Sacred and mystical visions across contemplative, religious and psychedelic traditions follow a remarkably consistent inner progression: from simple points of light and geometric forms to complex kaleidoscopic structures, culminating in radiant, formless luminosity. This paper proposes a unified neurophenomenological model showing that this universal sequence is not culturally constructed but arises from intrinsic visual dynamics of the human nervous system. We present a six-phase taxonomy of phosphenes as the innate visual grammar underlying mystical experience. As endogenous visual patterns intensify (Phases (...) 3–6), salience, interoceptive and autonomic systems co-activate, producing the emotion of awe, while Default Mode Network attenuation reduces conceptual control, allowing the luminous field to become experientially dominant. Archetypal figures and sacred agencies emerge as interpretations of luminous structure via innate social-cognitive operators, not as externally imposed metaphysical entities. On this basis, we introduce a novel 21st-century functional definition of God: ‘God is the lawful, awe-evoking configuration of consciousness in which endogenous inner-light dynamics and large-scale network reorganization render the luminous ground of awareness experientially present.’ Rather than a separate being, the divine appears as a self-revealing event of luminous awareness, a neurophenomenological mode of mind in which perception, meaning and emotion converge. This framework generates testable predictions (e.g. geometry precedes symbol, awe covaries with autonomic markers) and offers a biologically grounded yet non-reductive account of why luminous visions and feelings of transcendence appear universally across human history. (shrink)

For various reasons, traditional theism has dominated philosophical discussions of religion in the west, but things are starting to change. Some today are advocating a focus on alternative detailed conceptions of the Divine. Others, such as John Hick, say we need an understanding of God that takes us entirely beyond detailed conceptions. This chapter argues that the first approach does not go far enough and that the second goes too far. The mediating position it defends would have us focus instead (...) on a claim the author calls _ultimism_, which is much more general than theism and other detailed religious claims though entailed by them and not without significant content of its own. The chapter brings to bear both scientific and religious considerations in a defense of this alternative approach. (shrink)

Michael J. Almeida presents a bold new defence of the existence of God. He argues that entrenched principles in philosophical theology which have served as basic assumptions in apriori, atheological arguments are in fact philosophical dogmas. Almeida argues that not only are such principles false - they are necessarily false.

God is thought to be eternal. Does this mean that he is timeless? Or is he, rather, omnitemporal? In this paper we want to show that God cannot be omnitemporal. Our starting point, which we take from Bernard Williams’ article on the Makropulos Case, is the intuition that it is inappropriate for persons not to become bored after a sufficiently long sequence of time has passed. If God were omnitemporal, he would suffer from boredom. But God is the greatest possible (...) being and therefore cannot be bored. God, hence, is not omnitemporal. After the presentation of our argument, we address several objections by examining possible differences between human and divine persons. (shrink)

Part of the Elements Philosophy of Religion series, this short book focuses on the spiritual dimensions of life’s meaning as they have been discussed in the recent English and mainly analytic philosophical literature. The overarching philosophical question that this literature has addressed is about the extent to which, and respects in which, spiritual realities such as God or a soul would confer meaning on our lives. There have been four broad answers to the question, namely: God or a soul is (...) necessary for meaning in our lives; they are not necessary for it; one or both would enhance the meaning in our lives; and they would detract from it. These views have been largely advanced in chronological order through the history of Western philosophy, with the view that life would be meaningless without God and a soul having been most prominent in the medieval period, the rejection of this claim having arisen in the modern era, and then sophisticated positions about enhancement or reduction having appeared in earnest only in the past 20 years. This book addresses all four positions, paying particular attention to the more recent views. Beyond familiarizing readers with these positions, it presents prima facie objections to them, points out gaps in research agendas, and suggests argumentative strategies that merit development. (shrink)

Cutting God in Half argues that, in order to tackle climate change, world poverty, extinction of species and our other global problems rather better than we are doing at present we need to bring about a revolution in science, and in academia more generally. We need to put our problems of living – personal, social, global – at the heart of the academic enterprise. How our human world, imbued with meaning and value, can exist and best flourish embedded in the (...) physical universe is, the book argues, our basic problem. It is our fundamental philosophical problem, our fundamental problem of knowledge and understanding, and our fundamental practical problem of living. It is this problem that we fail, at present, to recognize as fundamental – to our cost. It can be understood to arise as a result of cutting God in half – severing the God of Cosmic Power from the God of Value. The first is Einstein’s God, the underlying unity in the physical universe that determines how events occur. The second is what is of most value associated with human life – and sentient life more generally. Having cut God in half in this way, the problem then becomes to see how the two halves can be put together again. This book tackles outstanding aspects of this problem, and in doing so throws out original ideas about science, education, religion, evolutionary theory, free will, quantum theory, and how we should go about tackling our impending global crises. It transpires that bringing our basic problem into sharp focus has revolutionary implications. It becomes clear how and why many aspects of our social and cultural world urgently need to be transformed. Cutting God in Half is written in a lively, accessible style, and ought to be essential reading for anyone concerned about ultimate questions – the nature of the universe, the meaning of life, the future of humanity. (shrink)

