

# **For a Genealogy of Proto-Logic: the Gesture of “non” and the Conceptual Role of Nothingness**

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## **Abstract**

This essay offers a speculative genealogy of formal logic starting from a minimal pre-logical level, characterized by a gesture of total exclusion (the “non”) and by a situation of complete absence of content (the “nothing”). The aim is neither to found a new logic in the technical sense nor to provide a metaphysical theory of nothingness, but rather to reconstruct a proto-logical “generative core” from which concepts such as identity and existence can be thought as rooted in a poorer structure, and relative to which one can only hypothesize, prospectively, a subsequent articulation of inferential structure. The study insists on a rigorous distinction among levels of discourse (proto-logical, formal, meta-theoretical), discusses the nature of nothing as a meta-linguistic description of total absence, addresses the “benign” circularity implicit in the emergence of identity, and situates the proposal in relation to several contemporary philosophical traditions (Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, Nishida; proof-theoretic semantics; inferentialism). The explicitly speculative and genealogical character of the reconstruction is made explicit, as are its structural limits.

**Keywords:** Proto-logic; Negation; Nothingness; Identity; Conceptual genealogy; Foundations of logic

## **Introduction**

Contemporary formal logic takes as given concepts such as identity, negation, quantification, domain, and truth-value. In many historical and systematic reconstructions these elements are treated as theoretical primitives, or at most as objects of axial clarification (Frege, 1967; Tarski, 1983).

This work pursues a different path: it proposes a genealogy of proto-logic that does not begin from already formed symbols and rules, but from a pre-logical level in which:

1. there are as yet no propositions, truth-values, or inferential rules;
2. there is, however, a minimal act available: a gesture of total exclusion, which I shall call the “gesture of NON”;
3. the overall situation is characterized by a total absence of determined content, which I shall describe, at the meta-theoretical level, as “nothing”.

The basic thesis is that, starting from this minimal core—gesture of NON + total absence—it is possible to model a first form of operational stability (a proto-identity) and, on this basis, a minimal conceptual domain with a single element, represented meta-linguistically by  $x$  such that  $x = x$ . This structure is not yet a logic in the full sense, but constitutes what may be called, in a strictly minimal sense, a proto-logic: the lower threshold from which standard logical concepts can be articulated and rendered intelligible as dependent upon a still poorer operational core.

The approach is explicitly speculative and genealogical: it does not describe a historical or psychological event (such as the “origin of negation” in Sartre (2018)), nor does it claim to establish a metaphysical truth about nothingness (in contrast to certain recent debates about the absolute impossibility of nothing) (Sorensen, 2021). It is rather an exercise in conceptual grounding: what minimal structures must be admitted in order to render the emergence of identity, existence and, prospectively, inference intelligible?

What follows:

- §1 clarifies the relevant levels of discourse;
- §2 characterizes the “non” as a pre-logical act-type;
- §3 defines nothing as a meta-linguistic description of total absence;
- §§4–6 show how from NON + nothing one obtains a first operational stability ( $C = C$ ), the modeling as  $x = x$ , and a minimal domain  $D = \{x\}$ ;
- §7 interprets the succession  $S_0 \rightarrow S_1$  as a conceptual proto-time;
- §8 compares the proposal with several strands of contemporary literature;
- §9 makes explicit the limits and assumptions of the genealogy;
- the Conclusion states what this reconstruction claims—and, especially, what it does not claim—to establish about logic and reality.

## **1. Levels of Discourse: Proto-Level, Formal Level, Meta-Theoretical Level**

To avoid confusion and uncontrolled circularities it is essential to distinguish three levels:

### **1. Proto-logical level ( $L_0$ )**

- There are no propositions, truth-values, or formal operators.

- We describe this level as characterized solely by:
  - an act-type of total exclusion (gesture of NON),
  - a situation of total absence of determined content (what, in our meta-language, we describe as “nothing”).
- No symbols ( $\neg$ ,  $=$ ,  $\exists$ ) are yet present at this level: these belong to our description, not to  $L_0$  itself.

## 2. Formal level ( $L_1$ )

- This is the level of logic proper: connectives, rules, domains, quantifiers.
- In this work we do not develop a new technical logic; we refer to  $L_1$  only as a possible horizon of subsequent articulation of the proto-logical core.

