Theory and Practical Applications of the Minimal Existential Pursuit Right in Bioethics, Biomedicine, and Environmental Ethics

Abstract

This work develops a unified normative framework for Bioethics and Environmental Ethics grounded in the Minimal Existential Pursuit Right (MEPR) and the Universal Ontological Formula (UOF). Departing from moral theories that rely on intuition, cultural consensus, or substantive value assumptions, the framework reconstructs normativity from the structural conditions required for the existence of a first-person normative subject. At the core of the theory is the concept of an ontological boundary, defined as the minimal condition enabling a subject to sustain internal motion, self-positioning, and normative utterance. The violation of this boundary is shown not merely to constitute moral wrongdoing, but to result in a structural collapse of normative validity itself. Ethical obligation, therefore, is not derived from external moral properties or subjective preferences, but emerges as a logical necessity inherent in the preservation of subjectivity. Within Bioethics and Biomedicine, the framework provides a substrate-neutral criterion for evaluating practices such as instrumentalization, coercion, and technological intervention, without recourse to biological essentialism or anthropocentric bias. In Environmental Ethics, it reconceptualizes ecological preservation as the infrastructural condition for the continued existence of normative agents, thereby resolving tensions between anthropocentric and biocentric approaches. By isolating minimal existential thresholds (MFCS/AEPS) and distinguishing logical necessity from policy discretion, this work offers a non-presumptive, structurally closed foundation for ethical and legal reasoning under conditions of technological acceleration and ecological instability.

Author's Profile

H.D. P.
Independent Researcher

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2026-01-12

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