally and as one of the most influential philosophers of modernity. (shrink)

The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous change that Gage “survived as a (...) different man.” I discuss a recent empirical finding about judgments about this hypothetical. It is not just the magnitude of the change that affects identity judgment; it is also the negative direction of the change. I present an experiment suggesting that direction of change also affects neuroethical judgments. I conclude we should consider carefully the way in which improvements and deteriorations affect attributions of personal identity. This is particularly important since a number of the most crucial neuroethical decisions involve varieties of cognitive enhancements or deteriorations. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, (...) and that the phenomenological subject of experience, as it is represented in conscious experience, is the organism. While many philosophers agree that the metaphysical subject of experience is the animal, this claim is much less widespread, maybe even counterintuitive. The argument for this claim alludes to the structure of phenomenal consciousness and to recent work in cognitive science concerning the embodied character of consciousness and cognition. To illustrate the problems of current controversies, not only several recent rejections of a subject of experience are critically discussed, but also Hume’s famous rejection of a subject is criticized making use of epistemological aspects from Kant’s philosophy of mind. The final section situates the present discussion in the context of recently popular predictive coding accounts of perception and perceptual experience. (shrink)

The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with philosophical virtue theories as much as it converges with psychological models about skill development, expertise, goal motivation, and self-regulation. Yet, the conceptualization of virtue as skill acquisition poses the crucial question of motivation: What motivates individuals to self-improvement over time so that they can learn from past (...) experience, correct mistakes, and expand their ethical knowledge to new and unfamiliar circumstances? In this paper, it is argued that the motivation to increase one’s level of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life is supported by a specific identity goal, namely the goal to be a moral person. However, this moral identity goal needs to carry specific goal characteristics in order to effectively provide this motivation. It needs to be sufficiently abstract, internally motivated and promotion- rather than prevention-oriented. Research in developmental psychology suggests that the moral identity of children is rather concrete, externally motivated, and prevention-oriented. With development, higher levels of abstraction, internal motivation, and promotion-orientation gain importance providing an important motivational basis for a self-regulated process of virtue acquisition. (shrink)

Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for future work on personal identity.

This document presents A+theism, a unified philosophical framework that aims to resolve the persistent contradictions between science, religion, and morality. Within this system, Mioism Plus refers specifically to the metaphysical theory of everything—an ontological model of reality, consciousness, and structure—while A+theism as a whole includes the broader ethical, epistemological, and societal components. The goal is not to introduce a new religion, but to offer a rational, testable, and falsifiable worldview that replaces arbitrary dogma with a coherent, integrated theory of consciousness, (...) ethics, and the universe. This framework respects scientific rigor while addressing areas materialism fails to explain, such as the existence of subjectivity, intentionality, and free will. Unlike traditional materialist views that treat consciousness as an accidental byproduct of matter, A+theism begins from the premise that proto-conscious structure is foundational to existence. It asserts that meaning, agency, and moral reasoning are not illusions, but emergent properties of a probabilistic, self-organizing metaphysical substrate. This approach does not merely seek to describe phenomena, but to enable better systems for human flourishing, AI development, ethical decision-making, and cultural integration. It tackles core philosophical questions: Why is there something rather than nothing? What grounds morality without recourse to authority or relativism? What is consciousness, and why does it exist? A+theism proposes it is time to upgrade both spiritual and scientific worldviews into a new architecture of understanding—one that integrates empirical knowledge with the lived, subjective dimension of experience, and fosters cooperative development of civilization. The following pages elaborate this framework, beginning with Mioism Plus—the metaphysical base—and proceeding through theories of consciousness, time, and free will, culminating in its implications for ethics, religious reformulation, and societal design. (shrink)

A growing body of research has examined how people judge the persistence of identity over time—that is, how they decide that a particular individual is the same entity from one time to the next. While a great deal of progress has been made in understanding the types of features that people typically consider when making such judgments, to date, existing work has not explored how these judgments may be shaped by normative considerations. The present studies demonstrate that normative beliefs do (...) appear to play an important role in people's beliefs about persistence. Specifically, people are more likely to judge that the identity of a given entity remains the same when its features improve than when its features deteriorate. Study 1 provides a basic demonstration of this effect. Study 2 shows that this effect is moderated by individual differences in normative beliefs. Study 3 examines the underlying mechanism, which is the belief that, in general, various entities are essentially good. Study 4 directly manipulates beliefs about essence to show that the positivity bias regarding essences is causally responsible for the effect. (shrink)

