This study aimed to discover the need for and approaches to repositioning Home Economics for a functional entrepreneurship education programme in Colleges of Education in the North-Central Zone of Nigeria. Four (4) specific objectives and Four (4) research questions guided the study. A descriptive survey design was used for the study. The population for the study comprised 73 Home Economics lecturers and 178 NCE III Students in Colleges of Education in North-Central, Nigeria. Sampling techniques were not carried out, all the (...) populations were chosen for sample size because the population is small, manageable, and individual views were considered important for the study. A 48-item questionnaire developed by researchers and validated by experts was employed as an instrument for data collection. The reliability coefficient of the instrument is 0.745 using Cronbach Alpha. The researchers along with the research assistants administered the instrument to the respondents. Seventy-three (73) Lecturers' questionnaires were administered, seventy-three (73) were returned and one hundred and seventy-eight (178) student questionnaires were administered but one hundred and sixty-two (162) were returned successfully thereby giving 100% and 91% return rate. Mean was used to analyze the data. The study's findings revealed the need to reposition the Home Economics curriculum for functional Entrepreneurship Education in Colleges of Education in the North-Central Zone, Nigeria (Average Mean 3.44). Based on the findings, recommendations were made to include that Colleges of Education should adopt innovative curriculum design, teaching methods, assessment tools, and robust feedback mechanisms. (shrink)

Short introduction to the V2 publication of "The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance" (2016). An anthology with Matteo Pasquinelli, Luciana Parisi, Graham Harman, Tomas Saraceno, René ten Bos, Tim Morton, and many others.

Ludwig Wittgenstein famously asserted that a serious work of philosophy could be written composed of nothing but jokes. Taking Wittgenstein’s assertion seriously, we examine a range of philosophical accounts of verbal humor, specifically jokes and puns, dividing them according to whether they focus on the syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic elements of joking and punning acts. We then employ them to see if standard examples of philosophical discourse could thereby be seen as jokes themselves. Perhaps Wittgenstein was more correct than he (...) realized and we are already writing philosophy in terms of jokes. (shrink)

In this paper I draw attention to the grammatical “deep joke”. Wittgenstein refers to this type of joke in PI §111, comparing its depth to the depth of philosophy. I start with a brief review of Wittgenstein’s notions of “grammar” and “depth”. Building on these ideas, I first offer some general considerations regarding jokes and then present descriptive remarks about deep jokes. I evaluate possible examples of deep jokes, including primary examples provided by Wittgenstein, which appear in preliminary (...) versions (1936-46) of the Philosophical Investigations but were cut later. I attempt to capture the distinctive qualities of deep jokes and seek to elucidate their philosophical potential. The results of the investigation of deep jokes provide an original reflection on our (mis-)understanding of linguistic practices. (shrink)

Bad jokes are not simply non-humorous texts. They are texts that are humorous for someone––their author at least––but not for their audience. Bad jokes thus involve a contextual––pragmatic––dimension that is neglected in the semantic theories of humor. In this paper, we propose an approach to humor based on the Aristotelian notion of surprising enthymemes. Jokes are analyzed as kinds of arguments, whose tacit dimension can be retrieved and justified by considering the “logic” on which it is based. However, jokes are (...) based on specific pragmatic conditions: they are regarded as arguments grounded on a generalization that is at the same time uncommon, retrievable, and acceptable or plausible for the audience. This perspective integrates the “local logic” of jokes within a broader rhetorical theory that ultimately rests on the communicative notion of common ground. (shrink)

“What is appreciation?” is a basic question in the philosophy of art, and the analogy between appreciating a work of art and getting a joke can help us answer it. We first propose a subjective account of aesthetic appreciation (I). Then we consider jokes (II). The difference between getting a joke and not, or what it is to get it right, can often be objectively articulated. Such explanations cannot substitute for the joke itself, and indeed may undermine (...) the very power of the joke to evoke an appropriate response. Sometimes the discourse of art critics can have a similar effect. We therefore explore the analogy between getting jokes and appreciating works of art (III), and find it unexpectedly strong. Finally (IV), we consider Wittgensteinian grounds for thinking as we do, considering the language game of joke-telling, the relevance of seeing aspects, and giving reasons. (shrink)

I argue that the philosophy of Jorge Portilla can help us understand the current social and political conditions of the United States. In particular, I draw from Portilla's account of relajo and his writing on community as horizon. I argue that Portilla's account of the person who engages in relajo accurately describes the character of individuals posting on various online spaces, particularly 4chan. Integral to Portilla's analysis of relajo is a disavowal of agency and a recognition of the affective forces (...) that lead individuals to participate in these spaces: the disavowal of one's agency does not mean that one stops having desires and resentments. A continuous disavowal of one's agency and one's responsibility to account for these affects places one in a position where one's agency can be hijacked and reoriented towards other goals. Hence, Portilla provides us with an analytic framework for understanding how a website that encourages nihilistic humor can be commandeered toward extremist politics. (shrink)

