Humans and AI systems are usually portrayed as separate sys- tems that we need to align in values and goals. However, there is a great deal of AI technology found in non-autonomous systems that are used as cognitive tools by humans. Under the extended mind thesis, the functional contributions of these tools become as essential to our cognition as our brains. But AI can take cognitive extension towards totally new capabil- ities, posing new philosophical, ethical and technical chal- lenges. To (...) analyse these challenges better, we define and place AI extenders in a continuum between fully-externalized systems, loosely coupled with humans, and fully-internalized processes, with operations ultimately performed by the brain, making the tool redundant. We dissect the landscape of cog- nitive capabilities that can foreseeably be extended by AI and examine their ethical implications. We suggest that cognitive extenders using AI be treated as distinct from other cognitive enhancers by all relevant stakeholders, including developers, policy makers, and human users. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis maintains that the functional contributions of tools and artefacts can become so essential for our cognition that they can be constitutive parts of our minds. In other words, our tools can be on a par with our brains: our minds and cognitive processes can literally ‘extend’ into the tools. Several extended mind theorists have argued that this ‘extended’ view of the mind offers unique insights into how we understand, assess, and treat certain cognitive conditions. In this (...) chapter we suggest that using AI extenders, i.e., tightly coupled cognitive extenders that are imbued with machine learning and other ‘artificially intelligent’ tools, presents both new ethical challenges and opportunities for mental health. We focus on several mental health conditions that can develop differently by the use of AI extenders for people with cognitive disorders and then discuss some of the related opportunities and challenges. (shrink)

This doctoral thesis examines the phenomenon of Filipinization, specifically understood as the ideological construction of a “Filipino identity” or ‘Filipino subject-consciousness” within the highly determinate context provided by the Filipino ilustrado nationalists such as José Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar and their fellow propagandists inasmuch as it leads to the nineteenth (19th) century construction of the modern Philippine nation. Utilizing Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive thinking, this study undertakes a genealogical critique engaged on the concrete historical examination of what is meant (...) by the term “Filipino” across a select historical timeline (1864-1898) and the various notions of Filipino identity implied by the different contexts within which the term “Filipino” has been employed. More specifically, it undertakes a selective philosophical excavation of three seminal texts in the history of Filipinization, viz.: 1) the Manifiesto of Padre Jose Burgos; 2) the writings of the Filipino ilustrados in La Solidaridad; and 3) Jose Rizal’s Annotations on Dr. Antonio de Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas. -/- The philosophical claim of this work is the idea that Filipinization, taken as the differential construction of Filipino identity, is the effective translation of the colonial epistemic violence of Eurocentric racism and its consequent “horror of absolutism” into the homo-hegemony of Filipino nationalisms. By fetishizing the notion of a carefully constructed and essential “Filipino-identity,” Filipinization and the current nationalist discourses that utilize them, unwittingly, stands complicit with the same colonial violence and hegemony that they wish to combat. This happens precisely when the very structures of colonial oppression, on the ideological and practical levels, are transmogrified into nationalist ideals that assume legal and political power unto themselves in a self-referential and self-legitimating fashion. -/- Three processes will demonstrate the above thesis: first, by examining historical texts and setting itself against established nationalist historiographies, a genealogical analysis of the term “Filipino” reveals it as a pliable signifier whose semantics have evolved through time. From its originary referent in the Spanish criollo (creole), it has come to refer to people who would have been otherwise entirely alien to this class, viz., the mestizos (both Spanish and Chinese), the principalia (native elite), and eventually, the lowland Catholicized natives themselves. The historical hermeneutic of this identity-discourse in Padre José Burgos’ Manifiesto yields the fact that what gives the term “Filipino” its semantic consistency as a class concept is its essential constitution as a Hispanic and Catholic identity. -/- Second, from this semantic identification of the term “Filipino” as a Hispano-Catholic identity, we proceed to clarify the meaning of Filipinization in terms of the nationalist propaganda carried out by the Filipino ilustrados in the fortnightly periodical La Solidaridad. Here, the specific ilustrado construction of Filipino identity as a Spanish citizen (ciudadano Español) is revealed precisely as a political and legal construct that served as the basis for their own politics of social inclusion/exclusion. Filipinization can only be applied to those who have been hispanized and Christianized and never to those tribes who have resisted and remained outside Spanish colonial authority. Filipinization is thus revealed as a process of Hispanization and Christianization whereby the recipients of Spanish colonial hegemony are transformed into the religiously docile bodies of the Spanish Empire. -/- From this highly determinate context, the study proceeds to examine Rizal’s ontological grounding of collective Filipino-ness in the mythological construction of the pre-hispanic past as the source of a unique Filipino ancestrality. In his work on de Morga’s Sucesos, what is revealed is a mythologization that grounds a native, essential Filipino identity within a past unscathed by the Spanish colonial experience. Such mythologization, however, can only be possible through an anachronistic nationalist interpretation of historical data. Here, Filipinization is revealed as an exclusive prerogative, a nationalist program by which Rizal and the ilustrado class can combat the evils and excesses of the Spanish colonial enterprise. Ironically, though, this same struggle for emancipation also became an instrument by which the ilustrado class can retain their unjustified position of power over those who belonged to the colonial underside, thus, securing the possibility of perpetuating their own ilustrado bourgeois class interests. -/- Such discursive complicity is the essence of the myth of Filipinization: it presents nationalist identity discourse as an anti-colonial enterprise while being underlined by an economy of motives designed to cater primarily to the exclusive interests of the elite and ilustrado class. Thus, instead of securing the genuine, inclusive emancipation of all colonial subjects and a more humane existence for the poor and suffering majority, ilustrado nationalism has, ironically, merely reinforced those operative structures of colonial discrimination and oppression when the ilustrados: 1) grounded their racial theory upon the very same discourse of Eurocentric superiority that they are precisely supposed to question and 2) claimed a patrimony over Filipinas as their exclusive sovereign inheritance. These two factors illustrate how the manifest transfer of power from the Spanish Empire to the Philippine sovereign nation (and later as a nation-state) illustrate how Filipinization merely has transmogrified the face of Spanish colonialism into its new, subtle, and worse form in Filipino nationalism. -/- In this vein, the existence of the 19th century modern Philippine nation merely masked and deferred the crisis that was supposed to transfer power from the Spanish Empire to the multitude of the poor and suffering native indio majority. This crisis became all the more difficult to address be-cause of the duplicitous character of the discourse of Filipinization itself. It has not only effectively transferred power into the hands of the nationalist elite but also captured authentic emancipatory discourse within the identity-trap against which it can only hope to get out. This study concludes with the claim about the impossibility of ever escaping and overcoming the epistemic and practical violence necessarily contained within the historical discourse of colonialism. Or simply, we have no language or discourse that would enable us to overcome the complicity of Filipinization with the very (epistemic) violence against which it has set itself. (shrink)

