I critically examine some provocative arguments that John Searle presents in his book The Rediscovery of Mind to support the claim that the syntactic states of a classical computational system are "observer relative" or "mind dependent" or otherwise less than fully and objectively real. I begin by explaining how this claim differs from Searle's earlier and more well-known claim that the physical states of a machine, including the syntactic states, are insufficient to determine its semantics. In contrast, his more recent (...) claim concerns the syntax, in particular, whether a machine actually has symbols to underlie its semantics. I then present and respond to a number of arguments that Searle offers to support this claim, including whether machine symbols are observer relative because the assignment of syntax is arbitrary, or linked to universal realizability, or linked to the sub-personal interpretive acts of a homunculus, or linked to a person's consciousness. I conclude that a realist about the computational model need not be troubled by such arguments. Their key premises need further support. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that images, whether in the world or in the head, do not have a privileged analysis into constituent parts. They are thought to lack the sort of syntactic structure necessary for representing complex contents and entering into sophisticated patterns of inference. I reject this assumption. “Image grammars” are models in computer vision that articulate systematic principles governing the form and content of images. These models are empirically credible and can be construed as literal grammars for images. (...) Images can have rich syntactic structure, though of a markedly different form than sentences in language. (shrink)

Turner argues that computer programs must have purposes, that implementation is not a kind of semantics, and that computers might need to understand what they do. I respectfully disagree: Computer programs need not have purposes, implementation is a kind of semantic interpretation, and neither human computers nor computing machines need to understand what they do.

Both string theory and V-JEPA 2 (Meta's self-supervised video learning system) execute the same eight-stage mechanism: (1) inherited structure enters (general relativity as consistency requirement; human-curated categorical structure), (2) formal processing occurs through opaque machinery (duality transformations; latent space operations), (3) provenance is obscured, (4) outputs are misattributed as emergent understanding, (5) practitioners cannot articulate what their systems comprehend, (6) pseudo-explanations are deployed when pressed (anthropic selection; emergence at scale), (7) the frame problem manifests (relevance undeterminable from within), and (8) (...) second-order blindness operates (failures are converted to apparent virtues). The parallel is not analogy but structural identity. Both fields instantiate the mechanistic paradigm's core assumption: that formal operations on discrete structures can ground semantic content. Three impossibility constraints establish why this assumption fails: no representation-manipulating system can ground reference; no statistical learner can acquire normativity; no syntactic engine can enter the space of reasons. Both string theory and self-supervised learning satisfy the antecedents; both exhibit the predicted failures. The convergence is diagnostic. When identical failure modes appear in fundamental physics and artificial intelligence - fields with different histories, methodologies, and practitioners - the failure indicates shared assumptions. The mechanistic paradigm has reached its terminal limit: the structural inability to ground semantics in syntax. String theory's mathematical structures underdetermine physical interpretation. AI's computational patterns underdetermine semantic content. Both paradigms pursue the incoherent aspiration to perspectiveless knowledge; both fail because perspectives are constitutive of understanding. This paper does not claim that string theory's mathematics is erroneous or that AI's engineering is useless. The mathematical tools and pattern-recognition capabilities are genuine achievements. The claim is that these achievements do not constitute what is claimed: physical understanding in string theory, world understanding in AI. Distinguishing achievement from overclaim is essential for deployment decisions, intellectual honesty, and the possibility of genuine progress. The crack runs through two structures. It is the same crack. (shrink)

Many attempts to define depiction appeal to viewers' perceptual responses. Such accounts are liable to give a central role in determining depictive content to picture features responsible for the response, design. A different project is to give a compositional semantics for depictive content. Such attempts identify syntax: picture features systematically responsible for the content of the whole. Design and syntax are competitors. But syntax requires system, in how picture features contribute to content, that design does not. By (...) examining John Kulvicki's semantics for basic depictive content, I argue that the relevant systematicity is absent from the pictorial realm. (shrink)

The ‘syntax’ and ‘combinatorics’ of my title are what Curry (1961) referred to as phenogrammatics and tectogrammatics respectively. Tectogrammatics is concerned with the abstract combinatorial structure of the grammar and directly informs semantics, while phenogrammatics deals with concrete operations on syntactic data structures such as trees or strings. In a series of previous papers (Muskens, 2001a; Muskens, 2001b; Muskens, 2003) I have argued for an architecture of the grammar in which finite sequences of lambda terms are the basic data (...) structures, pairs of terms syntax, semantics for example. These sequences then combine with the help of simple generalizations of the usual abstraction and application operations. This theory, which I call Lambda Grammars and which is closely related to the independently formulated theory of Abstract Categorial Grammars (de Groote, 2001; de Groote, 2002), in fact is an implementation of Curry’s ideas: the level of tectogrammar is encoded by the sequences of lambda-terms and their ways of combination, while the syntactic terms in those sequences constitute the phenogrammatical level. In de Groote’s formulation of the theory, tectogrammar is the level of abstract terms, while phenogrammar is the level of object terms. (shrink)

An essay on Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense and its relation to his idea that "logic must take care of itself". I explain how Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism is supposed to resolve Russell's paradox, and I offer an alternative to Cora Diamond's influential account of Wittgenstein's diagnosis of the error in the so-called "natural view" of nonsense.