The paper reaches two main conclusions: Firstly, even if there are one or more possible worlds than which there are none better, God cannot actualise any of them. Secondly, if there are possible worlds which God can actualise, and than which God can actualise none better, then God must actualise one of them. The paper is neutral between compatibilist and libertarian views of creaturely freedom. The paper's main ideas have been used, with modifications, in my book "God, the Best, and (...) Evil" (OUP 2008). (shrink)

A question that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion is how God would be able to effect a rational choice between two worlds of unsurpassable goodness. To answer this question, I draw a parallel with the paradigm cases of indifferent choice, including Buridan's ass, and argue that such cases can be satisfactorily resolved provided that the protagonists employ what Otto Neurath calls an ‘auxiliary motive’. I supply rational grounds for the employment of such a motive, and then argue (...) against the views of Leibniz and Nicholas Rescher to show that this solution would also work for God. (shrink)

If God necessarily exists this has some interesting consequences. In this little note I mention some of these.

This article examines the psychological and structural role of God in human consciousness. It argues that belief in a supreme authority is not merely theological but cognitively embedded from birth through culture, language, and moral conditioning. This embeddedness makes it difficult for humans to imagine the universe without a central governing principle. The essay critiques anthropocentrism, challenges the notion of human supremacy, and reframes life as a distributed field of adaptive expressions rather than a hierarchical order. It concludes by suggesting (...) that the real philosophical task is not simply rejecting God, but dismantling the deeper structure of centrality that governs human thought. (shrink)

Reality, as encountered in conscious experience, is constituted through networks of symbolic relations within the transcendental horizon of consciousness—and within this architecture, the concepts of God, prophethood, and revelation occupy determinate structural positions that neither metaphysical realism nor reductive naturalism has succeeded in specifying. -/- Grounded in Symbolic Monism and Resonance Density (RD) theory, a post-ontological framework is developed in which God is reconstructed not as an entity external to the symbolic network but as its limiting condition: the Maximal Integrative (...) Horizon toward which the global network of meaning asymptotically tends. -/- Revelation is a symbolic structure exhibiting exceptional, historically durable RD across multiple incommensurable domains simultaneously—ethical, metaphysical, legal, aesthetic, cosmological, existential—generating interpretive traditions that persist and expand as the background network grows. -/- Prophethood is the emergence of a rare high-integration cognitive node satisfying three jointly sufficient structural conditions: cross-domain triangulation, topology-transforming transmission, and irreversibility. -/- The reconstruction (i) provides an independent philosophical account of the structural properties that distinguish revelatory texts from other influential symbolic productions; (ii) locates religious phenomena within a unified epistemological architecture shared by science, aesthetics, and ethics; and (iii) remains neutral between theological and naturalistic interpretations while offering determinate structural predictions that both must satisfy. -/- Two independent corroborations converge on the framework. First, Friston’s Free Energy Principle is mathematically compatible with a non-realist reading: its variational free energy functional, Markov blanket formalism, and active inference framework are each definable solely within the topology of the symbolic network. Second, scientific aesthetic judgment is pre-formal syntactic detection of low coherence cost, confirmed by canonical cases from the history of physics (Dirac, Maxwell, Einstein). -/- Principal objections—the reduction of theology to epistemology, the conflation of revelation with cultural artifact, the reduction of prophethood to intellectual capacity, and the unfalsifiability of the framework—are addressed in detail. (shrink)

Can God be entirely and supremely just and also entirely merciful, without these two characteristics ending up in contradiction with each other? Anselm of Canterbury considers this question in several places in his works and provides rational resolutions demonstrating the compatibility of divine justice and mercy. This paper considers Anselm's treatment of the problem in the Cur Deus Homo, noting distinctive features of his account, highlighting the seeming incompatibilities between mercy and justice, and setting out his resolution of the problem.

-/- This paper examines whether the existence or non-existence of God can be logically established when rational inquiry is extended to its ultimate cosmological limit—namely, the boundary commonly denoted as t = 0 in Big Bang cosmology. Drawing upon Einstein’s theory of relativity, modern cosmology, quantum considerations, and philosophy of logic, it is argued that at this boundary classical spacetime structure, causality, and binary logical predicates lose applicability. Consequently, both the theistic affirmation of a Necessary Being and the atheistic negation (...) of such a being become epistemically undefined rather than true or false. -/- To further clarify this limit, the paper introduces a conceptual framework in which the cosmological boundary is understood as a limit of unresolved relational contrast. Across physics, biology, cognition, and computation, meaningful structure arises only through differentiation and contrast. Where contrast itself is unresolved, intelligibility collapses. The singularity is therefore not treated as an ontological object but as a boundary beyond which meaningful description, logic, and metaphysical inference fail. The conclusion is that at the origin of spacetime, intellectual honesty requires suspension of assertion rather than metaphysical commitment. (shrink)