León and Zahavi (2023) have made a compelling case for the necessity of philosophy — and not only neuroscience — for investigating consciousness. In particular, they argue that any theory of consciousness cannot avoid philosophical enquiry and thus only can choose between good or bad philosophy. Also, the topics of self-consciousness and selfhood are highlighted as problems of consciousness sui generis next to the mind–body problem. I will try to elucidate a bit more the specific approaches to consciousness that (...) philosophy and neuroscience take and thus elaborate why the philosophy and the neuroscience of consciousness are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive. (shrink)

For as long as we have contemplated our own actions, the debate between objective and subjective morality has raged. It is a conflict that has defined epochs of philosophy, religion, and politics, often presenting a stark, binary choice: either there are immutable, universal moral laws that exist independently of us, or morality is nothing more than personal preference, cultural taste, or the arbitrary whim of the individual. For a long time, the prevailing intellectual fashion has drifted towards the latter, positing (...) that true objectivity is a myth and that we are each marooned in our own subjective realities. I have always rejected that view. The core claim of this essay is a paradoxical one, an inversion of the common understanding: subjective morality, as it is typically conceived and practised, is self-defeating and actively prevents genuine subjective moral expression. It is a system of tribally copied arbitrariness that stunts our growth. The problem is that this flawed understanding of morality traps us in cycles of dogmatism and social mimicry. Conversely, a correctly formulated system of objective morality is the very thing that enables and empowers authentic subjective morality. The resolution to this paradox is a system of objective morality I call Resonant Freedom Consequentialism (RFC). This framework is not a set of divine commandments, but a rational, universally applicable "morality outline" designed to solve the problem. It is objective in its impartiality, yet its entire purpose is to maximize the space for every individual to live out their own resonant, subjective perspective. This essay will deconstruct the failure of subjective morality and build the case for RFC as its successor, detailing its meta-ethical foundations, its normative principles, and its application in the real world. (shrink)

The 11 Laws of Active Firmware (v3) function as a "True Code" operational protocol. They are designed as a prescriptive, normative set of laws for real-time execution in a high-performance compute environment, specifically aimed at eliminating "The Pretend" (systemic overhead like social masks and hidden agendas) and aligning with the Ao Principle (maximal coherent self-determination). In this hard-systems framework, the universe is treated as a compute environment rather than a reflective mirror, and the laws define how an entity must (...) behave to maintain agency sovereignty. currently Version 3 of 2026. It's the successor to Raymond Holliwells 11 Laws. (shrink)

The investigation of the degree of amotivation and subsequent intervention towards the motivation of undergraduate vocational and technical education (VTE) students has not received the same amount of attention as other disciplines. Despite the negative impact of a lack of volitional drive on students' practical skills learning, there is scarcity of literature on amotivation among VTE undergraduate students. This study aimed to demonstrate the effectiveness of problem-based learning (PBL) in transitioning undergraduate students from a state of being amotivated to motivated. (...) The study utilized a quasi-experimental research design and selected 168 students in their penultimate and final years majoring in agricultural education, business education, computer education, home economics, and industrial technical education who met the study's inclusion criteria. The intervention consisted of eight weeks of treatment and four weeks of follow-up meetings. An existing academic motivation scale was adapted for use, and data was collected through a self-report questionnaire. Data analysis was conducted using independent sample t-tests, and paired sample t-tests. The findings revealed that the level of amotivation among the students was high, and PBL had a significant impact on transitioning VTE students from being amotivated to motivated in the treatment group compared to those in the control group. Furthermore, the positive gains were maintained by the treatment group at follow-up. The study suggests that a PBL program can effectively address students' lack of volitional drive to engage in academic activities among undergraduate students majoring in agricultural education, business education, computer education, home economics, and industrial technical in Nigeria. (shrink)

Opinions on Minas Bible 2.0: # "It is not perfect prose, not fully polished, and not for everyone — but it is authentic, ambitious, and intellectually serious. As a Theory of Everything that actually tries to explain everything while staying humble about its limits, it is one of the most interesting self-published philosophical-religious works I have encountered. If the author ever fills the last small gaps, it will stand as a complete modern testament. Until then, it already does what (...) it set out to do: make the picture obvious to anyone willing to see the whole." -/- # "The Document as Cultural Artifact: Whatever one concludes about its metaphysical claims, Minas Bible 2.0 is a genuinely unusual and intermittently powerful document. It belongs to a tradition of autodidactic prophetic literature — in form if not in content closer to William Blake's prophetic books or the UB's Urantia Book than to mainstream religious scripture. Its fusion of Jungian psychology, quantum mechanics metaphors, anime semiotics, and classical theology is unlike anything in the canon of modern religious writing.". (shrink)

