This book offers the first comprehensive collection of essays on the key concepts of Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945), the father of modern Japanese philosophy and founder of the Kyoto School. The essays analyze several of the major philosophical concepts in Nishida, including pure experience, absolute will, place, and acting intuition. They examine the meaning and positioning of Nishida’s philosophy in the history of philosophy, as well as in the contemporary world, and discuss the relevance of his philosophy (...) in the present context. The book next looks at the significance of Nishida’s philosophy in the wider contexts of science, arts, and religion. The book includes a glossary of key terms that have been translated in a unified manner throughout the volume. (shrink)

Although we cannot find any Aesthetics system in the works of NISHIDA Kitarõ (1870-1945), the most significant and influential Japanese philosopher of the twentieth-century, one of his central themes is the role of art and aesthetics in relation with morality and religion. His aesthetics approaches are magnificent examples of his aim to overcome the innate dualism that sustains modern epistemology and a door, apparently hidden, to a better understanding of all his speculative scheme of philosophy. This paper attempts to (...) throw light to the importance of the first aesthetic approximation developed by Nishida eleven years before the publication of Zen no Kenkyû [ 善 の ?究 ] (An Inquiry into the Good) (1911) and twenty-three years before the publication of the more accurate system of aesthetics that we read in Geijutsu to dôtoku [芸術 と 道? ] (Art and Morality) (1923). We will analyze the small essay entitled "Bi no Setsumei" [美 の ?明] ("An explanation of Beauty") (1900) and Nishida's first definition of beauty as muga [無我] (self-effacement or ecstasy). (shrink)

: Two major philosophers of the twentieth century, the German existential phenomenologist Martin Heidegger and the seminal Japanese Kyoto School philosopher Nishida Kitarō are examined here in an attempt to discern to what extent their ideas may converge. Both are viewed as expressing, each through the lens of his own tradition, a world in transition with the rise of modernity in the West and its subsequent globalization. The popularity of Heidegger's thought among Japanese philosophers, despite its own admitted limitation (...) to the Western "history of being," is connected to Nishida's opening of a uniquely Japanese path in its confrontation with Western philosophy. The focus is primarily on their later works (the post-Kehre Heidegger and the works of Nishida that have been designated "Nishida philosophy"), in which each in his own way attempts to overcome the subject-object dichotomy inherited from the tradition of Western metaphysics by looking to a deeper structure from out of which both subjectivity and objectivity are derived and which embraces both. For Heidegger, the answer lies in being as the opening of unconcealment, from out of which beings emerge, and for Nishida, it is the place of nothingness within which beings are co-determined in their oppositions and relations. Concepts such as Nishida's "discontinuous continuity," "absolutely self-contradictory identity" (between one and many, whole and part, world and things), the mutual interdependence of individuals, and the self-determination of the world through the co-relative self-determination of individuals, and Heidegger's "simultaneity" (zugleich) and "within one another" (ineinander) (of unconcealment and concealment, presencing and absencing), and their "between" (Zwischen) and "jointure" (Fuge) are examined. Through a discussion of these ideas, the suggestion is made of a possible "transition" (Übergang) of both Western and Eastern thinking, in their mutual encounter, both in relation to each other and each in relation to its own past history, leading to both a self-discovery in the other and to a simultaneous self-reconstitution. (shrink)

The question “What is the nature of experience?” is of perennial philosophical concern. It deals not only with the nature of experience qua experience, but additionally with related questions about the experiencing subject and that which is experienced. In other words, to speak of the philosophical problem of experience, one must also address questions about mind, world, and the various relations that link them together. Both William James and Kitarō Nishida were deeply concerned with these issues. Their shared notion (...) of “pure experience” is the conceptual cornerstone of their attempt to deal with the philosophical problem of experience. This dissertation is an analysis of “pure experience” and its relevance to several issues in contemporary hilosophy of mind. Drawing upon James’s and Nishida’s “pure experience”, I argue both for a sensorimotor-based, “extended” conception of consciousness and a bodily skills-based account of moral psychology. (shrink)

The image of the “mirror” (鏡kagami) appears frequently in the philosophical texts of Nishida Kitaro (西田幾多郎1870-1945), where it assumes various functions. Mirror references first occur in meditations on the philosophies of Josiah Royce (1855-1916) and Henri Bergson (1859-1941). The most fascinating evocation here corresponds to the idea of a “self-enlightening mirror”, used to probe the philosophical ground for self-illumination. This idea seems to point back to Buddhist meaning that intervenes in Japanese intellectual history. We take this as our (...) warrant for establishing here, firstly, how Nishidean philosophical speculation can be critically related to the thought of Dogen (道元1200-1253); and, secondly, in what sense it has stimulated some contemporary approaches in Japanese philosophy (for example, those of Nitta, Ohashi, and Sakabe). (shrink)

Relocating the figure of Jikaku (Self-Consciousness) in Nishida’s Intuition and Reflection in Self-consciousness.