In his “Noesis and Logos in the Eleatic Trilogy, with a Focus on the Visitor’s Jokes at Statesman 266a-d,” Mitchell Miller explores the interplay of intuition and discourse in the Statesman. He prepares by considering the orienting provocations provided by Socrates’ refutations of the proposed definition of knowledge — namely, “true judgment and a logos” — in the closing pages of the Theaetetus, by the Eleatic Visitor’s obscure schematization at Sophist 253d-e of the kinds of eidetic field discerned by dialectic, (...) and by his discussion at Statesman 277a-278e of the use of paradigms. Miller then seeks to show how the Visitor’s odd medley of geometrical and Homeric jokes at Statesman 266a-d aims, in the language of the Seventh Letter, to “spark” an intuition of the nature of statesmanship, an intuition whose “self-nourishing” motivates the subsequent rejection of the initial definition of the statesman as shepherd of the human herd, the turn to the paradigm of the weaver, and the rejection of bifurcatory division in favor of the non-bifurcatory account of the kinds of art that function as the “limbs” of a well-formed city. (shrink)

This treatise deploys Ockham's War—a methodology of aggressive intellectual self-criticism—to demolish the farcical "otrovert" construct emerging in contemporary personality discourse. Through systematic application of Boether's (2025) framework, I expose the otrovert as an intellectual joke, a laughable repackaging of internet-culture's "sigma" personality archetype dressed in pseudo-academic terminology. The analysis reveals the otrovert to be not merely wrong but embarrassingly derivative, representing the apotheosis of pop-psychology's tendency toward manufactured profundity. Having reduced the otrovert to intellectual rubble through systematic skepticism, I (...) propose its replacement with the "Ubervert"—a genuinely transcendent personality configuration that exists beyond traditional categorical constraints. The Ubervert embodies authentic comfort in liminal spaces between conventional binaries: existence/non-existence, happiness/sadness, social/solitary. Unlike the otrovert's pretentious mediocrity, the Ubervert represents the rarest psychological configuration—those who find equanimity in paradox itself. This paper demonstrates how only through the warfare methodology of systematic skepticism can we destroy pseudo-intellectual constructs like the otrovert and clear space for genuine philosophical innovation. (shrink)

The present essay argues that Bergson’s account of the comic can only be fully appreciated when read in conjunction with his later metaphysical exposition of the élan vital in Creative Evolution and then by the account of fabulation that Bergson only elaborates fully three decades later in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The more substantive account of the élan vital ultimately shows that, in Laughter, Bergson misses his own point: laughter does not simply serve as a means for (...) correcting human behavior but is rather the élan vital’s vital summons, the demand of life itself, that human beings challenge their obligations, question their societal forms, and thereby create new and, for Bergson, more ideal forms of life and community. (shrink)

In two very influential papers from 2008, Tamar Gendler introduced the concept of “alief” to describe the mental state one is in when acting in ways contrary to their consciously professed beliefs. For example, if asked to eat what they know is fudge, but shaped into the form of dog feces, they will hesitate, and behave in a manner that would be consistent with the belief that the fudge is really poop. They alieve that it is disgusting, while they believe (...) it is not. This paper investigates laughter from self-proclaimed egalitarian, tolerant folk, in response to oppressive jokes that might fit the alief-model. If I merely alieve the content of a joke at which I laugh, will that constitute morally exculpating reasons for such laughter? And what else might it imply? This paper will provide insights at the intersections of humor studies, ethics, epistemology, phenomenology, and the philosophy of mind, all while being moderately and appropriately amusing. (shrink)

A widely circulated list of spurious proof types may help to clarify our understanding of informal mathematical reasoning. An account in terms of argumentation schemes is proposed.

We live in a world that witnesses an ongoing war between an entitled audience and, for the purposes of this paper, comedians who are too afraid to be vocal in their acts. There is no better time to try and understand the journey of humor- how it has fared in history and how people have reacted to it over time. This paper focuses on the philosophical implications of a joke by trying to break down the concept of humor to (...) its fundamentals. (shrink)

This paper introduces a novel computational theory of humor by formally equating jokes with cognitive bugs - mismatches or misfires within the predictive models of intelligent agents. We argue that humor arises from the sudden detection and resolution of epistemic errors, and that laughter serves as a public signal of successful model correction. By extending this theory to artificial intelligence, we propose that the ability to generate and comprehend jokes constitutes a form of self-debugging and may serve as a proxy (...) indicator for general intelligence. Importantly, we contend that humor has direct implications for AI safety: systems that fail to recognize joke-like incongruities may also overlook critical misalignments between their behavior and human values. We develop a taxonomy of joke types mapped to software bug categories, explore the limits of formalizing funniness, and propose that humor may represent an AI-complete problem. In doing so, we offer both a theoretical lens and a diagnostic framework for assessing epistemic integrity and alignment robustness in advanced AI systems. (shrink)