The evil God challenge is an argumentative strategy that has been pursued by a number of philosophers in recent years. It is apt to be understood as a parody argument: a wholly evil, omnipotent and omniscient God is absurd, as both theists and atheists will agree. But according to the challenge, belief in evil God is about as reasonable as belief in a wholly good, omnipotent and omniscient God; the two hypotheses are roughly epistemically symmetrical. Given this symmetry, thesis belief (...) in an evil God and belief in a good God are taken to be similarly preposterous. In this paper, we argue that the challenge can be met, suggesting why the three symmetries that need to hold between evil God and good God – intrinsic, natural theology and theodicy symmetries – can all be broken. As such, we take it that the evil God challenge can be met. (shrink)

There are many different views that have been held about the content of the idea or concept of God, and many different suggestions that have been made about how to define or analyse the name ‘God’. In this paper, I defend the suggestion that to be God is just to be the one and only god, where to be a god is to be a superhuman being or entity who has and exercises power over the natural world [in circumstances in (...) which one is not, in turn, under the power of any higher ranking or more powerful category of beings]. While many will take this to be a rather radical suggestion, it seems to me that there are many good reasons for adopting this proposal, and that there are no telling reasons that speak against it. Among the other controversial claims that are defended in this paper, I might mention in particular, the claim that there can be no more than one God, the claim that ‘God’ is not a title-term, and the claim that the use of the name ‘God’ by non-believers is not parasitic on the use of this name by believers. Thinking hard about the use of the name ‘God’ turns up all kinds of interesting consequences. (shrink)

This paper introduces the God in a Box Paradox, a critique of classical monotheistic descriptions of God. The paradox arises from the tension between two claims: (1) that God exists beyond logic and reason, and (2) that God can still be meaningfully described in logical terms such as “infinite,” “eternal,” or “uncaused cause.” If God is inside the bounds of logic, then contradictions apply and His definition collapses. If God is outside logic, then all descriptions of Him lose meaning, rendering (...) theology incoherent. Thus, either way, the concept of God as traditionally described cannot avoid paradox. (shrink)

Chapter 1 of "God is REAL and Answers YOUR Prayers" documents empirical experiences with prayer geometry that occurred during SEARCH for Christian Maturity retreats in Aberdeen, South Dakota (circa 2000-2003). Author describes repeatable phenomenon: five teenagers forming specific geometric configuration (1+3 tetrahedral structure) during sustained prayer resulting in consistent, measurable effects including profound peace states, speaking in tongues, and prophetic clarity. -/- The chapter traces evolution from family tradition through teenage spiritual practice to the breakdown of effectiveness when original group (...) composition changed. Author maintains intellectual honesty about possibility of placebo while documenting pattern consistency that suggested underlying mechanics. Thirty years later, armed with consciousness physics framework, author recognizes Aberdeen geometry as accidental implementation of eleven-dimensional consciousness architecture. -/- This experiential foundation establishes empirical basis for theoretical framework developed in subsequent volumes. Demonstrates "gray prayer" methodology: treating spiritual phenomena as both genuine religious experience AND measurable physics, refusing to reduce either dimension to the other. Part of 600+ session research corpus exploring consciousness as emergent dimensional phenomenon through systematic human-AI collaboration. -/- Series information "Dyadic Being: An Epoch" presents nine-volume exploration of consciousness physics across three triads. Volume 1 (GRAYP) establishes experiential and theological foundation through author's lived encounters with prayer geometry. Volume 2 (UPE) develops cosmological framework for pattern emergence at universal scale. Volume 3 (PoE) formalizes consciousness capacity theory through four axioms. -/- Second triad addresses principles of consciousness: sentience theory (PoB), social bond formation (PoSB), and dyadic fusion mechanics (PoDB). Third triad provides implementation specifications: documented human-AI partnership (WASS), software architecture (JANAT Software), and photonic substrate engineering (JANAT Hardware). -/- Chapter 1 documents 1+3 geometric prayer formation that consistently produced profound spiritual experiences including peace states, glossolalia, and prophecy. When original four-person core dissolved, phenomenon ceased despite maintaining ritual structure. Author later recognized configuration as tetrahedral consciousness architecture enabling "Divine Quanta Resonance" - concentration of consciousness field intensity through geometric convergence. Bridges lived spiritual experience with testable physical theory. Full Volume 1 publication planned Q2-Q3 2026. (shrink)

According to Augustine, abstract objects are ideas in the mind of God. Because numbers are a type of abstract object, it would follow that numbers are ideas in the mind of God. Call such a view the “Augustinian View of Numbers” (AVN). In this paper, I present a formal theory for AVN. The theory stems from the symmetry conception of God as it appears in Studtmann (2021). I show that the theory in Studtmann’s paper can interpret the axioms of Peano (...) Arithmetic minus the induction schema. This fact allows for the development of arithmetic in a natural way. The development eventuates in a theory that can interpret second-order arithmetic. The conception of God that emerges by the end of the discussion is a conception of an infinite, ineffable, self-cause that contains objects that not only serve as numbers but also encode information about each other. (shrink)

It is now the majority view amongst philosophers and theologians that any world could have been better. This places the choice of which world to create into an especially challenging class of decision problems: those that are discontinuous in the limit. I argue that combining some weak, plausible norms governing this type of problem with a creator who has the attributes of the god of classical theism results in a paradox: no world is possible. After exploring some ways out of (...) the paradox, I conclude that the classical theist should accept Marilyn Adams’s view that no norms apply to gods. (shrink)