Phrase structure trees have a hierarchical structure. In many subjects, most notably in {\bf taxonomy} such tree structures have been studied using ultrametrics. Here syntactical hierarchical phrase trees are subject to a similar analysis, which is much simpler as the branching structure is more readily discernible and switched. The occurrence of hierarchical structure elsewhere in linguistics is mentioned. The phrase tree can be represented by a matrix and the elements of the matrix can be represented by triangles. The height at (...) which branching occurs is not prescribed in previous syntactic models, but it is by using the ultrametric matrix. In other words the ultrametric approach gives a complete description of phrase trees, unlike previous approaches. The ambiguity of which branching height to choose, is resolved by postulating that branching occurs at the lowest height available. An ultrametric produces a measure of the complexity of sentences: presumably the complexity of sentences increases as a language is acquired so that this can be tested. All ultrametric triangles are equilateral or isosceles. Here it is shown that \={X} structure implies that there are no equilateral triangles. Restricting attention to simple syntax a minimum ultrametric distance between lexical categories is calculated. A matrix constructed from this ultrametric distance is shown to be different than the matrix obtained from features. It is shown that the definition of {\sc c-command} can be replaced by an equivalent ultrametric definition. The new definition invokes a minimum distance between nodes and this is more aesthetically satisfying than previous varieties of definitions. From the new definition of {\sc c-command} follows a new definition of of the central notion in syntax namely {\sc government}. (shrink)

Is syntax an evolutionary novelty in the human lineage? This question, along with the question of how human syntax evolved, is highly debated in the field of language evolution. In this paper, I reconstruct two prominent frameworks for studying the evolution of human syntax, which I call “unbounded hierarchy” (Bolhuis et al. 2018) and “compositional semantics” (Townsend et al. 2018). I argue that both frameworks face problems when it comes to explaining the evolution of human syntax. (...) Considering these problems, as well as empirical evidence of hierarchy in nonhuman animals, I provide an alternative framework for studying the evolution of human syntax, which I call “bounded hierarchy”. The bounded hierarchy framework that I propose traces the evolutionary origins of human syntax to simpler forms of bounded hierarchy that may be present in extant nonhuman animals. (shrink)

The Frege–Geach problem is often taken to demonstrate a fundamental incompatibility between expressivist accounts of moral language and logical embedding. This paper argues that the problem's persistence reflects misplaced expectations about what natural language syntax can support. Formal logic was developed to supplement ordinary language by enforcing semantic invariance under transformation; treating this engineered invariance as a universal criterion of semantic adequacy reverses the historical lesson. Drawing on the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis, the paper locates moral predicates within a broader (...) class of recruitable expressions — terms whose full evaluative load is attenuated under embedding whilst a thinner structural-inferential skeleton remains available for reasoning. The standard of practical inferential adequacy replaces the demand for semantic identity: what ordinary reasoning requires is not unrestricted invariance but inferential sufficiency. This pattern is not peculiar to moral language; thick evaluative terms, epistemic contestables, and institutional vocabulary exhibit analogous redistribution under embedding. The Frege–Geach problem is dissolved as a demand for unrestricted semantic invariance and resolved insofar as the behaviour it identifies is explained, predicted, and shown to be general. (shrink)