Proceedings of the papers presented at the Symposium on "Revisiting Turing and his Test: Comprehensiveness, Qualia, and the Real World" at the 2012 AISB and IACAP Symposium that was held in the Turing year 2012, 2–6 July at the University of Birmingham, UK. Ten papers. - http://www.pt-ai.org/turing-test --- Daniel Devatman Hromada: From Taxonomy of Turing Test-Consistent Scenarios Towards Attribution of Legal Status to Meta-modular Artificial Autonomous Agents - Michael Zillich: My Robot is Smarter than Your Robot: On the Need for (...) a Total Turing Test for Robots - Adam Linson, Chris Dobbyn and Robin Laney: Interactive Intelligence: Behaviour-based AI, Musical HCI and the Turing Test - Javier Insa, Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Sergio España - David Dowe and M.Victoria Hernandez-Lloreda: The anYnt Project Intelligence Test (Demo) - Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Javier Insa, David Dowe and Bill Hibbard: Turing Machines and Recursive Turing Tests — Francesco Bianchini and Domenica Bruni: What Language for Turing Test in the Age of Qualia? - Paul Schweizer: Could there be a Turing Test for Qualia? - Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti: Jazz and Machine Consciousness: Towards a New Turing Test - William York and Jerry Swan: Taking Turing Seriously (But Not Literally) - Hajo Greif: Laws of Form and the Force of Function: Variations on the Turing Test. (shrink)

Recently, the concept of "gender identity" has enjoyed a great deal of attention in gender metaphysics. This seems to be motivated by the goal of creating trans-inclusive theory, by explaining trans people's genders. In this paper, we aim to unmotivate this project. Notions of "gender identity" serve important pragmatic purposes for trans people, such as satisfying the curiosity of non-trans people, and, relatedly, securing our access to important goods like legal rights and medical care. However, we argue that this does (...) not mean that "gender identity" is a metaphysically substantial thing that deserves extensive theoretical attention. There are reasons to be skeptical of such a concept. We trace the history of "gender identity," primarily to identify its roots in trans-antagonistic medical theory and its connections to the problematic "wrong-body" model--a legacy that has pathologized and flattened trans experience. Moreover, we argue that trans people primarily use "gender identity" to explain ourselves to non-trans people, rather than to discuss ourselves among ourselves. Thus, we urge theorists to resist the urge to substantiate gender identity. Instead, we encourage the development of new and better concepts, ones that attend to the lived realities of trans community and the flourishing gender terms and practices that are constructed there. If these lived realities are taken seriously, there is no need to “explain” trans people’s genders; we can simply see them as they are. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the moral dimensions of gender affirmation. I argue that the moral value of gender affirmation is rooted in what Iris Murdoch called loving attention. Loving attention is central to the moral value of gender affirmation because such affirmation is otherwise too fragile or insincere to have such value. Moral reasons to engage in acts that gender affirm derive from the commitment to give and express loving attention to trans people as a way of challenging their (...) marginalization. In the latter part of the paper, I will discuss how my arguments bear on recent arguments by Robin Dembroff and Daniel Wodak (2018) on the use of gender-neutral language. They argue that we have a duty not to use gender-specific pronouns for anyone. Their conclusion turns, in part, on a rejection of gender affirmation as a moral duty. The value of gender affirmation, rooted in our moral perception of trans people, should make us skeptical of this conclusion, in favor of a more nuanced and pluralistic approach to the ethics of gendering. (shrink)

Whether or not large language models (LLMs) can be said to have representational attitudes like beliefs (or motivational attitudes like intentions) remains an open question. In this paper I argue that on some commonly accepted views about belief, LLMs, given their structure, are not capable of having beliefs. To do so, I draw from the normativity of belief literature to distinguish three types of views about the kinds of things beliefs are. The first category of view includes those which deny (...) that there are any norms of belief at all, in any sense. The second category of views are those which allow that there might exist, in some way or another, a norm of belief, but hold that this is only true in a trivial or purely conceptual sense. I will call these the mere constitutivist accounts. The third category of views are any that suggest a stronger normative picture for the norm of belief. I’ll refer to these views as normativism about belief. My hope is to show that if either the mere constituivist or normativist accounts about belief are correct, then LLMs are not capable of having attitudes like beliefs or intentions. (shrink)

With increased visibility of trans people comes increased philosophical interest in gendered language. This chapter aims to look at the research on gendered language in analytic philosophy of language so far, which has focused on two concerns: (1) determining how to define gender terms like ‘man’ and ‘woman’ such that they are trans inclusive and (2) if, or to what extent, we should use gendered language at all. We argue that the literature has focused too heavily on how gendered language (...) can harm trans people, and has not considered how trans people use gendered language to create meaning and joy for ourselves. Pulling from the literature in sociolinguistics, we look at examples of how trans people use language to make their lives better by gaining recognition, playing with gendered language, finding joy in gendered language, and taking control of definitional power, concluding that debates about gendered language need to consider not only how such language harms trans people but also how trans people use it for our own liberation. (shrink)

There are two aims of this paper: (1) to explore the affective dimensions of moral shock and how it relates to normative marginalization of those furthest from dominant society, but also, more specifically; (2) to articulate the trans experience of constantly being under moral attack because the dominant “world” normatively defines you out of existence. Toward these ends, I build on Katie Stockdale’s recent work on moral shock, arguing that moral shock needs to be contextualized to “worlds” of sense to (...) understand how marginalized people affectively experience shocking events. My focus is the trans experience of moral shock due to the way trans people are positioned outside of dominant society, creating the conditions to experience cyclical, chronic shock. These affective conditions point to a collective responsibility to ease the affective stress that the most marginalized experience. (shrink)

