Abstract

This article investigates the epistemological nature of the act of believing, aiming to clarify to what extent belief can be considered a legitimate instance of knowledge or a mental state with epistemic value. The analysis begins with the conception of belief as a representational psychological disposition associated with a predicative proposition, whose validity and truth are presupposed by the subject. It is argued that, for a belief to possess full epistemic status, it must be properly justified and true, resulting from a cognitive process oriented toward reality. The implications of Gettier-style cases and Alvin Plantinga's approach to warrant are examined, confronting internalist and externalist perspectives on justification. It is concluded that believing, although psychologically necessary, is epistemically valid only when it is open to the rational and ontological scrutiny of truth, and may, under certain conditions, coincide with knowledge. Belief is thus conceived as a mental state that participates in the economy of knowledge, but whose epistemic value is conditional, graded, and dependent on its grounding in reality.