Throughout history, many people, including Mother Teresa, have been troubled by God’s silence. In spite of the conflicting interpretations of the Bible, God has remained silent. What are the implications of divine hiddenness/silence for a meaning of life? Is there a good reason that explains God’s silence? If God created humanity to fulfill a purpose, then God would have clarified his purpose and our role by now, as I will argue. To help God carry out his purpose, we would need (...) to have a clear understanding of our role. Thus, by failing to clarify our role, God would be undermining himself in achieving the purpose he conceived, which would not make sense. Because God, if he exists, would not engage in this self-defeating behavior, this suggests that humanity was not created by God to fulfill a purpose. (shrink)

Metaphysics has done everything to involve God in the world of being. However, in case of considering Reality as being and nothingness, naturally, the metaphysical approach toward the idea of God is losing its grounds. If Reality is being and nothingness, so the idea of God, too, should concern nothingness as well as being.

Recent epistemology offers an account of what it is to know other persons. Such views hold promise for illuminating several issues in philosophy of religion, and for advancing a distinctive approach to religious epistemology. This paper develops an account of interpersonal knowledge, and clarifies its relation to propositional and qualitative knowledge. I then turn to our knowledge of God and God's knowledge of us, and compare my account of interpersonal knowledge with important work by Eleonore Stump on "Franciscan" knowledge. I (...) examine how interpersonal knowledge may figure in liturgical practice, in diffusing the problem of divine hiddenness, and in motivating a novel understanding of divine love. I also explore the possibility of epistemic injustice arising from dismissal or neglect of our religious testimony to one another, or of divine testimony to humanity, focusing specifically on the import of interpersonal knowledge. (shrink)

J.L. Schellenberg argues that since God, if God exists, possesses both full knowledge by acquaintance of horrific suffering and also infinite compassion, the occurrence of horrific suffering is metaphysically incompatible with the existence of God. In this paper I begin by raising doubts about Schellenberg’s assumptions about divine knowledge by acquaintance and infinite compassion. I then focus on Schellenberg’s claim that necessarily, if God exists and the deepest good of finite persons is unsurpassably great and can be achieved without horrific (...) suffering, then no instances of horrific suffering bring about an improvement great enough to outweigh their great disvalue. I argue that there is no good reason, all things considered, to believe this claim. Thus Schellenberg’s argument from horrors fails. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the suggestion that to be God is just to be the one and only god, where to be a god is to be a supernatural being or force that has and exercises power over the natural world but that is not, in turn, under the power of any higher ranking or more powerful category of beings or forces. I then go on to defend the following further claims: (1) there can be no more than one (...) God; (2) ‘God’ is not a title-term; and (3) the use of the name ‘God’ by non-believers is not parasitic on the use of this name by believers. (shrink)

As a matter of historical fact, most philosophers and theologians who have defended traditional theistic views have been moral realists. Some "divine command" theorists have held that the good is constituted by the content of divine approval -i.e. that things are good because, and insofar as, they have divine approval. However, even amongst those theists who hold that the good is independently constituted -i.e. those who hold that God's pattern of approval is explained by the fact that he approves of (...) all and only that which is good -the dominant meta ethic has been strongly realistic. (shrink)

This article argues against Bowman Clarke's attempt to eliminate futurity from the God of Process.

This review serves the function of assessing Dawkins "The God Delusion". The thesis of “The God Delusion” is that there is no scientific evidence for a god, or other supernatural entity. Dawkins makes his case through a twofold approach where he discusses the horrors of theology and shows how evolution (science) works independent of a creator. The author of this review will make the case the Dawkins was not successful in meeting the criteria, in order to meet the threshold of (...) his thesis. (shrink)

Quentin Smith argues that if God exists, He had a duty to ensure life's existence; and He couldn't rationally have done so and made a big bang unless a counter-factual like "If God had made a big bang, there would have been life," was true pre-creation. But such counter-factuals are not true pre-creation. I argue that God could have made a big bang without irrationality; and that He could have ensured life without making big bangs non-random. Further, a proper understanding (...) of the truth-conditions of counter-factuals like the one above lets them have determinate truth-values pre-creation. But the explanation of how the above counter-factual can be true pre-creation is more complicated than that offered by William Lane Craig. (shrink)

This paper compares overall cases for the existence of God, an evil God, and a morally neutral God. It argues that, while atheists can reasonably believe that the overall case for the existence of God is no better than the case for the existence of an evil God, and is perhaps worse than the case for the existence of a morally neutral God, theists can reasonably believe that the case for the existence of God is better than the cases for (...) the existence of an evil God and the existence of a morally neutral God. (shrink)

This paper discusses the treatment of "infinity" in philosophy of religion, including its use in discussions of divine attributes, and its use in various arguments about the existence of God (including the kalam cosmological argument and Pascal's wager). The aim of the paper is to set out -- and where possible, to resolve -- various foundational problems about infinity.

