Logic, Language and Reality in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy
Abstract
The early 20th century philosophy withstood what is known as “linguistic turn”, a concept espoused by Gustav Bergmann in his review of Peter’s Strawson’s Individuals in 1960, under the name of analytic philosophy. This turn was quite panoramic, fastening on all aspects of language such as the nature of language, the nature of meaning, the nature of reference, semantic theory, linguistic phenomena, varieties of speech act, the epistemology and metaphysics of language, not forgetting the theory of truth, the relation between language and reality, and must especially the logical analysis of this one. This turn greatly captured the interest of a huge number of philosophers, logicians and mathematicians amongst which the Austrian Philosopher and Logician Ludwig Wittgenstein. The question of the relationship between language and reality is one of his fundamental concerns. Language to him is essentially descriptive, isomorphic to the world. In fact, it is the ultimate reality. This work therefore seeks to examine the bond that exists between these notions. With that being said, the Wittgensteinian conception of language as correlative to reality, is it perfectly consistent when we know that language has a dimension other than reality?