Thomas Wilk's and Steven Gimbel's In on the Joke: The Ethics of Humor and Comedy, takes on a gargantuan task in less than 140 pages; although, to offer my first nitpick, the font is quite small. Too small, really. The stated objective is to provide a theoretical basis for ethical decisions regarding humor and comedy from everyday situations among non-comedians and non-philosophers to sold-out venues by well-known comedians, and likely, nonphilosophers. One thing that makes the endeavor audacious is that (...) ethics has a long history, and some quite recent as evidenced by so many first-year students in philosophy classes, of being tossed into the realm of extreme relativism and/or pure subjectivism, as if our moral sense were no different from our sense of taste. On top of this, comedy, humor in general, is often thought to be wholly subjective, and, since it is a matter of individual tastes, and there's no accounting for taste, it follows that Wilk and Gimbel are engaged in the hapless task of trying to account for pure opinion using an entirely subjective tool. I find that funny. Perhaps others do as well, but who's to say? Well, Wilk and Gimbel, for two. But, to compound the difficulties, humor is not an "ordinary" speech act with conventional rules of the sort outlined by H.P. Grice and his "Cooperative Principle", where one can be "corrected" for flaunting the conversational regulations of clarity, precision, and truth, for example. So, it is not obvious that our "ordinary" ethical assumptions can (or should at all) apply to humorous speech or performance. Yet, humor is employed everyday, likely by everyone in some fashion to some degree. We are ensconced in humor, almost as much as we are in language as such, and because of this, we might fail to recognize the moral implications of our attempts at humor. Or, if we do think about them, especially the putatively humorous acts of others that are composed of content about which we disagree, we proclaim that such acts constitute a moral harm, and we're outraged enough to jump on the hashtag-cancel-bandwagon. Or, if we happen to be superfans of the comedian in potential moral peril, we proclaim that it was "just a joke", and so it would be silly to invoke censure of any kind, much less moral. Sometimes our reactions in either case might be justified. But when and why? (shrink)

Mobsters and others engaged in risky forms of social coordination and coercion often communicate by saying something that is overtly innocuous but transmits another message ‘off record’. In both ordinary conversation and political discourse, insinuation and other forms of indirection, like joking, offer significant protection from liability. However, they do not confer blanket immunity: speakers can be held to account for an ‘off record’ message, if the only reasonable interpreta- tions of their utterance involve a commitment to it. Legal liability (...) for speech in the service of criminal behavior displays a similar profile of significant protection from indirection along with potential liability for reasonable interpretations. Specifically, in both ordinary and legal contexts, liability depends on how a reasonable speaker would expect a reasonable hearer to interpret their utterance in the context of utter- ance, rather than on the actual speaker’s claimed communicative intentions. (shrink)

Scholastic philosophers can be quite funny. What’s more, they have good reason to be: Aristotle himself lists ready wit (eutrapelia) among the virtues, as a mean between excessive humor and its defect. Here, I assess Scholastic discussions of humor in theory, before turning to examples of it in practice. The last and finest of these is a joke, hitherto unacknowledged, which Aquinas makes in his famous Five Ways. Along the way, we’ll see (i) that the history of philosophy is (...) not so hostile to humor as is commonly supposed; and (ii) that the competing theories of humor like the Incongruity Theory and the Release Theory are not altogether incompatible. We’ll also see at least one example of an apparent attempt by modern translators to excise humor from a medieval text. Our considerations will open a window into what oral discussion and debate at medieval universities was actually like, and how we should understand the relationship between the texts we have now and the exchanges that actually occurred then. (shrink)

Metaphorical statements surprise us as literal falsehoods, but the interpretation reveals a special motive for the figurative use of the language. Donald Davidson objects to nonliteral meaning: “to suppose a metaphor can be effective only by conveying a coded message is like thinking a joke or a dream makes some statement which a clever interpreter can restate in plain prose.” Taking this remark as my starting point I analyze interpretative strategies for metaphors, jokes, riddles and counterfactual conditionals – all (...) of them involve an initial incongruity and most of them require a certain blending of two different domains. I suggest that the ability to interpret metaphors is based on our ability to apprehend a special cognitive content associated with metaphors. (shrink)

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the (...) bedrock of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.

The joke among scientists is that ‘philosopher’ is the last stage of one’s scien- tific career, to be arrived at when one can no longer get grants funded or graduate stu- dents to advise. Despite the fact that some of the greatest minds in evolutionary biology (from Darwin to Ernst Mayr) were very much interested in the philosophical aspects of what they were doing, the bad joke persists in the halls of academia.