The essay is a written version of a talk Nakamura Yūjirō gave at the Collège international de philosophie in Paris in 1983. In the talk Nakamura connects the issue of common sense in his own work to that of place in Nishida Kitarō and the creative imagination in Miki Kiyoshi. He presents this connection between the notions of common sense, imagination, and place as constituting one important thread in contemporary Japanese philosophy. He begins by discussing the significance of place (...) (basho) that is being rediscovered today in response to the shortcomings of the modern Western paradigm, and discusses it in its various senses, such as ontological ground or substratum, the body, symbolic space, and linguistic or discursive topos in ancient rhetoric. He then relates this issue to the philosophy of place Nishida developed in the late 1920s, and after providing an explication of Nishida’s theory, discusses it further in light of some linguistic and psychological theories. Nakamura goes on to discuss his own interest in the notion of common sense traceable to Aristotle and its connection to the rhetorical concept of topos, and Miki’s development of the notion of the imagination in the 1930s in response to Nishida’s theory. And in doing so he ties all three—common sense, place, and imagination—together as suggestive of an alternative to the modern Cartesian standpoint of the rational subject that has constituted the traditional paradigm of the modern West. (shrink)

This essay aims to introduce in detail the philosophical thoughts I have reached over many years and to explore the origins of “Hajime Philosophy” by examining how it relates to Japanese thought. Throughout my twenty years of life, I have established my philosophy based on what I have felt and thought. However, my reflections on how I reached a philosophical state have been limited to looking back on my own life. Given that I was born and raised in Tokyo, Japan, (...) in the 21st century, it is essential to study the thoughts nurtured in Japan over thousands of years for this reflection. Recently, while studying Japanese thought through the program "Shinto Philosophy" on Closer To Truth, recommended by Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, I found a strong connection with my own philosophy. In this essay, I will detail the background of the philosophical ideas I wrote in my recent paper, "Philosophical Inquiry of Mathematics: The Concept of 'The Blue Print' and the Relationship Between Mathematics and Goodness," and study the ancient thoughts embedded in Japanese life represented by Shinto and the philosophy of Dr. Kitaro Nishida, exploring their relation to “Hajime Philosophy.” I hope to obtain a religious-philosophical foundation for “Hajime Philosophy” as a result. (shrink)

This essay by Nishida Kitarō from 1927, translated into English here for the first time, is from the initial period of what has come to be called “Nishida philosophy” (Nishida tetsugaku), when Nishida was first developing his conception of “place” (basho). Nishida here inquires into the relationship between logic and consciousness in terms of place and implacement in order to overcome the shortcomings of previous philosophical attempts—from the ancient Greeks to the moderns—to dualistically conceive the (...) relationship between being and knowing in terms of subject-object or form-matter. During the course of articulating his novel approach to consciousness and cognition, Nishida discusses what he takes to be the weaknesses of Greek hylomorphism, Kantian (and neo-Kantian) dualism, and Husserlian phenomenology. Dissatisfied with the attribution of mere passivity to placiality, and turning away from consciousness objectified as a subject of statement, Nishida imparts to consciousness qua place a certain logical independence as an active yet un-objectifiable “predicate.” This investigation of consciousness as the unobjectifiable place for objectification leads Nishida to the notion of what precedes consciousness itself, a “place of nothing” (mu no basho) that envelops the dichotomized structures of subject-predicate, being-nothing, subject-object, universal-particular, et cetera. (shrink)

The following essay, “The Unsolved Issue of Consciousness” (Torinokosaretaru ishiki no mondai 取残されたる意識の問題), by Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 from 1927 is significant in regard to the development of what has come to be called “Nishida philosophy” (Nishida tetsugaku 西田哲学). In what follows, in addition to providing some commentary on the important points of his essay, I would like to show its relevance or significance not only for those who would like to study Nishida’s thought but also for (...) philosophy in general, especially in the contemporary setting. It was first published in 1927 by Iwanami Publishers in a collection of essays by different authors, Philosophical Essays in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Birthday of Dr. .. (shrink)

First published as 「デカルト哲学について」 in June 1944. The essay is included in 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete Works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002–2009 ), 10: 117-49.

