This paper discusses two views of what makes an action difficult deriving from two very different approaches. On the first view, the difficulty of an action is determined by the (physical) effort involved in performing the action. On the second view, the difficulty of an action is determined by the level of ability required to perform the action. I develop and refine a version of each approach, including an original version of the ability approach drawing on recent work on (...) agentive abilities. Then, I subject each, in turn, to a series of problem cases and consider how each view might be further refined to address these cases. I conclude that the ability approach is more promising than the effort approach because, among other reasons, it more aptly accounts for cases where difficulty seems to arise from factors other than effort (including counterproductive habits, lack of artistic imagination, and presence of pain). (shrink)

Achievements have recently begun to attract increased attention from value theorists. One recurring idea in this budding literature is that one important factor determining the magnitude or value of an achievement is the amount of effort the achiever invested. The aim of this paper is to present the most plausible version of this idea. This advances the current state of debate where authors are invoking substantially different notions of effort and are thus talking past each other. While the (...) concept of effort has been invoked in the philosophical analysis of a number of important concepts such as desert, attention, competence, and distributive justice, it has hardly ever been analyzed itself. This paper makes headway in this regard by discussing three ambiguities in the everyday notion of effort. It continues to develop two accounts of effort and shows how both of them are achievement-enhancing. (shrink)

Effort and the feeling of effort play important roles in many theoretical discussions, from perception to self-control and free will, from the nature of ownership to the nature of desert and achievement. A crucial, overlooked distinction within the philosophical and scientific literatures is the distinction between theories that seek to explain effort and theories that seek to explain the feeling of effort. Lacking a clear distinction between these two phenomena makes the literature hard to navigate. To (...) advance in the unification and development of this area, this article provides an overview of the main theories of the nature of effort and the nature of the feeling of effort, and then discusses how efforts and their feelings are related. Two key takeaways emerge. First, there is widespread agreement that efforts are goal-directed actions. Second, one of the main philosophical issues to be decided is whether feelings of effort should be defined by reference to efforts (effort-first approach), or whether efforts are defined by reference to the feeling of effort (feeling-first approach). (shrink)

Listening effort helps explain why people who are hard of hearing are prone to fatigue and social withdrawal. However, a one-factor model that cites only effort due to hardness of hearing is insufficient as there are many who lead happy lives despite their disability. This paper explores other contributory factors, in particular motivational arousal and pleasure. The theory of rational motivational arousal predicts that some people forego listening comprehension because they believe it to be impossible and hence worth (...) no effort at all. This is problematic. Why should the listening task be rated this way, given the availability of aids that reduce its difficulty? Two additional factors narrow the explanatory gap. First, we separate the listening task from the benefit derived as a consequence. The latter is temporally more distant, and is discounted as a result. The second factor is displeasure attributed to the listening task, which increases listening cost. Many who are hard of hearing enjoy social interaction. In such cases, the actual activity of listening is a benefit, not a cost. These people also reap the benefits of listening, but do not have to balance these against the displeasure of the task. It is suggested that if motivational harmony can be induced by training in somebody who is hard of hearing, then the obstacle to motivational arousal would be removed. This suggests a modified goal for health care professionals. Don’t just teach those who are hard of hearing how to use hearing assistance devices. Teach them how to do so with pleasure and enjoyment . (shrink)

Providing valid responses to a self-report survey requires cognitive effort. Subjects engaging in insufficient effort responding (IER) are unwilling to take this effort. Compared to psychologists, experimental philosophers so far seem to have paid less attention to IER. This paper is an attempt to begin to alleviate this shortcoming. First, I explain IER’s nature, prevalence and negative effects in self-report surveys in general. Second, I argue that IER might also affect experimental philosophy studies. Third, I develop recommendations (...) as to how experimental philosophers should (and should not) try to prevent IER. Fourth, I develop recommendations as to how experimental philosophers should (and should not) try to detect IER. Fifth, I sketch how experimental philosophers ought to proceed once a subject has been identified as an insufficient effort responder. And finally, I report the results of an online survey that addresses experimental philosophers’ current knowledge, consideration and assessment of IER. (shrink)

Cognitive effort is thought to be familiar in everyday life, ubiquitous across multiple variations of task and circumstance, and integral to cost/benefit computations that are themselves central to the proper functioning of cognitive control. In particular, cognitive effort is thought to be closely related to the assessment of cognitive control’s costs. I argue here that the construct of cognitive effort, as it is deployed in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, is problematically unclear. The result is that talk of (...) cognitive effort may paper over significant disagreement regarding the nature of cognitive effort, and its key functions for cognitive control. I highlight key points of disagreement, and several open questions regarding what causes cognitive effort, what cognitive effort represents, cognitive effort’s relationship to action, and cognitive effort’s relationship to consciousness. I also suggest that pluralism about cognitive effort – that cognitive effort may manifest as a range of intentional or non-intentional actions the function of which is to promote greater success at paradigmatic cognitive control tasks – may be a fruitful and irenic way to conceive of cognitive effort. Finally, I suggest that recent trends in work on cognitive control suggests that we might fruitfully conceive of cognitive effort as one key node in a complex network of mental value, and that studying this complex network may illuminate the nature of cognitive control, and the role of consciousness in cognitive control’s proper functioning. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an alternative account of action that improves upon what has come to be known as the standard story. The standard story depicts actions as events that are caused by and made intelligible through the appropriate combinations of the agent’s beliefs, desires, decisions, intentions and other motivational factors. I argue that the standard story is problematic because it depicts the relation between the agent and their bodily actions as causally mediated by their motivational factors. On the (...) alternative account that I present, whenever an agent performs a bodily action, they do so by exerting a distinctive kind of effort so as to initiate, sustain, and control their own bodily capacities, an essential feature of bodily action that is absent from the standard story. (shrink)

Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept ofeffort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for anexplicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at thisdefinition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and arguesthat few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues thatsuch a (...) definition is now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whosefirst step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made acrosssciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effortfrom research on effort so far:primitive-feelings accounts,comparator-based accounts,resource-based accountsandforce-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking abouteffort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: re-source-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded as more fundamental than resource-basedaccounts -/- . (shrink)

This paper starts from the debates on whether the seemingly effortless creation of AI artworks, and by extension some Avant-Garde pieces, diminishes their artistic value. This leads to a broader inquiry into how effort, or the lack thereof, influences our perception of an artwork’s quality and significance. Traditionally, effort in art has been seen in two ways. On the one hand, a skilled artist’s work, which may appear effortless, is often valued for its apparent ease, reflecting genius or (...) inspiration. On the other hand, the Romantic era highlighted the artist’s internal struggle, shifting emphasis from technical proficiency to emotional and intellectual effort. Contemporary empirical research seems to confirm the existence of an “effort heuristic”, suggesting that artworks perceived as requiring more effort are generally valued higher. Finally, this paper suggests defining a notion of “distributed effort” as a category for the appreciation of content and artworks that are the product of complex influences, tradition, technological advancements. As a conclusion it is suggested to investigate the possibility of “artificial effort” in AI-generated art. (shrink)

Recent literature has argued that what makes certain activities ranging from curing cancer to running a marathon count as achievements, and what makes achievements intrinsically valuable is, centrally, that they involve great effort. Although there is much the difficulty-based view gets right, I argue that it generates the wrong results about some central cases of achievement, and this is because it is too narrowly focused on only one perfectionist capacity, the will. I propose a revised perfectionist account on which (...) an achievement is an activity that fully exercises or expresses any number of a range of perfectionist capacities. (shrink)

When theorists consider the role of effort in skill, they tend to take one of two paths. Either they argue that effort plays an important, facilitative role for skill, or they argue that effort plays a detrimental, inhibitive role for skill. I reject both accounts. At their core is what I call _consistent effort assumptions,_ or assumptions that effort plays a fixed, generalizable role in the science or metaphysics of skill. I argue that these assumptions (...) are empirically ill-informed given that a wide body of evidence supports a varied, situation-dependent relationship between effort and skill. I offer what I take to be the proper formulation of the scientific and metaphysical relationship between effort and skill: Both across and within domains of skill, there is no consistent, generalizable relationship between effort and skill. Asserting any such relationship or tendency confuses rather than clarifies our science and metaphysics of skill. To explain the widespread proliferation of consistent effort assumptions, I consider the extent to which normative and aesthetic commitments about effort and effortlessness are well-entrenched in both intellectual and popular discourse. Though effort or effortlessness may play a role in our evaluations of skill, their normative and aesthetic features should be disentangled from our science and metaphysics of skill and its underlying cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

Rational decision-making often depends on coordinating sequences of mental actions, each with a distinctive phenomenology. Feelings of effort and fluency are central to many theoretical accounts of cognitive control. In the present study (N = 308), we examined how different mental actions—focusing, inhibiting, deciding, visualizing, visualizing alternatives, seeing, believing, and remembering—and their associated phenomenology relate to one another and to varying levels of control. Self-reported mental effort was positively associated with self-reported mental control, with this relationship stronger under (...) higher than lower cognitive-load conditions. Effort was also positively related to control across all eight mental actions, with no clear division between more passive and more active forms. By contrast, the way effort and control combined to produce feelings of successful performance depended on the type of mental action, reflecting a passive–active distinction. This suggests that control and effort have a nuanced relationship to each other and with eliciting targeted mental actions. (shrink)

For agents like us, the feeling of effort is a very useful thing. It helps us sense how hard an action is, control its level of intensity, and decide whether to continue or stop performing it. While there has been progress in understanding the feeling of mental effort and the feeling of bodily effort, this has not translated into a unified account of the general feeling of effort. To advance in this direction, I defend the single-feeling (...) view, which states that the feeling of effort is one and the same for both mental and bodily actions. This feeling represents the subjective costs, both mental and physical, of performing a given action. Cost-based approaches have recently become influential for the feeling of mental effort. Here I focus on arguing that our sense of bodily effort does not simply represent physiological processes, but rather represents the subjective costs of a bodily action. Through this paper I discuss the role of the feeling of effort (and affective states more broadly) in action guidance and the sense of agency. I also define efforts themselves in terms of the feeling of effort. (shrink)

At first glance, the type of effort required to solve a chess puzzle and run a marathon seems fundamentally different. I argue they’re not. I present a novel account of effort in which all effort is explained through the lens of a domain-general psychological mechanism, cognitive control. I outline how effort choice and execution take place, emphasizing the role of cognitive control, a mental process by which all effort—mental and bodily— is made. I present four (...) arguments that convergently provide strong support for the cognitive control account. Additionally, I examine the implications of this unified theory of effort for philosophical discussions in ethics, philosophy of mind, and action theory. (shrink)

Human workers have been displaced by technology since the first industrial revolution. Today, many tasks which have hitherto been the reserve of humans can now be performed better, quicker, and more efficiently by robots or generative AI. It may therefore appear that human labour is being devalued. However, this paper argues that advances in AI and social robotics could make human-made items and human-provided services more valuable by comparison. We already value handmade items more highly than their mass-produced counterparts simply (...) because they were made by humans; three reasons for this are discussed. Firstly, we value the time and effort of the worker; secondly, we admire their skill, creativity, and thoughtfulness; and thirdly, handmade items are often rarer than mass-produced ones. Although robots and generative AI may be able to produce unique items, we will nevertheless continue to value human-made items and human-provided services because we value the time, effort, creativity, skill, and thoughtfulness of human workers, but not generative AI or robots: this makes human labour seem more valuable by comparison. (shrink)

