- From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 07:12:31 +0100
- To: Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com>
- Cc: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
- Message-ID: <CAD9ie-tMxQrouu6syQ-6zrHB+CLpQsX=LkYsbuzdqgtpiu9NhQ@mail.gmail.com>
As an author I support adoption On Mon, Aug 17, 2026 at 5:01 AM Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com> wrote: > Hello HTTP WG, > > At IETF 126, we discussed draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key and we heard a > fair bit of interest in this work. We’ve previously issued an adoption call > earlier in the year, but we’ve had more discussion since then. We’d like to > get input from the group on whether or not you think we should adopt this > work. Please email the list with your input by September 7! > > Best, > Tommy > > > > On Aug 16, 2026, at 8:54 PM, Tommy Pauly via Datatracker < > noreply@ietf.org> wrote: > > > > This message starts a httpbis WG Call for Adoption of: > > draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key-08 > > > > This Working Group Call for Adoption ends on 2026-09-07 > > > > Abstract: > > This document defines five HTTP header fields for use with HTTP > > Message Signatures as defined in RFC 9421. The Signature-Key request > > header distributes public keys used to verify signatures, with eight > > initial key distribution schemes: pseudonymous inline keys (hwk), > > self-issued key delegation via JWK Thumbprint JWTs (jkt-jwt), > > identified signers with JWKS URI discovery (jwks_uri), direct JWKS > > fetch (jwks), JWT-based delegation (jwt), self-issued JWTs (self- > > jwt), X.509 certificate chains (x509), and references to previously > > cached assertions (cached). The Accept-Signature-Scheme and Accept- > > Signature-Alg response headers state the schemes and algorithms a > > server accepts, so a client can select both before it signs. The > > Signature-Error response header provides structured error information > > when signature verification fails, and the Signature-Key-Cache > > response header issues a cache identifier by which a caller can > > reference a previously presented assertion instead of resending it. > > Together, these mechanisms enable flexible trust models ranging from > > privacy-preserving pseudonymous verification to horizontally-scalable > > delegated authentication and PKI-based identity chains. > > > > Please reply to this message and indicate whether or not you support > adoption > > of this Internet-Draft by the httpbis WG. Comments to explain your > preference > > are greatly appreciated. Please reply to all recipients of this message > and > > include this message in your response. > > > > Authors, and WG participants in general, are reminded of the Intellectual > > Property Rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in BCP 79 [2]. > > Appropriate IPR disclosures required for full conformance with the > provisions > > of BCP 78 [1] and BCP 79 [2] must be filed, if you are aware of any. > > Sanctions available for application to violators of IETF IPR Policy can > be > > found at [3]. > > > > Thank you. > > [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bcp78/ > > [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bcp79/ > > [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6701/ > > > > The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key/ > > > > There is also an HTML version available at: > > > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key-08.html > > > > A diff from the previous version is available at: > > > https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key-08 > >
Received on Monday, 17 August 2026 06:12:46 UTC