The Impossibility of Ontological Grasping: Reframing Possession, Harm, and Domination Through Processual Ethics

Abstract

This thesis presents a radical reconceptualization of fundamental ethical categories through the lens of ontological instability. Building upon recent developments in fluctuational ontology and process philosophy, I argue that the impossibility of ontological grasping—the fundamental inability to secure stable being—necessitates a complete reframing of our understanding of possession, harm, and domination. The central contribution of this work is the development of a novel theoretical framework called the Processual Ethics of Ontological Instability (PEOI), which demonstrates that traditional ethical concepts predicated on stable entities are not merely inadequate but conceptually incoherent given the processual nature of reality. The thesis proceeds through four main arguments: First, that ontological instability is not an epistemological limitation but a fundamental condition of being itself. Second, that this instability renders traditional concepts of possession, harm, and domination impossible in their conventional formulations. Third, that these concepts must be reframed in processual terms as temporary stewardship, disruption of becoming-patterns, and flow-capture respectively. Fourth, that this reframing opens new possibilities for ethical thinking that are more adequate to the dynamic nature of reality. Through rigorous philosophical analysis supported by mathematical modeling and empirical validation, this thesis establishes that the impossibility of ontological grasping is not a problem to be solved but the fundamental condition that makes ethical existence possible. The work introduces nine novel concepts including processual subjectivity, fluctuational normativity, and rhizomatic responsibility, while demonstrating their practical implications for contemporary ethical challenges.

Author's Profile

Kwan Hong Tan
Singapore University of Social Sciences

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2025-09-26

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