This article analyzes the historical development of the philosophical logic syntax from the standpoint of the unity of historical and logical methods. According to this perspective, there are three types of logical syntax: the elementary subject-predicate, the modified definitivespecificative, and the standard propositional-functional. These types are generalized in the grammatical and mathematical styles of logical syntax. The main attention is paid to two scientific revolutions in elementary subject-predicate syntax, which led to the emergence of modified definitive-specific (...) and standard propositional-functional syntaxes and created the syntactic conditions for the development of contemporary philosophical logic. The specifics of contemporary philosophical logic and the methodological possibilities of its application to philosophical discourse are studied. The article aims to reevaluate the undeservedly forgotten systems of philosophical logic of the continental tradition, created by such prominent representatives as Aristotle, G.W.F. Hegel, and E. Husserl, and to actualize these logics in the context of contemporary philosophical culture. The potential of the above-mentioned logics is not fully involved in the philosophical discourse of modernity, primarily because they primarily used an imperfect elementary subject-predicate syntax and modified definitive-specificative syntax as its slightly improved version. Both syntaxes have one thing in common: the grammatical style of sentence structure. Nevertheless, they also have one common flaw – a high dependence on grammar formalism. As a result, the interaction between these syntaxes and Frege’s standard propositional-functional syntax is impossible, because the latter is based on mathematical formalism, which operates on the philosophical logic of the analytic tradition. The article substantiates the way to solve this problem by constructing a modified subject-predicate syntax of contemporary philosophical logic. This syntax provides information interaction between Aristotle’s elementary subject-predicate syntax, and Frege’s standard propositional-functional syntax based on Hegel’s modified definitive-specificative syntax. The proposed solution to this problem can create new opportunities for complementarity and mutual enrichment between the philosophical logic of continental and analytical traditions. The theoretical basis for the construction and study of contemporary philosophical logic is a functional analysis of contemporary symbolic logic, which improves the grammatical analysis of traditional formal logic. Functional-grammatical analysis is a way to rehabilitate the philosophical logic of the continental tradition. The novelty of this paper lies in the substantiation of the modified subjectpredicate syntax of contemporary philosophical logic. It makes it possible to establish a dialogue between continental and analytical traditions, which is designed to promote the further development of philosophy. (shrink)

Recent advances in artificial intelligence, particularly large language models, have renewed debates about whether AI systems genuinely understand meaning or merely simulate it. This paper offers a novel conceptual framework for clarifying this debate by distinguishing between meaning construction and meaning possession. Drawing on and extending pattern-theoretic insights associated with Ulf Grenander, the paper introduces a three-circle model—syntax, structure, and coherence—to explain how contemporary AI systems generate outputs that are widely experienced as meaningful. The central claim is that modern (...) AI statistically superimposes syntactic order, structural constraint, and global coherence into a single probabilistic surface, thereby producing stable Gestalts of intelligibility. These Gestalts are not random artifacts but converge on a 'sweet spot' shaped by human language use, feedback, and normative expectations. However, while this intersection suffices to construct forms that invite interpretation, it does not suffice for meaning as a lived, owned, or situated phenomenon. The paper argues that meaning emerges only at the level of interpretation, through agents who already possess prior Gestalts grounded in embodiment, practice, and historical continuity. AI systems therefore function as meaning-constructors, not meaning-givers, while humans remain the locus of semantic attribution. This distinction explains both the remarkable power of AI to simulate understanding and the persistent intuition that something essential is missing. By relocating meaning at the interface between statistical construction and human interpretation, the paper provides a non-reductive, non-mystical account of AI's capabilities and limits, with implications for ongoing discussions of intelligence, understanding, and artificial agency. (shrink)

This paper argues that the idea of a computer is unique. Calculators and analog computers are not different ideas about computers, and nature does not compute by itself. Computers, once clearly defined in all their terms and mechanisms, rather than enumerated by behavioral examples, can be more than instrumental tools in science, and more than source of analogies and taxonomies in philosophy. They can help us understand semantic content and its relation to form. This can be achieved because they have (...) the potential to do more than calculators, which are computers that are designed not to learn. Today’s computers are not designed to learn; rather, they are designed to support learning; therefore, any theory of content tested by computers that currently exist must be of an empirical, rather than a formal nature. If they are designed someday to learn, we will see a change in roles, requiring an empirical theory about the Turing architecture’s content, using the primitives of learning machines. This way of thinking, which I call the intensional view of computers, avoids the problems of analogies between minds and computers. It focuses on the constitutive properties of computers, such as showing clearly how they can help us avoid the infinite regress in interpretation, and how we can clarify the terms of the suggested mechanisms to facilitate a useful debate. Within the intensional view, syntax and content in the context of computers become two ends of physically realizing correspondence problems in various domains. (shrink)