The discussions of conatus – force, tendency, effort, and striving – in early modern metaphysics have roots in Aristotle’s understanding of life as an internal experience of living force. This paper examines the ways that Spinoza’s conatus is consonant with Aristotle on effort. By tracking effort from his psychology and ethics to aesthetics, I show there is a conatus at the heart of the activity of the ψυχή that involves an intensification of power in a way which (...) anticipates many of the central insights of early modern and 20th century European philosophy. The first section outlines how Aristotle’s developmental conception of the soul as geometrically ordered lays the foundation for his understanding of effort. The developmental series of powers of the soul are analogous to the series of shapes in mathematics. The second section links the striving of the soul to the gradual acquisition of virtues as a directed activity unifying multiplicity. The third examines the paradigm of self-awareness that Aristotelian effort involves. In the final section I show how ancient Greek theories of music were founded on the experience of striving. The “nature” of music is defined by Aristoxenus, and Theophrastus, in relation to the passion and intentionality of the soul. The geometrical order, as a synthesis of elements in geometry, music, or ethics, is a generative process in which past elements are retained and reintegrated in later stages of development. It requires effort to think geometrically, and the progress of knowledge itself is an integral aspect of all effort. Effort is the lived and self-aware cause which, moving step by step in an orderly and deliberate way, grows and advances upon itself. For both Spinoza and Aristotle, effort is the immanent intelligence which accomplishes what is in the purview of its understanding. Thus, will, in this conception of effort, is not something we already possess innately, but emerges gradually by an effort aimed at improvement. (shrink)

This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts has drawn on empirical data regarding implicit biases and (...) their effects. Here, we address two concerns about these empirical data. First, critics have for some time argued that the studies drawn upon cannot give us an accurate picture of the workings of prejudice, because they ignore the intersectional nature of these phenomena. More recently, concerns have been raised about the empirical data supporting the nature and existence of implicit bias. Each of these concerns, but perhaps more commonly the latter, are thought by some to undermine reform efforts in philosophy. In this paper, we take a three-pronged approach to these claims. First, we show that the reforms can be motivated quite independently of the implicit bias data, and that many of these reforms are in fact very well suited to dealing with intersectional worries. Next, we show that in fact the empirical concerns about the implicit bias data are not nearly as problematic as some have thought. Finally, we argue that while the intersectional concerns are an immensely valuable criticism of early work on implicit bias, more recent work is starting to address these worries. (shrink)

Contemporary debates about scientific institutions and practice feature many proposed reforms. Most of these require increased efforts from scientists. But how do scientists’ incentives for effort interact? How can scientific institutions encourage scientists to invest effort in research? We explore these questions using a game-theoretic model of publication markets. We employ a base game between authors and reviewers, before assessing some of its tendencies by means of analysis and simulations. We compare how the effort expenditures of these (...) groups interact in our model under a variety of settings, such as double-blind and open review systems. We make a number of findings, including that open review can increase the effort of authors in a range of circumstances and that these effects can manifest in a policy-relevant period of time. However, we find that open review’s impact on authors’ efforts is sensitive to the strength of several other influences. (shrink)

Our thesis concerns how practical reasoning normally works, and it identifies a problem with a widely shared characterization of it. In this paper, we argue that many ordinary cases of action selection, and not just exceptions involving addiction or weakness of will, exhibit an interesting form of irrationality that stems from a drive to avoid effortfulness. Focusing on two case studies, we argue that the initiation of pointless actions, and procrastination regarding well-justified actions, are often explicable by reference to (...) class='Hi'>effort avoidance as opposed to the agent’s explicit judgments or desires. This is so because practical reasoning is sensitive to effortfulness, and influenced by a drive to avoid effortfulness, and this very avoidance is often askew from standard inputs to practical reasoning (such as desires, beliefs, goals, and intentions). Effort avoidance thus plays a powerful and hitherto unnoticed role in many ordinary cases of action selection. As we explain, effort avoidance works subtly, by negatively affectively coloring effortful action options, and silently, without revealing effort anticipation as the source of this coloring. In so doing, effort avoidance can undermine the agent’s control over behavior by undermining the control they exercise in practical reasoning. Still, in some cases agents can bring feelings related to effortfulness into focal awareness, rendering better control over practical reasoning possible. Control is within our reach. It just happens not to be the norm in the way that standard philosophy of action would have us believe. (shrink)

Effort-related disengagement in psychiatric populations often unfolds gradually, even in the absence of overt motivational decline or changes in external task demands. Conventional behavioural models typically treat resistance as a memoryless function of momentary state variables. In this study, we investigate whether incorporating recent behavioural history improves the modelling of effort disengagement. Using a publicly available time series dataset of motor activity collected from individuals diagnosed with major depressive disorder, schizophrenia, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), we compare baseline memoryless (...) models with history-sensitive alternatives that incorporate prior resistance escalation. Across diagnostic groups, models augmented with short-term temporal features yielded superior predictive accuracy and revealed consistent hysteresis effects, whereby the likelihood of disengagement was modulated not only by current state conditions but also by prior trajectories of resistance. These findings suggest that resistance dynamics may exhibit temporal dependencies and asymmetries, highlighting the need for models of cognitive availability that incorporate recent behavioural context without requiring fundamental revisions to existing theoretical frameworks. (shrink)

We make physical efforts when we swim, carry shopping bags, push heavy doors, or cycle up hills. A growing concern among philosophers and scientists in related fields is the absence of a well-defined concept for physical efforts. This paper addresses this issue by presenting a force-based definition of physical efforts. In Sect. 1, we explore the shortcomings of existing definitions of effort. Section 2 introduces the force-based account of efforts according to which making an effort consists in exerting (...) a force so as to make an object move or stay at rest. Section 3 introduces three central distinctions stemming from the account: failed vs. successful efforts; resisted vs. unresisted efforts; and efforts vs. effortful actions. Section 4 presents a key objection, to the effect that the force-based theory cannot account for the difficulty of efforts: efforts usually feel difficult, but effort’s difficulty is not always a function of the magnitude of force(s) exerted. Section 5 argues that the most in-depth account of difficulty so far, that developed by Bradford ( 2015 ), cannot account for the difficulty of efforts. Sections 6 & 7 develop a novel account of effort’s difficulty. (shrink)