## 3. Meta-theoretical level ( $L_2$ )

- This is the level of the philosophical discourse we are currently conducting.
- Here we use symbols such as  $x$ ,  $=$ , “there exists,” “domain  $D = \{x\}$ ,” and concepts such as “identity,” “existence,” “operator”.
- All formulae ( $C = C$ ,  $\text{NON} = \text{NON}$ ,  $x = x$ ,  $\exists x (x = x)$ ) belong to  $L_2$ : they are retrospective models of what we suppose occurs (or is presupposed) at  $L_0$ .

The genealogical thesis concerns the passage  $L_0 \rightarrow L_1$ , but its formulation requires the use of  $L_2$ . Consequently:

- whenever we write, for example,  $x = x$ , it must be read as follows:

there is an act-type which, in our modeling, can be treated as a stable element of a minimal domain, and the notation  $=$  expresses its operational invariance under repetition.

This distinction prevents us from projecting into the proto-level concepts (identity, existence, domain) which are precisely what the genealogy aims to elucidate.

## **2. The Gesture of “non” as a Pre-Logical Act**

### **2.1 Act-Type, Not Symbol**

We describe  $L_0$  as a level at which an act-type of total exclusion is available, which I will denote “NON” (in capitals to distinguish it from the operator  $\neg$  of formal logic). This gesture of NON is to be understood as:

- not a written symbol,
- not a syntactic connective applied to a proposition,
- but a practical or structural act, of which certain formal properties can be listed while abstracting from any empirical or psychological content.

By analogy, Sartre’s phenomenology of negation—where consciousness is the origin of negation and nothing—is a way of conceiving a negative operation as an originary structure rather than merely a truth-functional operation on judgments. This genealogy adopts a similar move, but deliberately abstracts from any reference to consciousness, proposing an even poorer structural minimum.

### **2.2 Total Exclusion**

The gesture of NON is characterized as total exclusion:

- NON does not select a subset within a given domain;
- NON does not yet operate on propositions of the form  $p$  so as to yield  $\neg p$ ;

- NON is an act that leaves no determined content.

In this sense, NON is “total” not because it is applied to “all that there is” (a concept still too rich for  $L_0$ ), but because its exercise is described as leaving nothing that could be further differentiated or articulated.

### **2.3 Repeatability and Recognition**

For one to speak of an act-type, NON must be repeatable:

- individual occurrences (act-tokens) differ in time or situation;
- yet, at  $L_2$ , we recognize them as of the same type.

This repeatability already implies a minimal form of re-identification:

- were we unable to recognize occurrences of NON as “the same gesture,” we could not, at  $L_2$ , introduce a singular designation (“the gesture of NON”).

Here the “benign” circularity to be made explicit in §5 announces itself: the genealogy of identity presupposes, in order to be formulated, a pre-conceptual capacity to recognize the repetition of the same act.

## **3. Nothing as the Conceptual Condition of Total Absence**

### **3.1 Nothing as a Meta-Linguistic Description**

We describe  $L_0$ , from the standpoint of  $L_2$ , as characterized by a total absence of determined content. There are no objects, properties, propositions, nor articulated states of affairs.

The term “nothing,” however, belongs to  $L_2$ : it does not name an object, but is a meta-linguistic description of this limiting condition:

- it is not a value,
- it is not an entity,
- it is not a domain,
- it is not a “state of the world” endowed with structure.

In this sense, the genealogy continues certain contemporary analyses of nothing as absence or as “presence of absence,” avoiding the reification of “Nothing” as an entity (Sorensen, 2021). Unlike some conceptions of “absolute nothingness” judged incoherent or impossible to obtain in any logical space (Sorensen, 2021), here nothing is not a state that “obtains” somewhere, but a regulative idealization: the way in which  $L_2$  describes a threshold of maximal absence.

### **3.2 The Relation to the Gesture of NON**

It is essential to distinguish:

- the gesture of NON (act-type of exclusion),
- nothing (the condition of total absence, described at  $L_2$ ).

Two relations are relevant:

1. The exercise of NON in a context devoid of determined contents introduces no content: the result, as it were, is still registrable as “total absence”.
2. From the standpoint of meta-discourse, we may say that:
  - if the gesture of NON is completely effective (leaves nothing determined),
  - then what remains is registered as “nothing”.

But this does not amount to an ontological identification of NON and nothing:

- NON is an act (in the most abstract sense possible),
- nothing is a description of the state of maximal absence to which such an act leads when exercised “without remainder”.

In this respect the account deliberately differs both from conceptions that treat nothing as the subject of “nihilation” (Heidegger) and from positions that radically deny the coherence of any absolute nothingness: what is assumed is only a regulative idealization functional to the genealogy.