Because psychological studies of attention and cognition are most commonly performed within the strict confines of the laboratory or take cognitively impaired patients as subjects, it is difficult to be sure that resultant models of attention adequately account for the phenomenon of effortless attention. The problem is not only that effortless attention is resistant to laboratory study. A further issue is that because the laboratory is the most common way to approach attention, models resulting from such studies are naturally the (...) most widely propagated, these models naturally tend to be biased toward features of attention most amenable to laboratory study, and these models by their implications set the agenda for future study that leads back to the laboratory. In this self-reinforcing system, features of attention not amenable to laboratory study are naturally neglected by researchers. In this chapter, I suggest an alternative model of attention as a heuristic for opening paths to further profitable research. The features of attention emphasized in this model are not new, but the synthesis is novel and sheds some light on issues relevant to the topic of effortless attention. I begin with the five following observations: 1. One naturally pays attention to a task of current interest. 2. There are (at least) two distinct modes of attention—selective and diffuse. 3. Attention is a constantly shifting avenue for the assimilation of information. 4. Information is not forced in from outside but is captured through internal sensitization. 5. Human information processing is fundamentally syntactic. Combining these five observations yields an explanatory model of attention that is not only consistent with the data from the many studies on attention in recent decades but also allows us to investigate the neglected phenomenon of effortless attention. The model relies on the notions of apertures, draw, and syntax and is explicated by addressing each of the above observations in turn. In the final part of the chapter, I explore how the model expands our understanding of effortless attention. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss a new perspective on the syntax-semantics interface. Semantics, in this new set-up, is not ‘read off’ from Logical Forms as in mainstream approaches to generative grammar. Nor is it assigned to syntactic proofs using a Curry-Howard correspondence as in versions of the Lambek Calculus, or read off from f-structures using Linear Logic as in Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG, Kaplan & Bresnan [9]). All such approaches are based on the idea that syntactic objects (trees, proofs, fstructures) (...) are somehow prior and that semantics must be parasitic on those syntactic objects. We challenge this idea and develop a grammar in which syntax and semantics are treated in a strictly parallel fashion. The grammar will have many ideas in common with the (converging) frameworks of categorial grammar and LFG, but its treatment of the syntax-semantics interface is radically different. Also, although the meaning component of the grammar is a version of Montague semantics and although there are obvious affinities between Montague’s conception of grammar and the work presented here, the grammar is not compositional, in the sense that composition of meaning need not follow surface structure. (shrink)

In this article I present the conception of syntax emerging from the “dynamic approach” to syntax and semantics, developed in the last few decades, moving from the critic to the static theories of language, either those developed in the Chomskian framework or those based on Montague’s grammar. I will suggest that this view can be fruitfully compared with Saussure’s position on syntax.

The first aim of the paper is to show that under certain conditions generative syntax can be made suitable for Montague semantics, based on his type logic. One of the conditions is to make branching in the so-called X-bar syntax strictly binary, This makes it possible to provide an adequate semantics for Noun Phrases by taking them as referring to sets of collections of sets of entities ( type <ett,t>) rather than to sets of sets of entities (ett).

The book argues for a reconceptualization of phrase structure so that, rather than combining two elements to make a new one (as Merge does), one element is combined with another becoming part of it. I show how this very simple but quite radical rethinking improves on bare phrase structure in numerous ways, and, with the addition of a very natural constraint on structure building, derives successive cyclicity as a theorem, and opens up the way to a new theoretical typology of (...) islands and their exceptions. (shrink)

The Frege-Geach problem is widely taken to expose a fundamental weakness in expressivist and non-cognitivist accounts of moral language. If moral predicates do not contribute stable truth-conditional content, it is unclear how they can function coherently in embedded contexts such as conditionals, negations, and disjunctions. This paper argues that the force of the problem depends on an overextended demand: that natural language must preserve invariant semantic contribution across unrestricted logical embedding. That demand, I suggest, reflects a projection of formal-logical ideals (...) onto ordinary discourse rather than a neutral criterion of semantic adequacy. Drawing on the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis, I distinguish between Invariant, Contestable, and Fluid expressions, and argue that moral predicates occupy an intermediate position: stable enough to support disagreement, criticism, and deliberation, yet insufficiently invariant to preserve all aspects of their function under formal manipulation. What Frege-Geach reveals, on this view, is not a defect in moral language but a redistribution of semantic roles under syntactic stress. The problem persists because metaethics continues to treat compositional invariance as a universal requirement rather than a local achievement of formal regimentation. (shrink)

A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.

Along with offering an historically-oriented interpretive reconstruction of the syntax of PM (1st ed.), I argue for a certain understanding of its use of propositional function abstracts formed by placing a circumflex on a variable. I argue that this notation is used in PM only when definitions are stated schematically in the metalanguage, and in argument-position when higher-type variables are involved. My aim throughout is to explain how the usage of function abstracts as “terms” (loosely speaking) is not inconsistent (...) with a philosophy of types that does not think of propositional functions as mind- and language-independent objects, and adopts a nominalist/substitutional semantics instead. I contrast PM’s approach here both to function abstraction found in the typed λ-calculus, and also to Frege’s notation for functions of various levels that forgoes abstracts altogether, between which it is a kind of intermediary. (shrink)