In February or March 2023, I went shopping for a mother's day card. I could not find any at a local shop and made an inquiry at the counter. The till worked said there were none. I picked up a card which said, "To my wife," brought it to the counter and said, "This might work for someone," alluding to the Oedipus myth. Pleased with my joke, I bought the card. I put it on a mattress next to mine (...) and also another curious card I found. In April 2023, I found they were missing and contacted the police. I asked them if an ELECTRONIC bug could be sent under the door of my apartment and remove the card. In September 2023, I was admitted to North Manchester General Hospital with mental health difficulties and my question was used as evidence of severe mental disorder. I said (a) that the bug question expressed a hypothesis, not a belief; and (b) I abandoned the hypothesis after talking to the police. (From my earlier reading on philosophy of psychiatry, delusions are supposed to be robust: the delusional subject does not abandon them. By the way, Sean Crawford, alarmed, said: you are working on that now!) I was troubled by the fact that my hypothesis was taken as evidence of paranoia and repeatedly asserted its status as hypothesis, but the consultant psychiatrist said that most people don't consider such a hypothesis. (Through my sister in October 2023, I learnt of another psychiatric response: "you acted on the hypothesis - you called the police." But the cards have never been found: it was entirely reasonable for me to call the police and I had other hypotheses, such as ordinary theft. By the way, it is not as if I am married and the to-my-wife card is normal in my home. NONE of these people asked about what was lost and whether it was found.) In a previous contribution, I have raised a concern about the NMGH consultant psychiatrist's appeal to what is normal versus my hypothesis (entitled "Hypotheses as evidence for madness, Humeans"). Here I will raise much the same concern with different detail: if you work in various areas of philosophy, you may well entertain hypotheses that are NOT normally considered in this situation going by statistics. Consider epistemology and philosophy of science, the second area being one I regularly write in. And you might naively introduce one of the less statistically normal hypotheses to a police officer, but certainly not one out-there by the standards of philosophy (evil demons manipulating your perceptual experience, brains-in-vats, etc.). This is especially likely if you believe your work to be of practical relevance, contrary to the common image of philosophy. (By the way, various philosophers would argue that it is rational, given our commonsense starting point, to ignore demons and brains-in-vats hypotheses, BUT do any think it is rational to ignore the electronic bug hypothesis in my 2023 position? The extent to which these people incentivize conformity to an extremely narrow standard of normality, by light or heavy means! "No, it's just for you in that situation." Really? I believe pastoral-lover Elizabeth Gaskell kept a cow in her garden in industrial Manchester!). (shrink)

The world provides us with an ocean of opportunities for fitting emotion. But we are beings with limited emotional resources, so missed opportunities are common. This chapter argues that these failures to take up fitting emotions are very frequently unfitting in their own right—so frequently, in fact, that most of us lead lives replete with unfitting absences of emotion. It begins by showing that, whenever an emotion can be unfitting in virtue of being too weak, the absence of that emotion (...) can also be unfitting, and for just the same reason. But emotional responses to a host of everyday objects—a funny joke, a nasty insult, and so on—can be unfittingly weak. This means that failures to respond emotionally to an enormous host of everyday objects are similarly unfitting. (shrink)

The ancient Chinese text theZhuangziraises a mix of epistemological, psychological, and conceptual challenges against the value and usefulness of philosophical disputation. But instead of advocating the elimination of philosophy, it implicitly embraces a broader conception of philosophy, the goal of which is to engage us to reflect on our limitations, question things we take for granted, and better appreciate alternative perspectives and possibilities. Philosophy thus understood is compatible with a variety of methods and approaches: fictions, jokes, paradoxes, spiritual exercises, argument, (...) disputation, and so on. Philosophical practices, on this view, also pave the way for an open‐minded, adaptive and flexible way of living that is at the core of the Zhuangist good life. (shrink)

I open with a contrast between the Searle-Derrida debate and British social anthropology’s opposition to cultural studies. My paper features an attempt at synthesis between the rival camps in the latter debate, which will be its most important material for some readers. Then I turn to someone much studied by Cultural Studies, it seems. Madonna has done stand-up comedy on The Tonight Show starring Jimmy Fallon. I have done some stand-up comedy myself. I think Madonna has used a rational strategy: (...) around 2 minutes in she says, “Please don’t pull me off, I have jokes.” In a gong show, a type of comedy show, audience members have the power to get rid of a comedian before their maximum allocated time is up, e.g. 5 minutes. Audiences at some gong shows are told to give comedians a minute or two to settle in, rather than making an instant assessment. So she takes risks earlier and around 2 minutes Madonna goes for heavy-hitting moves to keep the audience on side: in her case, discussion of the paintings she owns. I have never used this strategy myself, although I asked a fellow comedian and he told me “Just do your best stuff from the start.” That is good advice for me. (shrink)

The published works of scientists often conceal the cognitive processes that led to their results. Scholars of mathematical practice must therefore seek out less obvious sources. This article analyzes a widely circulated mathematical joke, comprising a list of spurious proof types. An account is proposed in terms of argumentation schemes: stereotypical patterns of reasoning, which may be accompanied by critical questions itemizing possible lines of defeat. It is argued that humor is associated with risky forms of inference, which are (...) essential to creative mathematics. The components of the joke are explicated by argumentation schemes devised for application to topic-neutral reasoning. These in turn are classified under seven headings: retroduction, citation, intuition, meta-argument, closure, generalization, and definition. Finally, the wider significance of this account for the cognitive science of mathematics is discussed. (shrink)