## **4. From the Configuration NON + Nothing to the First Operational Stability**

### **4.1 The Configuration $S_0$**

Let us call  $S_0$  the following conceptual configuration, as described at  $L_2$ :

- the gesture of NON (repeatable act-type) is available,
- no determined content is given,
- the overall situation can be described, at  $L_2$ , as:  
the exercise of NON in a condition of total absence of content.

To avoid confusion, I shall not write NON(Nothing) as if “Nothing” were an argument. Rather, I shall speak of NON\_in\_void: the act of negating in a context devoid of articulable contents.

### **4.2 Invariance of NON\_in\_void**

Now consider the repetition of this gesture: NON\_in\_void, NON\_in\_void, ...

Since:

- the context is described as lacking determined contents,
- the gesture of NON, by hypothesis, does not introduce contents,

the repetition of the gesture produces no articulable difference in the overall picture:

- the “first” and the “second” occurrence of NON\_in\_void do not differ by any resulting content;
- the only structure we can register is the same operational configuration of total exclusion.

At the meta-theoretical level this invariance can be expressed by saying:

the configuration of NON\_in\_void is operationally identical to itself.

Let us call C this minimal configuration (which comprises both the act-type NON and the context of total absence); then, at L<sub>2</sub>, we annotate:

- $C = C$ .

Here:

- = does not yet express a fully developed logical notion of identity;
- it is a meta-theoretical symbol marking the operational invariance of one and the same configuration under repetition.

In this sense, proto-identity does not arise as a property of already given objects, but as the stability of a configuration structured by a single act-type of negation.

For simplicity, in what follows we shall focus not so much on  $C$  as the pair (act + context), but rather on the act-type NON that structures  $C$ : it is this act-type that will be reified as  $x$  (§5).

## 5. Introducing $x$ , Operational Identity, and the Modeling as $x = x$

### 5.1 Conceptual Reification of the Act-Type

We now take a further step in meta-discourse: instead of speaking directly of the “gesture of NON,” we introduce a symbol  $x$  that denotes the act-type NON considered as a conceptual unit.

The move is analogous to the well-known way in which proof-theoretic semantics reifies inferential rules as objects of inquiry (e.g., in Schroeder-Heister, 2006), but here it is applied to a pre-logical gesture. We therefore stipulate, at  $L_2$ :

- $x$  designates the act-type of total exclusion (NON), not the “result nothing”.

The meta-linguistic formula  $C = C$ , which expresses the invariance of the configuration structured by NON, can be related to the act-type that generates it in the following way: since, by hypothesis, the context of total absence is fixed, the only element repeatedly at stake in the configuration is the act-type of negation. The invariance of  $C$  can then be read, at the level of modeling, as the invariance of the act-type that structures all occurrences of  $C$ . If that act-type is designated by  $x$ , then, at  $L_2$ , we annotate:

- $x = x$ ,

thereby introducing, as a new meta-theoretical idealization derived from the reading of  $C = C$ , the operational stability of that very act-type.

## 5.2 Benign Circularity of Identity

It is evident that the very possibility of writing  $x = x$  presupposes:

- the possibility of re-identifying the act-type represented by  $x$  as “the same” across different occurrences.

This is a circularity with respect to the genealogical project of letting identity “emerge” from the gesture of NON:

- to recognize that  $x = x$  we must already possess a pre-reflective capacity to distinguish between:
  - “this act-type,”
  - “another possible act-type”.

Nevertheless the circularity is benign, in the sense typical of many conceptual genealogies:

- the genealogy does not “create” the concept of identity *ex nihilo*;
- rather, it makes explicit what is implicitly involved in the practice of recognizing the repetition of a selfsame act.

In other words:

- the capacity to identify an act-type is a condition of possibility of the genealogy;
- the formula  $x = x$  is the explicit formalization of that capacity, applied to the limiting case in which the only recognizable content is the gesture of total exclusion.

The fact that the genealogy presupposes, implicitly, what it then makes explicit does not nullify its point: it does not aim to deduce identity from something wholly different, but to show how

the content of the concept of identity can be rendered transparent within an extremely impoverished framework.

## **6. Structural Existence of $x$ and the Minimal Domain $D = \{x\}$**

### **6.1 “Existence” as a Modeling Device**

At this point it is natural to introduce a quasi-logical language in meta-discourse and assert:

- “there exists  $x$  such that  $x = x$ ”.

This formulation is not to be understood as a formal quantification internal to  $L_1$ , nor as a robust ontological commitment to an identified metaphysical entity.