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have reopened foundational questions about the nature of language and the locus of innateness. Classical accounts, most prominently those associated with Chomsky's Universal Grammar and its minimalist successors, posit an innate syntactic structure as the basis of language acquisition. However, the ability of LLMs to generate fluent language without an explicitly encoded syntactic module challenges this assumption and invites a theoretical reorientation. This paper advances the thesis that what is innate in humans is (...) not syntax, but a more fundamental faculty of understanding — defined here as the capacity to map signals to intentions within a shared context, enabling appropriate inference and response. We propose a three-layer model in which (1) understanding, rooted in social-intentional cognition, constitutes the innate core; (2) communication emerges as a pre-rational, embodied process involving gesture, gaze, affect, and contextual coordination; and (3) syntax arises as a rational stabilization of these interactions. We further introduce a critical distinction between genuine understanding — grounded in embodied perception, affective salience, and social-intentional cognition — and functional understanding, which LLMs achieve through large-scale pattern matching. Syntax is thus an externalizable crystallization of understanding, not its engine. Empirical anchors from developmental psychology, human interaction, and AI benchmarks support this hierarchy. Pre-linguistic infants demonstrate joint attention and intentional attribution prior to any productive syntax; everyday communication routinely relies on non-syntactic cues; and LLMs exhibit systematic limitations on reformulation-resistant Theory of Mind benchmarks — the signature of functional but not genuine understanding. These findings suggest that while syntax is externalizable and reproducible, genuine understanding remains grounded in embodied, relational, and context-sensitive processes. This reframing relocates the innateness debate from syntactic structure to the capacity for intentionality, with significant implications for both cognitive science and the future of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

In this essay I focus on the idea of the univocity of being, championed by Duns Scotus and given prominence more recently by Deleuze. Although I am interested in how this idea can be established, my primary concern is with something more basic: how the idea can even be properly thought. In the course of exploring this issue, which I do partly by borrowing some ideas about logical syntax from Wittgenstein's Tractatus, I try to show how there can be (...) dialogue between analytic philosophers and those of other traditions. (shrink)

Current theories of grammar handle both extraction and anaphorization by introducing variables into syntactic representations. Combinatory categorial grammar eliminates variables corresponding to gaps. Using the combinator W, the paper extends this approach to anaphors, which appear to act as overt bound variables. [Slightly extended version in Bartsch et al 1989.].

Cappelen and Lepore's "Varieties of Quotation" builds on Davidson (1968, 1979) to give an account of mixed quotation. The result is a rich paper, which introduces interesting data and raises many thought-provoking questions. Given this, I can't possibly discuss the paper in its entirety. Instead, I intend simply to paraphrase their position, develop it a little, and then raise a few concerns.

Current knowledge of the RNA world indicates 2 different genetic codes being present throughout the living world. In contrast to non-coding RNAs that are built of repetitive nucleotide syntax, the sequences that serve as templates for proteins share—as main characteristics—a non-repetitive syntax. Whereas non-coding RNAs build groups that serve as regulatory tools in nearly all genetic processes, the coding sections represent the evolutionarily successful function of the genetic information storage medium. This indicates that the differences in their (...) class='Hi'>syntax structure are coherent with the differences of the functions they represent. Interestingly, these 2 genetic codes resemble the function of all natural languages, i.e., the repetitive non-coding sequences serve as appropriate tool for organization, coordination and regulation of group behavior, and the nonrepetitive coding sequences are for conservation of instrumental constructions, plans, blueprints for complex protein-body architecture. This differentiation may help to better understand RNA group behavioral motifs. (shrink)

Natural recursion in syntax is recursion by linguistic value, which is not syntactic in nature but semantic. Syntax-specific recursion is not recursion by name as the term is understood in theoretical computer science. Recursion by name is probably not natural because of its infinite typeability. Natural recursion, or recursion by value, is not species-specific. Human recursion is not syntax-specific. The values on which it operates are most likely domain-specific, including those for syntax. Syntax seems to (...) require no more (and no less) than the resource management mechanisms of an embedded push-down automaton (EPDA). We can conceive EPDA as a common automata-theoretic substrate for syntax, collaborative planning, i-intentions, and we-intentions. They manifest the same kind of dependencies. Therefore, syntactic uniqueness arguments for human behavior can be better explained if we conceive automata-constrained recursion as the most unique human capacity for cognitive processes. (shrink)

Manfred Eigen employs the terms language and communication to explain key recombination processes of DNA as well as to explain the self-organization of human language and communication: Life processes as well as language and communication processes are governed by the logic of a molecular syntax, which is the exact depiction of a principally formalizable reality. The author of the present contribution demonstrates that this view of Manfred Eigen’s cannot be sufficiently substantiated and that it must be supplemented by an (...) approach based on linguistic pragmatics. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that being in an intentional state is a matter of being related to a sentence in a mental language-a 'Language of Thought' (see especially Fodor 1975, 1987 Appendix; Field 1978). According to this view-which I shall call 'the LT hypothesis'-when anyone has a belief or a desire or a hope with a certain content, they have a sentence of this language, with that content, 'written' in their heads. The claim is meant quite literally: the mental representations that (...) make up the items of this language have semantic and syntactic properties. This is why, according to this view, cognitive psychology does, and should, treat that part of the mind which deals with intentional states as a semantic and a syntactic 'engine'. (shrink)