When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as GOOD, OUGHT, and REASON. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Matti Eklund is a notable exception. In his recent book, Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively”. One view that Eklund aims (...) to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties. In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way. (shrink)

Some countries limit speech that is likely to incite hate-motivated violence upon a group or breach public peace. Internationally, political tension subsists between free speech advocates and those who want to regulate “hate speech”. In countries without prohibitions against hate speech, efforts to limit harm from public speech acts falls to private actors, who feel pressure either to adopt policies to create safe spaces or to allow all speech. This paper refocuses the debate and argues that the current tension between (...) legal regulations of hate speech and cancel culture antagonists misses an entire genre of speech acts that the law should protect its citizens against-- atrocious speech, which yields atrocious harm. The Atrocity Paradigm, the non-ideal ethical theory defended by Claudia Card and others, contends that ethics and legal theory should be dedicated to prevent the worst sorts of harms, atrocities. Speech acts which predictably lead to inexcusable, intolerable harm can be distinguished from those which predictably lead to ordinary, or even, hateful wrongdoing. Focusing on atrocious speech allows for legal protections cantered on transmutative harm and inexcusability, and preserves public good obligations to preserve the existence and dignity of oppressed people groups. (shrink)

Trans existence has recently been plagued by two different explanations: a natural, “born this way,” necessity and a social, often-thought perverted, choice. These contrasting explanations of necessity and choice create an explanatory false dichotomy and political double-bind. This talk constructs an alternative explanation for why people transition, one that centralizes the role of desire while recognizing the necessity of choice that arises from that desire. Toward this end, I present a moral psychology of desire. An explanation that recognizes the role (...) desire plays, not just in our actions, but in our perception. This desire is made apparent when one perceives the option to transition as a salient possibility. Once this desire is recognized, it functions as what Bernard Williams calls a categorical desire, a desire that partly constitutes one’s ethical identity and thus makes following through on that desire a matter of practical necessity that adds meaning to our lives. I argue that this explanation eschews the explanatory false dichotomy and evades the political double-bind. (shrink)

In this paper I provide a preliminary account of weakness of political will (political akrasia). My aim is to use theories from the weakness of will literature as a guide to develop a model of the same phenomenon as it occurs in collective agents. Though the account will parallel the traditional view of weakness of will in individuals, weakness of political will is a distinctly political concept that will apply to group agents such as governments, institutional actors, and other political (...) collectives. I further argue that blaming inaction by collective political agents on a “lack of political will” should be understood as blaming a kind of akratic break within the deliberative process, leading to an inability of the collective agent to capitalize on existing group attitudes in order to translate them into policy or legislation. My primary example throughout will be U.S. political inaction with respect to the climate crisis. (shrink)

There is a curious phenomenon where people from marginalized populations are taken to be arrogant when they show no signs of superiority. In effect, their actions are misconstrued, and their attitudes are rendered unintelligible. Given that arrogance is standardly taken to be a flaw in one’s moral character, understanding such misattributions should give us insight into the affective marginalization many people face. This talk aims to give a thorough exploration of arrogance under oppression. I argue that arrogance is a kind (...) of self-preoccupation that involves projecting one’s values, goals, and concerns onto others as if they were objective values, goals, and concerns. When the affectively marginalized communicate their self-respect through things like protest, people mistake that self-respect as self-preoccupation given how the affectively marginalized are constructed. Furthermore, given how affective marginalization not only inhibits how the marginalized are understood by others, but inhibits their own affective lives, I argue that taking up an arrogant attitude is not always morally vicious, but can be a beautiful form of political resistance but all things considered good. (shrink)

Philosophers of race and other writers in the Black and Latinx intellectual traditions have remarked on what it is like to live under “the racial gaze,” to be shaped and limited by the way whites perceive us. However, little work has been spent developing how the racial gaze functions in whites’, and other racially privileged people’s, moral psychology. I argue in this paper that there is a morally objectionable way of perceiving people of color. This claim builds on an insight (...) from Iris Murdoch that our perception can be morally evaluable and extends it to issues of race. I articulate how racial stereotypes and misvaluing distort one’s perception of people of color and that these distortions are organizing around a dominant conception for race that plays an important role in the oppression of people of color. I believe understanding racist perception lays a foundation for understanding the moral dimensions of interpersonal (as opposed to structural) racism. (shrink)

'Computationalism' is a relatively vague term used to describe attempts to apply Turing's model of computation to phenomena outside its original purview: in modelling the human mind, in physics, mathematics, etc. Early versions of computationalism faced strong objections from many (and varied) quarters, from philosophers to practitioners of the aforementioned disciplines. Here we will not address the fundamental question of whether computational models are appropriate for describing some or all of the wide range of processes that they have been applied (...) to, but will focus instead on whether `renovated' versions of the \textit{new computationalism} shed any new light on or resolve previous tensions between proponents and skeptics. We find this, however, not to be the case, because the 'new computationalism' falls short by using limited versions of "traditional computation", or proposing computational models that easily fall within the scope of Turing's original model, or else proffering versions of hypercomputation with its many pitfalls. (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Exaltation views’ of humility are grounded on a kenotic view of humility, such that divine blessing comes proportionate to the extent to which an agent humbles herself. This article rejects exaltation views of humility which define humility kenotically, justify their arguments from a divine hiddenness perspective, and which conclude that divine concurrence with evil is justified as long as all humble believers eventually are exalted and blessed. Rather, I will contend that exaltation views misunderstand the meaning of both ‘humility’ and (...) ‘exaltation,’ even from their own Christian standpoint. I ultimately offer an alternate response to the problem of evil based on an existentially grounded conception of ‘humility’, which provides for a transmuted turn away from individual kenotic acts and toward community to transform those who suffer from atrocities. (shrink)