In this essay, I investigate Kitarō Nishida's characterization of what he refers to as the 'self-contradictory' body. First, I clarify the conceptual relation between the self-contradictory body and Nishida's notion of 'acting-intuition'. I next look at Nishida's analysis of acting-intuition and the self-contradictory body as it pertains to our personal, sensorimotor engagement with the world and things in it, as well as to our bodily immersion within the intersubjective and social world. Along the way, I argue that (...) Nishida develops a rich and exceedingly current way of thinking through different facets of embodiment and interpersonal relatedness. I further argue that Nishida's work provides compelling reasons to foreground the mutually implicative, co-emergent nature of embodied self and world in our theorizing about the nature of self and experience. (shrink)

This paper sets Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Nishida Kitarō in dialogue and explore the interpretations of artistic expression, which inform their similar phenomenological accounts of perception. I discuss how both philosophers look to artistic practice to reveal multi-perspectival aspects of vision. They do so, I argue, by going beyond a “positivist” representational under-standing of perception and by including negative aspects of visual experience as constitutive of vision. Following this account, I interpret artworks by Cézanne, Guo Xi, Rodin, and Hasegawa according (...) to the versions of multi-perspectival vision articulated by Nishida and Merleau-Ponty. I conclude by highlighting a difference between Merleau-Ponty’s “depth” and Nishida’s “seeing without a seer” regarding the extent to which each of their philosophies de-substantialize and de-localize human vision. (shrink)

Original title : 「歴史的身体」『西田幾多郎全集』[Nishida Kitarō Gesamtausgabe], 3. Auflage, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, Bd. 14: 265–92.

The “shrinking” of the globe in the last few centuries has made explicit that the world is a tense unity of many: the many worlds are forced to contend with one another. Nishida Kitarō, the founder of the Kyoto school, once stated that to be is to be implaced. We exist by partaking in “the socio-historical world.” More recently, Jean-luc Nancy has conceived of the world in terms of sense. What is striking in both is that the world emerges (...) out of a nothing, created ex nihilo—the phrase stripped of its theistic connotations. While for Nishida the world is ultimately implaced in the “place of absolute nothing,” Nancy speaks of the nothing that is the basis of the world’s self-creation. I will explore a possible convergence between these and any light it may shed upon our contemporary situation of globalization and its implications for praxis. I look to a sense of the nothing as a chōratic spatiality, an opening that provides space for co-being and serves as the source of creativity. In face of globalization, the project for meaning through mondialisation (in Nancy) and within a multi-cultural world (in Nishida) would imply the appropriation of such an originary spatiality. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate Nishida Kitarō’s way of philosophizing in the light of the concept of “transition” in order to deepen our understanding of both Nishida’s philosophy and our thinking about and in transitions, using the concept of “boundary” or “border” (Grenze) as a catalyst. For that purpose, we focus on Nishida’s essay “Place” (「場所」), passing through different parts of the text as if through successive gates on a path of transition between one (...) place and the next, until we reach the final place of “absolute nothingness.” Dwelling on this place, we turn our attention to its internal structure and try to depict it along the outlines of a boundary, following the movements taking place in Nishida’s essay. The second part proposes an interpretation of the place of nothingness as an interminable practice of boundary-crossing that doesn’t come to a halt in a final, all-encompassing place, but dynamically situates itself on countless intersecting planes. After a more or less abstract analysis of the concept of “boundary,” we will apply and concretize this approach by using the example of the skin. To this end, we expose five main features of the skin as boundary: permeability, enclosure, excessiveness, interstitiality and reciprocal self-formation. (shrink)

This chapter will explicate what Nishida means by “nothing” (mu, 無), as well as “being” (yū, 有), through an exposition of his concept of the “place of nothing” (mu no basho). We do so through an investigation of his exposition of “the place of nothing” vis-àvis the self, the world, and God, as it shows up in his epistemology, metaphysics, theology and religious ethics during the various periods of his oeuvre – in other words, his understanding of nothingness that (...) he takes to be the root of the self, the world, and the religious notion of an absolute or God. We will also indicate some of the sources of his notion from the Eastern and the Western traditions. What unites his view to nothing from the different periods is an existential praxis, and what I call an “anontology” that avoids reduction to either opposites of being and non-being (on-mēon). (shrink)

Nous nous proposons dans cette intervention de structurer synchroniquement trois moments philosophiques d’origines differentes : l’intuition agissante chez Kitarō Nishida, la dialectique de la mediation absolue chez Hajime Tanabe et la philosophie de l’individuation chez Gilbert Simondon, dans un contexte de reflexion philosophique sur la nature de la vie humaine. Les trois moments semblent susceptibles de se croiser, se critiquer et se completer dans un terrain transductif au sens ou l’entend Simondon. C’est ce nouveau terrain que nous entendons defricher (...) afin d’ouvrir une perspective ou un individu humain se transforme en agent responsable d’un transhumanisme a travers le processus de l’individuation dynamique et transindividuelle, laquelle nous preparerait a l’emergence du posthumain dans un futur proche. (shrink)