This paper argues that an AI judge is conceptually undesirable and not just something that lies beyond the state of the art in computer science. In a nutshell, even if an AI system could accurately predict how a good human judge would decide a particular case, its prediction would be the product of correlations between such factors as patterns of syntax in bodies of legal texts. This approach of AI systems is insufficient for basing their output on the sort (...) of rationales that are expected of valid judicial decisions in any desirable legal system. Thus, by their very nature, AI systems are incapable of providing valid legal decisions in any such system. (shrink)

Expressiveness and decidability are two core aspects of programming languages that should be thoroughly known by those who use them; this includes knowledge of their metalanguages a.k.a. formal grammars. The van Wijngaarden grammars (WGs) are capable of generating all the languages in the Chomsky hierarchy and beyond; this makes them a relevant tool in the design of (more) expressive programming languages. But this expressiveness comes at a very high cost: The syntax of WGs is extremely complex and the decision (...) problem for the generated languages is generally unsolvable. With this in mind, I provide here a short primer of the syntax of WGs, which includes syntactic restrictions that guarantee decidability for the corresponding generated languages. (shrink)

Agnosia is characterized by intact sensory perception but impaired semantic mapping, leading to deficits in object, face, auditory, or tactile recognition. This paper proposes a **grammar-based scaffold intervention** that leverages generative syntax to facilitate emergent perception. By encoding sensory features into a formal syntax and using multimodal external scaffolds, such as American Sign Language (ASL), visual-tactile mappings, or symbolic gestures, patients can develop alternative cognitive pathways. This approach allows compensatory learning, enhances affordance detection, and may convert deficits into (...) emergent abilities. The intervention is applicable across multiple agnosia types and provides a theoretical framework connecting neuroplasticity, extended mind, and compensatory cognition. (shrink)

F. H. Bradley argues that any plurality of objects possessing qualities or standing in relations to one another is impossible because it leads to a vicious regress. Bradley’s regress objection continues to draw the attention of some contemporary metaphysicians. I indicate how the problem can be resolved by developing relevant semantic and logical ideas from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein’s deflationary account of truth, together with his view that propositional signs picture or model possible atomic facts, shows how a proposition that (...) seems to ascribe a quality to an object in fact does not. Guided by the semantic principle that the sense and reference of a proposition are determined by the senses and references of its parts, Wittgenstein adopts a convention for eliminating the identity sign in his logical syntax that allows for a regress-free internal realism about relations consisting of true sentences containing relation symbols along with different names or variables for distinct objects. Finally, in a manner reminiscent of Kant’s antinomies, Wittgenstein’s elucidation of necessity and impossibility in terms of sinnlos logical tautology and contradiction, together with his conception of the world as a limited whole, enables him to resist a prima facie powerful Tractarian reductio that Bradley might present in response to Wittgenstein’s apparent claims of metaphysical necessity. (shrink)

This paper brings Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to Sasha Waltz’s dance film S, which focuses on the relation between sexuality and language. Maintaining that movement in cinema takes place in the viewers and not the film, the paper considers how the visual can be deepened to include the ways we move and are moved. Saussure’s insights into language are brought to the sensible, which is here understood in terms of divergences from norms. Though film would seem to privilege vision, viewing this (...) film helps to elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s claim that a film succeeds when it engages the viewer’s embodied understanding, and shifts the norms of the corporeal schema. (shrink)

It is unfashionable to suggest that enactive processes - including some that involve the mirror neuron system - might contribute to the comprehension of sign language. The present essay formulates and defends a version of that unfashionable suggestion, as it applies to certain forms of syntactic processing. There is evidence that has been thought to weigh against any such suggestion, coming from neuroimaging experiments and from the study of Deaf aphasics. In both cases it is shown to be unpersuasive.