I feel you don’t like this kind of stuff, PhilPapers Editors, and seemingly one of my friends does not, but some of my other friends do I suspect: they love it even! I present a paper which on the one hand shows considerable evidence of social intelligence. The author is able to realize why jokes cause offence and the various motives for telling jokes which potentially cause offence and even unconscious attitudes. On the other hand, taking the author’s writing at (...) face value, he does not appear to understand that his abstract will trigger certain expectations and furthermore that the order of discussion he specifies, in combination with the abstract, will. Paradoxically, on the one hand he is able to mind read so well; on the other hand so poorly! My apologies to all concerned. (shrink)

We care about whether the people around us can take a joke. And this care has a moral tinge to it: we're more likely to trust good-humoured people, and are prone to accusing humourless people of being ‘sanctimonious buzzkills’ who need to ‘get over themselves’. But are these moralized reactions justified? And what, if anything, justifies them? This paper discusses the moral value of humour in terms of its connection to mutual recognition: by engaging humourlessly with one another, we (...) are afforded a quick and dirty way to share perspectives in the way that relationships of mutual recognition often require. (shrink)

The verb to legitimate is often used in political discourse in a way that is prima facie perplexing. To wit, it is often said that an actor legitimates a practice which is officially prohibited in the relevant context – for example, that a worker telling sexist jokes legitimates sex discrimination in the workplace. In order to clarify the meaning of statements like this, and show how they can sometimes be true and informative, we need an explanation of how something that (...) is officially illegitimate can have a kind of ersatz legitimacy conferred on it, and how this can occur even when the actor ‘doing the legitimating’ lacks formal authority. I examine one putative explanation centred around the phenomenon of normalization, and I highlight some advantages that this account has in comparison to an alternative explanation, one that makes reference to the phenomenon of licensed authority. (shrink)

This paper responds to the popular singer Madonna’s attempt at stand up comedy, or one of her attempts at least. The audiences for comedy, in my experience, are mostly young people - 20 somethings or early 30 somethings - and Madonna is surely an expert at winning over such audiences, but her comedy seems suited for older audiences with more experience of life. Strange for someone with a reputation for business shrewdness: I present this as a dilemma. After addressing it, (...) I introduce the suspicion that under the pressures of the comedian system (hostile audiences), Madonna will feel disposed to move towards more one liners - brief jokes - but this makes it hard to allow her to share her rich vat of experiences in comedic form: a project surely of artistic value. On the other hand, by doing one liners she stands more chance of amusing diverse audiences and she stands greater chance of social justice: we can track new one liners, given what we know and give her credit as a comedic craftswoman. (shrink)

Autistic speakers commonly report feelings of being misunderstood. Where communication is concerned, such misunderstandings manifest when the communicative intentions of an autist—i.e., an autistic person—are misinterpreted by their interlocutor(s). While in some cases this can lead to seemingly benign kinds of miscommunication, such as when someone takes what was intended as a genuine assertion or question as a joke, the same basic phenomenon can also lead to illegitimate criticism of the autist—e.g., for being ‘rude’ or ‘weird’. I argue that (...) such misunderstandings, given their frequency, cause serious harm to members of the autistic community and propose that the frequency of autists being so misunderstood can be explained by a sort of intellectual arrogance often exhibited by allistic (non-autistic) interlocutors. Allistic speakers have a tendency to smuggle certain assumptions into the conversational backdrop because they take these assumptions to simply be matters of ‘common sense’. Yet—as far as I am aware—no principled, much less predictive, account has been provided to explain where such assumptions are actually coming from. My suggestion is that the dogmatic way that allistic speakers tend to rely on their ‘common sense’ assumptions in the interpretation of conversational exchanges opens them up to misunderstanding the intentions of others in potentially harmful ways. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate whether verbal humour can serve as a subversive tool for feminist aims. I examine standard theories by Raskin and Attardo that regard opposing scripts as the essential property of verbal humour. Challenging script opposition and shifting the focus on conceptual re-evaluation, I refer to an alternative theory, proposed by Bing and Scheibman. Their model of blended spaces builds on the cognitivist theory of conceptual blending, where frames from established domains are combined to yield hybrid frames. (...) By laying emphasis on the generation of new meaning in humorous communication, this model proves to be suitable for a purposeful investigation of subversive humour. I critically address the question how fictional narratives of verbal humour may have an impact on real social circumstances and argue that the politically relevant aspect of verbal humour lies the oscillation between conceptual play and linguistic efficacy. Though not all subversive humour is feminist or politically productive, the conclusion shows that joking, as a practice of re-signification, allows women* and other marginalised groups, who are typically excluded from active participation in the language game of joking, to playfully challenge the status quo. Possibly initiating changes in the shared understanding of our concepts. (shrink)