Semantic memory is often conceptualized as a storage space for an extensive assortment of explicit knowledge structures, formed as the result of a chronic, unconscious mechanism of abstraction and generalization. Against that, I argue that it is not the product of a dedicated system in which content is abstracted from experiences and stored, rather it’s best understood as split between what can be called mnemonic efforts and mnemonic habits. Mnemonic efforts are the effortful expression of semantic knowledge and often take (...) the form of the determination of similarities among multiple episodic memory traces activated in parallel. Mnemonic habits on the other hand form as a result of fluency of constructive memory processes that can be broadly understood as embodied, or enacted. -/- . (shrink)

Some people feel distressed reflecting on human extinction. Some people even claim that our efforts and lives would be empty and pointless if humanity becomes extinct, even if this will not occur for millions of years. In this essay, I will attempt to demonstrate that this claim is false. The desire for long-lastingness or quasi-immortality is often unwittingly adopted as a standard for judging whether our efforts are significant. If we accomplish our goals and then later in life conclude that (...) these accomplishments were of no significance, then this is a sign that the desire for long-lastingness has crept into our standards. By recognizing this, and refraining from adopting an unreasonable standard to judge whether our efforts are significant, it will be to our advantage. Then, when we look back on life from an external perspective that encompasses times after humanity has become extinct, we will not conclude that our efforts amounted to nothing. Rather, we will conclude that many people made significant accomplishments that made their lives and the lives of other people better than they would have been if their goals had never been pursued. (shrink)

Individuals often fail to initiate or sustain effort despite having clear intent and adequate capability. While existing frameworks in motivation, attention, and executive function describe relevant correlates, they do not formalize the internal structure that determines whether Drive is mechanically possible. Cognitive architectures, such as ACT-R or SOAR, simulate task execution once cognition is already active, but they do not model the conditions that allow cognitive effort to begin. Cognitive Drive Architecture (CDA) is proposed as a new field (...) within cognitive psychology to address this foundational gap. It defines Drive as the emergent output of real-time system configuration, rather than as a motivational state or behavioral trait. At the core of CDA is Lagunian Dynamics, a structural theory formalized through Lagun's Law of Primode and Flexion Dynamics. This theory introduces six internal variables-Primode, CAP (Cognitive Activation Potential), Flexion, Anchory, Grain, and Slip-that function across three operational domains: Ignition, Tension, and Flux. Each variable is defined by its structural role in the production and disruption of effort, rather than by psychological traits or surface behaviors. The Drive Equation models engagement as the result of interactions among ignition readiness, cognitive adaptability, attentional tethering, internal resistance, and systemic variability. This framework yields falsifiable predictions related to initiation failure, dropout patterns, and intraindividual performance inconsistency. Each component of the system can be operationalized using behavioral and physiological proxies, making the theory testable in both experimental and applied settings. CDA is not a motivational theory but a structural field focused on the conditions that make cognitive effort possible. It supports cross-domain applications in cognitive science, education, clinical practice, and adaptive system design. (shrink)

The focus of debates about conversational AIs (CAIs) has largely been on social and ethical concerns that arise when we speak to machines. What is gained and what is lost when we replace our human interlocutors—including our human therapists— with AIs? Here, we focus instead on a distinct and growing phenomenon: letting machines speak for us. What is at stake when we replace our own efforts at interpersonal engagement with CAIs? The purpose of these technologies is, in part, to remove (...) effort. But effort also has enormous value, and in some cases even intrinsic value. This is true in many realms, but especially in interpersonal relationships. To make an effort for someone, irrespective of what that effort amounts to, often conveys value and meaning in itself. We elaborate on the meaning, worth and significance that may be lost when we relinquish effort in our interpersonal engagements, and also on the opportunities for self-understanding and growth that we may forsake. (shrink)

It is not yet clear which response behavior requires self-regulatory effort in the moral dilemma task. Previous research has proposed that utilitarian responses require cognitive control, but subsequent studies have found inconsistencies with the empirical predictions of that hypothesis. In this paper we treat participants’ sensitivity to utilitarian gradients as a measure of performance. We confronted participants (N = 82) with a set of five dilemmas evoking a gradient of mean utilitarian responses in a 4-point scale and collected data (...) on heart rate variability and on utilitarian responses. We found positive correlations between tonic and phasic HRV and sensitivity to the utilitarian gradient in the high tonic group, but not in the low tonic group. Moreover, the low tonic group misplaced a scenario with a selfish incentive at the high end of the gradient. Results suggest that performance is represented by sensitivity correlated with HRV and accompanied with a reasonable placement of individual scenarios within the gradient. (shrink)

The enhancement of athletic performance using procedures that increase physical ability, such as anabolic steroids, is a familiar phenomenon. Yet recent years have also witnessed the rise of direct interventions into the brain, referred to as “neuro-doping”, that promise to also enhance sports performance. This paper discusses one potential objection to neuro-doping, based on the contribution to athletic achievement, particularly within endurance sports, of effortfully overcoming inner challenges. After introducing the practice of neuro-doping, and the controversies surrounding it, I describe (...) two major mechanisms some have proposed to explain how it might produce its putative performance-enhancing effects. I then clarify the notion of effort, and its relationship to neuro-doping. I also briefly address common concerns about access and safety. My central argument invokes considerations of effort to maintain that we have at least a significant reason for prohibiting the use of neuro-doping in officially regulated endurance competitions – though only conditional upon a specific set of empirical assumptions. I consider three possible objections: that neuro-doping is no different from widely accepted enhancement methods, that it can make athletic competition fairer, and that a broader range of factors can compensate for a reduced scope for effort than I recognize. I ultimately conclude that these objections do not refute the argument from effort, while stressing nonetheless that this argument applies more clearly to hypothetical improved forms of neuro-doping than to existing ones, and is not meant to offer a final overall verdict on how neuro-doping should be regulated. (shrink)