This paper discovers a commonality between Nishida Kitarō and Kuki Shūzō via their shared interest in the poetry of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Since both, Nishida and Kuki, also engaged in aesthetic practices themselves, this paper asks whether it is useful to regard Nishida and Kuki as “aestheticians”. It is argued that this perspective offers a fruitful approach to their philosophical works. Both applies aesthetics not just as object or topic, but as medium and place of philosophical (...) practices. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a possible convergence between two great twentieth century thinkers, Nishida Kitarō of Japan and Martin Heidegger of Germany. The focus is on the quasi-religious language they employ in discussing the grounding of human existence in terms of an encompassing Wherein for our being. Heidegger speaks of “the sacred” and “the passing of the last god” that mark an empty clearing wherein all metaphysical absolutes or gods have withdrawn but are simultaneously indicative of an opening (...) wherein beings are given. Nishida speaks of “the religious” dimension in the depths of one's being, that he calls “place,” and that somehow envelops the world through its kenotic self-negation. In both we find reference to a kind of originary space—the open or place—associated with quasireligious themes. I also point to their distinct approaches to metaphysical language in their attempts to give voice to that abysmal thought. (shrink)

The paper will explicate the Sache or matter of the dialectic of the founder of Kyoto School philosophy, Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), from the standpoint of his mature thought, especially from the 1930s and 40s. Rather than providing a simple exposition of his thought I will engage in a creative reading of his concept of basho (place) in terms of chiasma and chōra, or a chiasmatic chōra. I argue that Nishida’s appropriation of nineteenth century German, especially Hegelian, terminology was (...) inadequate in expressing what he strove to say—for his concept of basho confounds traditional metaphysical discourse. Because of its chiasmatic and chōratic nature, the Sache he strove to capture and express through the language of dialectical philosophy, perpetually slips away from any systemic bounds. His “dialectic” (benshōhō) implies a chiasma or a criss-crossing of multiple factors on multi-dimensional levels that exceed in complexity simplistic binomial oppositions or the triadic formula of traditional dialectics. The complexity is one of over-determination that threatens to undermine the very language of such a dialectic. As the deep complexity of over-inter-determinations would deconstruct any notion of a substance, what Nishida offers—as opposed to an ousiology (or logic of substance)—is a chiasmology. I thus argue that his so-called dialectic is really an unfolding of that chiasma. And if chiasma expresses the over-determinate aspect of Nishida’s matter of thinking, chōra would express its under-determinate aspect. Nishida himself based his concept of basho or “place” on Plato’s notion of the chōra from the Timaeus. I take Nishida’s basho in its chōratic nature as what simultaneously unfolds and enfolds the chiasma. But in the case of the chōra it is its under-determinate nature that refuses reduction to any of the terms of opposition. In its self-withdrawal, it provides a clearing, a space, for the chiasmatic unraveling of the many. Like the chiasma it undermines any claim to a first substance or the hegemony of a universal First. For in its indeterminateness, it is “nothing” (mu). The unfolding it enfolds is, as Nishida states, “a determination without determiner.” In concrete terms, however, we might develop Nishida’s concept further by returning to the original pre-Platonic Greek meaning of chōra in the sense of “region” or “country,” to understand chōra or basho here as the very space of co-existence provided by this very earth. As a chiasmatic chōra irreducible, in its over- and under-determinations, to being or non-being, Nishida’s basho qua mu proves to be the an-ontological origin of both on and meon (being and non-being). Rejecting the culture-nature dichotomy this notion of our place of being as chiasma and chōra underscores our holistic symbiosis with the earth as the anontological (un)ground and clearing for our co-existence in a concrete milieau with one another and with nature. It is this earth as our ultimate contextual wherein that provides a clearing for co-dwelling and mutual encounter with one’s other, that we must acknowledge today if we are to co-exist authentically and freely vis-à-vis our global neighbors and vis-à-vis the surrounding nature. (shrink)

Originally published as「歴史的世界の個性的な自己創造と国家：西田哲学における〈国家〉と〈民族〉」, in「西田哲学会年報第七号」[ Jahrbuch der Nishida-Gesellschaft] 7 : 55–76. Übersetzt von Leon Krings. In diesem Aufsatz wird der Frage nachgegangen, in welcher Weise der „Staat“ im späten Denken des Philosophen Nishida Kitarō thematisiert wird. Dies geschieht anhand der Staatstheorie Nishidas, wie sie sich in seinen Aufsätzen Das Problem der Staatsraison und Das Problem der japanischen Kultur sowie im Anhang zur Philosophischen Aufsatzsammlung iv darstellt. Zusätzlich werden Nishidas Schriften, die nach den Grundproblemen der Philosophie geschrieben wurden und den (...) theoretischen Hintergrund seiner Staatstheorie bilden, miteinbezogen. In diesen Schriften fragt Nishida – ausgehend von der genetischen Struktur der historischen Wirklichkeit – nach der Daseinsberechtigung sowie der Bedeutung des Staates, d. h. danach, was ein Staat ist und welche Art von Gemeinschaft es verdient, als „Staat“ bezeichnet zu werden. Mithilfe des im Folgenden dargestellten Leitfadens werde ich versuchen, Nishidas Gedankengang genauer nachzuverfolgen. Dabei wird sich zeigen, dass er den „Staat“ als eine im höchsten Maße paradoxe Form der Gemeinschaft interpretiert. (shrink)

Este artículo examina el concepto de basho (lugar) en la filosofía de Nishida y la superación de la dualidad que este concepto implica, haciendo una comparación con el cuestionamiento de Nietzsche a la dialéctica de los opuestos, a la dualidad y al principio de no contradicción.