I didn't make a mistake in using "too" rather than "two": it is a philosophical joke. Are video games art? A response offered by various contributors to this question is that art and games are two different things. Various supposed differences are appealed to in order to establish their mutual exclusivity. And the conclusion sounds initially plausible: when one thinks of art, what comes to mind first and foremost are these things, and when one thinks of games, what comes (...) to mind first and foremost are other things - the lists are totally different. But I feel it is important for assessors of this debate to realize something. If one is making a video game with graphics, one has considerable space for visual artistic expression or representation. I also propose that sole authored video games can better express unconscious contents. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The logic of humor has been acknowledged as an essential dimension of every joke. However, what is the logic of jokes, exactly? The modern theories of humor maintain that jokes are characterized by their own logic, dubbed “pseudo,” “playful,” or “local,” which has been the object of frequent criticisms. This article intends to address the limitations of the current perspectives on the logic of jokes by proposing a rhetorical approach to humorous texts. Building on the traditional development of (...) Aristotle’s almost neglected view of jokes as surprising enthymemes, the former are analyzed as rhetorical arguments. Like enthymemes, jokes are characterized by natural inferences that can be represented as topics, and quasi-formalized in argumentation theory as argumentation schemes. Like rhetorical arguments, jokes express a reason in support of different types of conclusions and proceed from distinct kinds of reasoning and semantic relations. (shrink)

At first glance, hate speech and microaggressions seem to have little overlap beyond being communicated verbally or in written form. Hate speech seems clearly macro-aggressive: an intentional, obviously harmful act lacking the ambiguity (and plausible deniability) of microaggressions. If we look back at historical discussions of hate speech, however, many of these assumed differences turn out to be points of similarity. The harmfulness of hate speech only became widely acknowledged after a concerted effort by critical race theorists, feminists, and other (...) activists. Before the 1990s, slurs were widely considered socially acceptable behavior: mere jokes that weren’t intended to be harmful. Authors like Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda, and Charles Lawrence pushed back against this dismissal. In this chapter, I show that their arguments for the serious harmfulness of hate speech prefigure and provide support for current debates about the serious harmfulness of microaggressions. Exploring resonances with the 1980s hate speech debate will allow us to explain why microaggressions fall below the cutoff for legal liability but remain apt targets for moral blame. (shrink)

This paper presents some counterexamples to Bergson’s thesis that we laugh when a human being behaves as if he (or she) were a simple machine. The first counterexample concerns laughing in anticipation of the amusing jokes and anecdotes that a man of a certain visage certainly knows. The second counterexample concerns laughing at the ability to overcome defensive behaviour in a foreign land: one merely laughs without actually doing the planned overcoming. The third counterexample concerns laughing at insensible projects that (...) you will surely also attempt. (shrink)

Are the long, wildly inventive etymologies in Plato’s Cratylus just some kind of joke, or does Plato himself accept them? This standard question misses the most important feature of the etymologies: they are a competitive performance, an agôn by Socrates in which he shows that he can play the game of etymologists like Cratylus better than they can themselves. Such show-off performances are a recurrent feature of Platonic dialogue: they include Socrates’ speeches on eros in the Phaedrus, his rhetorical (...) discourse in the Menexenus, and his literary interpretation in the Protagoras. The paper compares these cases to work out the ground rules, purposes and implications of the Platonic agôn, and the Cratylus etymologies in particular. (shrink)

To become a public figure or celebrity, I claim, is to exist alongside a zombie version of yourself. This zombie shares the same name and physical likeness but operates independently of its flesh-and-blood counterpart. In fact, public figures do not have any special authority over the zombie version of themselves, and in some contexts, they enjoy less authority over their zombie counterparts than others do. In the US, for example, public figures are not legally entitled to protections against criticism via (...) parody, which can include unauthorized use of their likeness for offensive images, insulting jokes, and other forms of public mockery. As Michel Foucault observed, a work is entitled to become the “murderer” of its author, which suggests that the author’s name exists among the living dead. An artist’s works can bear their name yet operate independently of their attitudes or mental states. In June of 2019, the master rights to Taylor Swift’s first six albums were sold without her knowledge or consent, effectively “murdering” her rights as their author. Swift’s 2019 decision to re-record her first six studio albums can thus be understood as an act of institutional revenge, a way to get back at the people who have wielded power over her and the institutions that enable exploitation—a battle with her zombified works: the “stolen” original albums. In this chapter I sketch an institutional theory of celebrity names to explain the institutional, personal, and political significance of self-appropriation, using Taylor Swift’s act of re-recording her own music as a paradigm case. (shrink)