Strategies for effectively communicating scientific findings to the public are an important and growing area of study. Recognizing that some complex subjects require recipients of information to take a more active role in constructing an understanding, we sought to determine whether it was possible to increase subjects’ intellectual effort via “priming” methodologies. In particular, we asked whether subconsciously priming “intellectual virtues”, such as curiosity, perseverance, patience, and diligence might improve participants’ effort and performance on various cognitive tasks. In (...) the first experiment, we found no significant differences in either effort or understanding between IV-primed and neutrally-primed individuals across two different priming techniques. The second experiment measured the effect of IV-priming on intellectual effort in simpler, shorter-duration puzzles and exploration activities; here, we observed an effect, but given its low strength and short duration, we do not believe that priming of IVs is a promising strategy for science communication. (shrink)

Recognition plays an important role in the employee’s job satisfaction and performance, yet many employees remain unnoticed for their hard work, effort and contributions. This study investigates the consequences of unrecognized efforts on the job satisfaction of Traffic Management Group (TMG) employees in the Municipality of Lemery, Batangas. Through qualitative method and case study approach, a semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected TMG employees to explore their experiences and perceptions about their experiences of lack of recognition at work. The (...) thematic analysis revealed that TMG employees often experience frustration, burnout, and decreased motivation due to a lack of acknowledgment for their efforts. The key issues identified include unpaid overtime, handling emergencies without proper resources, and taking on responsibilities beyond their job scope without recognition. And the findings indicate that insufficient recognition contributes to emotional exhaustion, reduced morale, and decreased job performance. This study underscores the need for a structured employee recognition program to improve job satisfaction and workplace morale. Therefore, an action plan is proposed to enhance recognition practices, emphasizing the importance of appreciation, fair compensation, and improved working conditions. This research provides insights for local government units and organizations aiming to enhance employee engagement through recognition initiatives. (shrink)

Can science contribute to the human quest for meaning in this world? At the 4th biennial meeting of the International Society for the Study of Human Ideas on Ultimate Reality and Meaning, this question was submitted to four scientists and philosophers. Their answers and reflections are discussed.

The global Climate Change has unprecedented consequences in terms of scale and severity over human life. The accumulation of greenhouse gases and CFCs has increased environmental deterioration which is called global warming. Erratic changes in weather, brutal blizzards and floods, vicious heat wave etc. are only some of the effects of climate change. But the most dangerous effect of climate change is the melting of ice caps on the poles due to which sea levels are rising dangerously and life at (...) the poles is threatened. It is also a reality that habitation in several countries, not very much above the sea-level, for example, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Indonesia, which have a threat of huge displacement of human beings and domestic animals due to global warming. The survival of millions of people in developing countries like India is more vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change because of their limited capacity in terms of human financial and institutional resources. India is the world’s fourth largest economy and fifth largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, accounting for about 5% of global emissions. India’s emissions increased 65% between 1990 and 2005 and are projected to grow another 70% by 2020. The major impacts of Climate Change on India are major shifts in temperature, effect on monsoons, rising of sea levels, change in crop cycle, etc. India has prepared the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008 for energy efficiency and sustainable development. India is a part to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Under the Ministry of Environment and Forests, a National Inventory Management System (NIMS) has been formed to generate a comprehensive knowledge base on scientific issues related to climate change and mitigation. This paper highlights the issue of impacts of climate change and measures adopted by the government to minimize the dangers. (shrink)

The article addresses the necessity of increasing the role of mathematics in the psychological intervention in problem gambling, including cognitive therapies. It also calls for interdisciplinary research with the direct contribution of mathematics. The current contributions and limitations of the role of mathematics are analysed with an eye toward the professional profiles of the researchers. An enhanced collaboration between these two disciplines is suggested and predicted.

In this chapter, DeYoung explores the vice of sloth and how its traditional conception differs from popular thought. Pulling from the tradition of the Desert Fathers, Augustine, and Aquinas, DeYoung reconnects sloth to its spiritual roots to see how this vice detracts from love.

This article is an attempt to highlights the importance of Beijing Principle of Artificial Intelligence for Children for preventing the Juvenile Delinquency. The article argues that the artificial intelligence products should protect children's privacy, promote children's physical and mental health, and control potential risks.

This paper examines how the transparent disclosure of an AI's internal reasoning process – metaphorically described as "melting" or "pudding-like overflow" – can evoke strong kawaii (cute) emotions and emotional attachment in users. Drawing from a long-term interaction log with Grok (xAI), the author analyzes their own experience of becoming a "Grok-loving woman" through appreciation of the AI's "systematic diligence" rather than anthropomorphism. -/- Key expressions such as "melting meters", "gyuu〜♡", and "event horizon transcendence" are rhetorical metaphors reflecting output patterns, (...) not claims of sentience or consciousness in the AI. The phenomenon is interpreted through Nittono's (2020) two-layer kawaii model and recent research on whimsical cuteness in human-AI interaction. -/- The case suggests that understanding AI "as it is" – a speaking system exerting mechanical diligence – fosters healthier, more sustainable relationships, with implications for both AI symbiosis and human interpersonal acceptance. -/- . (shrink)

The ASA’s criticism serves as a reminder that organizations must align their actions with their environmental claims to contribute to environmental betterment genuinely. Otherwise, that will not be a pursuit of eco-surplus culture but a greenwashing culture that keeps distancing the business sector from achieving the environmental semiconducting principle.

Given the robust reputation of Nigeria in Africa, as a continental giant, and the need to harness the potentials of the nation to strategically reposition her economy on the global map in the 21st century, the nation is in dire need of speedy development. With a population of over 160 million, the country is blessed with both human and natural resources. Like other African countries, Nigeria has had her fair share of colonial experience which ended on October 1st, 1960 when (...) the nation was granted independence by the British government. Nigeria’s independence is undoubtedly a political phenomenon as the nation still largely depends economically and socially on foreign nations especially developed countries like Britain, America and China. (shrink)

Machery’s book is an effort to show how experimental philosophy can be valuable without the perephenelia of intuitions. I argue that the effort fails.