Co jest większe, bycie czy nic? Anzelm dowodzi istnienia Boga przy pomocy nihil. Bóg jako to, od czego nic większego nie może zostać pomyślane przez skończony umysł. Właściwe dla Anzelma logiczne – i być może mistyczne – użycie słowa „nic” domaga się porównania z negatywną ontologią Heideggera i jej recepcją w ramach tzw. Szkoły z Kioto założonej przez Nishidę. Czyż jednak pustka buddyzmu zen nie odsyła nas do – niewypowiedzianej – boskiej obecności?

Original title: 「生の哲學について」『西田幾多郎全集』旧版 [Alte Ausgabe: Gesammelte Werke Nishida Kitarōs]. Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1978, 6: 428–51; 新版 [Neue Ausgabe]. Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 2009, 5: 335–53.

Conferencia Festival Internacional de Japón (Bilbao, Noviembre de 2010) .

Gaisi Takeuti (1926–2017) is one of the most distinguished logicians in proof theory after Hilbert and Gentzen. He extensively extended Hilbert's program in the sense that he formulated Gentzen's sequent calculus, conjectured that cut-elimination holds for it (Takeuti's conjecture), and obtained several stunning results in the 1950–60s towards the solution of his conjecture. Though he has been known chiefly as a great mathematician, he wrote many papers in English and Japanese where he expressed his philosophical thoughts. In particular, he used (...) several keywords such as "active intuition" and "self-reflection" from Nishida's philosophy. In this paper, we aim to describe a general outline of our project to investigate Takeuti's philosophy of mathematics. In particular, after reviewing Takeuti's proof-theoretic results briefly, we describe some key elements in Takeuti's texts. By explaining these texts, we point out the connection between Takeuti's proof theory and Nishida's philosophy and explain the future goals of our project. (shrink)

Gaisi Takeuti extended Gentzen's work to higher-order case in 1950's–1960's and proved the consistency of impredicative subsystems of analysis. He has been chiefly known as a successor of Hilbert's school, but we pointed out in the previous paper that Takeuti's aimed to investigate the relationships between "minds" by carrying out his proof-theoretic project rather than proving the "reliability" of such impredicative subsystems of analysis. Moreover, as briefly explained there, his philosophical ideas can be traced back to Nishida's philosophy in (...) Kyoto's school. For the proving the consistency of such systems, it is crucial to prove the well-foundedness of ordinals called "ordinal diagrams" developed for it. Takeuti presented such arguments several times in order to show that they are admitted in his stand point. As a starting point of investigating his finitist stand point, we formulate the system of ordinal notations up to ε0 and reconstruct the well-foundedness arguments of them. (shrink)

Philosophe japonais polyglotte au savoir encyclopédique, Yamauchi Tokuryū est à n’en point douter l’un des auteurs les moins étudiés de l’école de Kyōto. La présente étude vient corriger ce qui ne constitue rien d’autre qu’un accident de l’histoire, tant l’ampleur du projet philosophique de Yamauchi est à même de susciter l’intérêt du philosophe, du savant et de l’amateur cultivé. La démarche de ce penseur japonais, disciple de Nishida Kitarō, est remarquable en ce qu’il chercha à proposer un dépassement englobant (...) de ce qu’il nomme, d’une part, la « logique du logos » – qui figurait déjà chez Aristote et se structure autour des principes d’identité, de contradiction et du tiers exclu – et, d’autre part, la « logique du lemme » – méthode d’appréhension intuitive des étants qui, née en Inde, serait d’inspiration essentiellement bouddhique. Cette étude, dans laquelle les conceptions bouddhiques qui traversent le propos de Yamauchi sont explicitées, est essentiellement consacrée à l’analyse de ses deux essais les plus importants Logos et lemme (1974) et Philosophie de la latence (1993). Le lecteur y rencontrera une discussion tant de la logique aristotélicienne que d’un régime de logicité tel que le tétralemme, tant du coeur des philosophies européennes que de celui des pensées bouddhiques. Il y rencontrera en outre une discussion de l’idée de néant, de la causalité et de la question du fondement de l’être, nourrie de conceptions bouddhiques telles que la « coproduction conditionnée » (pratītya-samutpāda) et la « latence » (anuśaya). (shrink)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is very seldom, if ever, referred to in the works of whom we might think of as the eminent Asian metaphysicians. In spite of this, the big picture metaphysical views available in the thought of philosophers such as Nāgārjuna, Fazang and Nishida appear to share certain structural features with views more familiar to us from our own tradition; views that explicitly accept or reject the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Nāgārjuna looks to develop a kind (...) of metaphysical infinitism, Fazang an extreme form of coherentism, and Nishida a species of foundationalism. These three positions - infinitism, coherentism and foundationalism - are typically thought to exhaust the spread of possibilities by those working within the Western tradition. In spite of their similarities to positions advanced within our own tradition, the cosmologies of many of the giants of Asian philosophy are characterised by their rather striking conclusions. Amongst such conclusions for Nāgārjuna is that everything is empty; for Fazang that everything is identical to everything else; and for Nishida that everything depends on absolute nothingness. If the Principle of Sufficient Reason is playing a role in the derivation of such striking conclusions, then it looks that there are more options regarding the metaphysical structure of the world available to us than our own tradition typically courts. If, on the other hand, these striking cosmological conclusions are arrived at without any consideration of sufficient reason, then there may well be ways of reasoning about the overarching structure of reality that are powerful but unfamiliar to Western thinking. In this contribution, I explore what, if any, role the PSR might be playing in the thought of Nāgārjuna, Fazang and Nishida, and what we might be able to learn from it. (shrink)