This paper explores the impact of furniture and machines on spatial organization and circulation systems in industrial buildings using space syntax analysis. While space syntax research covers various settings, industrial buildings have received limited attention. This study aims to address this gap by examining how machines and furniture influence spatial organization and circulation in two industrial buildings: A Nitrile Glove manufacturing facility and a textile manufacturing factory. The furnished and unfurnished floor plans were analyzed using space syntax (...) software, DepthMapX, with connectivity and agent-based analyses. The results indicate that unfurnished plans have centrally located connectivity values, whereas furnished plans create subspaces with varying connectivity. Agent-based analysis reveals that unfurnished spaces have high density in the center, while furnished spaces distribute density more evenly, resulting in more uniform circulation. This study concludes that industrial building spatial configurations result from a combination of architectural design and the placement of machines and furniture. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of the structure of ‘if’-clauses in noun phrases (N if S) and verb phrases (V if S), labeled ‘conditional predicates’. The analyses are developed in a three-layered architecture for noun phrases (√-n-n∗) and verb phrases (√-v-v∗). I provide evidence from ellipsis and interactions with modifiers which support analogous structures for N if S conditionals and V if S conditionals. In both cases the ‘if’-clause combines with a predicate and is interpreted under the base position of (...) an external argument. I argue that interpretation at the level of the √P and nP/vP are each possible; and the ‘if’-clauses can modify predicates of events, states, and entities. An array of novel corpus data and crosslinguistic data are provided. The data and syntactic results have rich implications for broader work on the semantics of conditionals as well as root meaning, ellipsis, and nominal and verbal predication. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Voynich manuscript should not be approached first as an undeciphered text, but as a visibly organized information architecture. A century of decipherment attempts has generated more speculation than agreement, while the manuscript’s formal structure remains directly observable. Its pages sort themselves into stable visual regimes, its sections exhibit recurrent page templates, and its imagery appears to carry a significant portion of the organizational burden ordinarily assigned to readable language. The paper’s central claim is that the (...) manuscript behaves like a templated operating system for organizing knowledge. Its coherence depends not first on translation, but on repeatable page-forms, countable units, closed-set pressures, and a visual syntax that structures how entries, relations, and procedures appear. The argument proceeds by separating codicological baseline from interpretive inflation, mapping the manuscript’s section-level information architecture, introducing the idea of combinatorial ontology for its composite plant forms, and proposing template friction as a method for inferring architectural priority without decipherment. The result is not a reading of the Voynich text, but a methodological shift: the manuscript is best understood as an unreadable yet visibly structured system in which form, segmentation, and image-bearing syntax carry part of the semantic and operational load. (shrink)

Intertheoretic relations are an important topic in the philosophy of science. However, since their classical discussion by Ernest Nagel, such relations have mostly been restricted to relations between pairs of theories in the natural sciences. In this paper, we present a model of a new type of intertheoretic relation, called 'Montague Reduction', which is assumed in Montague's framework for the analysis and interpretation of natural language syntax. To motivate the adoption of our new model, we show that this model (...) extends the scope of application of the Nagelian (or related) models, and that it shares the epistemological advantages of the Nagelian model. The latter is achieved in a Bayesian framework. (shrink)

Revised version published 2015 as "Instruction Grammar. From Perception via Grammar to Action" Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter. Part I of the book presents my basic assumptions about the syntax-semantics relationship as a competence of language users and compares them with those of the two paradigms that presently account for most theoretical linguistic projects, studies, and publications. I refer to them as Chomskyan Linguistics and Cognitive-Functional Linguistics. I will show that these approaches do not provide the means to accommodate the sociocultural origins (...) of the “linking” competence, creating the need for an alternative approach. While considering these two approaches (sections 2.1 and 2.3), an alternative proposal will be sketched in section 2.2, using the notion of “research programme”. Thus, part I deals mainly with questions of the philosophy of science. Nevertheless, the model underlying the research programme gives structure to the procedure followed throughout the rest of the book, since it identifies the undertaking as multidisciplinary, following from the central roles of perception and action/attribution. This means that approaching the competence of relating form to content as characterized above requires looking into these sub-competences first, since the former draws upon the latter. Part I concludes with the formulation of an action-theoretic vocabulary and taxonomy (section 2.4). This vocabulary serves as the guideline for how to talk about the subject-matter of each of these disciplines. Part II and chapter 3 then deal with the sub-competences that have been identified as underlying linguistic competence. They concern the use of perception, identification/categorization, conceptualization, action, attribution, and the use of linguistic symbols. Section 3.1 in part II deals with perception. In particular, two crucial properties of perception will be discussed: that it consists of a bottom-up part and a top-down part, and that the output of perception is underspecified in the sense that what we perceive is not informative with respect to actional, i.e., socially relevant matters. The sections on perception to some degree anticipate the characterization of conceptualization in section 3.2 because the latter will be reconstructed as simulated perception. The property of underspecification is thus sustained in conceptualization, too. If utterances encode concepts and concepts are underspecified with respect to those matters that are most important for everyday interaction, one wonders how verbal interaction can (actually) be successful. Here is where action competence and attribution come into play (the non-conceptual contents referred to above). I will show that native speakers act and cognize according to particular socio-cognitive parameters, on the basis of which they make socially relevant attributions. These in turn specify what was underspecified about concepts beforehand. In other words, actional knowledge including attribution must complement concepts in order to count as the semantics underlying linguistic utterances. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 develop a descriptive means for semantic contents. I present the inherent structural organization of concepts and demonstrate how the spatial and temporal aspects of conceptualization can be systematically related to the syntactic structures underlying utterances. In particular, I will argue that conceptualization is organized by means of trajector-landmark configurations which can quite regularly be related to parts of speech in syntactic constructions using the notion of diagrammatic iconicity. Given a diagrammatic mapping and conceptualization as simulated perception the utterance thus becomes something like an instruction to simulate a perception. In part III, section 4.1 deals with the question of what the formal constituents of utterances/constructions contribute to the building of a concept from an utterance. In this context a theory of the German dative is presented, based on the theoretical notions developed throughout this work. Section 4.2 sketches the non-formal properties that reduce the remaining underspecification. In this context one of the most fundamental cognitive properties of language users is uncovered, namely their need to find the cause of any event they are cognizing about. I will then outline the consequences of this property for language production and comprehension. Section 4.3 lists the most important linking schemas for German on the basis of the most important constructions, i.e., motivated conceptualization-syntactic construction mappings, and then describes in a step-by-step manner how – from the utterance-as-instruction-for-conceptualization perspective – such an instruction is obeyed, and how such an instruction is built up from the perception of an event, respectively. The last section, 4.4, is dedicated to a discussion of some of the most famous and most puzzling linguistic phenomena which theoretical linguists traditionally deal with. In discussing the formal aspects of the linguistic competence, examples from German are used. (shrink)