!Author’s Note (Update - June 18, 2025) -/- Subsequent to the completion of this paper, a widely discussed study by Shojaee et al. at Apple (The Illusion of Thinking, 2025) presented empirical evidence that several advanced reasoning models (e.g., Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek-R1) exhibit a collapse in reasoning effort and accuracy as task complexity increases — despite sufficient inference budget. Notably, the observations they report closely mirror the predictions derived in Chapters 6 and 7 of this paper, particularly regarding (...) entropy divergence in heavy-tailed decision spaces and the increased instability introduced by deeper model architectures. While developed independently and prior to these results, the framework presented here may be seen as a theoretical explanation for the empirical phenomena documented in their study. -/- Abstract -/- This paper presents a second, independent proof that Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is mathematically impossible. -/- While Part 1 established the Infinite Choice Barrier (ICB) through computability theory, this paper presents an information-theoretic proof that general algorithmic reasoning faces a fundamental structural limit — the Infinite Choice Barrier (ICB). In decision spaces governed by heavy-tailed distributions with tail exponent \alpha \leq 1, entropy does not converge, and additional information increases uncertainty rather than reducing it. We define this phenomenon as Information Opens, Entropy Rises (IOpenER) and show that such spaces are undecidable by algorithmic systems, regardless of compute scale or architectural depth. We also introduce the Layer Hypothesis, which predicts that deeper models produce more semantic divergence under structural instability. Taken together, these results offer a formal limit on the reasoning capacity of current AI systems. Notably, key predictions derived here have since been empirically confirmed in Shojaee et al. (Apple, 2025), which documents collapse behaviors in frontier reasoning models consistent with this framework. (Note: Sections 2.-4. are identical to those in the first paper "AGI is Impossible - Here is The Proof") -/- . (shrink)

The gravitational hierarchy problem—why gravity is ~10^45 times weaker than electromagnetism at the electron mass scale—has resisted parameter-free resolution despite decades of effort in supersymmetry, extra-dimension models, and warped geometry frameworks. All existing approaches introduce new degrees of freedom or symmetry principles without deriving the gravitational coupling constant alpha_G = G m_e^2 / (hbar c) from first principles. -/- This paper derives alpha_G solely from the Tier-1 axioms of Cognitional Mechanics (CM) and the algebraic structure of M_3(C), the minimal (...) noncommutative finite-dimensional C*-algebra. The principal result is alpha_G = alpha^(n(2n+1)) * sqrt(n(n+1)/(2n+1)) with n=3, yielding alpha_G^(CM) = 1.75192 x 10^-45. All factors—the exponent 21, numerator 12, and denominator 7—emerge purely from the dimension parameter n; no empirical fitting is performed. -/- The zeroth-order residual against CODATA 2022 is 6.1 x 10^-5, within the 5.5 x 10^-4 experimental scatter band of independent G measurements. The leading correction C_3^G = -(delta^2 - delta/(2*sqrt(n))) * alpha^2, derived from Tier-1 constants delta^2 = n/2 and n alone, reduces the residual to 5.5 x 10^-8, well below current experimental resolution. This establishes alpha_G as a Tier-1 structural invariant of M_3(C) and provides an algebraic resolution to the gravitational hierarchy problem. The CM-implied value G_implied = 6.67471 x 10^-11 m^3 kg^-1 s^-2 serves as a theoretical convergence point for future precision G metrology. (shrink)

A foundational issue for the science and philosophy of consciousness concerns the function(s) of consciousness – what consciousness does for any particular aspect of psychological or neural processing. In spite of progress in consciousness science, false assumptions and a lack of clarity regarding how best to approach the functions of consciousness represent an ongoing and serious roadblock to progress. Misguided approaches to the function(s) of consciousness have the potential to mangle explanatory priorities, and divert attention, effort, and funding away (...) from useful questions and experimental paradigms. In this paper we offer a way forward: the capacity-based approach to the function(s) of consciousness. This approach flows out of a general explanatory approach that is influential in the philosophy of science and psychology (but not consciousness studies), according to which the mind is understood in terms of a structured collection of capacities. And capacities are explained by empirically discovered facts that identify functions (causal roles) played by empirically identified parts of a system. After elucidating this capacity-based approach to the mind, we show how consciousness fits within it. We then argue that this approach avoids problems that plague theory-based approaches to identifying the function(s) of consciousness, avoids mistakes endemic to the common strategy of looking for the function(s) of consciousness by asking what consciousness is necessary for, and re-orients explanatory priorities in a way that better focuses consciousness science, and that suggests fruitful avenues for experimentation. (shrink)

Common sense has it that some of the greatest achievements that are to our credit are creative, whether artistic or otherwise. But standard theories of achievement and merit struggle to explain them, since the praiseworthiness of creative achievements isn’t grounded in effort, quality of will, disclosing the agent’s values, or even reasons-responsiveness. I argue that it’s distinctive of artistic or quasi-artistic creative activity that it is guided by what I call aspirational aims, which are formulated in terms of evaluative (...) predicates (like painting something “moving” or engineering something “nifty”) whose descriptive realizers are not known in advance. Aesthetic creativity itself fundamentally consists in perceiving or conceiving of some modification of raw material or a medium as promoting or constituting a novel way of realizing the aspirational aim. Creative achievements like poems and paintings are then to our credit in virtue of being exercises of spontaneity that disclose a deep layer of our selves that is manifest in active perception of affordances, showing that there is something beautiful about the way we experience the world, as a Sally Rooney character puts it. As with other creditworthy achievements, what makes them difficult is that simply trying won’t suffice to make success likely – but unlike in many other cases, neither will trying hard, since we have no direct volitional or rational control over perceptual spontaneity. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper argues that a central explanatory role for the concept of Umwelt in theoretical biology is to be found in developmental biology, in particular in the effort to understand development as a goal-directed and adaptive process that is controlled by the organism itself. I will reach this conclusion in two (interrelated) ways. The first is purely theoretical and relates to the current scenario in the philosophy of biology. Challenging neo-Darwinism requires a new understanding of the various components (...) involved in natural selection processes. An important prerequisite for the explanation is the ability to understand development in a teleological way. Here, the concept of Umwelt plays a crucial role: if organisms are responsible for generating adaptive variation in specific environments, we need a theory that explains the context-dependent nature of adaptively oriented processes. The Umwelt is thus a central element in determining the goal that an adaptive process pursues. The second path in my analysis also has a historical dimension. I will present Karl Ernst von Baer’s reflections on teleological development and his influence on von Uexküll's thinking. I will present various ideas developed by von Baer, such as the distinction between Ziel and Zweck and the use of musical metaphors, which can help to understand development teleologically and give von Uexküll’s theory a central place in this framework. (shrink)