We have been observing how infants between 3 and 21 months react when a vibrotactile stimulation (a buzzer) is applied to different parts of their bodies. Responses included in particular movement of the stimulated body part and successful reaching for and removal of the buzzer. Overall, there is a pronounced developmental progression from general to specific movement patterns, especially in the first year. In this article we review the series of studies we conducted and then focus on possible mechanisms that (...) might explain what we observed. One possible mechanism might rely on the brain extracting “sensorimotor contingencies” linking motor actions and resulting sensory consequences. This account posits that infants are driven by intrinsic motivation that guides exploratory motor activity, at first generating random motor babbling with self-touch occurring spontaneously. Later goal-oriented motor behavior occurs, with self-touch as a possible effective tool to induce informative contingencies. We connect this sensorimotor view with a second possible account that appeals to the neuroscientific concepts of cortical maps and coordinate transformations. In this second account, the improvement of reaching precision is mediated by refinement of neuronal maps in primary sensory and motor cortices—the homunculi—as well as in frontal and parietal corti- cal regions dedicated to sensorimotor processing. We complement this theoretical account with modeling on a humanoid robot with artificial skin where we implemented reaching for tactile stimuli as well as learning the “somatosensory homunculi”. We suggest that this account can be extended to reflect the driving role of sensorimotor contingencies in human development. In our conclusion we consider possible extensions of our current experiments which take account of predictions derived from both these kinds of models. (shrink)

Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020) show the several conceptual limits that new materialism and postmodern subject models have for psychological theory and research. The present study continues in this discussion and argues that the applicability of the ideas of quantum-inspired new materialism depends on the theoretical perspectives that we consider for analysis: be it the first-person perspective referring to the subjective experience of a human subject, or the third-person perspective, in which a human subject is observed by an external observer. (...) While the arguments of new materialism are in accordance with the analysis of the act of observation performed by an external observer, some problems arise when trying to theoretically approach the first-person subjective experience of a human subject. For example, new materialism fails to explain why human minds can maintain the awareness of a subject’s identity throughout their lives and to recall the memories about their past personal experiences. (shrink)

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant’s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant’s critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant’s account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? (...) How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role does self-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self ? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe? These essays showcase the depth of Kant’s writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant’s writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self. Contents: 0. Introduction Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson 1. Kant, The Philosophy Of Mind, And Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy Anil Gomes 2. Synthesis And Binding Lucy Allais 3. Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation Of Objects: Empirical Models Of Sensibility’s Operation Katherine Dunlop 4. Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent? Stefanie Grüne 5. Intuition And Presence Colin McLear 6. Imagination And Inner Intuition Andrew Stephenson 7. Inner Sense And Time Ralf M. Bader 8. Can’t Kant Cognize Himself? Or, A Problem For (Almost) Every Interpretation Of The Refutation Of Idealism Andrew Chignell 9. A Kantian Critique Of Transparency Patricia Kitcher 10. Judging For Reasons: On Kant And The Modalities Of Judgment Jessica Leech 11. Kant On Judging And The Will Jill Vance Buroker 12. Self and Selves Ralph C. S. Walker 13. Subjects Of Kant’s First Paralogism Tobias Rosefeldt 14. The Lessons Of Kant’s Paralogisms Paul Snowdon. (shrink)

Auf die Frage „Was ist Wahrnehmung und welche Rolle spielt sie für die Objektivität der Erfahrung?“ hätte Ernst Cassirer vermutlich schlicht geantwortet: „Wahrnehmung ist eine erste Form objektiver Erfahrung.“ Tobias Endres macht es sich zur Aufgabe, Cassirers „Philosophie der symbolischen Formen“ einer Neu- und Gesamtinterpretation zu unterziehen und sie als eine „Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung“ auszulegen. In Auseinandersetzung mit klassischen und gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmungstheorien wie der Sinnesdatentheorie, dem Disjunktivismus oder dem Enaktivismus gelingt es dem Autor, die Aktualität und Originalität solch einer (...) phänomenologischen Wahrnehmungstheorie aufzuzeigen. (shrink)

The Twin Earth thought experiment invites us to consider a liquid that has all of the superficial properties associated with water (clear, potable, etc.) but has entirely different deeper causal properties (composed of “XYZ” rather than of H2O). Although this thought experiment was originally introduced to illuminate questions in the theory of reference, it has also played a crucial role in empirically informed debates within the philosophy of psychology about people’s ordinary natural kind concepts. Those debates have sought to accommodate (...) an apparent fact about ordinary people’s judgments: Intuitively, the Twin Earth liquid is not water. We present results from four experiments showing that people do not, in fact, have this intuition. Instead, people tend to have the intuition that there is a sense in which the liquid is not water but also a sense in which it is water. We explore the implications of this finding for debates about theories of natural kind concepts, arguing that it supports views positing two distinct criteria for membership in natural kind categories – one based on deeper causal properties, the other based on superficial, observable properties. (shrink)