Analogous to certain deflationary or structural readings of existence—in which “to exist” is equivalent to “being a value of a bound variable in a model” (Quine, 1948) or “appearing within a given field of sense” (Gabriel, 2015)—here:

- “there exists  $x$ ” means:

in the conceptual model we are constructing, there is at least one structural unit that can be treated as an object of identification and re-identification, and this unit is the act-type NON reified as  $x$ .

The use of existential terminology is thus purely a modeling device at  $L_2$ .

### **6.2 The Minimal Domain $D = \{x\}$**

Having defined  $x$  in this way, we may introduce, again at  $L_2$ , a domain:

- $D = \{x\}$ ,

where:

- $D$  is the minimal domain compatible with the presence of:
  - an identifiable element ( $x$ , i.e., the act-type NON reified as an element of the model),
  - a (operational) identity relation  $=$ ,
  - a minimal grammar for statements such as  $x = x$ .

Again:

- $D$  is not an “originary” domain of  $L_0$ ,
- it is the formal projection, within the  $L_1/L_2$  framework, of what, at  $L_0$ , is only the stability of an act-type.

The genealogy does not demonstrate that only  $x$  exists in the ontological sense; rather, it maintains that:

- if one assumes as the sole given the gesture of NON in total absence of content,
  - then the minimal formal model able to represent this situation as a proto-logical structure has domain
- $D = \{x\}$ .

In this sense a minimal result is obtained:

- there is at least one structural element ( $x$ )
- for which a relation of operational self-identity is expressible ( $x = x$ ).

All this remains at the level of retrospective modeling, but it suffices to show how standard logical concepts can be anchored in a poorer core.

## 7. Proto-Time as an Order of Foundational Dependence

### 7.1 From the Succession $S_0 \rightarrow S_1$ to the Notion of “Before/After”

We can now distinguish, at  $L_2$ , two conceptual states of our description:

- $S_0$ : availability of the gesture of NON under total absence of determined content; no identity yet made explicit;
- $S_1$ : a configuration in which the stability of the gesture has been modeled as  $x = x$  and hence a minimal domain  $D = \{x\}$  exists (in the modeling sense).

The relation between  $S_0$  and  $S_1$  is not temporal in the physical sense; it is a conceptual dependence:

- $S_1$  (operational identity of  $x$ ) cannot obtain without  $S_0$  (stability of the act-type NON),
- whereas  $S_0$  is thinkable without  $S_1$ .

This justifies introducing a proto-time:

- not a chronological time,
- but an order of foundation:

$S_0$  is conceptually “prior” to  $S_1$ .

This idea of “logical time” or “logical order” is present, in different forms, in many traditions, from Hegel (2010) (becoming as the movement between being and nothing) to recent

conceptualizations of logical time and grounding in ontology (Gabriel, 2015). In our case, the notion of proto-time has a limited role:

- it serves only to mark the direction of the genealogy,
- without suggesting any cosmological or psychological chronology, and without attributing to  $L_0$  a “before” and “after” other than in the sense in which such labels are introduced at  $L_2$ .

## 8. Comparison with the Literature

### 8.1 Affinities and Divergences with Hegel

In the first book of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel (2010) develops the movement from pure being and pure nothing to becoming, insisting on the initial indeterminacy of being and nothing and on their unity in becoming.

The present genealogy is akin in at least two respects:

1. it assumes an initial indeterminate level (total absence of content);
2. it considers the emergence of a structure (here: operational identity of the gesture) as the first step toward an articulated logic.

It diverges, however, on two crucial points:

- instead of the pair being/nothing, the starting point is the gesture of negation (NON) together with nothing as total absence;
- the movement is not elaborated as a conceptual dialectic internal to the Absolute, but as a minimal genealogy of logical structures starting from an act of exclusion.

One may say that, in a purely genealogical key, the figure proposed takes negation as prior to conceptualized being: the first “conceptual entity” of the model is the gesture of NON reified as x. This does not entail an ontological thesis about the real primacy of negation, but only a conceptual ordering choice within the reconstruction.

## **8.2 Heidegger: Nothing and Logical Negation**

In *What Is Metaphysics?*, Heidegger (1993) maintains that nothing is not simply the result of a negative judgment, but that logical negation is derived from a more originary experience of nothing (“das Nichts nichtet”).

