Abstract

Kant has been interpreted as claiming that persons possess unconditional and incomparable value. If this claim, which I call the “absolute value claim,” entails that persons are valuable in all circumstances and cannot be valued vis-à-vis each other, then its philosophical validity may be disputed. I point to passages in which Kant can be understood as saying that persons, as opposed to non-persons, can be thought to have absolute value, but persons performing immoral actions can be denied value. I argue that if we accept these propositions, then, at least from the Kantian standpoint, some well-known cases which seem to problematize the absolute value claim—a soldier sacrifices himself in battle to save four of his comrades; a person kills another person in order to save his own life; should a scarce life-saving drug be given to a young or an old person?—need not be seen prima facie to undermine the philosophical viability of this claim.