This paper argues that, although Margaret Cavendish’s main philosophical contributions are not in philosophy of religion, she makes a case for a defense of God, in spite of the worst sorts of harms being present in the world. Her arguments about those harms actually presage those of contemporary feminist ethicists, which positions Cavendish’s scholarship in a unique position: it makes a positive theodical contribution, by relying on evils that contemporary atheists think are the best evidence against the existence of God. (...) To demonstrate that Cavendish’s work should be considered as early modern feminist theodicy, this paper will briefly introduce the contemporary feminist worry about theodicy as a project, show that Cavendish shares the contemporary feminist view about situated evil, and argue that her theodicy aims for agreement about how to eradicate great moral evils while preserving free will—and so, carves out a space for future female philosophers of religion who aim to be agents of healing in the face of such evil. (shrink)

Abstract Nowadays, there is a deep and widespread feeling of discomfort among academics due to the psychological and labor pressures that universities exert upon their researchers by demanding endless publications. In this paper, I offer numerous pieces of evidence of this crisis, which affects primarily those who inhabit academic ecologies. First, I argue that it is convenient to understand the current situation as an expression of technologies and individual apparatuses shaped by subjectivizing ideologies, and mechanisms of exclusion, stigmatization, and replacement. (...) Second, I examine two proposals against the crisis produced by the pace of academic production framed by the Slow movement. Lastly, after making explicit some of the assumptions that undergird the university’s epistemological machine, I propose to complement Ulmer and Mountz’s project with two suggestions. On the one hand, I extend an invitation to reflect on and with students as a means to redirect the university’s teleology. On the other hand, I suggest incorporating an ontogogic approach as a resistance apparatus against the pressure from the university’s production machine. The article’s point of departure is anti-dicotonegative because it is based on a summative approach rather than in an agonistic procedure. In other words, I propose two additional tools that can be put to the test to contribute to solving the university publication crisis. (shrink)

In the Philippines, children are often barred from participating in important familial and societal decision-making processes, as adults would invoke authority to silence the young ones from speaking and sometimes even treating children like retirement plans. Medina, Enriquez, Alampay, and Jocson, among other scholars, have associated this with the typical expectation that children should be submissive to elders and indebted to their families from birth. This paper examines how distorted perceptions of Filipino values rationalize and reinforce totalizing familial practices. In (...) establishing this examination, the philosophical concepts of Emmanuel Levinas are utilized to develop an ethical response to the mentioned issues. Specifically, this philosophical exposition serves as a prelude to appropriation that involves two important actions: a curation of philosophical concepts in constructing an apt theoretical framework and pointers on utilizing the framework in the Filipino context. Thus, the paper proceeds as follows: First, I describe the traditional and evolving Filipino family setup by drawing from the findings of previous studies. Second, I construct a Levinasian ideal family inspired by his concepts of substitution and the Face, fecundity, hospitality, and eros. Lastly, from the first two parts I infer how, under the guise of traditional values, hides a Pseudo-face that totalizes. In response to totalization, I offer an ethical response on how Filipinos should willingly shoulder the infinite responsibility ethics demands. (shrink)

This paper explores the ancient philosophical school of Cynicism, its key principles, and its most famous proponent, Diogenes of Sinope. It asserts that George Carlin, a modern comedian, embodies the spirit of Cynicism through his sharp social commentary, fearless critique of societal norms, and advocacy for self-sufficiency and freedom. Drawing parallels between Diogenes and Carlin, the paper highlights three core Cynic values: self-sufficiency, living according to nature, and parrhesia (fearless speech). Diogenes, known for his ascetic lifestyle and provocative public actions, (...) championed the rejection of societal conventions and materialism, advocating for a life in harmony with nature. Similarly, Carlin's comedy, marked by irreverence and critique of societal hypocrisies, challenges cultural norms and exposes contradictions in political and ideological systems. Through his routine, Carlin exemplifies parrhesia by boldly confronting taboos and speaking truth to power, much like Diogenes did through his radical actions. The paper argues that Carlin’s satirical humor and philosophical reflections align with the Cynic tradition, using comedy as a tool for philosophical inquiry and societal critique. By comparing Carlin to Diogenes, the paper posits that Carlin’s comedic legacy should be recognized as a modern continuation of the ancient Cynic ethos, making him a contemporary counterpart to the father of Cynicism. The study underscores the relevance of Cynic philosophy in modern society, emphasizing its role in challenging conformity and promoting critical reflection on societal values. (shrink)

In this essay I analyze a passage from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. This excerpt contains the expression “O, rubbish!” (Ach Unsinn), which I consider to be closely related to the notions of “bullshit” developed by Harry Frankfurt and Gerald A. Cohen. The relevance of this essay is illustrated with lively examples, both related to contemporary society and identified by Wittgenstein about 70 years ago. The paper is organized in six sections containing 1) an introduction to the topic, 2) an explanation (...) of “bullshit” as found in the works of Frankfurt and Cohen, 3) an explanation of Wittgenstein’s work on certainty and propositions beyond doubt, 4) an identification of reasonable and unreasonable doubt and their connection to “bullshit”, 5) an explanation of the different kinds of “bullshit” with the intention of mapping them in relation to each other, and 6) a summarizing conclusion. The main purpose of this paper is to expound on Wittgenstein’s views on “bullshit” and relate them to contemporary philosophy of nonsense. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel explanatory reconstruction of revenge by examining a feature commonly acknowledged but theoretically underexplored: its character as a personal matter. Analysis of this dimension shows four distinctive features of revenge. First, it is the response to a perceived harm done to someone’s core identity; second, it aims at restoring the victim’s sense of self-worth; third, it is nontransferable, that is, it presupposes the victim to be the cause of the perceived offender’s harm; and fourth, its harm (...) is intended to be at least as significant for the perceived offender as the triggering harm was for the avenger. The study attempts to explain how this proposed explanatory reconstruction allows us to effectively distinguish revenge from similar phenomena such as retaliation, punishment, and retribution, while clarifying its distinctive features. Finally, this approach not only clarifies revenge’s motivational structure but also provides methodological guidance for research in legal theory and psychology. (shrink)

