Abstract

Catriona Mackenzie in a recent essay, Relational Equality and the Debate Between Externalists and Internalist Theories of Relational Autonomy (2022), takes a look back at an intractable debate within the relational autonomy literature that she attempts to resolve. Mackenzie’s innovative insight is that rather than try to resolve the rift by arguing that one side or the other is correct, her account is ecumenical and preserves what is attractive about both internalism and externalism. Her essay serves as a retrospective on the concept she and Natalie Stoljar helped popularize. Their edited volume Relational Autonomy established the framework for this entire debate. In the twenty-five years since this famous collection came out, this divide has only further entrenched. It is my aim with this paper to heal this rift between internalists and externalists by recasting the central conceptual tool of relational autonomy to affordances. I will be using a conceptual schema connected to affordances which in total make up what I call the “meso-level” of phenomena. My secondary purpose in this paper then is to have this particular problem in relational autonomy be a stalking horse to show the conceptual power and usefulness of this meso-level in helping us think through ethical and political problems. Inspired by the 4EA (extended, embodied, embedded, enactive, affective) movement I call this shift in conceptual focus extended relational autonomy. In Section 1 I explain what relational autonomy is and how it was shaped by criticisms that we are inextricably dependent creatures and that normatively this is not a bad thing. I also explain the two main positions of the debate, internalism and externalism. In Section 2 I lay out four problems within relational autonomy that remain intractable. In Section 3 I explain Mackenzie’s multi-dimensional account of relational autonomy and her replies to the four problems I laid out in Section 2. In Section 4 I define what affordances are and distinguish my preferred “relational ontology” account from mainstream psychology’s “dispositional ontology” account. I then introduce a schema of other concepts that connect to affordances such as the landscape and field of affordances, skills, capacities, habits, and ontogenesis. Together with affordances these concepts form what I call the “meso-level” of phenomena. In this section I initiate my main criticism that internalism is descriptively wrong and that relational autonomy needs an external criteria. At the same time, I contend that externalism is also descriptively wrong in that it presumes that structural political phenomena exhaust the external and neglects the meso-level. This leads to Section 5, where I show the power of affordances and the meso-level as a tool in reconnecting internalism and externalism. Finally, I conclude by looking at work on affordances that show the concept’ s usefulness as a tool.