My objective here is to give an account of self-deprecating humor—examining what works, what doesn't, and why—and to reflect on the significance of the audience response. More specifically, I will be focusing not only on the purpose or intention behind self-deprecating jokes, but considering how their consequences might render them successful or unsuccessful. For example, under what circumstances does self-deprecation tend to put listeners at ease, and when is this type of humor more likely to put people off? I will (...) also consider the ways in which self-deprecating jokes are similar to gallows humor, and the extent to which context counts. The target or "butt" of these jokes, in cases of self-deprecation as well as gallows humor, will be explored; as will whether or not the audience bears some responsibility or has a role to play in the ultimate success or failure of a joke. For instance, is the audience role a completely receptive and passive one? Is the joker/jokee relationship one which confers no responsibility on the listener whatsoever? Or, do listeners have an obligation to respond with appreciative laughter to mere attempts at humor, especially the self-deprecating sort, by accepting such levity in the spirit in which it is intended? Does this mean that being a good sport—responding generously or appreciatively when a well-intentioned joke fails to land—would be a habit worth cultivating? If so and courtesy laughter or a playful appreciation of self-deprecating humor is something that can be cultivated, what specifically would that entail? In sum, although I cannot fully or definitively answer each and every one of these questions, I do hope to provide some provisional responses. To better situate the nature of self-deprecation, I will not only provide a brief description of the gallows genre, I will also explore two traditional theories of humor. Those that are particularly relevant, to both gallows and self-deprecating humor are Freud's relief theory and the incongruity view. In addition, I will identify what I believe to be the three essential ingredients of successful self-deprecation and, finally, will conclude with the argument that audiences or listeners do have an important role to play. And, moreover, that generous, appreciative laughter can and should be cultivated—even though this is something that will largely depend on one's personal history and habits, dispositional character and cultural background. (shrink)

Aristotle claims, in his Nicomachean Ethics, that in addition to being, for example, just and courageous, and temperate, the virtuous person will also be witty. Very little sustained attention, however, has been devoted to explicating what Aristotle means when he claims that virtuous persons are witty or to justifying the plausibility of the claim that wittiness is a virtue. It becomes especially difficult to see why Aristotle thinks that being witty is a virtue once it becomes clear that Aristotle’s witty (...) person engages in what he calls ‘educated insolence’. Insolence, for Aristotle, is a form of slighting which, as he explains in the Rhetoric, generally causes the person slighted to experience shame and anger. In this paper, I attempt to bring some clarity to Aristotle’s claim that being witty is a virtue by examining why Aristotle thinks that the object of a witty person’s raillery will find this joking pleasant. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the conditions under which light teasing, irony, and joking (hereafter referred to as banter)—despite containing elements of aggression—can be interpreted favorably, by modeling them through the dynamics of interpersonal relations. -/- Rather than treating banter as mere play or a tool for compatibility screening, the paper conceptualizes it as an intentional perturbation of relational equilibrium, through which recovery potential and permissible deviation width are jointly assessed. To ensure analytical consistency, all examples are unified under the form of (...) paradoxical praise. -/- It is shown that an identical form of deviation may function as (i) shared elasticity in private and symmetric relationships, (ii) a ritual of repair in temporally separated relations, (iii) a response task within institutional environments, and (iv) an affiliation ritual when normalized at the group level. Through this framework, the paper clarifies the effective scope and ethical limits of banter, particularly with respect to residual power, continuous load, and asymmetrical cost allocation. (shrink)

It is trivially true that comedians make jokes and thus are not serious; they are “just playing.” But watching Louis CK, especially his performances in Chewed Up, Shameless, and Hilarious, it is evident that he has more in mind than simply getting his audience to frivolously guffaw. I will make the case that this is so given the content of some of his humor which centers on areas of socio-political-ethical tensions that can be uncomfortable when addressed in a direct, “bona-fide” (...) communicative mode. I will concentrate upon his playful, yet serious, account of issues surrounding race and privilege which, though not obvious center-pieces, can be found in almost all of his performances. These are complex areas that are not obvious fodder for humor, and it is clear that his comedic repertoire is broad enough that he is not including these issues for lack of funnier bits. I will argue that through his humor, he at once brings to consciousness hidden biases, challenges them in a subversive manner on behalf of those harmed by cultural stereotypes, e.g., and opens up an otherwise adversarial audience to the possibility that they harbor such unwanted stereotypes—a necessary element in consciousness-raising. My account will require a brief distinction between seriousness and playfulness, a defense of the claim that we are drawn to humor even when it is used to question our cherished presuppositions, and an interpretation of thought experiments that parallels Louis CK’s comedic mechanisms in his stand-up performances and episodes from Louie. In some cases he is explicit that he is just “making shit up” (Oh My God), or, as he cautions in the setup to a story in Shameless, “it doesn’t matter cus’ I’m gonna lie to you.” But that does not take away from my point that he is serious with his humor about social reality in the same way that philosophers have traditionally “made shit up” with thought experiments for serious purposes. Louis CK employs a similar device with his humor, and in many ways is more effective than philosophers in making the implicit explicit for his (much larger) audiences who then spread his word. (shrink)

This research report presents findings about the extent and nature of digital self-harm among New Zealand teens. Digital self-harm is broadly defined here as the anonymous online posting or sharing of mean or negative online content about oneself. The report centres on the prevalence of digital self-harm (or self-cyberbullying) among New Zealand teens (aged 13-17), the motivations, and outcomes related to engaging in this behaviour. The findings described in this report are representative of the teenage population of New Zealand by (...) gender, ethnicity and age. Key findings are: Overall, 6% of New Zealand teens have anonymously posted mean or negative content online about themselves in the past year. Teenagers’ top reasons for this behaviour were: making a joke, wanting to show resilience, looking for friends’ sympathy, and seeking reassurance of friendship. By exploring the nature and extent of this behaviour, we are providing the online safety community, schools and parents with insights about a complex and, to some extent, hidden phenomenon involving New Zealand teens. (shrink)

This afterword to Species and Beyond provides some reflections on species, with special attention to what I think the most significant developments have been in the thinking of biologists and philosophers working on species over the past 25 years, as well as some bad jokes.