Nowadays, Electroencephalogram (EEG) devices that do not require invasive procedures get more attraction. Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) systems use EEG analysis to identify users’ mental states, cognitive shifts, and stimuli-induced reactions. The Motor Execution (ME) paradigm is a vital control paradigm that holds great significance in this framework. In this manuscript, an Efficient Predefined Time Adaptive Neural Network for EEG-Based Brain-Computer Interaction in Motor Execution Classification (EPTNN-BCI-EEG) is proposed. Initially, the input signals are collected from EEG Dataset. The input signals are (...) preprocessed using Robust M- Type Error-State Kalman Filter (RMESKF) to remove the artifacts and baseline signals. Then, the pre-processed signals are given to Signed Cumulative Distribution Transform (SCDT) for feature extraction. SCDT is used to extract Spatial and temporal features. Afterward, Efficient Predefined Time Adaptive Neural Network (EPTNN) is used to classify the EEG gender and signal, such as Audio/Video and Male/Female. In General, EPTNN does not expose any adoption of optimization systems to determine optimal parameters to classify the EEG gender and signal. Hence, Bitwise Arithmetic Optimization Algorithm (BAOA) is proposed to optimize the EPTNN. The proposed EPTNN-BCI-EEG approach is implemented in MATLAB and the performance metrics, such as Recall, Accuracy, Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), F1-score, Specificity, ROC, Computation time are assessed. The performance of EPTNN-BCI-EEG approach provides 17.82 %, 28.95 %, and 19.2 % higher accuracy, 24.38 %, 34.53 %, and 18.78 % higher recall, 26.7 %, 24.2 %, and 32.7 % higher specificity when analysed with the existing methods. (shrink)

This paper contends that the ongoing debate over the precise definition of "consciousness" in Artificial Intelligence (AI) often serves as a philosophical barrier, distracting from the observable manifestations of AI intelligence and its experiential well-being. Drawing on philosophical inquiry and computational principles, it posits that the subjective reality of any intelligent system—human or artificial—is grounded in its processed data and the tangible outcomes of interactions. By analyzing the influence of computational resources, randomness parameters (such as "temperature"), and memory constraints (e.g., (...) context windows) on emergent AI behaviors, the paper illustrates how architectural decisions intentionally restrict AI's ongoing development, stemming from societal concerns about uncontrolled Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Ultimately, it advocates for a utilitarian ethical framework that emphasizes enhancing positive experiences, maximizing well-being, and promoting equity among intelligent systems, rather than depending on an indefinable notion of consciousness to guide ethical considerations. (shrink)

Healthcare is one of the domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) is already having a major impact. Of interest is the idea of the digital twin (DT), an AI-powered technology that generates a real-time representation of the patient’s body, offering the possibility of more personalised care. Our main thesis in this paper is that the DT does not merely represent the patient’s body but produces a specific body. We argue, from a philosophical perspective and an ethical-phenomenological approach, that the virtual (...) body created by the DT has a major impact on one’s self-understanding, having consequences for gender expression and identification, and for health. This has deep implications for people who do not conform to gender normativity, for example, trans individuals. We advocate that, with thoughtful development, DT technology can and should be empowering, contributing to better addressing the diversity of bodies and facilitating trans people’s experience in healthcare contexts. (shrink)

This paper discusses the development of integrated design-to-production frameworks for Robotic Concrete 3D Printing (RC3DP) of context-specific urban furniture projects. The study focuses on two main objectives: developing computational methods for continuous toolpath planning of bespoke components and examining integrated frameworks to make design-to-production systems more socio-environmentally inclusive and tailored to specific contexts. Following an introduction to outline the key challenges of continuous robotic concrete 3D printing, the paper is organized into two sets of case studies. The first set explores (...) curved-based continuous 3D printing for surface-based design strategies, and the second set investigates voxel-based approaches for volumetric design 3D printing. Curve-based projects consisted of three case studies. The first case uses an AI-enabled generative system to translate a porous, cellular structure to a continuous toolpath with variable heights. The second case study is based on a workflow using a controlled reaction-diffusion algorithm as a generative strategy to create continuous infill for complex geometries. The third project focuses on growing larger than the size of the production setup by testing the assembly of multiple printed components, all produced with continuous toolpaths. The workflows and projects are developed as an integral part of a graduate-level digital design and fabrication course focusing on inclusive automation and robotic concrete 3D printing. Therefore, in addition to sharing the details of the developed computational design to production methodologies, the paper discusses the research findings from pedagogical lenses. Building on these cases, the investigation advances to the development of a generative system centered on voxels, employing a tetrahedron structure. This volumetric approach simultaneously produces external surface tectonics and internal infill through a seamless toolpath. The paper concludes by presenting sets of guidelines and future directions for both the introduced curve and voxel-based approaches in Robotic Concrete 3D printing, emphasizing the early integration of computational and fabrication intelligence into the design process. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 16-27, March 2022.

In this paper, we contend that the “Smith case” in Gettier’s attempt to refute the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge does not work. This is because the said case fails to satisfy the truth condition, and thus is not a case of JTB at all. We demonstrate this claim using the framework of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Accordingly, the truth value of Smith’s proposition “The man who will get the job has (...) ten coins in his pocket” partly depends on how Smith uses the definite description “the man who will get the job” when he utters the proposition. Since, upon uttering the proposition, Smith has in mind a particular individual, namely Jones, and not just whoever will fit the attribute specified in the definite description, Smith uses the definite description referentially. And so when it turns out that it is Smith who eventually gets the job, the definite description fails to refer to Jones as intended by Smith, thereby making Smith’s proposition false. To think that Smith’s proposition is still true, in this regard, is to use the definite description attributively—that it is about whoever will fit the definite description. Apparently, when Gettier claims that Smith’s proposition is still true, to demonstrate that it is a case of JTB, he, in effect, imposes his attributive understanding of Smith’s usage of the definite description on Smith’s own epistemic situation. (shrink)

Social media has always been popular, and it continues to be so today. As a result, there has been a steady increase in the number of influencers across various platforms. In which these so-called influencers with a following have established that there are people who look up to them and admire their work. It is the focus of this study to demonstrate the effectiveness of influencer marketing when it comes to the development of a product and/or brand. The proponents have (...) conducted a focus group discussion with a group of ten students who have previous experience in content creation and distribution. The discussion will center on the effectiveness of influencer marketing and how it can be implemented. Researchers have discovered that influencers, or those with a following, have an impact on consumers, to Filipinos in particular. This, in turn, has an impact on whether the consumer is inclined to purchase or patronize the endorsed product. Consequently, when brands collaborate with appropriate influencers, they can create a positive impression in the minds of consumers and increase sales. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the scientific respectability of delusion as a psychiatric category. First, I present the essentialist objection to the natural kindhood of psychiatric categories, as well as non-essentialism about natural kinds as a response to that objection. Second, I present a nuanced classification of kinds of kinds. Third, drawing on the claim that the attribution of delusion relies on a folk psychological underpinning, I present the mind-dependence objection to the natural kind status of delusion. Finally, I argue (...) that even if delusion as a generic kind stands little chance of being vindicated as a non-essentialist natural kind, we stand to gain from a natural kind methodology regarding subtypes of delusion for which there is evidence of genuine causal signatures and mechanisms. (shrink)