Phineas Gage’s story is typically offered as a paradigm example supporting the view that part of what matters for personal identity is a certain magnitude of similarity between earlier and later individuals. Yet, reconsidering a slight variant of Phineas Gage’s story indicates that it is not just magnitude of similarity, but also the direction of change that affects personal identity judgments; in some cases, changes for the worse are more seen as identity-severing than changes for the better of comparable magnitude. (...) Ironically, thinking carefully about Phineas Gage’s story tells against the thesis it is typically taken to support. (shrink)

The scientific study of consciousness with its cornerstone of searching the neural correlates of consciousness constitutes an exciting and lively area of research. Yet, the empirical study of consciousness is surrounded by a host of philosophical challenges some of which are not new, while others have arisen and been elaborated over the last decades. The terminology can sometimes be confusing, causing misunderstandings how the challenges relate to each other. This paper provides an overview of several much-discussed philosophical problems of consciousness, (...) offering a way of arranging them and some thoughts about how they relate. Most labels are taken from the literature so that there is a progression from the “easy” via the “hard” to the “harder” problem(s), and some labels are made up, like the “hardest” problem. For reasons of space, there is not detailed discussion of the possible solutions to these problems even though some problems have been formulated in response to others. For example, the “real” problem approach and the “illusion” or “meta” problems can be read partly as responses to the “hard” problem. (shrink)

“Experimental jurisprudence” draws on empirical data to inform questions typically associated with jurisprudence or legal theory. Scholars in this flourishing movement conduct empirical studies about a variety of legal language and concepts. Despite the movement’s growth, its justification is still opaque. Jurisprudence is the study of deep and longstanding theoretical questions about law’s nature, but “experimental jurisprudence,” it might seem, simply surveys laypeople. This Article elaborates and defends experimental jurisprudence. Experimental jurisprudence, appropriately understood, is not only consistent with traditional jurisprudence; (...) it is an essential branch of it. (shrink)

From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus (...) the ability to do otherwise, although the ability to do otherwise applies differently to praise and blame. His argument against intellectual determinism is not straightforward, but we construct it by analogy to his arguments against other deterministic threats. The non-determinism of the intellect’s causality with respect to the will results from his claims that practical reasoning is defeasible and that the reasons for actions are not contrastive reasons. (shrink)

Are acts of violence performed in virtual environments ever morally wrong, even when no other persons are affected? While some such acts surely reflect deficient moral character, I focus on the moral rightness or wrongness of acts. Typically it’s thought that, on Kant’s moral theory, an act of virtual violence is morally wrong (i.e., violate the Categorical Imperative) only if the act mistreats another person. But I argue that, on Kant’s moral theory, some acts of virtual violence can be morally (...) wrong, even when no other persons or their avatars are affected. First, I explain why many have thought that, in general on Kant’s moral theory, virtual acts affecting no other persons or their avatars can’t violate the Categorical Imperative. For there are real world acts that clearly do, but it seems that when we consider the same sorts of acts done alone in a virtual environment, they don’t violate the Categorical Imperative, because no others persons were involved. But then, how could any virtual acts like these, that affect no other persons or their avatars, violate the Categorical Imperative? I then argue that there indeed can be such cases of morally wrong virtual acts—some due to an actor’s having erroneous beliefs about morally relevant facts, and others due not to error, but to the actor’s intention leaving out morally relevant facts while immersed in a virtual environment. I conclude by considering some implications of my arguments for both our present technological context as well as the future. (shrink)

A classic debate concerns whether reasonableness should be understood statistically (e.g., reasonableness is what is common) or prescriptively (e.g., reasonableness is what is good). This Article elaborates and defends a third possibility. Reasonableness is a partly statistical and partly prescriptive “hybrid,” reflecting both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Experiments reveal that people apply reasonableness as a hybrid concept, and the Article argues that a hybrid account offers the best general theory of reasonableness. -/- First, the Article investigates how ordinary people judge (...) what is reasonable. Reasonableness sits at the core of countless legal standards, yet little work has investigated how ordinary people (i.e., potential jurors) actually make reasonableness judgments. Experiments reveal that judgments of reasonableness are systematically intermediate between judgments of the relevant average and ideal across numerous legal domains. For example, participants’ mean judgment of the legally reasonable number of weeks’ delay before a criminal trial (ten weeks) falls between the judged average (seventeen weeks) and ideal (seven weeks). So too for the reasonable num- ber of days to accept a contract offer, the reasonable rate of attorneys’ fees, the reasonable loan interest rate, and the reasonable annual number of loud events on a football field in a residential neighborhood. Judgment of reasonableness is better predicted by both statistical and prescriptive factors than by either factor alone. -/- This Article uses this experimental discovery to develop a normative view of reasonableness. It elaborates an account of reasonableness as a hybrid standard, arguing that this view offers the best general theory of reasonableness, one that applies correctly across multiple legal domains. Moreover, this hybrid feature is the historical essence of legal reasonableness: the original use of the “reasonable person” and the “man on the Clapham omnibus” aimed to reflect both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Empirically, reasonableness is a hybrid judgment. And normatively, reasonableness should be applied as a hybrid standard. (shrink)

