Abstract

This chapter examines how mindshaping theory can reconfigure our understanding of self-deception in four respects. First, our folk-psychological attributions of self-deception, which are traditionally regarded as epistemic tasks carried out by mindreading mechanisms, can be seen as part of a non-epistemic regulative mindshaping process intertwined with normative social expectations. Second, explanations about how it is possible for someone to be self-deceived should include mechanisms to shape the social environment and should revise the role of internal mechanisms insofar as they are subject to the social normativity of an already shaped mind. Third, metacognitive processes involved in acknowledgments of one’s self-deceived state are primarily a way of self-regulating one’s behavior rather than simply uncovering hidden beliefs. Fourth, theories that explain the evolution of self-deception as an adaptation for interpersonal deception should also consider its role as a mindshaping tool for regulating relationships, simplifying interactions and promoting cooperative behavior.