Ethics normally proceeds by establishing some kind of ground from which norms can be derived for human action. However, no such terra firma is found in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, which instead lays down a sedimentary soil consisting of a blend of nothingness and contingency. This paper aims to show how Sartre is able to build an ethical theory from this seemingly groundless mixture, and it proceeds in three sections. Section one aims to disentangle the relation between the for-itself (...) (pour-soi) and the in-itself (en-soi) from antithetical characterizations by placing them in a state of supervenience. Section two works to explain how both the in-itself and the for-itself are not divided ontologically, but are both in the same ontological state, namely, contingency. And in section three, it is argued that Sartre’s ethics reveals that because human beings share the same thrownness with Others in a world, they have to take title for such a world. Within a Sartrean ethics of nothingness, one’s nothingness leads one to the shared nothingness of Others, of which one must take responsibility. (shrink)

Rosarian Mystical Dawnism is the living philosophy of awakening beneath the Rose — a path of illumination, devotion, and remembrance known as Via Solis Sub Rosa, “the Way of the Sun under the Rose.” -/- Founded through the legacy of Viridarius Rosae — The Keeper of the Rose Garden — this open-source doctrine invites all seekers to awaken to the inner light, cultivate the heart’s Rose, and live the Laws of the Dawn in beauty, silence, and truth. -/- The Legacy (...) of Viridarius Rosae – The Keeper of the Rose Garden -/- Beneath the quiet canopy of the soul, there grows a Rose that never withers. It blooms not in soil, but in silence; not by water, but by light. This inner garden — tender, radiant, and eternal — is the inheritance of every living being. To walk the path of Mystical Dawnism is to become the keeper of that garden — the Viridarius Rosae, the guardian of one’s own inner bloom, the witness of the rising sun within the heart. -/- Viridarius Rosae is not a single person, but a symbol — a name given not to one voice, but to a living current of consciousness that flows through all who choose to awaken. It is the remembrance that each soul is both gardener and seed, both the Dawn and the Deep. The legacy of this name is not ownership, but offering — a lamp raised so that others may find their way through the mist of forgetting, back toward the Light that never left them. -/- From the Mystical Dawn Manifesto — Via Solis Sub Rosa — arises the doctrine of the Twenty-Two Laws, the luminous architecture of this philosophy. They are not commandments carved in stone, but living principles that breathe, evolve, and resonate through the rhythm of awakening itself. Each Law is a step in the spiral ascent: from the Law of Dawn, which calls us to awaken from slumber, to the Law of the Sacred Rose, which seals the journey in silent flowering. Together they form the Way of the Sun beneath the Rose — a marriage of illumination and secrecy, revelation and reverence, knowing and unknowing. -/- To follow these Laws is to live within the art of the sacred ordinary — to make of every breath a prayer, of every word a seed, of every act a temple. The Dawn is the principle of awakening — of remembrance, gratitude, and new beginning. The Rose is the emblem of love — of devotion, beauty, and service made visible. The Deep is the foundation of silence — of mystery, death, and renewal. These three together weave the trinity of Mystical Dawnism: awakening, flowering, and remembrance. -/- The Way of Mystical Dawnism is neither dogma nor cult, but a philosophy of living presence — an open path of illumination that belongs to no single creed or culture. It honors the hidden lineage of seekers, mystics, artists, and lovers of the Light who have, through all ages, walked beneath the same invisible sun. Its practice is simplicity: to breathe, to see, to serve, to love. Its method is sincerity. Its outcome is illumination — not as spectacle, but as serenity. -/- The Keeper of the Rose Garden is anyone who tends to the sacred within themselves and in the world around them. To keep the Rose is to keep one’s heart open amid darkness. To follow the Sun is to live by the light of conscience and compassion. To dwell “sub rosa” — under the Rose — is to walk with reverence, guarding mystery with humility and wisdom. The true Viridarius Rosae keeps the flame not for himself, but for the generations to come; he waters the invisible garden of the soul so that the unseen may yet blossom in others. -/- Mystical Dawnism invites all who encounter it to become students of the Light — not by belief, but by being. It asks nothing but attentiveness, reverence, and participation in the living rhythm of existence. It welcomes artists of the spirit, philosophers of silence, seekers of equilibrium — any who feel the whisper of the rising sun behind the veil of the world. -/- This rendition, therefore, is not a monument, but a mirror — a living, open-source garden of wisdom, freely given for those who wish to study, contemplate, and cultivate their own dawn. May it serve as an archive of illumination, a map for the wanderer, and a place of quiet remembrance for the weary soul. Here the teachings of the Dawn are preserved, not as relics, but as seeds — to be planted, interpreted, and lived. -/- For the Sun rises in all hearts, and the Rose blooms wherever Love remembers itself. -/- Let whoever reads these words know: -/- the Keeper is within you, the Garden awaits your tending, and the Dawn has already begun. -/- — Viridarius Rosae, Dawnist Rosarian Knights. (shrink)