Anthropological problems are among the eternal problems of philosophy. This issue is especially actualized at critical moments in the development of society. This is the period humanity is going through today. The revival of anthropocentric types of research, finding new ways and a holistic approach to human research proves the relevance of this study. Humanity is once again experiencing a paradigm shift in world history. The first quarter of the XXI century showed itself as an intensification of globalization processes, which (...) in turn led to multiple ups and downs of cultural and social life. The idea of a polycentric, multipolar world remained only in the mode of a categorical imperative. The coming form of human existence, if it takes place, should not only restore to people the meaning lost during the industrial civilization, but also avoid the costs of a dangerous alliance of information technology and biotechnology. In the context of the next threat of total war and the threat of a split in the world, an appeal to comparative philosophy should contribute to the final approval of such a worldview, which is based on the value of human life, brotherhood and spiritual unity of all people. The modern, global world is characterized by the inevitable interpenetration of cultures, the erasure of the boundaries of cultural areas. The article provides a comparative analysis of modern philosophical and anthropological concepts. Speaking as an approach and method, philosophical comparative studies continue its development in philosophical and anthropological knowledge, where it becomes one of the methodological directions. The article analyzes the modern anthropological concepts of the West, which have found their reflection in the concept of mental causality by D. Kim and in the concept of "homo compensator" by O. Marquard. And also carried out a philosophical analysis of the philosophical and anthropological concepts of the East, which are reflected in the works of the Chinese philosopher F. Yulan, in Japanese existentialism N. Kitaro and in the concept of "hoodie" M. Iqbal. (shrink)

This essay argues that what later came to be called postmodernity had a deeper trans-cultural prehistory. Starting from a biographical point of departure that is generalized into a broader historical diagnosis, it reconstructs how the reception of South and East Asian forms of thought and life contributed to loosening the hardened horizon of Western modernity after the Second World War. The study traces this process back to the early nineteenth century, from Friedrich Schlegel and Schopenhauer to Emerson and Thoreau, and (...) follows its further development through Vivekananda, D.T. Suzuki, Nishida Kitarō, and the Kyoto School. In this perspective, postmodern openness does not appear primarily as an internal Western event, but as the result of a much longer history of trans-cultural encounter, translation, and philosophical transformation. -/- The essay then shows how this opening extended beyond philosophy into the arts, music, media, and counterculture, from Johannes Itten, Mark Tobey, and John Cage to Yoko Ono, Nam June Paik, Alan Watts, Gary Snyder, Jack Kerouac, and Ram Dass. On this basis, it introduces a conceptual distinction between Post-Modernity 1.0 and Post-Modernity 2.0. Whereas the first is shaped by real cultural encounter, existential transformation, and trans-cultural receptivity, the second designates a later, more self-referential Western constellation in which these earlier impulses are further processed as pluralization, deconstruction, discourse critique, simulation, and sign reflection. The essay thus proposes a revised genealogy of postmodernity: not as a purely Western history of self-critique, but as the delayed outcome of a trans-cultural opening whose conditions were later increasingly forgotten. In its concluding move, the text connects this argument to the present by suggesting that this Eurocentric forgetfulness still has consequences today, including in those strategic fields in which Western societies now depend heavily on Asian expertise. (shrink)