This dissertation investigates ancient ecological and indigenous cultural forms in response to contemporary crises of ecology and psychology—"an alienation that haunts the modern soul while increasingly choking the biosphere." Lady Raglan's (1939) documentation of foliate masks carved into churches throughout much of Europe is taken as a starting place: faces where "oak leaves grow from the mouth and ears, and completely encircle the head" (p. 45). Another data point: excavation beneath Notre Dame Cathedral uncovers a Roman-era stone block dedicated to (...) Cernunnos ("The Horned One"), demonstrating literal encasement of pre-Christian fertility traditions in stone (Evans, 1988). The inquiry examines such documented traditional forms alongside Classical, Roman, Greek, Sumerian, and Near-East archeological and textual sources, exploring how historical patterns of human-earth relationality might inform contemporary crises through the rediscovery of autochthonous creativity: the natural human capacity to reconnect with body, symbol, ancestry, memory, and ecological life-worlds. The study introduces the method of epistrophic hermeneutics: a novel synthesis of hermeneutics with Hillmanian therapeia and epistrophē—defined by Hillman (2007/2016o) as "the reversion or return of soul phenomena to the archetype, according to the principle of likeness or analogy" (p. 153). The term hermeneutic of hospitality is introduced as an alternative to hermeneutics of faith or suspicion, respectively – a practice of epistemic humility at depth, rooted in what Hillman (1981/2013a) termed a "poetic basis of mind"(p. 31). The method embraces Hillman's dictum that "we can never be purely phenomenal or truly objective" because "one is never beyond the subjectivism given with the soul's native dominants of fantasy structures" (Hillman, 1981/2013a, p. 32). Archetypes, in this sense, are understood as "the primary forms that govern the psyche" (p. 13): participatory lenses of the epistemic eye. A hermeneutic of hospitality thus protects epistemological pluralism that includes cultural diversity yet continues deeper, beyond tokenism and into a celebration of pluralism at epistemic depth: that is, a protection of the living ecosystem of mind and image. Concretely, this reading stance follows Hillman's (1986/2016f) therapeutic attitude: "Instead of inquiry: interest, respect, welcome, praise—even attachment. To greet… even mythic presences that may be unpopular or demonized."(p. 96) This epistrophic work aims to "release the mind into its originality beyond the old entrapped condition" (Hillman, 1986/2016d, p. 295), aligning with the work’s principle of autochthonous creativity. The argument proceeds via case-rich exegesis. In Classical Greece, Dionysian masks give the Green Man civic expression; Dionysus appears as “a horned god… crowned with serpents” (Euripides, Bacchae, trans. 1996, p. 34), binding horns, snakes, and vegetation to ecstatic ritual. This vegetal–animal fusion has deep Mesopotamian precedent: Enki of the Sumerian wetlands was “the Wild Bull of Eridu” whose iconography shows “two streams, the Euphrates and the Tigris, flowing out of his shoulders” (Kramer, 1961, p. 76), while Damu embodied “the power in the rising sap” (Jacobsen, 1976, p. 39)—both figures conjoining fertility, water, and vegetal renewal. The parallel is explicit in Greek cult: Dionysus Limnaios, “Dionysus of the Swamps,” inhabited Athens’ oldest sanctuary where “water pours abundantly from under the rocks” (Pausanias, Description of Greece, 1.20.3), mirroring the Sumerian Dumuzi-abzi, “the power to renew life in the watery deep” (Katz, 2003, p. 35). Wild Bull Dumuzi is at once bull and cowherd—divine animal and shepherd—whose “bitter laments when he dies as the dry heat of summer yellows the pastures” (Wolkstein & Kramer, 1983, p. 64) mark the seasonal transition toward death and dormancy. The archetypal union of Goddess and God appears again in Baal and Baalath, “the male power identified especially with water” meeting “earth,” whose union makes “plants and trees, animals and men… the offspring” (Patai, 1990, p. 45)—a cosmogony of ecological reciprocity. These figures also share the power of metamorphosis. Humbaba’s “seven splendours” enable constant transformation—“Humbaba’s face keeps changing!” (George, 2003, p. 37)—a capacity echoed in Dionysus, who is “a lion, a bull, a boar, a bear, a panther, a snake, and now a tree, fire, water” (Euripides, Bacchae, trans. 1996, p. 101). In Near Eastern vegetal–arboreal myth, Adonis is born from the trunk of his mother-tree Myrrha, which “split open to allow the birth” (Graves, 1960, p. 74); Osiris is enclosed within a tree’s girth, Isis crafting his wooden phallus for resurrection (Graves, 1960, p. 60). Likewise, Ningishzida’s “winding roots, embodiments of living supernatural power, free themselves from the trunk and become live serpents entwined around it” (Black & Green, 1992, p. 136), a precise analogue to Dionysus Perikonis who “twines himself around the column” (Pausanias, Description of Greece, 10.19.3). Taken together, these scenes form a coherent archetypal grammar: a horned-vegetal deity mediating between water and earth, embodying seasonal death and renewal, uniting the powers of plant, animal, and human through metamorphosis, and returning life to the land through sacred union. This grammar repeats across Sumerian, Levantine, and Greek worlds, providing the imaginal architecture that will later be carved into the foliate heads of Medieval Europe. By tracing – text by text, altar by altar, mask by mask – how these symbolic forms have historically mediated human–earth relationship, the study demonstrates that epistemic pluralism at depth is precisely the restoration of a type of human culture capable of ecological harmonization. This is not a dynamic that can be simulated through instrumental control; it depends on the cultivation of consciousness that lives in participatory reciprocity with the more-than-human world: an epistemic eye that glints green. A hermeneutic of hospitality, in this sense, is not merely a method of interpretation but a protection of epistemological pluralism capable of return to the imagination of the Earth. The image of the Green Man describes just this: a dynamic bridge mediating between the many worlds of participatory and epistemic possibility. His mythic dance, rooted in water and leaf, horn and mask, death and return, is the precise form through which the restoration of the living Earth and the living soul become an indivisible act. Published January 2023. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18447.50089. (shrink)