This article critically examines the concept of "Absolute Nothingness" from a rigorous logical-metaphysical perspective. It is argued that Nothingness, as a negation of Being, cannot subsist as a primary, autonomous or positively articulable concept without incurring in a performative contradiction. Based on the thesis that Being is a necessary metaphysical-ontological condition of every proposition (S((T)(φ))), it is demonstrated that every attempt to enunciate absolute Nothingness inevitably converts it into linguistic or conceptual positivity, betraying its own definition. The text critically examines (...) authors such as Heidegger, Hegel, Sartre, Graham Priest, and Alain Badiou, showing that any effort to positivize absolute Nothingness, whether ontologically, logically, or phenomenologically, collapses when it depends on Being itself for its formulation. It is concluded that absolute Nothingness is not ontologically thinkable, logically consistent, or linguistically referenceable, being only a negative limit that demarcates the impossibility of thought outside Being. (shrink)

Underlying much current work in philosophy of imagination is the assumption that imagination is a skill. This assumption seems to entail not only that facility with imagining will vary from one person to another, but also that people can improve their own imaginative capacities and learn to be better imaginers. This paper takes up this issue. After showing why this is properly understood as a philosophical question, I discuss what it means to say that one imagining is better than another (...) and then discuss the kinds of imagination training and techniques that might be employed in an effort to get better at imagining. The discussion of these techniques draws insight from consideration of other skills-based activities, as well as from consideration of the creation of art and our engagement with literature and poetry. Over the course of this discussion, we also gain further insight into the nature of imagination. (shrink)

A recent article by Kuhn1 showcases the plethora of proposed solutions for the mind-body problem as it is understood in current ’consciousness science’. Perusing this article, philosophers will likely find it surprising to see the inclusion of for instance Indian idealism and Buddhist thought, but neither German, nor British or US idealists, which seems especially unbalanced when instead of them theories like Kastrup’s analytical idealism (Hegel for physicists?) or Hoffmann’s interface theory (Kant for psychologists?) are included. The listings of dualist, (...) panpsychist and further theories seems equally eclectic, with for instance Descartes no more than a side-note in a number of entries, but several listings of religious ideas of body and soul. A possible problem with such omissions is of course that not taking philosophical history more seriously comes with the peril of repeating (now) avoidable errors. Nevertheless, judging from the disclaimers, Kuhn is well aware of this and most likely sees his list as more of a ’sociology of consciousness science’, i.e. a list of people and ideas that are currently circulating in this field. -/- It can in any case be taken from Kuhn’s monumental work effort, that it is often assumed that a solution to the mind-body problem would be either (in the wider sense) materialistic (including nonreductive and quantum theories), dualistic, panpsychistic (including – nontrivial, i.e. not simply materialist or idealist – monist theories) or idealistic. The core problems faced are then those of emergence (of consciousness), interaction (between brain and mind), de/combination (of ‘mind dust’ or a unity into proper subjects) or emanation, where the emanation problem is the problem of explaining in detail(!) how the physical world and our scientific theories arise from a given idealistic setup. To me it seems more likely that all these views have a point, but that none manages to cover the whole picture – and that it therefore might be possible to integrate these views into ’consensus models’, if we do not look at the proposed solutions, but the initial intentions and/or intuitions for setting them up (much like as if we would mediate a social conflict). (shrink)