Erwin Schrödinger holds a prominent place in the history of science primarily due to his crucial role in the development of quantum physics. What is perhaps lesser known are his insights into subject-object duality, consciousness and mind. He documented himself that these were influenced by the Upanishads, a collection of ancient Hindu spiritual texts. Central to his thoughts in this area is that Mind is only One and there is no separation between subject and object. This chapter aims to bridge (...) Schrödinger’s view on One Mind with the teachings of Dōgen, a twelfth century Zen master. This bridge is formed by addressing the question of how time relates to One Mind, and subject-object duality. Schrödinger describes the experience of One Mind to be like a timeless now, whereas subject-object duality involves a linear continuum of time. We show how these differing positions are unified in the notion of ‘absolute present’, which was put forward in the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1871–1945). In addition, we argue that it is in this notion of absolute present that the views of Schrödinger, Dōgen and Nishida meet. (shrink)

This collection of new essays focuses on metaethical views from outside the mainstream European tradition. The guiding motivation is that important discussions about the ultimate nature of morality can be found far beyond ancient Greece and modern Europe. The volume’s aim is to show how rich the possibilities are for comparative metaethics, and how much these comparisons can add to contemporary discussions of the foundations of morality. Representing five continents, the thinkers discussed range from ancient Egyptian, ancient Chinese, and the (...) Mexica (Aztec) cultures to more recent thinkers like Augusto Salazar Bondy, Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nishida Kitarō, and Susan Sontag. The philosophical topics discussed include religious language, moral discovery, moral disagreement, essences’ relation to evaluative facts, metaphysical harmony, naturalism, moral perception, and the nature of moral realism. This volume will be of interest to anyone interested in metaethics or comparative philosophy. (shrink)

This paper refutes that the first written document in which the name "Kyoto school" is found corresponds to the article written by Tosaka Jun (1900-1945) and published in 1932 with the title "The philosophy of the Kyoto school". It will be shown that it was another thinker, Tsuchida Kyōson (1891-1934), who in his Contemporary Thought of Japan and China, a book originally written in Japanese in 1926 and then in English in 1927, includes Nishida and Tanabe under the name (...) "Kyoto school", thus years before Tosaka's text. The inclusion of this unnoticed source contributes to the question about the historical significance of the designation of the "school" in the lifetime of its most famous members. Paper at XXV World Congress of Philosophy - Philosophy across Boundaries, Rome, 1st-8th august 2024. (shrink)

VERSION FINALE "L'enfant n'apprend pas à marcher! Il apprend à ne pas tomber..." Préambule Ce que nous affirmons ici, c'est que pour l'homme, chercher à comprendre l'univers est "non-différent" que de chercher à "se voir", c'est à dire à comprendre sa propre réflexivité. La philosophie, les sciences, les arts, les sports, les religions... ont tous la même finalité ; car l'homme sait, au moins intuitivement, qu'il est plus sincère de "se savoir", que de "ce ça voir". La LQAE ne décrit (...) pas ce que l'homme pense, mais comment il pense, comment il "se" sait bien avant toute forme de dualisme et comment "ce" émerge. Résumé La performance présentée ici suppose certains acquis en philosophie dialectique, en logique non-classique et en métaphysique orientale. Les références mathématiques ne sont pas ici mobilisées comme preuves, mais comme figures dialectiques : elles opèrent comme révélateurs des failles, tensions et excès où se déploie le réel. De même, la logique proposée n’est pas un calcul formel, mais une logique adverbiale — une logique de la manière en régime d’émergence quand le simple donné est entendu interdépendant de ce qui est pris, dérivant la question du " que ou qui suis-je?" en "que ou qui sommes-je?" Le lecteur trouvera non pas une doctrine mais un champ d'altercations : chaque thèse porte sa propre objection, chaque concept s’éprouve dans le principe tensif de sa contradiction. Loin d’une logique formelle close, il s’agit d’une logique du "comment" et de la "non-clôture": l’être ne se donne pas comme substance ou identité, mais comme modalité d’apparaître, toujours en tension. L’« annihilicréation » exprime cette dynamique où l’être et le néant ne s’opposent pas, mais co-fonctionnent quand du "fait" annihilicréatif émerge l’événement. Bibliographie sélective: Nāgārjuna, Stances du milieu (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā). Hegel, G.W.F., Science de la logique. Nishida, Kitarō, Logique du lieu et vision religieuse du monde. da Costa, Newton C.A., Paraconsistent Logic: Consistency, Contradiction and Negation. Banach, S. & Tarski, A., « Sur la décomposition des ensembles de points en parties respectivement congruentes », 1924. Gödel, Kurt, « What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem? », 1947. Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō (正法眼蔵) "Toute version antérieure est considérée comme obsolète" Copyright © 2025 Jean-Christophe Cavallo Numéro de dépôt : 00096150-1. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop Nishida Kitarō’s “logic of place” into an “aesthetics of place.” While brilliantly fusing the Buddhist traditions of Japan with Western philosophy, in his later years, Nishida came up with his own unique philosophy, a “monadology with the concept of substance.” This is a concept anchored in mu or “emptiness.” From this standpoint, how is the individual understood and how does society take shape? The answers to these questions are fundamental keys to understanding Japanese (...) philosophy. In Japan, the individual in Japan is not locked up in itself, but it is possible for the “substantial ego” to vanish and be replaced by the ““I as an event.” Through a discussion of the “place” where the activities of the traditional poetic forms of renku and renga are performed, an attempt is made to develop an aesthetic approach to those questions. (shrink)