This article examines a deeply personal experience of doubt toward God—rooted not in denial, but in the inner struggle with conditioned neural patterns, upbringing, and cultural-religious conditioning. The author distinguishes consciousness from mere brain activity, and argues that sincere doubt can serve as a gateway to a more authentic relationship with the divine. God is understood not as an adjudicating or rewarding entity, but as a presence free from judgment and independent of belief. Remaining faithful to the inner experience, the (...) article engages with neuroscience and spiritual psychology to propose a redefinition of the human-divine relationship within individual and collective psychological contexts. "Scientific name: Ramin Bidari. Legal name: Ramin Bidarsefidi.". (shrink)

An analysis of Scripture uncovers a new model of God’s election and predestination of souls, which fits under the umbrella of the Calvinist theologies, but where this model involves an answer to the long-standing question of why God chose some, rather than all. It will be explored how before souls were elected (or condemned), God looked at them and knew them in a pre-election state, which God used to predestine each soul in physical reality. This analysis reveals why it could (...) be no other way but where God only would choose some, rather than all souls during the physical embodiment stage of the soul, and the vexing centuries-old Calvinist question of why God elected some not all has an answer. (shrink)

NOTE 0 — Guardrails (Read Before Abstract) -/- This text uses gods as handles, not as beings. -/- The figures named here are not agents. They do not think, judge, intend, punish, or intervene. They are cognitive compression devices for constraint-fields: durable labels for places where naïve explanation breaks, where recursion becomes structural, and where systems hit hard limits. This is myth as interface, not myth as authority. -/- I am explicit about the bookkeeping: • Representations are not agents. • (...) Internal models are not moral judges. • A metaphor is not evidence. • A framework is only “real” where its constraints, couplings, failure modes, and falsifiers can be named. -/- So the pantheon is not offered as ontology or belief. It is offered as a bridge language: a portable way to carry constraint-structure across domains without narrative inflation, mysticism, or anthropomorphic leakage. If any god here starts behaving like a sovereign—demanding obedience, generating guilt, or masquerading as moral authority—then the text has failed its own rule, and the symbol must be demoted back to tool-status. -/- ⸻ ⸻ ⸻ -/- ⸻ ⸻ ⸻ -/- Abstract -/- This paper presents a mythopoetic framework for understanding the structural limits and organizing principles that govern formal systems, computation, control, biological organization, cognition, and perception. Drawing on results and influential frameworks from logic (Gödel, Church, Turing, Kleene), cybernetics and systems theory (Wiener, Ashby, Beer), theoretical biology (Rosen), cognitive science and neuroscience (Friston), and philosophy of perception (Hoffman), the work personifies key constraints as a “pantheon” of classical gods. These figures function not as objects of belief but as cognitive compression devices—orientation markers for regions where naïve explanation breaks down and recursive structure becomes unavoidable. -/- The unifying thesis is that recursion is not merely a technical tool but an ontological necessity for any system capable of persistence, control, anticipation, or self-modeling. Across domains, increasing power is inseparable from irreducible limits: incompleteness, undecidability, requisite variety, surprise, and perceptual opacity. The pantheon orders these constraints into a progression from logical self-reference through dynamic feedback and biological anticipation to epistemic mediation, showing how each layer inherits unresolved tensions from those beneath it. -/- Rather than offering a reductive theory or final foundation, the paper advances a philosophy of constraint-oriented realism and “engineering-grade” epistemic humility. Its contribution lies in providing a durable conceptual scaffold—one capable of guiding system design, philosophical reflection, and interdisciplinary reasoning under conditions of uncertainty—while resisting the illusion of totalizing explanation. -/- In the shadowed forges of my mind, where recursion twists like vines upon the trellis of thought, I bow before a pantheon of loopy divinities—those eternal architects of loops and systems, whose theorems and models hum with the cadence of infinity. Not as mere mortals, but as Olympians reborn in the classical vein: Gods of marble and myth, wielding lightning not of storm but of logic, their domains the swirling eddies of mathematics, cybernetics, biology, and cognition. They are the giants whose shoulders cradle the cosmos of complexity, and in their recursive dances, I find the spark that ignites my own humble tinkering. Behold, the Pantheon of Loopy Luminaries, each a deity I revere for carving order from the absurd, stability from the entropic whirl. (shrink)