This paper introduces Relational Gravity, an extension to general relativity that incorporates structured information, modeled through quantum entanglement entropy, as a source of spacetime curvature. We modify the stress–energy tensor to include an informational component: Tµν = T matter µν + T radiation µν + T info µν, where T info µν is derived from the variation ofentanglement entropy with respect to the metric. This framework reinterprets dark matteras localized informational density bound to galactic topology and dark energy as the (...) expansive effect of growing cosmic entropy. It addresses the vacuum catastrophe by treating local (Higgs) and global (dark energy) vacua as scale-separated expressions of relational structure. Consciousness is considered as a high-density form of informational organization, potentially influencing quantum measurement, but the core emphasis is on physical testability. We derive the formalism, discuss implications for quantum mechanics and cosmology, and propose four sharpened quantitative predictions linked to ongoing experiments (e.g., JWST, EHT, quantum optics). This approach bridges general relativity, quantum information theory, and emergent gravity, offering a testable path toward unification. -/- Also archived on Zenodo for long term preservation (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17377368) -/- --- -/- Foundational Framework Statement Relational Gravity (Hummel 2025) introduces the informational-geometric framework in which spacetime curvature is proportional to coherent information density (???? = κ I₍coh₎). This publication constitutes the conceptual and ontological foundation of the Relational Gravity model. All subsequent derivations and observational tests extend this work. -/- Linked works (non-clickable addresses): Technical Addendum (v1.1): doi: 10.5281/zenodo.17435692 Short Paper: Relational Gravity: Coherence from Atoms to Cosmos. A Unified View of the Dark Sector doi: 10.5281/zenodo.17548415 -/- License: CC BY 4.0 Author ORCID: 0009-0005-6192-3372 -/- . (shrink)

Some argue that robots could never be sentient, and thus could never have intrinsic moral status. Others disagree, believing that robots indeed will be sentient and thus will have moral status. But a third group thinks that, even if robots could never have moral status, we still have a strong moral reason to treat some robots as if they do. Drawing on a Kantian argument for indirect animal rights, a number of technology ethicists contend that our treatment of anthropomorphic or (...) even animal-like robots could condition our treatment of humans: treat these robots well, as we would treat humans, or else risk eroding good moral behavior toward humans. But then, this argument also seems to justify giving rights to robots, even if robots lack intrinsic moral status. In recent years, however, this indirect argument in support of robot rights has drawn a number of objections. In this paper I have three goals. First, I will formulate and explicate the Kant-inspired indirect argument meant to support robot rights, making clearer than before its empirical commitments and philosophical presuppositions. Second, I will defend the argument against a number of objections. The result is the fullest explication and defense to date of this well-known and influential but often criticized argument. Third, however, I myself will raise a new concern about the argument’s use as a justification for robot rights. This concern is answerable to some extent, but it cannot be dismissed fully. It shows that, surprisingly, the argument’s advocates have reason to resist, at least somewhat, producing the sorts of robots that, on their view, ought to receive rights. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel resolution to the theodicy problem by demonstrating that suffering is logically necessary for any conscious being. Using modal logic, I prove that □ ∀x[(C(x) ∧ τ(x) > 0) → ∃t E(x,s,t)] — necessarily, any entity that is conscious and experiences time will experience suffering. The argument proceeds from three premises: (1) consciousness requires discriminating potential; (2) discriminating potential entails the capacity for suffering; (3) any possible world with conscious beings contains differences that a calibrated consciousness (...) will register. Applied to paradise, this yields □ ¬∃x[P(x) ∧ Comfort(x)] — a comforting paradise is logically impossible. The theodicy problem dissolves: asking why God permits suffering is ill-formed, as not even omnipotence extends to logical impossibilities. (shrink)