The genealogy proposed:

- agrees in treating logical negation ( $\neg p$ ) as a derivative structure;
- introduces, however, a difference: what is originary is not a nothing that “nihilates,” but the gesture of NON which, in our description, yields a state of total absence (“nothing”).

If one wishes, Heidegger’s formula can be inverted:

- it is not “nothing that nihilates,”
- but “total negating” which, in the absence of content, is registered as “nothing”.

Thus the genealogy aligns with the Heideggerian intuition of the priority of nothing with respect to logical negation, but offers an operative, non-phenomenological-existential version.

## **8.3 Sartre: Origin of Negation and Nothing at the Heart of Being**

In *L’Être et le néant*, Sartre (2018) insists that nothing is inseparable from consciousness and that negation arises from the operation of consciousness in its distance from the world: negation is “grounded” in consciousness as the power to posit non-being.

Our proposal is akin in the thesis that:

- negation is not primarily a truth-functional operator,
- but an originary act (which Sartre attributes to consciousness, here depersonalized).

However:

- we do not assume any theory of consciousness;
- the gesture of NON is reduced to its structural form of total exclusion.

What remains from Sartre is the idea that the originality of negation is played out at a pre-logical level, and that nothing is not a mere object but a way of registering phenomena of absence.

#### **8.4 Nishida and the Logic of the Place of Absolute Nothing**

Nishida Kitarō's "logic of the place" (2012) (*basho*) interprets absolute nothing as the locus that contextualizes not only the world and entities, but also the logical forms with which we think them.

Our genealogy is compatible with this intuition in two respects:

1. it places formal logic above a stratum of total absence (nothing) which, in our genealogical reconstruction, functions as the lower bound of what is logically thinkable;
2. it views logical forms as successive articulations of a pre-logical core (here: the gesture of NON).

It nonetheless avoids any strong ontological commitment to absolute nothing as ultimate reality: nothing is treated as a limiting description, not as a metaphysical foundation.

## 8.5 Proof-Theoretic Semantics and Inferentialism

Proof-theoretic semantics, in the tradition from Gentzen (1969) to Schroeder-Heister (2006), interprets the meaning of logical connectives in terms of inference rules (introduction/elimination), rather than truth-conditions.

Similarly, Brandom's inferentialism (Brandom, 1994) sees conceptual contents as determined by their role in inferential practices.

The present genealogy is akin to these approaches insofar as:

- it does not derive logic from an ontology of truth-values, but from an operative act (NON);
- it shows how identity itself can be seen originally as the stability of a gesture.

The work may be read as an attempt to “regress” one step prior to proof-theoretic semantics:

- rather than starting from inferential rules already presupposing propositions and derivations,
- it starts from a pre-propositional gesture of exclusion, showing how it can be reified into a first “logical object” (x) within a minimal model.

## 8.6 Differences with Truth-Functional Approaches (Frege, Tarski)

In the Fregean tradition, negation is a *functio* from thoughts to truth-values; in many contemporary reconstructions it is treated as a truth-functional connective defined by truth-tables (Frege, 1967; Tarski, 1983).

Identity, similarly, is a primitive logical concept expressing a relation among objects.

Tarski's semantic conception of truth, for its part, defines truth for a formal language in terms of satisfaction in a model, within an already consolidated set-theoretic framework.

Relative to this tradition:

- the genealogy advanced here does not contest the technical validity of such approaches;
- but it regards them as operating at a level  $L_1$  that presupposes:
  - a domain,
  - an identity,
  - a formalized negation,
  - a semantic structure (model);

whereas our interest is to show how such elements can be thought as emerging, at the modeling level, from a poorer pre-logical core structured by the gesture of NON and total absence.

## **9. Limits of the Proposal and Nature of the Genealogy**

For a demanding reader it is important to make explicit certain structural limits and background assumptions.

### **9.1 Assumption of an Originary Gesture of NON**

The entire construction assumes, without demonstration, the existence of an originary act-type of total exclusion.

This assumption can be understood in two ways:

1. as a minimal phenomenological datum (on the Sartrean or Heideggerian model of ordinary negativity);
2. as a metaphysical hypothesis: there is a structure of exclusion prior to any logic.

In both cases no independent justification is offered. The genealogy is thus conditioned by this initial assumption, which defines its speculative character.

## **9.2 Inevitable Use of Concepts to Be Genealogized**

Meta-discourse employs concepts—identity, existence, domain—that are themselves the object of the genealogy.