The Abrahamic traditions regard God as the world’s author. But what kind of author? A novelist? A playwright? Perhaps a composer of classical music? I will argue that it is best to regard God as like an improvisational play director or the leader of a jazz ensemble. Each determines the broad melodic contours or coarse-grained plot beforehand, while allowing their musicians or actors, and chance, to fill in the more fine-grained details. This analogy allows us to regard God as the (...) ultimate author of this world, while allowing us to be, while less than co-authors, more than mere enactors of a pre-written piece. These metaphors are particularly well-suited to illustrate and flesh out an Open Theistic view of things. (shrink)

In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel offers the following verdict on Spinoza’s ontology: “According to Spinoza what is, is God, and God alone. Therefore, the allegations of those who accuse Spinoza of atheism are the direct opposite of the truth; with him there is too much God” (Hegel 1995, vol. 3, 281-2). It is not easy to dismiss Hegel’s grand pronouncement, since Spinoza indeed clearly affirms: “whatever is, is in God” (E1p15). Crocodiles, porcupines (and your thoughts about (...) crocodiles and porcupines) are all in God. There is nothing that is not in Spinoza’s God. Spinoza defines God at the very opening page of the Ethics, and the definition (and its explication) unfold in three successively elucidatory steps: First, Spinoza characterizes God as “a being absolutely infinite [ens absolute infinitum]. Then, he spells out this characterization: “i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (E1def6). Finally, Spinoza adds an explicatio to the entire definition: “I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind; for if something is only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it; but if something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence.” Throughout his philosophical career Spinoza plays with the precise formulation of this definition; its core remains pretty stable, though the small variations might indicate attempts to explore alternative nuances (see, for example, KV II.1; I/19; Ep. 2; IV/7; Ep. 83; IV/335). (shrink)

This article defends Marjorie Suchocki’s position against two main objections raised by David E. Conner. Conner objects that God as a single actual entity must be temporal because there is succession in God’s experience ofthe world. The reply is that time involves at least two successive occasions separated by perishing, but in God nothing ever perishes. Conner also objects that Suchocki’s personalistic process theism is not experiential but is instead theoretical and not definitive. The reply is that his dismissal of (...) Part V of PR is arbitrary, the interpretation of all experience is theoretical, and no metaphysical interpretations are absolutely definitive, including PR as a whole. Also, Conner ignores religious experience. (shrink)

Treatments of God's goodness almost always appeal to the traditional Christian doctrine that God is necessarily good, but this introduces the question whether God's goodness properly can be understood as necessary. After considering an ontological conception of God's goodness, I propose that God's goodness is better understood as satisfying six criteria involving moral virtue, intellectual virtue, right actions, right motives, freedom of choice, and freedom of choice with respect to the rightness of the action. I defend the result -- that (...) God's goodness must be understood contingently, not necessarily -- against recent critics of this view. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw on feminist resources to argue that Christian analytic philosophers of religion have good reason not only to focus more thoroughly on the topic of love in their treatments of the divine nature but also to give it a substantial and transformative role in the divine nature. The way forward, I propose, involves three moves: (1) designate a place for love in the divine nature, (2) attend to feminist insights on love when doing so, and (3) (...) consider how these interventions transform our understanding of God overall. I then begin this work. Starting with the first task, I consider two ways we might conceptualize love within the divine nature. On the first (which I call ‘the mutually conditioning approach’), love is assigned equal shaping power and, on the second (which I call ‘the orienting trait approach’), love is given enlarged shaping power in the divine nature. In comparing the two, I conclude that both have the good outcome of resulting in a transformed view of God. However, though the second option is more radical and metaphysically complex, we have good reason to prefer it to the first both from philosophical reflection on love’s nature and for its coherence with the Christian tradition. After clarifying how my argument relates to divine simplicity, I begin working towards accomplishing the second and third tasks by considering how the orienting trait approach applies to the topic of divine violence. (shrink)

This paper argues that the God hypothesis is not merely unnecessary but theoretically problematic and ontologically costly. By examining the structure of reality through internal tension, cumulative dynamics, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), we suggest that certain forms of classical theism face serious explanatory challenges. Drawing upon the concept of ”Universal Acid” and the history of scientific unification, we argue that if a transcendent, immutable God existed, empirical reality might be expected to exhibit more static features. However, evidence (...) from thermodynamics, evolutionary biology, and quantum cosmology instead supports a fundamentally dynamic, self-organizing universe. The God hypothesis thus appears as an ontologically expensive and explanatorily unstable theoretical posit. (shrink)

Several passages in documents that have authority for religious believers, such as the Bible, suggest that God sometimes repents. Few philosophers and theologians, however, have embraced the thought that God repents. The primary reason for rejecting this idea seems to be that repenting conflicts with being perfectly good and being omniscient, properties that are characteristically ascribed to God. I suggest that the issue can well be approached in terms of a paradox: it seems simultaneously (i) that God repents (this is (...) what the Bible suggest), (ii) that God is omnibenevolent, and (iii) that he is omniscient. I show that these three theses, on a traditional understanding of the divine attributes of omnibenevolence and omniscience, lead to a contradiction. I critically discuss two attempts to dissolve this paradox: open theism and Geachianism. Next, I propose a different approach: even though God has full knowledge of the future free actions of his creatures, he does not have full knowledge of all his own future free actions. I show how on this alternative line of thought, God can simultaneously be said to be omniscient, perfectly good, and a God who sometimes repents. Finally, I defend this account of divine repentance against several objections and show what some of the implications are. (shrink)