Scholars have argued that Plato's decision to include women in the ruling class was either intended as a joke, or else was forced on him by other political commitments. In tis paper, I argue that the arguments he offers for including women in positions of power can and should be taken as sincere.

The Onion, a widely known satirical newspaper, frequently finds its articles taken as the literal truth. One article from May 2011, “Planned Parenthood Opens $8 Billion Abortionplex,” featured teenage girls gushing over the amusement park amenities like a ten-screen theater, nightclub and “lazy river” and a fake PR representative touting, “Whether she’s a high school junior who doesn’t want to go to prom pregnant, a go-getter professional who can’t be bothered with the time commitment of raising a child, or a (...) prostitute who knows getting an abortion is the easiest form of birth control—all are welcome” and “Our hope is for this facility to become a regular destination where a woman in her second trimester can whoop it up at karaoke and then kick back while we vacuum out the contents of her uterus.”The Onion, “Planned Parenthood Opens $8 Billion Abortionplex”. Given the extremity and arguable tastelessness of this joke, it is nearly impossible to imagine this as anything.. (shrink)

Contemporary comedy audiences are accused by some comedians of being too morally sensitive to appreciate humor. To get closer to an idea of what this means, I will first briefly present the argument over audience sensitivity as found in the non-philosophical literature. Second, I then turn to the philosophical literature and begin from the idea that “funny” is a response-dependent property. I present a criticism of this response-dependence account of “funny” based in the claim that funniness is not de- termined (...) by what normal audiences actually laugh at, but by what merits laughter. Third, I argue that excessive or deficient moral sensitivity distorts audience receptivity to humor. Fourth, I turn to candidates for ideally sensitive audiences. I conclude by returning to the particular cases of supposed oversensitivity or undersensitivity to jokes to see how we might judge them. (shrink)

The artform of standup comedy can be seen as having much in common with the discipline of philosophy, particularly with the way philosophy is carried out or “performed,” whether professionally or otherwise. There are, for instance, certain basic similarities between how standup comedians and philosophers value ideals of clarity and precision when it comes to the issue of determining what kind of language is best to employ if one seeks to either effectively deliver a funny joke, as in the (...) case of standup comedy, or if one seeks to effectively articulate and present an argument that can later be assessed as sound, as in the case of philosophy. The reason this is of note is because it is rooted in another similarity that serves not only to bring these two activities significantly closer but to isolate standup comedy from most artforms when it comes to how it conceives of matters pertaining to interpretation and purpose. More specifically, this is the fact that standup comedians and philosophers alike hope, and even expect on some level, that, in the best of cases, their respective jokes and reasoned arguments will compel some form of unanimous approval from those who properly understand and engage with their content. When this observation is combined with the additional observation that jokes can also serve as vehicles for imparting wisdom of a genuinely philosophical nature despite the fact that generating laughter rather than seeking truth per se represents standup comedy’s ostensive primary goal, this leads one to wonder how porous the boundaries that otherwise serve to distinguish these two activities might be. In particular, in light of the nature and scope of the many similarities that can be said to exist between them, which I lay out and discuss in the article, it seems that standup comedy could even be reasonably argued to be the artform closest to philosophy. (shrink)

• It would be a moral disgrace for God (if he existed) to allow the many evils in the world, in the same way it would be for a parent to allow a nursery to be infested with criminals who abused the children. • There is a contradiction in asserting all three of the propositions: God is perfectly good; God is perfectly powerful; evil exists (since if God wanted to remove the evils and could, he would). • The religious believer (...) has no hope of getting away with excuses that evil is not as bad as it seems, or that it is all a result of free will, and so on. Piper avoids mentioning the best solution so far put forward to the problem of evil. It is Leibniz’s theory that God does not create a better world because there isn’t one — that is, that (contrary to appearances) if one part of the world were improved, the ramifications would result in it being worse elsewhere, and worse overall. It is a “bump in the carpet” theory: push evil down here, and it pops up over there. Leibniz put it by saying this is the “Best of All Possible Worlds”. That phrase was a public relations disaster for his theory, suggesting as it does that everything is perfectly fine as it is. He does not mean that, but only that designing worlds is a lot harder than it looks, and determining the amount of evil in the best one is no easy matter. Though humour is hardly appropriate to the subject matter, the point of Leibniz’s idea is contained in the old joke, “An optimist is someone who thinks this is the best of all possible worlds, and a pessimist thinks.. (shrink)