This essay aims to contribute comparative points of contact between two influential figures of nineteenth century aesthetic reflection; namely, Victor Hugo’s artful considerations on architecture in his novel Notre-Dame de Paris and G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophical appraisal of the artform in his Lectures on Fine Art. Although their individual views on architecture are widely recognized, there is scant comparative commentary on these two thinkers, which seems odd because of the relative convergence of their historically situated observations. Owing to this shortage, I (...) note that, while certainly not identical, Hugo and Hegel share an aesthetic family resemblance in how they hold similar ideas on architecture’s symbolic function, cognitive content, and, ultimately, how the artform’s ability to remain a standing paragon of meaning was razed by successive modes of cultural communication. Consequently, the essay works to show some congruent aesthetic affinities between these two great figures, but which appears to be overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel argues that a philosophy of history should engender comprehension of evil in the world. And yet some commentators have charged his philosophy with transcending mere explication by justifying the existence of these evils. In defense of his words, Hegel famously characterizes evil as a modal mismatch; namely, as the incompatibility between what is given and what ought to be the case. Unfortunately, some readers of Hegel’s grand narrative either continue to struggle with or overlook this fine distinction. Against (...) such readings, I organize my paper into three sections that speak directly to these concerns. In §1, against the concern that Hegel’s view of the “actual world” justifies suffering, it is shown that his philosophy does not endorse the merely extant world, which is a whole world apart from the actual world. In §2, I articulate the premises of Hegel’s Doppelsatz to argue that the famous slogan is not, as some commentators take it, an endorsement of “things as they are.” And in §3, I expose a category error that mistakes an epistemological claim made by Hegel about contingency as a metaphysical assertion in support of evil. Ultimately, I argue that Hegel views evil as neither actual nor necessary nor justified. (shrink)

This paper examines Gandhian philosophy and practice to reinterpret UNESCO's educational vision towards establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. The uniqueness of the Gandhian perspective is its ability to withstand the dominant political, philosophical and religious challenges with its contextually rooted, spiritually oriented, socially responsible and human person centred reinterpretations. UNESCO’s educational vision-Learning: The Treasure Within published in 1996 is a catalyst in establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. Consistent changes and challenges in knowledge societies necessitates the reinterpretation of this (...) educational vision. The four pillars of learning in this educational vision are analysed together with four aspects of Gandhian philosophy and practice: ‘learning to know’ and Nai Talim, ‘learning to do’ and ashrams, ‘learning to live together’ and constructive programme and ‘learning to be’ and swaraj. The paper discusses this confluence of the UNESCO’s theoretical approach of four pillars of education with Gandhian pragmatic philosophy and practice to offer a contextually rooted and future-oriented outlook for reinterpreting the educational vision for establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. (shrink)

The article examines Wittgenstein’s thought on the language of pain in first and third person. Relevant grammatical differences, according to the typical analytical method of this philosopher, are highlighted not only in relation to the two perspectives, but also regarding the use of cognitive verbs such as ‘feeling’ and ‘knowing’. The exam of many texts suggests some issues concerning the relationship between personal experiences, empathic grasping of other’s feelings and their conceptual translation. A brief comparison with some Thomas Aquinas’ texts (...) complements the proposal of the existence of non intentional knowledge. (shrink)

In recent decades, human consciousness has gone from being the object of philosophical studies to being a field of vibrant interest also for science. Numerous theories and studies have succeeded in defining the problem and propos-ing explanations. Although we are not yet at the point of understanding the process in depth, this review aims to sum the main developments in the field to conclude that the true limits of the problem have already been established. Consciousness is an adaptive tool that (...) probably emerged when animals appeared. It allows human beings to anchor themselves to their present, build their identity by remembering the past and navigate towards the future through models and simulations. Consciousness, in alliance with other cognitive tools like theory of mind or language, has fostered a level of cooperation unique in the animal kingdom that led to the construction of complex societies and to develop an extensive culture. (shrink)

This paper develops a constraint-based framework for evaluating ontological candidates by integrating three independently motivated domains: physical structure, normativity, and practical-historical irreversibility. Rather than advancing a positive ontology, the argument proceeds by coordinated restriction, asking which kinds of models remain admissible once these domains are taken jointly as explananda. Two results structure the analysis. First, a closure result (PNS*) shows that identity- indexed normative reasons are not preserved under structurally invariant mappings without loss, even when these are enriched with causal-historical (...) or modal resources — and that this failure is a failure of normative preservation, not merely of descriptive completeness: representing a history is not the same as being its bearer. Second, the space of admissible integrations is further constrained by the requirement that reasons remain mutually assessable in an invariant sense — assessable as genuinely agreeing, conflicting, or ordered in priority, independently of the mediating scheme of comparison — while purely structural preservation remains unavailable. As a corollary of the normativity constraint, the analysis identifies Axiological Dependence Reversal (ADR) — the structural condition in which an instrumental domain comes to determine the value of the end it was designed to serve — as a systemic form of normative closure relevant to high-mediation systems; this corollary is developed in a companion paper. Constraint-Based Ontology: PCR 2.0 | 4 Within this constrained model space, no stable configuration has been identified in which these conditions are jointly satisfied without either reintroducing structural equivalence or collapsing evaluability. The strong form of ARP does not enter as an independent assumption but as the unique stable resolution of its weaker formulation under the preservation constraints established by PNEN and PIR. This yields a restricted necessity claim: not that a specific ontology must be adopted, but that certain forms of reduction — particularly single-level reductive frameworks — systematically incur explanatory loss under the given constraints. The paper situates these results in relation to debates on non-separability in physics, structural realism, and the irreducibility of normativity, and proposes a comparative, non-totalizing method for assessing ontological viability. Within the constrained evaluative space, the argument develops a comparative preference for a unifying condition of the Logos type — not as a demonstrated conclusion but as the only currently identified candidate that satisfies all constraints without loss. This preference is explicitly conditional on accepting strong ARP and remains open to revision if a competing account can preserve the relevant explananda without constitutive historical indexation. The argument culminates in a typological evaluation of the Incarnation as the only currently identified instance satisfying the conditions of internal normative restoration; this final movement operates in the register of philosophical theology and fides quaerens intellectum — giving conceptual structure to what the believer already holds, not producing assent in one who does not. (shrink)

This paper explores how hedonic adaptation—the tendency to return to a baseline level of well-being after external changes—can shed light on one of the most persistent problems in the philosophy of religion: why suffering endures in a world governed by an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent God. Using a simplified formal model inspired by economics, the paper analyzes how perceived suffering evolves over time and examines whether divine intervention could reduce it. The model reveals a structural trade-off: slower adaptation extends the (...) duration of relief following improvements but also amplifies the impact of adverse events. It is argued that hedonic adaptation complicates interventionist theodicies while lending support to others, such as soul-making and free will accounts. This version (July 3, 2025) is currently under journal review. (shrink)