We propose the Finite Tree Conjecture: that the set of syntactic trees actually realized in natural language is finite. While generative grammar presumes the infinite productivity of syntax, this assumption may have no empirical basis. The paper outlines reasons from cognitive constraint, corpus observation, and communicative pragmatics that support the plausibility of finiteness. This conjecture reframes the task of grammar: not to explain how more can be generated, but why so little ever is.

This paper highlights a small selection of cases where crosslinguistic insights have been important to big questions in the theory of semantics and the syntax/semantics interface. The selection includes (i) the role and representation of Speaker and Addressee in the grammar; (ii) mismatches between form and interpretation motivating high-placed silent operators for functional elements; and (iii) the explanation of semantic universals, including universals pertaining to inventories, in terms of learnability and the trade-off between informativeness and simplicity.

In this paper, I argue for a modified version of what Devitt calls the Representational Thesis. According to RT, syntactic rules or principles are psychologically real, in the sense that they are represented in the mind/brain of every linguistically competent speaker/hearer. I present a range of behavioral and neurophysiological evidence for the claim that the human sentence processing mechanism constructs mental representations of the syntactic properties of linguistic stimuli. I then survey a range of psychologically plausible computational models of comprehension (...) and show that they are all committed to RT. I go on to sketch a framework for thinking about the nature of the representations involved in sentence processing. My claim is that these are best characterized not as propositional attitudes but, rather, as subpersonal states whose representational properties are determined by their functional role. Finally, I distinguish between explicit and implicit representations and argue that the latter can be drawn on as data by the algorithms that constitute our sentence processing routines. I conclude that skepticism concerning the psychological reality of grammars cannot be sustained. (shrink)

Estonian doesn't have a definite article. Instead, bare singular noun phrases can unambiguously bear either a definite interpretation or an indefinite interpretation. This paper argues that the pragmatic principles governing the felicitous use of three English articles ("a", "the" and "another"), described by A Grønn and KJ Sæbø (2012, 'A, the, another: A game of same and different' Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21, 75-95) can also account for the conditions under which a bare singular noun phrase in Estonian (...) bears a definite or instead an indefinite interpretation. The two languages use the same pragmatic principles to determine the definiteness interpretation of a noun phrase. The difference is just that in English (where definiteness meanings have been lexicalized) these pragmatic principles govern the felicity of article use, whereas in Estonian they govern the interpretation of a bare singular noun phrase. (shrink)

This paper presents EQLM, a neural architecture designed as the computational implementation of Consciousness + Conflict Theory (C+C Theory). Where C+C Theory models consciousness as a recursive self-dialogue loop and operationalizes conflict as a functional proxy for subjective experience, EQLM instantiates those principles as trainable structure: a bidirectional LAS Network (Luci Alignment System) handles comprehension, a smaller causal LM Transformer handles articulation, and asymmetric cross-attention bridges create continuous bidirectional exchange between the two during a single forward pass. M.I.N. (Main Intuition (...) Network) accumulates conflict signal as intuition through Hebbian learning, converting accumulated experience into wisdom injected at every layer of the LAS. Alignment logic is expressed in EQLang, a domain-specific language whose programs run live alongside the model, making behavioral constraints readable and editable as source code rather than emergent weight patterns. The architecture has been trained from scratch at 109M and ~11B parameters, demonstrating that the understanding-heavy design scales predictably: the LAS holds 74% of parameters at 109M and 88.6% at 11B. This paper documents the bridge between the theoretical framework established in German (2025a) and the empirical validation in German (2026b), and the purpose-built architecture that follows from both. (shrink)