Abstract

This paper is a critical analysis of transcendental naïve realism (TRN), a metatheory of perception proposed by Allen, and inspired by the works of Merleau-Ponty and P.F. Strawson. TRN postulates granting naïve realism a special status amongst philosophical theories of perception on the basis of a transcendental argument that purports to render naïve realism unfalsifiable. Perhaps this conception manages to identify a so far unacknowledged reason why some philosophers regard naïve realism as the best theory of perception. But if TRN is supposed to support naïve realism in the debate with competing theories of perception, it is a counterproductive enterprise. For it creates an impression that the belief in naïve realism has its source in wishful thinking. That impression is mistaken, as Allen’s transcendental argument is neither the only nor the best account of naïve realism’s motivations.