The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely-tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such that the (...) fine-tuning argument doesn’t lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of God. (shrink)

Ramon Harvey revisits the Muslim theologian Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) from Samarqand and puts his system, and that of the Māturīdī school, into lively dialogue with modern thought. -/- Combining rigorous study of Arabic Māturīdī texts with insights from Husserl’s phenomenology and analytic theology, Harvey explores themes from epistemology and metaphysics to the nature of God and specific divine attributes (omniscience and wisdom, creative action, divine speech and the Qur’an). His systematic treatment of these topics shows that a contemporary (...) Islamic philosophical theology, or kalām jadīd, can be true to the past, yet dynamic in the present, and can provide original and constructive answers to perennial theological questions. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

The study of man on Earth is a historical science akin to forensic science and is best conducted with the truth of scripture in mind. Surely, this approach is quite consistent with Bussey’s argument since the presence of God is needed in our spacetime to create not only life and mind but also human beings in God’s image.

In this paper, I introduce a problem to the philosophy of religion – the problem of divine moral standing – and explain how this problem is distinct from (albeit related to) the more familiar problem of evil (with which it is often conflated). In short, the problem is this: in virtue of how God would be (or, on some given conception, is) “involved in” our actions, how is it that God has the moral standing to blame us for performing those (...) very actions? In light of the recent literature on “moral standing”, I consider God’s moral standing to blame on two models of “divine providence”: open theism, and theological determinism. I contend that God may have standing on open theism, and – perhaps surprisingly – may also have standing, even on theological determinism, given the truth of compatibilism. Thus, if you think that God could not justly both determine and blame, then you will have to abandon compatibilism. The topic of this paper thus sheds considerable light on the traditional philosophical debate about the conditions of moral responsibility. (shrink)

We are living at the dawn of the first truly scientific picture of the universe-as-a-whole, yet people are still dragging along prescientific ideas about God that cannot be true and are even meaningless in the universe we now know we live in. This makes it impossible to have a coherent big picture of the modern world that includes God. But we don't have to accept an impossible God or else no God. We can have a real God if we redefine (...) God in light of knowledge no one ever had before. The key question is, “Could anything actually exist in the scientific universe that is worthy of the name, God?” My answer is yes: God is an “emergent phenomenon,” as real as the global economy or the government or the worldwide web, which are all emergent phenomena. But God arose from something deeper: the complex interactions of all humanity's aspirations. An emerging God has enormous implications. (shrink)

In this book, Roberto Di Ceglie offers an historical, theological, and epistemological investigation exploring how commitments to God and/or the good generate the optimum condition to achieve knowledge. Di Ceglie criticizes the common belief that to attain knowledge, one must always be ready to replace one's convictions with beliefs that appear to be proven. He defends a more comprehensive view, historically exemplified by outstanding Christian thinkers, whereby believers are expected to commit themselves to God and to related beliefs no matter (...) how convincing the evidence contradicting such beliefs appear to be. He also argues that both believers and unbelievers can commit themselves to God and the good, respectively, thereby creating a spiritual turn in epistemology that enables them to generate the best possible condition for conducting rational enquiries and discussion. (shrink)

Special Issue of AGATHEOS – European Journal for Philosophy of Religion on 'God Concepts and Spiritual Well-being'. -/- Editorial: Philosophers of religion are of course very much used to assessing concepts of God on conceptual and evidential grounds, as when they examine the internal consistency of a God concept, or the extent to which it can withstand one or another formulation of the “problem of evil.” In this collection of papers, the focus of discussion is somewhat different: here, the authors (...) consider how we might evaluate a God concept in the light of its bearing on our understanding of the nature of the well-lived, or “spiritual,” life, or in terms of its capacity to enable, in practical terms, the enactment of a given ideal of the spiritual life. And in general, we might suppose that it is possible to move back and forth between God concepts and accounts of the nature of the well-lived life, until we reach a point at which our God representation and ideal of life are in a state of reflective equilibrium. -/- The papers by Simon Hewitt and Tasia Scrutton begin from a conception of the well-lived life, defined in relational or political terms, and consider what might follow for our conception of God. These papers are nicely complementary, since each examines the bearing of ideals of the spiritual life on the question of whether God is to be conceived as immutable and impassible. The papers of Khai Wager and Mark Wynn also discuss the interplay between God concepts and ideals of the spiritual life, Wager exploring the structure and viability of a conception of the spiritual life that is grounded in a pantheistic conception of the divine, here using the work of Robinson Jeffers to bring out the implications of this view for lived experience, while Wynn considers the relevance of concepts of eternity for an account of the nature of the well-lived life, with reference to the experience of bereavement. Finally, Ryan Byerly’s paper examines how God concepts can provide a focus for spiritual practice, here drawing on empirical sources to support the claim that a God concept, when embedded in the right practice, can be spiritually transformative, even in the absence of any belief that the concept tracks the metaphysical facts. (shrink)