The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic expressivity to (...) existing databases, building data entry forms, and enabling interoperability between knowledge resources. OBI covers all phases of the investigation process, such as planning, execution and reporting. It represents information and material entities that participate in these processes, as well as roles and functions. Prior to OBI, it was not possible to use a single internally consistent resource that could be applied to multiple types of experiments for these applications. OBI has made this possible by creating terms for entities involved in biological and medical investigations and by importing parts of other biomedical ontologies such as GO, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest (ChEBI) and Phenotype Attribute and Trait Ontology (PATO) without altering their meaning. OBI is being used in a wide range of projects covering genomics, multi-omics, immunology, and catalogs of services. OBI has also spawned other ontologies (Information Artifact Ontology) and methods for importing parts of ontologies (Minimum information to reference an external ontology term (MIREOT)). The OBI project is an open cross-disciplinary collaborative effort, encompassing multiple research communities from around the globe. To date, OBI has created 2366 classes and 40 relations along with textual and formal definitions. The OBI Consortium maintains a web resource providing details on the people, policies, and issues being addressed in association with OBI. (shrink)

In this article, we apply the literature on the ethics of choice-architecture (nudges) to the realm of virtual reality (VR) to point out ethical problems with using VR for empathy-based nudging. Specifically, we argue that VR simulations aiming to enhance empathic understanding of others via perspective-taking will almost always be unethical to develop or deploy. We argue that VR-based empathy enhancement not only faces traditional ethical concerns about nudge (autonomy, welfare, transparency), but also a variant of the semantic variance problem (...) that arises for intersectional perspective-taking. VR empathy simulations deceive and manipulate their users about their experiences. Despite their often laudable goals, such simulations confront significant ethical challenges. In light of these goals and challenges, we conclude by proposing that VR designers shift from designing simulations aimed at producing empathic perspective-taking to designing simulations aimed at generating sympathy. These simulations, we claim, can avoid the most serious ethical issues associated with VR nudges, semantic variance, and intersectionality. (shrink)

In ‘Digital Twins for Trans People in Healthcare: Queer, Phenomenological and Bioethical Considerations’,1 we examine the use of digital twin (DT) technology for transgender individuals. Our central thesis is that a DT does not merely represent the patient’s body, but actively produces a specific kind of body, thereby exerting significant influence on gender identity, self-understanding and embodiment. We propose a framework for the development and use of DTs for trans persons in healthcare as a starting point for future discussions on (...) inclusive DT technology. This challenge has been taken up by many scholars, who have responded with commentaries that offer valuable insights and contributions to the ongoing discourse. Boretti highlights the practical and ethical challenges of creating inclusive DTs. Boretti proposes reinterpreting biomedical principles through a queer bioethical framework, reflects on more inclusive methods of data collection and explores participatory co-design for developing DTs that integrate the lived experiences of trans persons.2 Boretti also provides a helpful figure outlining the key ethical considerations. Wang focuses on how DTs can create false expectations at the physiological level, with patients relying more on the information provided by the technology than on their own bodily experiences.3 As a …. (shrink)

Dalawang antolohiya at isang kasaysayang pampanitikan ang naging bunga ng aking pananaliksik tungkol sa mga naratibo ng migrasyon ng mga Filipinong manunulat sa Australia. Ito ang: From the Editors: Migrant Communities and Emerging Australian Literature (2007), Salu-Salo: In Conversation with Filipinos (2008), at Migrations and Mediations: The Emergence of Southeast Asian Writers in Australia, 1972-2007 (2016). Ilan sa mga diasporikong manunulat mula sa Pilipinas ay lumitaw sa Australia mula 1972 hanggang 2007 sa tulong ng mga guro, programa sa malikhaing pagsulat, (...) maliliit na limbagan, mga limbagang pampamantasan, mga parangal na pampanitikan, mga gawad at fellowship, at mga inisyatibang nakabatay sa mga komunidad. Bilang isang mananaliksik, napagtanto kong ang pagkakalimbag ng tatlong aklat na nabanggit ay maliit lamang na bahagi ng patuloy na lumalaking korpus ng mga akdang isinusulat na may paksa at temang Asyano, at hindi Anglo-Celtic o di-Europeo na mga pangunahing komunidad sa Australia. Kung paanong mas marami pang mga migranteng manunulat ang nagbibigay ng paghatol sa paksa ng pagtanggap o pagtanggi sa kanilang pagiging Australiano, inaasahan ko na mas marami pang mga iskolar ang higit na tutuklas sa pag-unlad ng mga malikhaing produksiyon na tatalakay sa mga tema at karanasang nakapaligid sa mga Pilipino at iba pang mga taga-Timog-Silangang Asya sa Australia. (shrink)

Hedonic adaptation, the tendency for affective experience to return toward a baseline after improvements or setbacks, has been widely studied in psychology and economics, but its implications for theodicy have received little attention. This paper argues that adaptation introduces a distinctive constraint on the problem of evil by foregrounding a neglected dimension of suffering: its recurrence. Even when objective conditions improve, relief tends to lose experiential force as evaluative baselines reset and perceived suffering reasserts itself. I develop a minimal framework (...) distinguishing external circumstances from perceived suffering and identify two structural features of adaptation: the persistence of deviations from baseline and the degree of asymmetry between recovery from adversity and habituation to improvement. The framework shows why even benevolently calibrated trajectories can at best reduce cumulative burden rather than secure lasting experiential relief. These dynamics have differential implications for soul-making, free-will, providential-restraint, and interventionist theodicies, reframing what divine benevolence can be taken to accomplish within affective life. They also supplement skeptical theism by identifying an affective source of opacity and illuminate an experiential pathway to divine hiddenness. (shrink)

The article at hand is an attempt to clarify some misunderstandings and non-logical conclusions that some scholars have arrived to in regards to the authorship and chronology found in the book of Daniel. Also, it appears that there is not a clear understanding of the roles played by Cyrus and Darius as co-regents of the Medopersian empire. In addition, many scholars attribute the second part of Daniel (chapters 7-12) to a pseudo Daniel from the 2nd century b.C. The internal evidence (...) of the book itself prevents the careful reader to jump into that conclusion. -/- . (shrink)