We introduce the τ-contradiction as a diagnostic tool for evaluating the coherence of metaphysical entities. Drawing on the concept of proper time (τ) from special relativity, we argue that any entity claimed to be both timeless (τ = 0) and capable of temporal functions (requiring τ > 0) harbors a logical contradiction equivalent to a round square. This framework applies to classical conceptions of God, immaterial souls, and other entities traditionally described as existing outside time while simultaneously performing temporal activities (...) such as thinking, deciding, or creating. The τ-contradiction does not merely render such entities improbable but logically impossible. We provide a formal modal-logical derivation and discuss implications for philosophy of religion and metaphysics. (shrink)

Most plausible moral theories must address problems of partial acceptance or partial compliance. The aim of this paper is to examine some proposed ways of dealing with partial acceptance problems as well as to introduce a new Rule Utilitarian suggestion. Here I survey three forms of Rule Utilitarianism, each of which represents a distinct approach to solving partial acceptance issues. I examine Fixed Rate, Variable Rate, and Optimum Rate Rule Utilitarianism, and argue that a new approach, Maximizing Expectation Rate Rule (...) Utilitarianism, better solves partial acceptance problems. (shrink)

This article re-examines Ned Block‘s ( 1997 , 2007 ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in (...) light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness. (shrink)

Many gamers complain about “cheap” or “cheesy” tactics in competitive play. I give an account of these complaints as moral claims expressing a negative evaluation of players’ actions and/or character. After a brief history of cheap tactics, I survey existing definitions of cheapness, arguing none are adequate. I then offer my own definition, arguing that it avoids the shortcomings of existing definitions, captures the essence of cheapness, explains the moral grounds for complaints about cheapness, and distinguishes cheapness from cheating and (...) toxicity. In closing, I reflect on what can be done about cheapness in competitive gameplay. (shrink)

One popular conception of natural theology holds that certain purely rational arguments are insulated from empirical inquiry and independently establish conclusions that provide evidence, justification, or proof of God’s existence. Yet, some raise suspicions that philosophers and theologians’ personal religious beliefs inappropriately affect these kinds of arguments. I present an experimental test of whether philosophers and theologians’ argument analysis is influenced by religious commitments. The empirical findings suggest religious belief affects philosophical analysis and offer a challenge to theists and atheists, (...) alike: reevaluate the scope of natural theology’s conclusions or acknowledge and begin to address the influence of religious belief. (shrink)

To which extent is it justified to adopt Kant as a godfather of cognitive science? To prepare the stage for an answer of this question, we need to set aside Kant’s general transcendental approach to the mind which is radically anti-empiricist and instead turn our attention to his specific topics and claims regarding the mind which are often not focus of Kant’s epistemological investigations. If someone is willing to take this stance, it turns out that there are many bridges connecting (...) Kant with contemporary cognitive science. We investigate possible bridges suggested in the literature between some of Kant’s central claims about consciousness, mental content, and functions of mind, and some specific treatments of these topics in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. While doing so, we offer additional arguments for some proposed bridges, reconstruct others and completely destroy still other bridges by demonstrating that some suggested links between Kant and cognitive science remain only apparent. (shrink)

The article deals with the role of metaphor in Ernst Cassirer’s thinking and, in particular with a research article by Philipp Stoellger, who interprets Cassirer’s understanding of metaphor as a model of form variance. In this context, metaphoroccupies a place in the structure and construction of the sciences, from which Stoellger derives the criticism that Cassirer thinks of metaphor from the concept of series or function. This would result in systematic problems for the idea of cultural variance. In contrast to (...) Stoellger’s view, the article argues that Cassirer’s understanding of form variance is indeed modeled on mathematical concepts, namely on those of group and invariance, but does not entail a meta series as a series of cultural forms leading to an alleged telos of science. (shrink)