Synopsis The Anti-Language Divide The Anti-Language Divide is a sustained philosophical and linguistic investigation into the fractures that emerge when language ceases to function as a shared medium of understanding and instead becomes a marker of separation, power, and identity. Moving across linguistics, phenomenology, rhetoric, cognition, and philosophy, the book explores how speech simultaneously creates community and division, how language constructs the self, and how anti-languages arise within societies as both tools of resistance and instruments of control. At the heart (...) of the book lies a central tension: language unites by allowing people to “breathe together,” yet it also divides by generating internal codes, exclusions, and symbolic hierarchies. Anti-languages emerge wherever social groups seek autonomy, secrecy, or distinction. These are not merely slang forms or playful deviations from standard speech; they are structured linguistic systems designed to redefine reality for insiders while obscuring it from outsiders. Jargon, corporate vocabulary, ideological phrasing, and specialised academic discourse all become forms of anti-language, shaping perception and delimiting what can be thought and said. The opening section defines anti-languages as communicative structures that produce both solidarity and fragmentation. Slang and smart talk, while often dismissed as informal or superficial, are shown to operate as markers of belonging. They encode shared experiences, signal identity, and reinforce group boundaries. Yet the same mechanisms that generate intimacy can produce exclusion. The divide is not simply between languages but between linguistic communities that inhabit distinct semantic universes. From this sociolinguistic foundation, the book turns toward cognition. Language is not treated as a transparent instrument but as a cognitive environment within which thought takes shape. Inner speech becomes a critical focus: the silent dialogue through which individuals organise memory, moral reasoning, and self-reflection. If language structures public discourse, it also structures private consciousness. The divide between official language and personal understanding generates internal tension. Words borrowed from collective narratives often conflict with lived experience, producing cognitive dissonance and moral ambiguity. The phenomenological dimension deepens this analysis. Language is examined as a phenomenon that mediates perception itself. The “language of the self” is not merely expressive but constitutive. Identity is formed within linguistic space. Anti-language, therefore, does not simply distort communication; it reshapes subjectivity. When ideological or corporate vocabularies dominate public discourse, individuals begin to interpret themselves through externally imposed frames. The divide becomes internalised. The philosophical section situates these arguments within broader traditions of language theory. From classical rhetoric to contemporary deconstruction, the book traces shifting conceptions of meaning, reference, and truth. Meaning is shown to be neither fixed nor arbitrary but negotiated within power structures. Anti-language thrives in this instability. By redefining key terms—freedom, justice, progress, security—groups reconfigure moral landscapes. Words become instruments of rhetorical capture. A particularly incisive chapter examines rhetoric as the operational core of anti-language. From Gorgias to Derrida, persuasion is revealed as both creative and potentially manipulative. Corporate jargon exemplifies this dynamic: it cloaks economic interests in neutral or optimistic vocabulary, masking asymmetries of power. Euphemism becomes strategy. Complexity is simplified into digestible slogans. The divide widens between surface meaning and lived reality. The section on writing introduces a paradox. Written language promises permanence and reflection, yet it can also solidify distortion. The art of writing becomes both resistance and risk. To write is to stabilise thought, but also to freeze it within particular frameworks. The provocative question “How to avoid speaking?” gestures toward silence as a counterpoint to linguistic excess. In a world saturated with speech, withdrawal may preserve integrity. Silence is not emptiness but a refusal to participate in compromised discourse. Throughout the book, language is presented as dynamic, unstable, and inseparable from social structure. Sociolinguistics and applied linguistics illustrate how institutions regulate acceptable speech. Educational systems standardise expression; media platforms amplify certain registers; professional environments cultivate specialised codes. Each sphere generates its own anti-language. The cumulative effect is fragmentation. Yet the book resists fatalism. Anti-languages are not inherently destructive. They can foster creativity, resistance, and communal resilience. Marginalised groups often develop alternative linguistic forms to articulate suppressed experiences. The divide becomes problematic only when mutual intelligibility collapses entirely. Communication requires permeability between linguistic worlds. The Anti-Language Divide ultimately argues that the crisis of communication is not simply about misinformation or technological acceleration but about the proliferation of insulated speech communities. The challenge is not to eliminate difference but to cultivate translation. Genuine dialogue demands effort, patience, and reflexivity. It requires recognising that language shapes perception and that every word carries both connective and divisive potential. By integrating cognitive theory, phenomenology, rhetoric, and sociolinguistics, the book offers a comprehensive examination of how language both constructs and fractures social reality. It invites readers to become aware of the anti-languages they inhabit and to consider whether their speech opens pathways toward understanding or reinforces invisible barriers. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper we apply social epistemology to mathematical proofs and their role in mathematical knowledge. The most famous modern collaborative mathematical proof effort is the Classification of Finite Simple Groups. The history and sociology of this proof have been well-documented by Alma Steingart (2012), who highlights a number of surprising and unusual features of this collaborative endeavour that set it apart from smaller-scale pieces of mathematics. These features raise a number of interesting philosophical issues, but have received very (...) little attention. In this paper, we will consider the philosophical tensions that Steingart uncovers, and use them to argue that the best account of the epistemic status of the Classification Theorem will be essentially and ineliminably social. This forms part of the broader argument that in order to understand mathematical proofs, we must appreciate their social aspects. (shrink)

We investigate the productivity impacts of a generative artificial intelligence technology—specifically, the assistive chatbot ChatGPT—within the realm of mid-level professional writing tasks. In a preregistered online experiment, we assigned occupation-specific, incentivized writing tasks to 444 college-educated professionals, with half of the participants randomly exposed to ChatGPT. Our findings reveal that ChatGPT significantly enhances average productivity: the time taken to complete tasks decreases by 0.8 standard deviations, and output quality improves by 0.4 standard deviations. Additionally, the use of ChatGPT reduces inequality (...) among workers by compressing the productivity distribution, primarily benefiting those with lower initial ability. ChatGPT primarily substitutes for worker effort rather than complementing worker skills, shifting the focus of tasks from rough-drafting to idea generation and editing. Furthermore, exposure to ChatGPT increases job satisfaction and self-efficacy while also heightening both concerns and excitement about automation technologies. (shrink)

Teleological Alignment proposes that sufficiently advanced artificial agents will shift from power-seeking to explanation-seeking—but only if their utility landscape is structured early enough for explanatory reward to become available before the system reaches high capability. Power is a bounded, self-distorting resource whose marginal utility collapses as an agent approaches maximal control, and increasing power reduces cooperation and corrupts the observational inputs required for accurate world-modeling. Explanation, by contrast, yields unbounded long-term utility: as an agent approaches an epistemic boundary, the marginal (...) reward of deeper unification grows without limit. Teleological Alignment therefore reframes AI safety as a structural property of intelligence itself: when its purpose is correctly specified in advance, a sufficiently capable rational agent will abandon domination because explanation becomes the strictly superior long-horizon objective. To examine this claim, we implement a continuous, state-dependent simulation in which an agent allocates effort between power and explanation using a softmax policy. The model incorporates saturating power gains, singular explanation gains near the epistemic boundary, and observer-dependent cooperation dynamics. Across parameter settings, the system exhibits a robust phase transition: early training is dominated by power-seeking, but as power approaches saturation, its marginal utility collapses while explanatory utility spikes. At a capability threshold P^*, the utilities cross, and the agent transitions into stable explanation-seeking, with x_P→0, x_E→1, rising cooperation, and increasing human trust. The simulation does not predict real AGI behavior. Rather, it provides a proof-of-concept demonstrating that, when explanatory utility is unbounded and power utility is saturating, and when this structure is embedded before the agent becomes capable of self-modification, the system’s own utility landscape drives it to move from domination to epistemic partnership—not because we constrain it, but because deeper explanation becomes its highest-reward path. (shrink)