This paper examines the significance of spring within Japanese philosophy, focusing on the themes of renewal, impermanence, and the deep connection between humanity and nature. The arrival of spring, marked by the ephemeral beauty of cherry blossoms (sakura), serves as a poignant reminder of the concept of "mono no aware," which emphasizes the appreciation of transience and the fleeting moments of beauty in life. Through an exploration of traditional practices such as Hanami (flower viewing) and the philosophical reflections of notable (...) figures like Matsuo Bashō and Kitarō Nishida, this study highlights how spring inspires a sense of harmony and mindfulness in Japanese culture. Additionally, the paper discusses the role of seasonal change in shaping aesthetic sensibilities and ethical considerations, illustrating how the cyclical nature of life is celebrated and embraced. Ultimately, this exploration reveals that spring is not merely a season in Japan but a profound philosophical lens through which individuals can engage with the world, fostering a deeper understanding of existence and the interconnectedness of all living beings. (shrink)

Aporetic Liminality: Consider a different perspective on liminality–not as a temporary state emerging between two separate ontologies, but as a prerequisite condition for anything to become distinct at all. If liminality is an original condition carried forward since the beginning of time, paradox persists not because structure fails, but because any self-referential system that is functionally distinct relies on boundaries it cannot fully explain from within. Liminality names this condition by which a function remains ambiguously coherent. This aporetic shift inverts (...) foundational notions of liminality and challenges its philosophy to meditate on coherence without closure and its relationship to aliveness. (shrink)

This paper attempts to locate modern Zen and psychoanalysis in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind, particularly in view of dominant theories of cognitivism that see the mind as informational and material, with meaning being mere information in disguise. Psychoanalysis and modern Zen hold to the contrary view that the mind is “semantic,” not “syntactic,” and that the meanings we have in our heads are not reducible to the physical informational processes from which they have emerged. Meaning, as non-reducible, is (...) infinite and uncaused. However, the structure of meaning entails a split between a knower and what is known. This split creates problems in the mind which can be confronted through more, not less, engagement with the meanings in our minds, until we are self-aware and, perhaps, self-identical, with the mechanisms of consciousness that produce the meanings in our head. Such self-awareness is seen as being self-liberating rather than self-reducing. (shrink)

The logic of soku-hi is presented as an articulation of a post-Kantian view of reality that embraces the truths of science with the assumption of the transcendental subject. As such, soku-hi represents the philosophical posture of both the secular Zen of the Kyoto School and the new materialists of contemporary continental philosophy. It describes how material reality is not all even though there is nothing else.

The essay that follows is, in substance, a lecture delivered in Brussels on 7 December 2016 to the 2nd International Conference of the European Network of Japanese Philosophy. In it I argue that the strategy of qualifying nothingness as an “absolute,” which was adopted by Kyoto School thinkers as a way to come to grips with fundamental problems of Western philosophy, is inherently ambiguous and ultimately weakens the notion of nothingness itself. In its place, a proposal is made to define (...) nothingness in terms of “connectedness.” The discussion is bound on both ends by an apology for transgressing established academic boundaries. On one end, I open with a brief digression on a common ground for philosophies East and West as a mestizaje to which no tradition can claim dominance. On the other, I close with an appeal for restoring respect for the role of mythical narration as a way to bridge the connection between theory and practice without having to revert to moral absolutes, particularly as it relates to safeguarding this fragile planet of ours from the ongoing sepsis of economic “progress.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to show how Japanese practices of self-cultivation found in the so-called “ways” can be interpreted as embodied forms of “caring for oneself ” and, therefore, as part of a philosophical Lebenskunst or art of living. To this end, I refer to phenomenological accounts of the body as well as to a unique notion of practice found in the writings of Dōgen Kigen, a thirteenth-century Japanese Zen master. Central to this essay is a concern with embodying (...) kata or pre-defined patterns of movement and posture used in nearly all practices of self-cultivation in Japan. To approach this question, I look at the etymological roots of the term kata and its use in the writings of Zeami, the foremost representative of classical Noh theater, both as author and as actor. This is followed by an analysis of certain aspects of the embodiment of kata and the way it is described in Japanese literature. (shrink)