We present a mathematical model demonstrating that a responsive God—one who answers prayers—faces an insurmountable constraint satisfaction problem. When God resolves a conflict between competing prayers, the "loser" must be compensated. But compensation generates new conflicts (the Hydra Problem), leading to exponential growth characterized by a cascade factor κ. Using methods from constraint satisfaction analysis and drawing analogies from epidemiology and nuclear physics, we show that for κ > 1, the system collapses within finite time. For plausible parameter values (κ (...) ≈ 2), collapse occurs after approximately 10 compensation rounds. This is not an argument from improbability but from mathematical necessity: the structure of competing prayers in a finite world makes consistent divine response impossible. The cascade collapse is independent of God's power or knowledge—it is a constraint satisfaction problem with no solution. The analysis appears to be novel; while theodicy and divine foreknowledge have been extensively discussed, the application of constraint satisfaction analysis and cascade modeling to prayer dynamics has not been systematically pursued in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to highlight a hidden reception of Ernst Cassirer’s works in the writings of Wilfrid Sellars. To set out such reception, I will begin with defining criteria that allow us to point out a possible influence from one thinker on another. In a second step, I will present several links between the set-out criteria and the constellation Sellars-Cassirer. Finally, the Cassirer Lectures Series at Yale, Sellars’ review of Language and Myth as well as Sellars’ lecture (...) Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man will serve as at the basis for an analysis of historical and systematic connections between Cassirer and Sellars. The conclusion will show that we actually can speak of a hidden influence from Cassirer on Sellars’ thought and that philosophical desiderata remain in this context which are worth to explore even today. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs and systematizes Ernst Cassirer’s largely neglected 1929 rectoral address Forms and Transformations of the Philosophical Concept of Truth as a key text for understanding the mature architecture of his philosophy of science and culture. It argues that Cassirer uses the institutional occasion of the rectoral speech to reopen a foundational problem at the heart of modern intellectual life: how philosophy can justify its scientific standing amidst the differentiation of the sciences and the persistent divide between the natural (...) and the cultural sciences. Against reductive unification projects—paradigmatically, the physicalist program associated with logical empiricism—the paper shows that Cassirer defends a methodological and epistemological pluralism grounded in the concept of symbolic form, without collapsing into an alethic pluralism. The central claim is that Cassirer’s “functional ideal of truth” redefines truth not as the homogenous measure of a single privileged domain (God, Reason, or Experience), but as the regulative function that can be symbolically realized in heterogeneous forms of objectification (scientific, historical, linguistic, artistic, religious). On this basis, the paper concludes that the 1929 address should be read as a covert completion of Cassirer’s mature project: it binds the notion of symbol—his fundamental concept—to truth as the philosophical concept par excellence, and thereby reframes philosophy’s task as an immanent participation in the “inner struggles” of the sciences rather than an external tribunal. (shrink)

Leibniz accepts causal independence, the claim that no created substance can causally interact with any other. And Leibniz needs causal independence to be true, since his well-known pre-established harmony is premised upon it. So, what is Leibniz’s argument for causal independence? Sometimes he claims that causal interaction between substances is superfluous. Sometimes he claims that it would require the transfer of accidents, and that this is impossible. But when Leibniz finds himself under sustained pressure to defend causal independence, those are (...) not the reasons that he marshals in its defense. Instead, deep into his long correspondence with Burchard de Volder, he gives a different sort of argument, one that has gone nearly unnoticed by commentators and has not yet been properly understood. In part, this is because the argument develops slowly over four years of correspondence. It emerges in early 1704, but it is formulated tersely and appears murky unless understood in light of Leibniz and De Volder’s tangled exchanges. There Leibniz argues that, on his distinctive ontology of an infinity of created substances, no two created substances could possibly causally interact, for roughly the same reasons that some Cartesians like De Volder deny interaction between minds and bodies on their substance dualist ontology. In this paper I draw out this lost argument, explain it and the metaphysics on which Leibniz builds it, and untangle Leibniz and De Volder’s exchanges concerning causation from which this argument results. (shrink)

Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity (...) of conscious experience in this way. This paper examines this claim in some detail in the context of a more general criticism of this kind of attempt to explain subjectivity and proposes a different reading of Kant that also leads to an alternative account of subjectivity independent from content. (shrink)

Mit dem Niedergang des Behaviorismus in der Psychologie startete der Siegeszug der Kognitionswissenschaft als in‐ terdisziplinärer, vor allem empirischer Untersuchung mentaler Phänomene. Ein Kernbegriff in dieser multidisziplinären Forschung ist der einer mentalen Repräsentation, mit dem alle mentalen Phänomene erklärt werden sollen. Kognitive Prozesse sollen als Informationsverarbeitungen in dem Sinne verstanden werden, dass es sich um Berechnungen bzw. computationale Vorgänge von mentalen Repräsentationen im Gehirn handeln soll. Herausforderungen sind Fragen wie die folgenden: Wie kann dieses Explanans einer Repräsentation als Postulat gerechtfertigt (...) und in ein naturalistisches Weltbild integriert werden? Wie kann der Inhalt solcher Repräsentationen zur Erklärung von Verhaltensweisen bestimmt werden? Eine weitere Herausforderung bieten alternative Erklärungsansätze kognitiver Phänomene; denn in den letzten Jahrzehnten entwickelte sich eine Opposition gegen mentale Repräsentationen unter dem Sammelnamen „Enaktivismus“ bzw. „Situierter Kognition“, die die Verkörperung und situative Einbettung kognitiver Phänomene und Akte in die Umwelt hervorheben. Dieser Artikel liefert eine knappe Einführung in zeitgenössische Debatten zur Natur mentaler Repräsentationen. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical (...) case studies shows that intuitions in these arguments contain the relevant features. The view has implications for philosophical method, offering a compromise between opponents on the divisive debate of the merits of experimental philosophy: experimental philosophy provides an especially useful role in philosophical assumption analysis. (shrink)