This entails a twofold tension:

- to formulate the genealogy one must presuppose, at least implicitly, capacities to:
  - re-identify an act-type (implicit identity),
  - speak of “structural existence” within a model;
- the genealogy cannot therefore claim to be a creation ex nihilo of logical concepts, but only an explication of what those concepts presuppose in terms of practices and acts.

The circularity is made explicit and declared “benign”: the aim is not to justify identity or existence against all skepticism, but to show a possible pre-logical root thereof.

## **9.3 Modeling Character of $D = \{x\}$**

The minimal domain  $D = \{x\}$  does not describe any real ontological situation:

- it is a retrospective construction, at  $L_2$ , which formalizes in set-theoretic terms the stability of an act-type.

Therefore:

- the genealogy does not entail any commitment to a “monistic” ontology of the gesture of NON;
- nor does it follow that the world, historically or metaphysically, was ever reducible to a “single entity”.

The function of  $D = \{x\}$  is purely exemplificatory: it shows that, starting from a single stable act-type, one can construct a conceptual structure that resembles, in an extremely impoverished way, a minimal logic.

#### **9.4 Neutrality with Respect to Positions on Nothing**

Finally, the stance on nothing is deliberately minimal:

- nothing is not treated as a state that “obtains” somewhere, in contrast with critiques that reveal the incoherence of an absolute nothing as “absence of everything in a place” (Sorensen, 2021);
- no positive theory of nothing is proposed: only a total absence of determined content is assumed as a regulative idealization.

This places the genealogy in a relatively neutral position with respect to contemporary metaphysical debates about nothing: it does not seek to resolve them, but to employ a sufficiently poor concept of nothing as the background for the gesture of NON.

## Conclusion

The proposal developed can be summarized as follows:

### 1. Proto-logical level ( $L_0$ )

It is assumed, at the level of description, that there is a level in which there are as yet no propositions, truth-values, or logical operators; there are only:

- an act-type of total exclusion (gesture of NON),
- a total absence of determined content, describable at  $L_2$  as “nothing”.

### 2. Stability of the Gesture and Operational Identity

The repeated exercise of NON under absence of content does not produce articulable differences: the configuration NON\_in\_void, which we have designated by C, is invariant under repetition. At  $L_2$ , this is annotated as:

- $C = C$ .

Focusing on the act-type that structures C, the reification of that act-type in a symbol x allows us to write:

- $x = x$ ,

where = expresses an operational identity: the stability of a selfsame act-type under repetition.

### 3. Minimal Domain and Proto-Logic

Introducing x and =, meta-discourse can:

- model a minimal domain  $D = \{x\}$ ,
- formulate a statement of structural existence: “there exists (in the model) at least one element  $x$  such that  $x = x$ ”.

This is not yet a fully developed logic, but it can be understood as what one may call a proto-logic, in the minimal sense in which it provides a core in which there are already:

- a minimal conceptual entity (the act-type NON reified as  $x$ ),
- an elementary notion of identity (operational),

and relative to which one can conceive a program of further articulations (introduction of differences, of other act-types, of derived operators), which is not developed here.

#### 4. **Proto-Time as an Order of Foundation**

The succession  $S_0 \rightarrow S_1$  is interpreted not as a physical temporal sequence but as an order of conceptual dependence:

- $S_0$  (gesture of NON under total absence) is conceptually prior to  $S_1$  (operational stability modeled as identity).

This proto-time is a structure of foundation, not a cosmological chronology.

#### 5. **Philosophical Placement**

The genealogy:

- stands in continuity with traditions that accord an originary role to nothing and to negation (Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, Nishida);

- engages approaches that define logical meaning through rules of use (proof-theoretic semantics, inferentialism);
- differs from truth-functional and model-theoretic approaches (Frege, Tarski), which already assume a fully developed logical and semantic apparatus.

## 6. What It Does Not Claim

The genealogy does not claim:

- to provide a metaphysical demonstration of the existence of an originary gesture of NON;
- to resolve the question of the possibility or impossibility of absolute nothing;
- to replace or correct existing formal logics.

Rather, it presents itself as:

- a conceptual model showing how identity, existence, and domain can be thought as formal expressions of a poorer pre-logical structure, defined by the gesture of total exclusion and by the absence of content.

In this sense the work offers a genealogical hypothesis: if one assumes an originary gesture of NON within a condition of total absence, then it is possible to model a proto-logical core from which formal logic can be thought as a subsequent articulation. The value of this hypothesis should be assessed not by its claim to metaphysical truth, but by its capacity to illuminate, in a conceptually rigorous way, the dependence of logic on earlier operative structures that are often taken for granted.

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