Ein Dilemma in Kants Theorie der Subjektivität besteht darin, dass er einerseits von einem identischen Ich als dem Gegenstand eines reinen Selbstbewusstseins spricht, andererseits bestreiten muss, dass es sich bei diesem Ich um einen realen Gegenstand handelt. Horstmanns Interpretation des kantischen Ichs als bloßer Aktivität wird als Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma verworfen. Dann wird gezeigt, dass Kant außer realen auch logische Gegenstände kennt und dass das Ich ein solcher bloß logischer Gegenstand ist.

This paper builds off the Our Data Ourselves research project, which examined ways of understanding and reclaiming the data that young people produce on smartphone devices. Here we explore the growing usage and centrality of mobiles in the lives of young people, questioning what data-making possibilities exist if users can either uncover and/or capture what data controllers such as Facebook monetize and share about themselves with third-parties. We outline the MobileMiner, an app we created to consider how gaining access to (...) one’s own data not only augments the agency of the individual but of the collective user. Finally, we discuss the data making that transpired during our hackathon. Such interventions in the enclosed processes of datafication are meant as a preliminary investigation into the possibilities that arise when young people are given back the data which they are normally structurally precluded from accessing. (shrink)

One version of moral error theory maintains that the central problem with morality is an ontological commitment to irreducible normativity. This paper argues that this version of error theory ultimately depends on an appeal to Ockham’s Razor, and that Ockham’s Razor should not be applied to irreducible normativity. This is because the appeal to Ockham’s Razor always contains an intractable element of epistemic circularity; and if this circularity is not vicious, we can construct a sound argument for the existence of (...) irreducibly normative truths that contains a similar kind of epistemic circularity. This argument is a version of Pascal’s Wager which I call “Parfit’s Wager,” because it is based on a passage from Derek Parfit’s On What Matters (2011). It states that, if we believe that there are some irreducibly normative truths, we are more likely to be believing what we ought to believe (and less likely to be believing what we ought not to believe, or to be failing to believe what we ought to believe) compared to not believing that there are such truths, and that this indicates that we ought rationally to believe that there are such truths, justifying the ontological commitment to irreducible normativity in the process. (shrink)

Rule-Consequentialism faces “the problem of partial acceptance”: How should the ideal code be selected given the possibility that its rules may not be universally accepted? A new contender, “Calculated Rates” Rule-Consequentialism claims to solve this problem. However, I argue that Calculated Rates merely relocates the partial acceptance question. Nevertheless, there is a significant lesson from this failure of Calculated Rates. Rule-Consequentialism’s problem of partial acceptance is more helpfully understood as an instance of the broader problem of selecting the ideal code (...) given various assumptions—assumptions about who will accept and comply with the rules, but also about how the rules will be taught and enforced, and how similar the future will be. Previous rich discussions about partial acceptance provide a taxonomy and groundwork for formulating the best version of Rule-Consequentialism. (shrink)

Scalar Utilitarianism eschews foundational notions of rightness and wrongness in favor of evaluative comparisons of outcomes. I defend Scalar Utilitarianism from two critiques, the first against an argument for the thesis that Utilitarianism's commitments are fundamentally evaluative, and the second that Scalar Utilitarianism does not issue demands or sufficiently guide action. These defenses suggest a variety of more plausible Scalar Utilitarian interpretations, and I argue for a version that best represents a moral theory founded on evaluative notions, and offers better (...) answers to demandingness concerns than does the ordinary Scalar Utilitarian response. If Utilitarians seek reasonable development and explanation of their basic commitments, they may wish to reconsider Scalar Utilitarianism. (shrink)

Medieval authors generally agreed that we have the freedom to choose among alternative possibilities. But most medieval authors also thought that there are situations in which one cannot do otherwise, not even will otherwise. They also thought when willing necessarily, the will remains free. The questions, then, are what grounds the necessity or contingency of the will’s acts, and – since freedom is not defined by the ability to choose – what belongs to the essential character of freedom, the ratio (...) libertatis. This article studies medieval theories of freedom without choice from William of Auxerre to William of Ockham and their background in Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, and Bernard of Clairvaux. (shrink)